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Abstract 
Harms produced by nuclear energy include the accident risks of population 
displacement, deaths, cancers, genetic, teratogenetic (affecting embryo and 
foetus) and psycho-social effects; increased radiation exposure to workers, 
locals and future generations from nuclear plants, uranium mines and waste 
storage facilities; thermal and toxic tailings pollution from nuclear plants and 
uranium mines; and other unknown long-term effects of increasing levels of 
background radiation. Historically, most greens have opposed nuclear energy 
alongside nuclear weapons. Recently, however, significant green spokespeople 
have combined with industry and governments in emphasising the need for 
nuclear energy in response to climate change. Based upon my experiences in 
the struggle against the Hinkley C nuclear power plant in Somerset, UK, this 
thesis contests the dominant framings of the debate. I suggest that arguments 
for nuclear energy are made possible by reductive understandings of the issue 
making it difficult to apprehend the significance of harms reinforced by nuclear 
energy. Taking an ecological approach I show how dominant discourses 
presuppose a hierarchical separation of science/politics, reinforced by and 
reinforcing the separation of nature/culture. These hierarchical separations 
depoliticise and naturalise harms produced by both nuclear energy and 
dominant forms of social organisation. As a result, these harms are difficult to 
communicate and contest as relevant to the discussion of our common futures. 
In this thesis I argue that we might more effectively convey the significance of 
these harms if we articulate them as injustices. Building upon the theory and 
practice of justice and liberation struggles I develop a heuristic framework for 
articulating injustices based around three intersecting images of politics as 
distribution, recognition and representation. I suggest articulating injustices of 
nuclear energy as i) the deprivation of basic necessities due to unequal 
distributions of burdens as well as goods; ii) the disrespect for ecological 
integrity due to desire for control of inevitable unpredictability in interaction; and 
iii) the denial of multiple authorities through monopolisation of rational speech 
and action and disengaged forms of knowledge production. Expressing harms 
of nuclear energy by way of this three-fold articulation of injustices politicises 
nuclear energy, climate change, and the dominant forms of social organisation, 
opening these up to political contestation to more effectively take ‘all affected’ 
into account before we reconsider how we might live together. 
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Preface 
 
As a child in Wales, growing up by a stream and the river Severn, with goats 
and chickens and many alder trees (but next to a very fast and busy trunk road), 
with a green German mother, and ‘red-with-green spots’ father, I developed a 
sensitivity to ecological and social justice problems. As a teen I worked on a pig 
farm. Increasingly I wanted to experience life in the city. Later, a fair bit into my 
twenties, I began to think about translating my ‘socio-ecological’ sensitivity into 
other aspects of my life. I was working as a care assistant in an old peoples’ 
home while studying for my masters in International Relations, and this provided 
another backdrop to my politicisation as I began to discover the conceptual 
tools available in critical theoretical traditions, for both social (including feminist 
understandings of intersectionality) and environmental or ecological justice, and 
I slowly began to find language to express those sensitivities. 
 Encouraged to do a PhD, although also gently chided by my masters’ 
dissertation supervisor that I would never manage it if I did not have confidence 
in my own voice, my first proposal proclaimed that it would study how British 
and German environmental movements engaged with issues of social justice. 
However, this did not quite feel right. I was determined to explore the 
intersections between ecological damage and social injustice. Ecofeminism was 
often disparaged and neglected due to ‘essentialism’ but I disagreed with its 
critics; it gave voice to vital connections which were not addressed elsewhere. I 
did not find my focus until I had become more involved in the green movement, 
with Climate Camp, and at the COP15 protests and World Peoples’ Summit on 
Climate Change in Copenhagen, Earth First! gatherings, and the particularly 
local struggle against Hinkley C, in Somerset. As I became more actively 
involved in the latter I suddenly had to explain and defend my position to some 
sceptical friends and family, including many passionate and actively involved 
greens. I also spoke to random strangers on train journeys, at protests and 
meetings and the general public in the street when holding a weekly stall to 
gather signatures for petitions and raise local awareness.  
And yet, for all of my study and my growing knowledge of the issue, I 
found that in too many cases I could not speak from my heart about this 
problem of nuclear energy, I could not articulate what I felt to be the underlying 
concerns. I had to learn to repeat the facts and figures of a reductive science 
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and economics, and while this was important and useful, I felt that by only doing 
this I was betraying something else that was important. The problem was 
incredibly complex and I could empathise with those green friends who had 
decided that nuclear energy was perhaps a ‘least-worst’ option. However, I 
knew that my intuitions about the injustices it would perpetuate, to both humans 
and nonhuman nature, were about more than simply ‘naïve and wishful 
emotions,’ or ‘ingrained political ideology,’ or an ‘inability to get my head around 
the facts and figures,’ and they were not idealist, but realist in a way which does 
not shy away from the capacity of each and every one of us to do harm. This 
was an anarchist and ecofeminist awareness of the inherent politics of life, but it 
was difficult to convey without being pigeonholed and dismissed. And so this 
thesis became about finding the language to express and articulate injustices of 
nuclear energy. I have tried to find a way of communicating the harms of 
nuclear energy and much of contemporary life, to help us to use the 
connections and the continuities but also revel in the differences between our 
common lives, and to encourage us to be brave enough to care, and to speak 
up. 
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Introduction  
 
As a result of three meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 
reactors in March 2011 over a hundred thousand people had to leave their 
homes, and local farming and fishing industries were badly affected by 
contamination (Bird, 2013; WNA, 2014). Official figures point to more than a 
thousand deaths resulting from evacuation after the accident (WNA, 2014). 
While attempting to regain control of the situation the Japanese government 
was forced to raise the acceptable legal radiation exposure for workers at the 
nuclear plants, with ongoing hazardous conditions and sinking morale 
(Demetriou, 2011; McCurry, 2013). The initial explosions and subsequent 
difficulties in controlling groundwater leaks over the past three years have led to 
substantial radioactive contamination of both land and sea, with contamination 
reported as far away as the west coast of the US, and full long-term effects 
upon human and nonhuman health as yet unknown (McCurry, 2012; Ryall, 
2013; Amos, 2014; McNeill, 2014). 
Supporters of nuclear energy, with some environmental campaigners 
amongst them, characterise the initial incident as a very low probability accident 
resulting from the tsunami, a force of nature, the effects of which have, 
moreover, been successfully controlled and minimised. Some also argue that 
reactions and responses regarding the risks of radiation are overblown and in 
themselves exacerbate the situation. Yet there have already been significant 
effects upon both human and nonhuman lives, and the full long-term costs 
remain unknown. As will become clear in this thesis, thinking about the politics 
of nuclear energy fundamentally challenges our assumptions about what is 
unfortunate, or justifiable according to dominant conceptions of nature and 
society. This has important implications for our understanding of injustice. While 
harms of nuclear energy may be justified as the inevitable and necessary side-
effects of the way things are and they thereby become naturalised according to 
dominant conceptions of nature and society, these harms are not ‘natural’ or 
necessary at all, but socially produced and avoidable. This thesis will 
demonstrate how harms of nuclear energy, including the disproportionate 
effects of uranium mining upon indigenous peoples’ lands worldwide, or the 
displaced effects of nuclear waste and the accompanying risks upon future 
generations, may be articulated as injustices, resulting from unjust and 
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unnecessary social relations both within the human world, and between humans 
and nonhumans.  
At point of writing, the UK government remains resolute in its insistence 
that nuclear energy must play a substantial role in the country’s future energy 
mix. Hinkley C, the first of the government’s planned new nuclear power plants, 
has been given planning permission, most of the capital costs have been 
underwritten by loans guaranteed by the Treasury, and a fixed price for nuclear 
energy for at least the next thirty years has been agreed. There have been 
extensive efforts from many locals and concerned people from across the UK 
and Europe to contest and resist the project, with representations at 
consultations, a number of legal challenges and sizeable protests, 
demonstrations and direct action. The series of failures at the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear power plants after the tsunami in March 2011 negatively 
affected attitudes to nuclear energy worldwide as they signalled a troubling 
reminder of both the environmental and social reasons for public anti-nuclear 
concern. However, neither this, nor the on-going and escalating problems at the 
Japanese site over the past few years have impacted significantly upon UK 
policy. An overwhelming consensus has emerged in consecutive governments 
with cross-party support. Nuclear energy is justified as necessary on the basis 
of carbon emissions reduction requirements in the context of climate change, 
concerns about the ‘energy gap,’ and the need to ensure security of energy 
supplies and sustain economic development.  
This ‘need for nuclear’ has been reinforced by prominent spokespeople 
and advocates from the green movement. In the recent film Pandora’s Promise 
(2013), Stewart Brand pointed to the depth of the split in the environmental 
movement when he said:  
The question is often asked, ‘Can you be an environmentalist and be 
pronuclear?’ I would turn that around and say, ‘In light of climate change, 
can you be an environmentalist and not be pronuclear?’ 
 
Climate change and the urgency of reducing carbon emissions, combined with 
the challenges which renewable forms of energy and efficiency pose to existing 
infrastructures and ways of life, have caused many greens to break with the 
perceived traditional anti-nuclear tendencies of environmentalism due to a 
sense that there is no realistic alternative. Nuclear energy is considered the 
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lesser evil in contrast to the looming catastrophic global impacts of continued 
reliance upon fossil fuels. 
This thesis emerges from my personal concerns in the struggle against 
Hinkley C, and within green politics more widely. It stems from my own 
observations and experiences of the difficulties of articulating the significance of 
harms of nuclear energy according to the dominant discursive framings which 
influence both sides of the debate. The dominant discourses1 tend to separate 
out and prioritise carbon emissions reduction and national economic 
development and security over other problems, and implicitly rely upon abstract 
techno-scientific and economic expert knowledge to control, predict and ascribe 
meaning to our collective futures. This has the effect that multiple existing and 
potential harms to human and nonhuman nature, in the present and in the 
future, in this country and in other countries, are difficult to articulate as 
important and politically relevant. 
Dominant discourses emphasise particular, reductive understandings of 
science, economics and security which naturalise harms into single-issues that 
tend to be pitted against each other. The split in the green movement seems to 
be suggestive of a deeper problem whereby important early green insights 
about the causes of the harms of nuclear energy have failed to penetrate the 
prevailing discourses, thereby failing to challenge the neglect of the social and 
political implications of these harms. My concern with articulation emerged from 
a sense that these significant harms are symptomatic of entrenched power 
disparities which are mutually reinforcing. Such power disparities and harms are 
not ‘natural’, nor are they unfortunate, yet justifiable, side-effects; they are 
socially produced and avoidable, and they therefore require articulation as 
injustices. Following Stuart Hall (1996), I understand articulation in the two-fold 
sense of i) saying and ii) joining. By this I mean finding a language which firstly, 
helps to provide the words with which to more clearly communicate these harms 
                                                     
1
 I use the term ‘dominant discourses’ in this thesis as shorthand for the prevailing discourses, which 
subscribe to reductive understandings of ‘science’ and ‘economics’ as separate from ‘politics,’ and which 
perpetuate implicit assumptions about the separation of nature/culture. Such discourses permeate 
industry, science and government as well as the arguments of both pro- and many anti-nuclear green 
spokespeople. My intention is to contest these dominant framings of debates and practices which are 
engaged in by a multiplicity of different actors. While for the broad purposes of discussion I generalise 
about these dominant discourses, my intention is not to negate the important differences between the 
social actors that engage with them. Like Dryzek (2005: 9), I understand discourses as powerfully 
politically constructive of meaning and relationship, influencing our definitions of legitimate knowledge 
as well as constituting and reproducing material political realities (see also Foucault, 1980). 
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as injustices, and secondly, helps to bring these injustices into contingent 
connection with each other as relevant to our understanding of political 
community.  
These injustices, and the intersections between them, have been difficult 
to articulate according to dominant discourses which naturalise the status quo 
and make such harms appear to be regrettable, but justifiable side-effects. 
Concerns about the ways in which nuclear energy blocks other solutions to the 
problems we face, centralising power and knowledge, limiting more empowering 
and decentralised adaptation and resilience to climate change and other 
ecological problems, and keeping us upon the path of high consumption, are 
dismissed as politically biased, detracting from a ‘cool’ and ‘rational’ appraisal of 
the problems we face. While some risk and harm is often acknowledged, it is 
pitted against other harms considered to be greater (the global impacts of fossil 
fuels, or significant disruption to economic growth), and consequently the harms 
of nuclear energy are justified and normalised by the insistence that there is no 
alternative.  
In consultations and debates over nuclear energy in the UK and 
elsewhere, concerns about the effects of uranium mining on those in other 
countries, of the waste upon future generations, and of the risks of a serious 
accident or other still unknown impacts are often dismissed or set aside with 
reference to improvements in science and technology – better forms of mining, 
future developments to deal with the waste, new safer designs in reactor 
technology (Bickerstaff et al., 2008; DECC, 2011a; Blowers, 2011). Too much 
concern about the long-term and unknown effects and risks of raising levels of 
background radiation upon human and nonhuman health is not admitted as 
valid, but seen as emotional, irrational and unduly fearful due to a lack of causal 
proof or statistically significant connections between cancers and low-level 
radiation (e.g. Jha & Boseley, 2010; Monbiot, 2011d; Kelly, 2011). Risk of a 
disaster such as Fukushima is ‘managed’ and mitigated by robust risk 
assessments and persistent doubters are deemed sensationalist (ONR, 2011; 
Menon, 2012). The harms are therefore considered minimal, unfortunate and 
unavoidable side-effects of the way things are and remain difficult to articulate 
as injustices according to the dominant logics. 
Green discourses in support of nuclear energy succumb to these 
dominant framings of the problems, capitulating to a sense that there is no 
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alternative. In addition, because raising concerns about harms to humans and 
nonhumans across time and space and in situations of scientific uncertainty, 
and raising possibilities of alternative less harmful ways of living is so difficult 
within the mainstream discourses, those opposing nuclear energy often do so 
according to the dominant terms, emphasising the promises of science and 
technology and the ‘neutral’, ‘non-biased facts’ rather than ‘emotional’ or 
‘politically biased’ concerns about low-level radiation, risks of disaster, or 
alternative ways of living. Arguments made according to the dominant framings 
are very vulnerable to capitulation however, for the supposed neutrality of these 
discourses has the tendency to reinforce the status quo and further limit and 
weaken a sense that there are alternative ways of viewing the problem, blocking 
awareness of harms or enabling their justification within narrow dominant 
framings of the possibilities. Thus the harms remain naturalised or justified 
within the status quo, and a sense that they are actually injustices, resulting 
from unjust and unnecessary social relations both within the human world, and 
between humans and nonhumans, goes astray, is lost, and gains no political 
traction. 
 It is this problem of the neglect of multiple injustices produced by nuclear 
energy and the difficulty of articulating these within the dominant discursive 
framings, which forms the starting point of my thesis. My two-part research 
question arising from this problem is therefore: how might we better understand, 
i) the injustices produced by nuclear energy, and ii) how these injustices 
intersect? I argue that the injustices of nuclear energy and their intersections 
can best be articulated in terms of three images of politics: distribution, 
recognition and representation. These articulations can give us a clearer picture 
of the politics of nuclear energy, with important implications for (green) politics. 
 While my research responds first and foremost to the political problem of 
articulating injustices of nuclear energy, it also responds to a lacuna in political 
theory. Much valuable critical political theory, that of Iris Young (1990), Nancy 
Fraser (1997, 2008), David Schlosberg (2007), for example, focuses upon 
struggles for justice and emphasises the importance of attending to the 
concerns of actual resistance struggles ‘on the ground.’ The emphasis in such 
struggles is upon achieving justice, but resistance is always rooted in 
experiences and senses of injustice. As both Judith Shklar (1990) and Vittorio 
Bufacchi (2012) have pointed out however, the conceptualisation of injustices 
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themselves has received less academic attention and remains under-theorised. 
My research intends to make some headway in addressing this. In particular, 
this thesis has three main research objectives. First of all, I aim to develop an 
open, heuristic framework which can assist in understanding and articulating 
different injustices. Second, I develop and ground the articulations emerging 
from this framework in the political struggle over nuclear energy. Third, I 
consider the political efficacy of this framework for articulating injustices and 
contesting dominant discourses around nuclear energy.  
I take an ecological approach to understanding the thesis problem and to 
developing the heuristic framework for articulating injustices. Before saying 
more about the framework and the objectives of the thesis, it may be helpful to 
give the reader some early indication of this ecological approach which I 
develop in Part I of the thesis, and how it underlies my overall argument about 
articulating injustices in Part II. The framework which I develop is particularly 
suited, yet need not necessarily be tied to this ecological approach which 
specifies my own ontological and normative commitments. I began with an 
ecofeminist sensibility to the intersections between environmental problems and 
social injustice, but my ecological analysis of the problem of nuclear energy was 
deepened as I engaged more thoroughly with both the problem and the 
theoretical literature which I used to build my conceptual framework. In 
developing my approach I am indebted to ecofeminist inspired thinking, 
particularly the work of Val Plumwood (1993, 2002) and Bruno Latour (2004), 
who offer insightful analysis of the constitutive, at times contradictory,2 symbolic 
hierarchical separations of science/politics, and nature/culture, separations 
which perpetuate and exacerbate injustices to both human and nonhuman 
nature. 
An ecological approach to challenging the problematic divide between 
humans and ‘nature’ emphasises the situated, embodied and relational, as well 
as the political character of all knowledge and requires sensitivity to both the 
differences and the continuities between entities (Plumwood, 1993). As such, 
the term ‘articulation’ is especially suited for the task which this thesis attempts, 
                                                     
2
 As Rogers (2008: 299) has pointed out, the associations of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ (for example, of the 
rational mind with ‘culture’ and ‘man’, and of bodily emotions with ‘nature’ and ‘woman’) while deeply 
ingrained, are intersectional rather than fixed, and tend to be ‘unhinged and rearticulated to suit the 
needs of the moment.’ As Latour (2004), Plumwood (1993, 2002) and others have shown, throughout 
western history, some have been able to use the power of these hierarchical separations for their own 
benefit and at the expense of others. 
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due to the double meaning of expressing and linking noted above, but also, as 
Stuart Hall (1996) emphasises, due to the process-sensitive, socially and 
historically contingent character of the intelligibility it offers. Ecological analysis 
reveals the ways in which the human/nature divide and related reductive 
separations serve to reinforce entrenched power disparities, which conceal and 
perpetuate injustices. These discursive power dynamics can be seen to underlie 
the dominant discourses of nuclear energy which depoliticize the issue in crucial 
ways. This depoliticization needs to be addressed if adequate contestation is to 
occur.  
Articulating harms as injustices is a form of politicization. While harms 
might be accepted and justified within cost-benefit analyses, articulating such 
harms as injustices draws attention to a form of suffering which is socially 
produced and unnecessary, rather than accidental and ‘natural’, and which can 
and should therefore be addressed. By articulating injustices to both human and 
nonhuman nature I seek to tackle the problematic and complexly constitutive 
separations of science/politics, and nature/culture so as to more adequately 
take into account the interests of ‘all affected’ in the politics of nuclear energy 
(Barnett, 2012: 681). In this thesis I draw upon ‘all affected,’ in a pragmatic 
sense, as an indefinite, ‘animating political intuition’ of affectedness that is 
sensitive to ‘situations in and through which felt senses of “justice violated” are 
generated, experienced and articulated as political claims’ (Barnett, 2012: 682, 
684). The importance of the ecological approach to taking all affected into 
account in this thesis lies in its attempt to move beyond the hierarchical and 
contradictory separations of science/politics and nature/culture in order to bring 
out a fuller understanding of what is at stake in the politics of nuclear energy: 
injustices, and consequently other possibilities for both human and nonhuman 
life. 
 To return to my research objectives, the first of these is to develop a 
heuristic framework which can assist in understanding and articulating different 
injustices. It is important to emphasise the reflexive process with which I have 
approached the development of this thesis. As a whole, this thesis engages in 
critical political theory of the kind which emphasises a reflective engagement 
with practice, as described by James Tully (2002). It begins by reflecting upon 
the problem of nuclear energy, through a critical survey of the governing 
discourses and the manner in which they have been contested. Rather than 
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develop a normative theory (of justice, for example), the aim is to redescribe the 
problem in a way which is helpful for those struggling within it, in an attempt to 
reveal possibilities for transformation. This is done by drawing out and 
unmasking that which has been taken for granted or deemed necessary. 
Uncovering the contingent, historically and spatially situated character of social 
relations helps to expand our understanding of the problem and the possibilities 
for change.  
As part of this heuristic framework, I identify three different yet 
intersecting images of politics: distribution, recognition, and representation. I 
take the expression of ‘images’ from James Ingram (2008) who discusses 
‘images of politics’ as emerging from predominantly unspoken assumptions 
regarding the composition of politics. These three images of politics that I draw 
upon involve distinct ways of thinking about politics and justice in political theory 
and they are also apparent in the historical theory and practice of liberation and 
justice struggles. Implicit in understandings of politics as distribution is the 
assumption that politics is about ‘who gets what.’ In recognition the underlying 
assumption is that politics is about ‘who counts as what.’ While in thinking about 
representation, politics is generally assumed to be about ‘who speaks with 
authority.’  
I consider each of these images of politics as important for articulating 
different yet intersecting injustices. In particular I draw upon David Schlosberg 
(2007). Following Nancy Fraser (1997), he begins to draw some insights from 
justice theory together to consider their usefulness for understanding the US 
Environmental Justice and Global Justice movements. In his sensitivity to the 
claims made by those resisting injustices, Schlosberg helps to link theory and 
practice and demonstrates the importance of acknowledging these different 
ways of thinking about politics in the multiple yet linked claims of social 
movements. While his work predominantly discusses justice, it offers a ‘shared 
toolbox’ which I use to develop my own conceptual framework in two ways: i) 
deepening the articulation of injustices, and ii) attempting to do so ecologically, 
i.e. seeking to directly confront the problematic separation of humans and 
‘nature’ and thereby more clearly revealing the complex intersections between 
injustices to both humans and nonhumans beyond the separations of 
science/politics and nature/culture. 
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My second research objective, to situate the development of my heuristic 
framework in the struggle to articulate injustices of nuclear energy emerges 
from my ecological and feminist commitment to an expressly situated and 
grounded form of knowledge development, drawing upon my own felt 
experiences and intuitions in anti-nuclear and green politics. I developed the 
framework in reflexive process between theory and practice and my intention 
has been to use this framework to make sense of injustices of nuclear energy 
vis-à-vis the dominant discourses. While there is a rich literature on the politics 
of nuclear energy, it rarely frames the problem in terms of injustice, and there 
has been no attempt to consider how injustices produced by nuclear energy 
challenge the depoliticising separation of nature/culture.  
Much has been written in the social sciences about the emergence of the 
‘risk society’ in industrial modernity that seeks to explain and understand public 
resistance to certain technologies, including nuclear energy, in terms of social, 
political and environmental impacts. Here there is acknowledgement of the 
importance of resistance and the problems with dismissing it as basic public 
ignorance or unreasonable technophobia (Beck, 1995; Bauer, 1995; Touraine, 
1995; Wynne, 2011). In political philosophy and International Relations some 
work considers the politics of nuclear energy, appealing to democratic norms of 
transparency and accountability (Stoett, 2003; Blowers, 2010; Bickerstaff et al., 
2008; Pidgeon et al., 2008), distributive justice and participation (Shrader-
Frechette, 2002; Endres, 2009; Blowers, 2011; Toke, 2013c) and emphasising 
the importance of considering neglected perspectives as well as the ethical 
impacts of the whole nuclear production process, including uranium mining 
(Plumwood, 1984; Martin, 2007; Hecht, 2012). Such work raises vital aspects of 
nuclear energy which remain bracketed and neglected in mainstream 
discussions of the issue. The attention which such work draws to moral and 
ethical concerns, as well as sustainability, points to the importance of 
ecologically fine-tuning the articulation of these as politically-relevant injustices 
which do not adhere to the dominant discursive separation of nature/culture. 
The thesis problem emerged from my own experiences in the struggle 
against new nuclear power at Hinkley C, from the difficulties I and others 
experienced in making our concerns heard and understood according to the 
terms of the prevailing discourses. Reductive understandings of science and 
economics and the dismissal of a broader understanding of politics in most 
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discussions both disempowered and subordinated significant concerns. At best, 
the dominant framings relegated our doubts to ‘secondary’ ethical issues which 
could in any case be shown by utilitarian cost-benefit or risk-probability 
calculations to be ‘overdramatizing’ the issue, or at worst our concerns were 
viewed as ‘ideological’, ‘naïve’, ‘emotional’, ‘irrational’, or ‘idealistic’ in contrast 
to a naturalised and normalised status quo. The politics of nuclear energy 
therefore lends itself particularly well to an ecological reformulation which 
challenges the hegemonic power of the pervasive separation of science/politics 
that relies upon the governing separation of nature/culture. In addition, early 
green movements developed partly as one and the same with the first anti-
nuclear movements, making an ecological approach particularly suited to the 
quest to articulate injustices of nuclear energy. By grounding the development 
of my heuristic framework in my own situated experiences of the struggle 
against nuclear energy I take seriously the ecological emphasis upon fostering 
knowledge which is situated and developed out of practical relations and 
experiences. 
So, as discussed, the first two objectives of my thesis involve the 
development of an ecologically grounded framework to enable a clearer 
articulation of injustices of nuclear energy, drawing on my experiences in the 
struggle against nuclear energy and building on three images of politics 
emerging from historical struggles against injustice. I argue that by redescribing 
and articulating the harms of nuclear energy as ecological injustices we can 
make these harms better heard and understood as relevant to political 
community (which includes the work of science and economics), at the same 
time as challenging the hegemonic separation of nature/culture which limits our 
understanding of the scope and character of politics and reinforces and 
perpetuates ecological injustices. The strength of the articulations according to 
this choice of framework lies in the reflexive grounding in both the theory and 
practice of struggles against injustice. Grounding in theory provides a wealth of 
literature and potential tools and concepts from which to draw possible 
articulations, while grounding in practice increases the likelihood that such 
articulations are practically familiar and accessible in the everyday process of 
struggle.  Rethinking each of these images of politics in ecological terms helps 
provide the apparatus with which to articulate injustices which are currently 
difficult to communicate as relevant within the limited terms of nuclear debates 
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and decision-making due to the separations of science/politics and 
nature/culture. 
The third and final objective of this thesis is to evaluate the political 
efficacy of the articulations of injustices which my framework highlights, 
primarily for contesting dominant discourses and decision-making on nuclear 
energy, and tentatively, for (green) politics more broadly. I do this by 
considering the transformative potential as well as the limits of each mode of 
articulation, and in particular I emphasise the importance of considering 
intersections between the multiple injustices to which these articulations draw 
our attention. I developed this particular framework with the intuition that 
although analytically distinct, distribution, recognition and representation 
intersect with each other in important ways.  
A few provisional points can be made at this juncture. The scope of this 
thesis is very wide and multifaceted because of the consideration of three 
established literatures in political theory around distribution, recognition and 
representation; the challenge of extending thinking about these in ways which 
go beyond the separation of nature/culture; and the need to engage with the 
complex and on-going problems of nuclear energy. Given this extensive and 
ambitious scope, the framework developed is preliminary. I contend, however, 
that it demonstrates the usefulness of linking up the different literatures and 
articulating injustices in terms of the three images of politics. This thesis 
demonstrates the importance of articulating and thinking about the intersections 
between multiple injustices to human and nonhuman nature across space and 
time, and the importance of developing a language which enables such linking 
to occur. While not claiming to present a comprehensive account of injustices of 
nuclear energy, I maintain that the account enabled by my framework helps to 
contest the dominant framings of the issue by providing a thicker description of 
the effects of nuclear energy so that we might better consider the injustices 
which are at stake. In the process, the framework is intended to help to more 
plainly reveal some of the key power disparities underlying discourses and 
decision-making on nuclear energy and to clarify how neglecting these can be 
counter-productive to the wider concerns of green politics. Importantly, it does 
this in a manner which challenges the problematic separations of 
science/politics and nature/culture. Inherent in my ecological approach is the 
understanding that this integration means that injustices to both human and 
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nonhuman nature should be understood as indicators which require 
consideration not ‘only’ as a matter of morality or ethics, but also as a matter of 
existential prudence affecting the precarious futures of many on earth. 
 
The formal structure of my thesis (see Table 1) is comprised of two parts. 
Part I, consisting of Chapters One and Two, presents the research problem, 
and the literature which I  use to i) explain my ecological approach (which in 
part emerges from the problem), ii) gather the ingredients for the framework for 
articulating injustices, and iii) set out the bare bones of that  
framework. Part II, consisting of Chapters Three, Four, and Five, develops this 
framework, which is guided by the ecological approach set out in Part I. In each 
of the chapters in Part II I aim to: i) consider the relevant literature in justice and 
green theory in order to rethink what is at stake in that particular image of 
politics from an ecological point of view; ii) articulate injustices of nuclear energy 
in terms of that image of politics; and iii) evaluate the political efficacy, i.e. the 
transformative possibilities and limits of each articulation, again from an 
ecological point of view. In Part I, the ecological approach, that emerges from 
 
Table 1: Formal thesis structure 
 Aims Steps taken 
                                          Part I : Diagnosis 
Ch. 1 Reflect on the problem and 
consider conditions of 
possibility within it 
Surveys practices and discourses of nuclear energy:  
i) in the present,  
ii) in the past,  
iii) in early ecologically inspired struggles against 
nuclear energy 
Ch. 2 Explain the ecological 
approach which underlies the 
thesis and outline my 
heuristic framework. 
Completes diagnosis of the problem and clarifies 
i) ecological approach to address problem,  
ii) components of heuristic framework to facilitate 
articulation of injustices, 
iii) articulation and efficacy. 
                                           Part II : Redescription 
Ch. 3 Articulate distributive 
injustices of nuclear energy 
and consider efficacy of 
articulation 
Draws on literature of politics as distribution to 
i) rethink what is at stake in ecological terms, 
ii) suggest a language to articulate injustices of nuclear 
energy, 
iii) evaluate political efficacy of this articulation 
Ch. 4 Articulate recognition-based 
injustices of nuclear energy 
and consider efficacy of 
articulation 
Draws on literature of politics as recognition to 
i) rethink what is at stake in ecological terms, 
ii) suggest a language to articulate injustices of nuclear 
energy, 
iii) evaluate political efficacy of this articulation 
Ch. 5 Articulate representation-
based injustices of nuclear 
energy and consider efficacy 
of articulation 
Draws on literature on politics as representation to 
i) rethink what is at stake in ecological terms, 
ii) suggest a language to articulate injustices of nuclear 
energy, 
iii) evaluate political efficacy of this articulation 
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my analysis of the problem, encompasses my non-arbitrary, yet contingent, 
ontological and normative commitments, namely an ecofeminist concern with 
taking the interests of all affected by socially produced, entrenched and unjust 
power disparities - including human and nonhuman nature - into account. In 
Part II, the images of politics as distribution, recognition and representation 
provide a heuristic framework through which I articulate injustices according to 
my ecological commitments. I maintain that this framework is particularly suited 
to an approach which is sensitive to the ecological intersections between 
injustices and addressing the hegemonic separation of nature/culture.  
 
The substance of my thesis proceeds as follows: 
 
In Chapter One I consider the environmental pro-nuclear case and the 
prevailing debates over nuclear energy. I give a brief historical overview of the 
politics of nuclear energy at state and international levels, and I consider the 
challenges of the ecological and anti-nuclear movements of the 1960s and 
1970s. I argue that despite the anti-nuclear roots and commitments of green 
movements, in the past and present, the debates and discourses have been 
dominated by reductive understandings of science and economics, and that 
some green support for nuclear energy is nothing new. Historically, the 
dominant discourses have neglected and devalued important concerns about 
the links between significant socially produced harms to both humans and 
nonhuman nature, which were expressed by early ecological and anti-nuclear 
movements and which continue to motivate many global and environmental 
justice movements today. I argue that the mainstream framing of the problems 
of nuclear energy and climate change reinforces the dominant forms of political 
organisation at the same time as it blocks understanding of other realities, 
tending to pit those struggling against harms produced by the dominant forms of 
social organisation against each other. The early anti-nuclear and green 
movements highlighted important ecological insights but these have not 
penetrated the dominant discourses. 
 In Chapter Two, I draw upon the work of Val Plumwood, Bruno Latour, 
and others, to redescribe the problem and clarify the ecological approach which 
aims to move beyond the limiting hierarchical separation of science/politics that 
is embedded in the separation of nature/culture. This ecological approach 
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emphasises the inherent politics of all knowledge. This approach insists upon 
asking ‘how many (and who) are we?’ a question which must not be short-
circuited by the next question ‘how can we live together?’ In the politics of 
nuclear energy, the latter has short-circuited the former by way of the 
hierarchical division of science/politics where scientific and economic facts 
about ‘what is’ have been used to abort political contestation of ‘what could be’ 
and the power relations which constitute political community. In order to better 
take knowledge and interests of all affected in the politics of common life into 
account I suggest that we need to more clearly articulate injustices which are 
perpetuated by the separation of nature/culture. Inspired by the work of David 
Schlosberg, and the theory and practice of justice and liberation struggles, I 
develop a heuristic framework based around three images of politics as 
distribution, recognition and representation. Rather than focus upon concepts of 
justice my work is explicitly concerned with articulating injustices in an 
ecologically sensitive manner, beyond the limiting separation of nature/culture. 
In developing my heuristic framework I address the questions of ‘how many 
(and who) we are’ in order to reopen the possibilities for answering the question 
of ‘how we might live together.’ I seek to enable contingent, practice-sensitive 
articulations of injustices which may also be politically effective in resisting the 
fragmentation and naturalisation of harms of nuclear energy in the dominant 
discourses. 
In Chapter Three I argue that we can understand distributive injustices of 
nuclear energy as deprivation of basic necessities. Basic necessities can be 
broadly understood as the healthy and sustaining conditions for being. 
Deprivation of basic necessities is caused by the unequal distribution of 
burdens as well as goods, across time, space and the human/nature divide. 
This includes the compounding of such unequal distributions with other forms of 
deprivation under the dominant forms of social organisation. In the politics of 
nuclear energy some humans in the present reap the benefits of nuclear energy 
production thereby depriving future generations, those in other countries and 
aspects of nonhuman nature of basic necessities, of healthy and sustaining 
conditions for life, by exposing them to the dangerous long-term legacy of high-
level radioactive wastes, the harms of uranium mining, and other risks of 
nuclear disaster. Importantly, those who are thus deprived are more likely to 
also suffer other forms of deprivation under current conditions. There is 
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transformative potential in the commensurability of distributive articulations with 
dominant discourses of cost-benefit analyses which can expose the correlations 
between deprivation of basic necessities and thus highlight striking distributive 
injustices across time and space. However, although a relational understanding 
of distribution helps to expose the limits for both human and nonhuman nature 
to sustain the burdens as well as the goods of contemporary life, such 
articulation cannot in and of itself challenge the dominant conceptions of what 
constitute ‘basic necessities’, nor comprehensively challenge the neglect of both 
future generations and nonhuman nature from understandings of political 
community. Contestation of the meaning of deprivation of basic necessities, as 
well as who or what can be understood to suffer such injustices, requires 
concomitant articulations of injustices in terms of the politics of recognition, 
while contestation of the authority of such meanings requires an understanding 
of the politics of representation. 
In Chapter Four I argue that we can articulate recognition-based 
injustices as disrespect for integrity. Integrity accounts for both continuities and 
differences between selves and others (human and nonhuman) and implies 
inevitable vulnerabilities and dependencies. Disrespect for integrity is caused by 
the desire for independence from and control of inevitable unpredictability in 
human and nonhuman interactions. In the politics of nuclear energy some 
humans (industry and government experts) deny human fallibility and 
vulnerability to nuclear risk, disrespecting the ecological integrity of both 
themselves and others with assumptions about the controllability of nuclear 
energy and the possibilities of minimising risk through control and coercive 
protective measures. There is transformative potential in this articulation as it 
challenges existing conceptions of the relations between selves and others, 
forcing as much attention upon the dominant self as upon the subordinate other. 
This enables contestation of identity and meaning and encourages awareness 
of the illusion of independence and control perpetuated by relations of 
domination. Such awareness can help to bring other possibilities for self/other 
relations into view. However, such awareness must be wary of the inevitable 
desire to overcome unpredictability in interaction; because of ongoing 
continuities and differences between entities in interaction alienation cannot be 
overcome. To guard against the desire to overcome alienation and/or deny 
dependencies and vulnerabilities, we need combined and sustained attention 
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also to distributive injustices which contest the ever present potential for 
deprivation of basic necessities, and we need to attend to representation-based 
injustices. 
  In Chapter Five I argue that we can understand representation-based 
injustices of nuclear energy as denial of multiple authorities.  I emphasise a 
more decentred, situated and multiple understanding of authorities that involves 
some power of authoring and determining one’s own narrative and existence in 
representative processes involving both speech and action. Denial of authority 
is caused by the assertion of particular, disengaged forms of authority over 
others. In the politics of nuclear energy the denial of multiple authorities plays 
out in the monopolisation and authoritarian use of the ostensibly ‘objective’ and 
‘apolitical’ knowledge claims and practices of technocrats and many nuclear 
(and other) scientists which deny the socially, politically and ecologically 
situated multiple authorities of others, both human and nonhuman. The 
transformative potential of articulating representation-based injustices as denial 
of multiple authorities lies in its commensurability with widespread discourses of 
democracy, and in emphasising the situated, embodied and partial character of 
all speech and action. This can help to unmask dominant monopolising 
representations which are non-reflexive in their claims of authority over others. 
There are potentials for a reimagining of science and democratisation of 
common life to expose the possibilities of both constructive and destructive 
collaboration. However, resources lie overwhelmingly with those who have an 
interest in maintaining dominant structures and discourses, and encouraging 
the representation of multiple authorities can run the risk of reinforcing these if 
not combined with articulation of other injustices. The idea of a neutral and non-
political science bolsters the status quo by masking underlying resource 
disparities and failing to engender the necessary reflexivity and responsibility 
about scientists’ and other authorities’ own roles in perpetuating dominant self-
other relations. It is precisely because of the inherent political implications of 
knowledge production that the idea of ‘neutral’ authorities in science and 
economics must be unmasked, and then negotiated with the help of 
concomitant attention to both distributive and recognition-based injustices. 
Taken together we see that articulating and contesting these injustices 
involves an understanding of all three images of politics as they intersect with 
and relate to each other. These intersections become clear as I consider the 
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transformative potential of each articulation at the end of each of the three 
substantive theoretical chapters in Part II. Deprivation of basic necessities, 
disrespect for integrity and denial of authority have a tendency to be mutually 
reinforcing. Emphasising the ecological perspective throughout, and the 
importance of attending to the continuities and differences between human and 
nonhuman nature in ‘environmental’ and ‘social’ injustices, I argue that 
understanding and tackling one aspect of potential injustices is insufficient, 
limited and will tend to be counter-productive if the others are not also taken into 
account. Articulating injustices in relation to each other can provide important 
political efficacy and potential for solidarity. I consider the broader implications 
of my framework for the politics of nuclear energy and green politics in general 
in my conclusion to the thesis. 
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PART I 
 
 
 
 
 
[W]e did not just stumble by some freak technological accident into the 
ecological mess we have made, and it will take more than a few bright boys and 
better toys to get us out of it 
        (Plumwood, 2002: 8) 
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Chapter One 
Politics of Nuclear Energy 
 
The tiny risk imposed by nuclear power has both obscured and invoked the far 
greater risk imposed by coal. Scare stories about nuclear power are a gift to the 
coal industry. Where they are taken seriously by politicians – as they have been 
in Japan – and cause a switch from nuclear to coal, they kill people. 
 (Monbiot, 2013) 
  
Both Japan and Germany have increased their reliance upon coal in large part 
due to recent moves away from nuclear energy.3 This strengthens the position 
of those who argue that we must choose nuclear energy as the lesser of two 
evils if we are concerned about both people and environment in the context of 
climate change. The prevalence of fear and mistrust about nuclear energy has 
been described as a sign of ‘displacement’, a fixation ‘on something small to 
avoid engaging with something big’ (Monbiot, 2013). There is persuasive force 
behind the comparisons of nuclear and coal, not least because this restrictive 
choice is backed up by powerful political discursive structures which constitute it 
as reality. However, as I seek to show in Part I of this thesis, there are deeper 
displacements at work here. Weighing up a limited choice of options according 
to limited dominant understandings of science and economics displaces 
confrontation with the inherent politics of these, and seriously hinders our 
understanding of significant, political harms produced by both nuclear energy 
and the dominant forms of social organisation. 
 In this chapter I seek to describe the research problem of the thesis. This 
is the problem of communicating harms of nuclear energy which are difficult to 
understand as significant according to the dominant discourses. I draw upon the 
current debates and the history of nuclear energy to show how the dominant 
discourses separate out and valorise scientific and economic facts and figures 
as forms of knowledge distinct from and more legitimate than political 
knowledge about the power relations which constitute political community. This 
separation normalises problematic political power relations perpetuated by 
nuclear energy, for this technology cannot be understood separately from the 
dominant forms of social and political organisation which produced it. It should 
therefore begin to become clear in this chapter that continuing to try to 
understand the problem of nuclear energy according to scientific and economic 
knowledge understood to be distinct from political knowledge inhibits our 
                                                     
3
 For Germany, see Nicola & Andresen, 2012, and for Japan, see Inajima, 2013. 
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understanding of the conditions and possibilities with which we are confronted. 
This is because this way of framing the problem reinforces dominant forms of 
political organisation (such as imperatives of capitalist state security and 
economic growth) at the same time as it fragments and blocks understanding of 
other realities, tending to pit those struggling against harms produced by the 
dominant forms of social organisation against each other.  
 In section one of this chapter I consider the trend for some 
environmentalists to support nuclear energy in response to climate change and 
I evaluate prevailing tendencies in debates for and against this form of energy. I 
claim that conceptions of science and economics as separate from politics tend 
to dominate disagreements over ‘the need for nuclear’. While engaging 
according to the terms of the dominant discourses appears to be a strategic 
necessity, I argue that this is limiting, particularly for those opposing nuclear 
energy as a solution to climate change and other ecological crises we face, 
because it disables political critique, reinforcing the dominant status quo which 
is able to pose as neutral and above politics. This hinders the contestation of 
nuclear energy as an inherently political issue. 
 In section two, I give a brief historical overview of the politics of nuclear 
energy at state and international levels. This enables me to highlight the 
dominant discourses of capitalist state security and scientific and economic 
development that reinforce the position of nuclear energy at the same time as 
nuclear energy in turn reinforces such discourses. These discourses are 
powerfully constitutive and rely upon the separation of democratic politics from 
understandings of science and economics, a separation which has also 
influenced the ways in which environmentalists have engaged with the issue of 
nuclear energy. Debates in the past demonstrate similar tendencies to those 
now, with an emphasis upon scientific expert knowledge at the expense of 
communicating and understanding the politics of the issue. Tracing the history 
up to the present day enables me to show how the urgency surrounding climate 
change and the discussion of this in terms of scientific and economic facts 
understood to be ‘above’ politics, has reinforced the dominant discourses of 
capitalist state security and economic growth, weakening and fragmenting 
challenges to the political status quo. 
 In section three I consider challenges to the political status quo which 
emerged in the intersecting social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. A key 
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aspect of these movements, although not always thoroughgoing or clearly 
communicated, was an ecological critique which emphasised the politically 
produced links between ecological damage and social injustices. Many of the 
diverse counterculture movements of this time converged around nuclear 
energy as symptomatic of the ways in which the dominant discourses 
perpetuated harms to both humans and ‘nature’ as a whole. The linking of the 
problems of social injustice and damage to nonhuman nature is still apparent in 
most green party principles as well as the rationales of many other grassroots 
activists worldwide. I argue that although this linking critique has failed to 
penetrate dominant discourses, particularly those concerning nuclear energy, it 
constitutes a vital form of knowledge and political critique which pays attention 
to the ecological and political character of relations across the culture/nature 
divide, the neglect of which severely limits our understanding of the problems 
we face. This paves the way for Chapter Two where I clarify how the 
perpetuation of the science/politics divide reinforces the prevailing separation of 
nature/culture and I suggest an ecological approach to addressing this 
separation and finding other perspectives on the problem. 
 
Debating ‘the need for nuclear’  
As the nuclear disaster at Fukushima had barely begun to unfold, environmental 
and social justice campaigner and long-time nuclear sceptic, George Monbiot 
(2011a), deepened and publicly exposed a split in UK (and international) green 
politics by declaring that this event had finally ‘made [him] stop worrying and 
love nuclear power’. Shocking as this may have seemed for many, the 
ambiguities within environmental politics over nuclear energy began well before 
Monbiot’s declaration. Environmentalists such as Mark Lynas, ‘reformed’ GM 
crop saboteur, Stewart Brand, promoter of the NASA planet earth image of the 
1960s, James Lovelock, author of the Gaia hypothesis, and others, all made 
strong statements in support of nuclear energy over the course of the last ten 
years. Environmentalists for Nuclear Energy (EFN), with Lovelock as their 
patron, have argued that environmentalist opposition to nuclear energy has 
been the ‘greatest misunderstanding and mistake of the century’ (EFN, 2012; 
see also Scurlock, 2010). These spokespeople and the arguments they make 
have considerable influence within the green movement and in my own circle of 
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acquaintances many have become convinced by arguments about the lesser 
evil in the context of climate change. 
Even Peter Harper and Paul Allen of the Centre for Alternative 
Technology (CAT) in Wales, a leading (predominantly radical and ecological) 
institution for alternative living, renewable energy and energy efficiency, stated 
at a conference hosted by Lovelock in 2004, that ‘[t]he worst possible nuclear 
disasters are not as bad as the worst possible climate change disasters’, and 
that there was need for debate in the UK over whether a limited replacement of 
existing nuclear power stations might be necessary, given the dual challenge of 
the ‘energy gap’ and reducing carbon emissions (Scurlock, 2010: 216; Vidal, 
2004; Brown, 2004).4 More recently, not long after the fifth IPCC report (2013) 
stated with 95% certainty that humans have caused current global warming, 
four prominent climate and atmospheric scientists penned an open letter ‘to 
those influencing environmental policy but opposed to nuclear power’ to request 
that they do an about turn and demonstrate their ‘real concern about risks from 
climate damage by calling for the development and deployment of advanced 
nuclear energy’ (Caldeira et al., 2013).  
In what follows I begin to illustrate the thesis problem, showing how a 
certain kind of emphasis upon science and economics predominates in 
contemporary discussions over nuclear energy. In the context of the sense of 
urgency surrounding climate change, and the important role which science has 
played in bringing climate change to international attention, nuclear energy 
tends to be debated with the implicit assumption that scientific facts and figures 
are distinct from and more legitimate than political knowledge of the issue. 
Emphasis upon the facts and figures is also apparent in the ways in which the 
economics of nuclear energy are debated, also in terms which naturalise the 
economic status quo and legitimise statistical economic knowledge over more 
obviously political concerns about the entrenched power imbalances and 
inequalities of political economy. Given this structuring of the dominant 
discourses it is understandable that campaigners on both sides rely upon these 
assumptions to give force and legitimacy to their arguments. However, this has 
a tendency to backfire for it reinforces the dominant framings which ultimately 
                                                     
4
 At this point in time, George Monbiot had continued to stress that ‘there is an alternative’, refusing to 
be constrained by the moral calculation arguments which point out that there are more deaths and risks 
from coal than from nuclear, arguing that this was a false choice, that alternatives exist and that giving 
nuclear the green light would be detrimental to these alternatives (Monbiot, 2004). 
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work against a more linked up, ecological understanding of the problem. This 
limits the possibilities for challenging the political status quo and finding 
solutions to the problems we face. It perpetuates the illusion that the dominant 
discourses provide the only rational and objective response. 
The issue of climate change and the urgent need to reduce carbon 
emissions is fundamental to the ‘conversion’ of environmentalists to nuclear 
energy. Caldeira et al. (2013) emphasise ‘the need to sharply reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions’, while Lynas (2013) has also conceded that it is 
only because of climate change that he is advocating nuclear energy. The 
emphasis upon climate change and carbon emissions reduction is combined 
with a conviction that other forms of energy production are not up to the task. 
Pro-nuclear environmentalists do not completely deny certain harmful effects of 
nuclear energy, but rather weigh them up and play them down against other 
harms. Monbiot (2011a) argues that ‘[i]f other forms of energy production 
caused no damage, these [nuclear] impacts would weigh more heavily’. Various 
arguments about the intermittent character of renewable energy, the 
dependence of renewables and efficiency technologies upon the 
environmentally destructive ‘rare earth’ mining industry, the problems of 
unregulated proliferation of decentralised renewables, and most of all, of 
course, the comparatively devastating effects of fossil fuels, are discussed 
(Monbiot, 2011b; Kidd, 2010; see also Parry & Douglas, 2011). Underlying the 
avowed pragmatism of the ‘lesser of many evils’ in the face of climate change 
argument are two dominant tendencies in the discursive formation of the issues. 
These are, firstly, the emphasis upon scientific progress, particularly 
quantifiable scientific facts and the promise of future scientific development of 
technology, and secondly, the emphasis upon economic facts and figures and 
the imperatives of economic growth combined with varying degrees of 
neoliberalism.  
For example, beginning with the focus upon science, Mark Lynas (2008) 
has described his ‘Damascene conversion’ to the cause of nuclear energy as a 
discovery that ‘the Green case against nuclear power is based largely on myth 
and dogma’, that nuclear power ‘is, without exception, dirty, dangerous and 
unnecessary – was untrue. Science has moved on. The old figures just don’t 
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stack up anymore’ (emphasis added).5 He cites the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) to argue that  
nuclear is just as low-carbon a power source as wind and solar: the 
world’s operating nuclear reactors save the planet from 2 billion extra 
tonnes of carbon dioxide per year, which would have been emitted had 
coal been used instead (Lynas, 2008).  
 
Lynas (2008) admits that the dangers of nuclear energy still exist, but making 
reference to the Chernobyl disaster, he emphasises that the ‘mainstream 
science’ of the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the United Nations 
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) cite a 
much lower death toll (28 initial deaths and several thousands of cases of 
nonfatal thyroid cancer) than Greenpeace (60,000 dead already with a further 
140,000 deaths in the future) (Greenpeace, 2006). Therefore, ‘[o]n a deaths per 
gigawatt-year basis, nuclear is safer than coal and oil (Lynas, 2008). George 
Monbiot (2011b) too weighs up numbers of deaths from nuclear energy and 
deaths from coal:  ‘Chinese coal mining alone kills as many people every week 
as the worst nuclear power accident in history – the Chernobyl explosion – has 
done in 25 years’.  
Just as measuring action against climate change in terms of carbon 
emissions reduction provides an apparently clear, straightforward and therefore 
seductive way of assessing progress or change in tackling the problem, 
engaging in moral calculations which quantify deaths according to energy 
source seems to provide a straightforward way to introduce the issues of 
concern for environment and people into knowledge frameworks and decision 
making dominated by quantitative thinking and the understanding that ‘science’ 
and legitimate knowledge production must be free from ‘politics’, where politics 
has become a dirty word involving bias and a lack of objectivity. The sense of 
urgency surrounding climate change, emphasis upon carbon emissions, and the 
general trend to understand issues in quantifiable terms amenable to utilitarian 
cost-benefit analyses has the effect of radically disadvantaging the key 
arguments of those engaging on the techno-scientific plane against it, for 
concerns about uncertainty, safety and risk are much more difficult to quantify 
or measure in this way. The moral calculations reduce and simplify the problem 
                                                     
5
 Lynas (2013) recounts on BBC Hardtalk how scientists had pointed out to him that if he respected the 
consensus on climate change, then he should also respect the consensus on other scientific 
‘controversies’ such as that on the impacts of radiation and risks of nuclear energy, or on genetically 
modified crops. 
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and create a depoliticised either/or choice abstracted from historical and local 
(political) contexts and conditions. 
Like Lynas, Monbiot (2011d) has railed against green and anti-nuclear 
advocates over the ways in which they have wielded science: ‘[n]uclear 
opponents have a moral duty to get their facts straight’. He has expressed 
dismay at ‘cherry-picking’ of ‘the science’ by campaigners against nuclear 
energy, also going into detail on the controversy over the numbers of deaths 
from Chernobyl (Monbiot, 2011c). Monbiot (2011c) characterises anti-nuclear 
activist reliance upon uncertainties within the scientific establishment over links 
between low-level radiation and certain cancers as analogous to the ‘cherry-
picking’ of climate sceptics, declaring that the United Nations Scientific 
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) ‘is the equivalent of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’. This is symptomatic of the 
reliance of environmentalists and green thinkers in general upon scientific facts 
and institutions to provide action-motivating and legitimate evidence for 
environmental problems in a world which requires ‘hard’ and ‘strong’ (read 
quantifiable) evidence if change and regulation are to get in the way of profit or 
in any way seriously challenge the status quo.  
Not least because of the vehemence of these debates, it is 
understandable that those opposing nuclear energy at times appear to have no 
choice but to formulate their counter-arguments on the same terms. However, 
as I seek to demonstrate with the following examples, this can backfire. While 
engaging according to the terms of the dominant discourses is at times a 
pragmatic necessity, and of course, quantifiable knowledge must remain an 
important part of how we make sense of the world, an emphasis upon this alone 
at the expense of other forms of knowledge means that important aspects of the 
problem remain unacknowledged. From a green point of view, not only is it not 
always successful, but it reinforces the illusion that the dominant discourses are 
as ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ as they claim to be, and detracts from and weakens 
the force and legitimacy of important political knowledge about the inherent 
power relations that affect how we live together, political knowledge which 
underlies green anti-nuclear engagement. 
In debate with George Monbiot on Democracy Now! (2011) Helen 
Caldicott, a veteran anti-nuclear campaigner fights back by using this sense that 
scientific knowledge is more legitimate knowledge to her advantage, 
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emphasising her own credentials as a ‘physician, highly trained. I was on the 
faculty at Harvard Medical School’. In the debate and her later written response 
(2011) she emphasises concerns about internal emitters and radiation and the 
consensus that no dose of radiation is safe, however small, including 
background radiation. She cites the Yablokov et al. (2009) report which 
translates the compilation and synthesis of thousands of Slavic publications and 
emphasises that we still don’t know the full extent of the damage from 
Chernobyl because of the long time-frames and extensive land mass involved. 
Yet Monbiot dismisses this, emphasising instead the Anglo-American 
dominated scientific consensus, and pointing out that although the report was 
published by the New York Academy of Sciences, reviews have been critical, 
and the Academy has since distanced itself from it (Monbiot, 2011d). This 
standoff over the scientific evidence points to the problems for anti-nuclear 
opponents when they engage in this debate which is predominantly structured 
around a division between ‘reputable’ and legitimate science and ‘disreputable’ 
politics, and when those on both sides of political deliberation draw upon 
scientific knowledge as settled ‘fact’ as a means of cutting through uncertainties 
and by-passing politics (Latour, 2004).  
This example also highlights the power disparities where one side is able 
to more successfully draw upon the consensus of the status quo and claim 
neutrality and therefore also emotional calm. Monbiot (2011d) takes the moral 
and scientific high ground arguing that ‘[i]f we don’t stick to the facts, if we don’t 
subject all claims to the same degree of scepticism, we could make a bad 
situation worse’.  At the end of the debate on Democracy Now! (2011) Monbiot’s 
implacable emphasis upon the scientific consensus stands in stark contrast to 
Caldicott, who having faltered over some of the facts, concludes with obvious 
emotion ‘Have you ever tried to help a child dying of leukaemia, George? It’s 
beyond comprehension.’ 
Science is considered legitimate knowledge because it is understood to 
be separate from bias, politics, ideology and emotions. Engaging in this debate 
solely on its own terms puts those concerned about the effects of nuclear 
energy in a weaker position because scientific research which supports the 
status quo is able to pose as neutral, while that which does not is marked as 
political and tends to suffer from lack of funding and status (cf. Plumwood, 
2002; Martin, 1986a). This is illustrated in Mark Lynas’ (2013) suspicion of any 
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scientific research carried out by scientists who are transparent about their 
critical political leanings, and is apparent also in the history of scientific 
developments and research (Haraway, 1988; Martin, 1986a, 1986b; Plumwood, 
2002). But as will become clearer in Chapter Two, such separation of science 
and politics bars any discussion of the implications of science and of its 
entanglement in industry and governance upon the power relations which make 
up political community. It blocks public deliberation over the type of political 
community in which we can and might live, which is particularly important in the 
context of climate change and widespread ecological degradation. 
The reliance upon scientific consensus and ‘scientific fact’ understood to 
be separate from politics is also bolstered in pro-nuclear arguments by an 
emphasis upon the potential of science to develop technology which can help 
us to deal with the problems we face. Caldeira et al. (2013) recognise that 
‘today’s nuclear plants are far from perfect’, but are pushing for ‘advanced 
nuclear energy’, and argue that ‘[f]ortunately, passive safety systems and other 
advances can make new plants much safer’. This advanced science means that 
‘modern nuclear technology can reduce proliferation risks and solve the waste 
disposal problem by burning current waste and using fuel more efficiently’ 
(Caldeira et al., 2013).  
Responding according to the terms of the dominant discourse, anti-
nuclear advocates also emphasise scientific and technological potential, 
pushing for the scientific development of wind, solar, tidal and other forms of 
renewable and efficiency technologies. However, once more the discussion of 
these in terms which use the legitimising shorthand of scientific and 
technological progress to add force to arguments can lead to accusations of 
‘double standards’. Monbiot (2011b) recounts a debate with Caroline Lucas, 
Green Party MP for Brighton Pavilion, in which he describes her response as 
‘wildly illogical’: 
[w]hen I raised the issue of the feed-in tariff, she pointed out that the 
difference between subsidising nuclear power and subsidising solar 
power is that nuclear is a mature technology and solar is not. In that 
case, I asked, would she support research into thorium reactors, which 
could provide a much safer and cheaper means of producing nuclear 
power? No, she told me, because thorium reactors are not a proven 
technology. Words fail me.  
 
While the politics of technology is partially present, but mostly implicit, in Lucas’ 
case about the incumbency of nuclear energy, this unveiling of the politics of the 
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issue is not thoroughgoing and for the strength of her argument she instead 
relies implicitly upon the technological promise of solar power. When challenged 
with another argument about technological promise (that of thorium) Monbiot 
pounces upon the weak point in her over-reliance upon the science, and the 
idea of ‘proven technology’ (which also points to the rigours of free market 
economic testing, see below) contradicts her previous point, thereby weakening 
her overall case (see also Rustin, 2011).  
Engaging in the dominant terms of the debate with an emphasis upon 
scientific fact and proof as well as scientific and technological promise has a 
tendency to backfire because the ‘neutral’ language tends to work in favour of 
the dominant discourse of technological progress upon which nuclear 
advocates rely. This obscures underlying unavoidably political problems. The 
double-bind here is difficult to escape however, because pointing out the 
inherent politics marks out those with an anti-nuclear stance as explicitly 
political and therefore with markedly less legitimate knowledge of the issue 
according to the dominant understandings. 
The Monbiot-Lucas example just given also points to the ways in which 
the debate is not only heavily dominated by abstracted discussions of science 
and technology considered to be above and separate from politics, but that 
these are intertwined with similar tendencies in discussions of economics and 
cost, as well as the assumptions and imperatives of economic growth. The 
question of whether or not nuclear power can realistically help with carbon 
emissions reduction is highly fought over in terms of a predominantly abstracted 
economic discourse. Caldeira et al. (2013) argue that ‘[i]nnovation and 
economies of scale can make new power plants even cheaper than existing 
plants’. But those arguing against nuclear energy argue that it will be too costly. 
The EPR to be built at Hinkley has run into problems elsewhere ‘[o]riginally 
priced at €3bn, the Finnish reactor’s cost is estimated to be at least €5.7bn, and 
the French reactor is doing just as badly’ (Dorfman, 2011; see also Thomas et 
al., 2007). 
Opponents of nuclear energy also argue that a high strike price, the price 
the government will guarantee for power generated by Hinkley C, goes against 
EU regulations, providing an indirect or ‘backdoor’ subsidy, which will 
unfavourably advantage nuclear energy vis-à-vis renewables (Mitchell & 
Woodman, 2006; Toke, 2013a, 2013b). The question of whether state support 
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is illegal and will distort competition is currently being considered in Brussels. 
The UK government argues that the contract with EDF should not qualify as aid, 
and does not contravene EU treaties (Chazan & Barker, 2013). However, anti-
nuclear proponents argue that despite the insistence that the British 
government is not subsidising new nuclear it will inevitably require public money 
of some kind, because no nuclear reactor has ever been built, never mind 
decommissioned without state funding (Thomas et al., 2007; see also Sovacool 
& Valentine, 2012). They point out that ‘Britain’s nuclear waste bill is still 
growing too: liability estimates have grown from £50bn in the mid-2000s to as 
much as £80bn at present’ (Dorfman, 2011; see also Mason, 2010). 
Yet the economic arguments against nuclear energy are countered with 
the point that renewables too require huge amounts of investment. While in 
some ways the decentralised character of many renewables enables a better fit 
with neoliberal market forces and it has been argued that  
at least with wind and solar power, it is possible to see the cost curve 
dropping to the break-even point in the near future. Nuclear power, by 
contrast, may never be able to convince investors to put their money 
down without government guarantees (Noyes, 2011).  
 
The important point here however, as in the Monbiot-Lucas example above, is 
that to argue only on the basis of cost and market forces, and to rely, in 
particular on arguments against state subsidies within the dominant neoliberal 
discourses is counter-productive. As Monbiot’s (2011b) expression of frustration 
over Lucas’ dismissal of support for thorium illustrates, such arguments, if only 
engaged in at the abstract level, may undermine greens’ own hopes about the 
influence of state power in encouraging investment and development in 
renewables.  
Simply weighing up the economics as separate from politics once more 
leaves the door open to accusations of double standards, exposing problems 
with green support for the feed-in tariff financial incentive to encourage the 
uptake of renewable electricity-generating technologies, yet opposition to 
support for nuclear energy. In 2011, this cost 41p per kilowatt hour, yet the 
estimated cost of nuclear energy was at 8.3p per kilowatt hour (Monbiot, 
2011b). This figure excludes the back-end costs of storing radioactive nuclear 
waste which are often assumed to be dealt with by better and cheaper 
technology, displacing and discounting them into the future, and it also excludes 
insurance against the risk of high-impact disasters. However, the point here is 
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that such figures distil information and abstract it from the inherent history and 
politics of the issue. It is not enough for anti-nuclear greens to argue simply on 
the basis of cost in a manner understood to be above politics. Although the 
economic system has become ‘naturalised’ and the market is seen as a neutral, 
independent force, economics and cost cannot be understood separately from 
politics; the power relations which make up political community. It is important 
that the historical political intertwining of politics and economics is clearly 
understood. This includes the concern that historically, nuclear power has 
absorbed and continues to absorb exorbitant amounts of public money for 
political reasons (see next section), and has and will continue to divert 
investment away from what is required for renewables and energy efficiency, 
transmission and storage solutions to be developed (Mitchell & Woodman, 
2006; Thomas et al., 2007; Sovacool & Valentine, 2012; Elliott, 2010b).  
In this respect, drawing attention to political knowledge of the issue must 
include questions about the power relations which make up political community: 
who benefits from the support given to different technological solutions; whose 
technology counts and is deemed worthy of support; whether a type of 
technology supports existing unjust and unecological tendencies in the status 
quo or whether it encourages other possibilities; does it require highly 
centralised control, thereby diminishing individual and community autonomy or 
does it enable decentralisation and empowerment of local communities? The 
reliance upon abstracted arguments about cost and economic efficiency in anti-
nuclear arguments carries with it the danger of reinforcing what Fisher (2009) 
terms the ‘capitalist realism’ which pervades dominant neoliberal discourses. 
This realism implicitly relies upon the nature/culture separation which 
naturalises market forces, making them appear inevitable and unchangeable. 
As a result, harms and inequalities produced by these dynamics are also 
naturalised and seen as unavoidable side-effects, therefore remaining 
unchallenged or implicitly uncontestable. 
As I have pointed out, what is apparent amongst the environmentalists 
who have become supportive of nuclear energy is a conviction about the 
urgency of the problem of climate change and a tendency to want to quantifiably 
measure various effects and provide definitive ‘true’ and scientifically ‘objective’ 
solutions to problems. The temptation to use facts and figures and the promises 
of science or the economy to cut through the complex and difficult business of 
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politics is understandable. But those on the other side of the debate are also 
convinced by and wield certain scientific, economic and technical facts and 
figures. The effect is such, that the question of whether or not nuclear power 
can or should realistically help with carbon emissions reduction and meeting 
energy needs takes place on a predominantly technical and economic plane, 
with facts and figures bandied backwards and forwards ad infinitum.  
The different potential abstract economic scenarios and statistics 
combined with diverse claims about the potentials of existing and developing 
technologies is bewildering and disempowering for lay people, particularly when 
divorced from concrete social and political realities. Dorfman (2011) attempts to 
bring a measure of politics, the social relation of trust, back into the polarised 
abstract scientific and economic discussions arguing that 
Since we’re not all energy technology practitioners, it may come down to 
who you trust. As Andrew Warren, the director of the Association for the 
Conservation of Energy asks: given that Germany has the confidence to 
go down a non-nuclear route with the same carbon objective as the UK, 
have EDF and Huhne really got it so right, and has Europe’s most 
successful economy really got it so wrong? 
 
But ultimately this too resorts to the terms of the dominant reductive economic 
rationalist discourse, for in other words, we ought to trust the country which has 
been judged most successful in abstract economic terms. Such economic 
arguments are not to be dismissed, for they take the terms of the debate as 
they stand and make a best effort to compete on those terms – a pragmatic 
necessity at times. However, they can also just as easily be dismissed. The 
German public is renowned for its strong anti-nuclear sentiment. As the history 
of official thinking about resistance to nuclear energy also demonstrates (see 
next section), such ‘sentiment’ or ‘feelings’ are generally associated with ‘fear’ 
and considered an ‘irrational’, emotional and therefore unduly biased and 
inaccurate response (e.g. see Kelly, 2011). Merkel may be seen as cynically 
responding to the ‘irrational fear of nuclear energy [which] runs deep in 
Germany’, during by-elections which were crucial for her government (Johnson, 
2011). This type of argument reinforces the neoliberal understanding that it is 
politics meddling in economic affairs causing distortions, rather than 
acknowledging that economics and politics are inseparable. Thus the 
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comparison to Germany is liable to backfire on its own terms.6 That Germany, 
having shut down its nuclear power plants, is now burning more brown coal 
(lignite, worst for CO2 emissions) as a result (Nicola & Andresen, 2012; 
Anderson, 2014), adds fuel to the fire of those who emphasise an either/or 
choice between nuclear and fossil fuels in the face of climate change and 
highlights the problems with single-issue campaigning and policy-making. 
Arguing simply on the basis of cost and within the dominant neoliberal 
economic discourse also fails to challenge the underlying political problem of 
assumptions about the possibilities of endless economic growth. As Monbiot 
(2011e) himself admits (belatedly, after triggering much green consternation 
with his provocations earlier in the year) 
even if we can accept an expansion of infrastructure, the technocentric, 
carbon-counting vision I've favoured runs into trouble. The problem is 
that it seeks to accommodate a system that cannot be accommodated: a 
system that demands perpetual economic growth. We could, as Zero 
Carbon Britain envisages, become carbon-free by 2030. Growth then 
ensures that we have to address the problem all over again by 2050, 
2070 and thereon after. 
 
Yet climate scientists James Hansen, Ken Caldeira and others (Caldeira et al., 
2013) simply underline the imperatives of economic growth: ‘[g]lobal demand for 
energy is growing rapidly and must continue to grow to provide the needs of 
developing economies’. They insist in this context that renewable energy 
sources ‘cannot scale up fast enough to deliver cheap and reliable power at the 
scale the global economy requires’ (Caldeira et al., 2013). 
Implicit within the discourses described is an emphasis upon that which 
is deemed ‘rational’, associated with the power of abstract, quantifiable scientific 
and economic facts and figures, and that which is deemed ‘irrational’, 
associated with the unreasonable disregard or clouding of ‘objective’ science 
and economics with emotions and political bias. As the next section will show, 
historically, and up to the present in the immediate aftermath of Fukushima, 
anti-nuclear protestors have been characterised as irrational or unreasonable, 
unable to objectively judge risk probabilities in contrast to government scientific 
advisors and industry experts (Jha & Boseley, 2010; Allison, 2009; see also 
                                                     
6
 Other attempts to use the example of Germany include the insistence that Angela Merkel is a scientist, 
and therefore a more legitimate political decision-maker in these matters (e.g. The Guardian, 2013). 
Again, however, this shores up the divide between scientific knowledge and political knowledge, 
masking the politics of the former and degrading the status of the latter. 
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Sunstein, 2002a).7 This is also clearly apparent in the arguments of those 
greens that have come out in favour of nuclear energy. For example, Caldeira 
et al. (2013) assert that 
Quantitative analyses show that the risks associated with the expanded 
use of nuclear energy are orders of magnitude smaller than the risks 
associated with fossil fuels. No energy system is without downsides. We 
ask only that energy system decisions be based on facts, and not on 
emotions and biases that do not apply to 21st century nuclear 
technology. 
 
Once more the narrative of unquestionably positive scientific progress is clear, 
and within the dominant terms of debate which emphasise the imperatives of a 
neutral and objective science above political values, this may come across as 
wholly convincing. As Chapter Two will show however, politically and 
emotionally sensitive knowledge is not ‘irrational’ at all. To argue that 21st 
century technology is somehow miraculously detached from political 
circumstance fails to understand the socially and politically situated character of 
all science and technology.  
 With the polarization of the nuclear energy issue, the sense of urgency 
over climate change, and the scientific and economic complexities and 
uncertainties, it is easy to understand why relying upon the apparent legitimacy 
of abstracted apparently unbiased scientific and economic knowledge is 
appealing and convincing for some. Drawing upon scientific and economic 
‘facts’ appears to ‘solve’ and cut a more efficient line through the more time-
consuming and unpredictable processes of politics, where judging ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’ courses of action is a challenging process. I  have tried to show here 
how the consideration and attempted contestation of the nuclear energy issue in 
such limited terms is counter-productive, because i) it reinforces the dominant 
understanding that scientific and economic knowledge can be considered 
separately from politics, and that the existing scientific and economic status quo 
                                                     
7
 Sunstein suggests ‘that probability neglect offers a new, if partial, explanation for the division between 
experts and ordinary people in thinking about social hazards—one that raises fresh questions about 
claims of rival rationality. Of course, it is true that experts have their own biases; they are often wrong. 
The point is not that experts are always right, but that when ordinary people disagree with experts, it is 
often not because of competing value judgments, but instead because ordinary people are more subject 
to probability neglect’ (Sunstein 2002a: 84). This type of argument does not take into account power 
imbalances, and the ways in which people are more risk averse when not in a position of power over an 
issue. This is not a sign of a lower form of rationality but a different form of rationality based on social 
position (Fischer, 2005). Sandman’s study of risk managers who were much more risk averse when 
asked to imagine themselves as fathers instead of businessmen and engineers, is a case in point (Fischer, 
2005: 59). 
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is ‘natural’ and ‘unchangeable,’ and ii) it reinforces the sense that political 
knowledge, of the power relations which influence how we live together, is of 
less value, thereby reinforcing the neglect of important knowledge of socially 
produced harms of nuclear energy, and blocking serious consideration of 
alternatives. In what follows I consider nuclear energy in historical context, to 
gain a clearer picture of this problem. 
 
Tracing the history of dominant discourses of nuclear energy 
Emerging as a by-product of the atomic bomb, nuclear energy was developed 
through close cooperation between state, scientific and industry elites, with high 
levels of secrecy and minimal public engagement.  Even before the advent of 
neoliberal ideas the tendency for the issue to be discussed in abstracted 
scientific and technological terms with minimal engagement with democratic 
politics and an emphasis upon national economic development and scientific 
progress was well established. Tracing the history of the politics of nuclear 
energy from the context of the cold war and hopes of the scientific and 
technological progress of modernity, through to the decline of the industry in 
many countries after the liberalisation of energy markets and the high-profile 
disasters of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl in the 1970s and 1980s, right up 
to the prospects of a ‘nuclear renaissance’ in the early 2000s, shows that the 
emphasis upon reductive understandings of economics and science is evident 
throughout its history and has underpinned dominant discourses of state 
security. In particular, nuclear energy highlights the synergies and tensions 
between free market, liberal rhetoric and aspiration and national state security 
concerns both during and after the cold war, and more recently with climate 
change.  
Given the industry’s early promises of endless cheap energy, it appeared 
an attractive proposition during this time, with support including early green 
campaigners and many on the left. Although the recent promoters of nuclear 
energy discussed in the previous section often perceive and portray themselves 
as ‘new radicals’, shaking up an old orthodoxy (Kingsnorth, 2012), support for or 
ambiguity over nuclear energy is not new amongst those concerned about 
green issues, nor is the focus and emphasis upon the  ‘real’ scientific and 
economic ‘facts’ of the matter. Tracing the history of nuclear energy shows why 
particular ‘neutral’ understandings of science and economics have come to 
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dominate green discussions, but also demonstrates the limits to the efficacy of 
this from an ecological point of view, not only because it continues to exclude 
and devalue important and inalienable aspects of the politics of the issue, but 
because in the process this reinforces dominant discourses of capitalist state 
security and economic growth at the expense of the cultivation of alternatives.  
 In the United States and elsewhere there had been an upsurge in anti-
nuclear feeling in response to the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end 
of the Second World War. At this time the link between nuclear reactors and 
nuclear weapons was relatively apparent. The first nuclear reactors at Calder 
Hall in the UK and those built as part of the Manhattan Project in the United 
States were built in order to supply weapons-grade plutonium (Wynne, 2011; 
Roberts, 1999). With Eisenhower’s international ‘Atoms for Peace’ program and 
promises from the nuclear industry and scientists about unlimited and affordable 
energy, this link was complicated though never fully broken (Camilleri, 1984). 
Early claims of the nuclear industry and supportive governments coincided with 
popular imaginations about the advancement of civilisation and the 
development of science and technology to overcome the bounds of the ‘natural’ 
world (Wynne, 2011). The industry’s promises of energy which was ‘too cheap 
to meter’ had seductive appeal (Strauss, 1954, in Sovacool & Valentine, 2012; 
Herring, 2005). 
The Atoms for Peace program combined the idea of creating a market for 
exporting American nuclear technology with that of the moral duty of the United 
States (and other Western nuclear countries, notably France and Britain) to 
transform the world by, for example, eliminating famine and converting Africa 
‘into another Europe’ (Weart, 1988: 159; Sovacool & Valentine, 2012; Camilleri, 
1984). Certain countries, such as South Korea and Pakistan, even Iran up until 
its revolution in 1979, developed strongly in this area from participation in the 
program, which also played a key part in the politics of the cold war (Camilleri, 
1984; Sovacool & Valentine, 2012). 
 Many saw emancipatory possibilities of industrial development to 
increase and enable better distribution of resources and an enhanced quality of 
life for all (Sovacool & Valentine, 2012: 70; Herring, 2005). Nuclear energy was 
promoted as a solution for the Third World in order to meet the vast future 
potential energy needs of the rural poor (Sovacool & Valentine, 2012). Such 
countries often saw the advantages in energy security and national 
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independence which technological development in this area seemed to 
promise. Electrification was viewed as an important ingredient of modernization 
in the Second World too, where the Soviet nuclear industry said ‘Let the atom 
be a worker, not a soldier’ (Sovacool & Valentine, 2012: 138). The Soviet 
Union’s ‘Peaceful Atom’ project was three times the size of the United States’ 
program in terms of funding, disseminating nuclear materials and knowledge to 
communist states such as China, Cuba and Vietnam (Sovacool & Valentine, 
2012).8 
The idea of big technological development in general, and nuclear 
energy in particular, as symbolic of modern progress and industrialization and 
capable of being harnessed by the socialist project was attractive for many on 
the left, but also within strands of the green movement when compared with 
other more obviously destructive and intrusive means of energy production 
(Herring, 2005).  Within the peace and nuclear disarmament movement too 
there were some such as Professor John Fremlin in the UK, who, although 
campaigning for nuclear disarmament, supported nuclear energy as a potential 
means of alleviating energy conflicts and avoiding war (Herring, 2005: 156; 
Hudson 2005; Scurlock, 2010). The emergence of the ‘national security state’ in 
the late 1940s was very much driven by the idea of ‘economic security’ drawing 
the liberal left into nationalist projects by resonating with ideas of ‘personal 
freedom’ and ‘social equality’ tied to individuals’ desires for personal and ’social’ 
security, and mediating between intra- and international politics as the US 
promoted and naturalised ‘a certain vision of economic order, both internally 
and internationally’, a commitment to capital accumulation (Latham, 1997: 144-
146; Neocleous, 2006: 379-380). 
The link between national and economic security exposes the power 
politics lying behind the ostensibly uneasy and contradictory tension between 
nationalist realist security narratives, and those of liberalisation and the free 
market – a combination which throws up especially stark double-standards 
when we consider the historical intertwining of national and international nuclear 
security and the development of the global nuclear industry (Camilleri, 1984; 
Hecht, 2002, 2003; Sovacool & Valentine, 2012). The sensitive nature of the 
materials to be traded in the international nuclear energy markets necessitated 
                                                     
8
 Funding far outweighed the lack of actual resources and the technical difficulties which the Soviet 
nuclear energy project experienced in the early years (Sovacool & Valentine, 2012: 129). 
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the founding of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Operational by 
1957, it had ‘a mandate to spread nuclear power to the south’ (Stoett, 2003: 
103). The Washington Export-Import Bank released funding for constructing 
and fuelling 42 exported nuclear power projects, and made direct loans mostly 
to South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines (Stoett, 2003: 103; Camilleri, 1984: 
240). As some of the more outlandish promises surrounding nuclear energy 
failed to materialise in the 1960s and 1970s, industry and governments around 
the world maintained a veneer of technological competence, exclusivity and 
legitimacy through concerted public relations campaigns designed to persuade 
the public that nuclear energy was essential for development and national 
security, and an answer to the ‘energy crisis’ following the Oil Shocks of the 
1970s (Stoett, 2003: 103-4; Camilleri, 1984: 132; Hilgartner et al., 1983). 
Resistance to nuclear energy was sporadic and weak in the early years 
in Britain, but early concerns were especially apparent at local levels. Since the 
birth of nuclear energy there had been ‘profound, but concealed ambivalence 
towards nuclear technology amongst the public’ (Herring, 2005: 199). The fact 
that authorities refused to acknowledge fears as valid reinforced their 
reputations as unresponsive and arrogant organizations (Herring, 2005). Both 
governments and the nuclear industry put much effort into researching the 
psychological causes of ‘irrational’ and ‘undue anxieties and fears’ and 
‘abnormal emotional response’, ‘consigning […] critics to the psychiatric couch’ 
(Hilgartner et al., 1983: 100). In 1957, the World Health Organization (cited in 
Hilgartner et al., 1983: 102) convened the Study Group on ‘Mental Health 
Aspects of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy’ with the aim of making 
a valuable and concrete contribution to the adaptation of mankind to the 
advent of atomic power, making it indeed as painless and as unharmful 
as possible and allowing man to reap a rich harvest from the seed that 
his inventive genius has sown (Hilgartner et al., 1983: 102).  
 
The impact of the Windscale accident in Britain (1957) was studied in this 
manner, with one British study group member, Lord Ritchie Calder (cited in 
Hilgartner et al., 1983: 103) documenting the ‘factual and reassuring’ nature of 
press coverage in the first two days following the fire. On the third day, 
however, after milk was deemed unfit for human consumption and was 
disposed of in the sea, Calder (1962, cited in Hilgartner et al., 1983: 103) wrote 
the headlines exploded . . . As we studied the third day’s headlines, Hans 
Hoff [chairman of the study group and director of the Psychiatric 
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University Hospital and Neurological Institute in Vienna] said to me, 
‘Obviously all the editors were breast fed.’ It was, to him, a perfect 
example of ‘regression’. 
 
Although deadly serious, these reports used crude Freudian (and highly 
gendered and masculinist) analysis which trivialised people’s genuine concerns 
about the unknown long-term effects of radiation upon people and the 
environment.  
The more mainstream environmental organisations were ambivalent 
about nuclear energy to begin with. In the early 1970s the newly formed Friends 
of the Earth in the UK was predominantly in favour of nuclear power (Burke, 
cited in Herring, 2005: 160). Within the mainstream movement in the UK there 
was not much concern or attention to nuclear energy. Unlike in the United 
States, Australia, France and Germany there was no mass campaign and most 
environmentalists were far more concerned with debates about the ‘Limits to 
Growth’ and the ‘Blueprint for Survival’ (Herring, 2005: 155).  Debates over 
nuclear energy in the UK green movement bear similarities to contemporary 
debates - weighing nuclear energy up against coal and engaging in the issue in 
a highly technical manner. There was some debate in the Conservation Society 
newsletter, with those opposing nuclear energy raising the problem of waste 
and the legacy for future generations in particular, while those supporting 
emphasised the greater dangers of fossil fuels and other methods of power 
production (Herring, 2005: 155-6). Similarly, in the 1960s and early 1970s in the 
United States, conservationists were more concerned with opposing large 
hydro-electric dams and achieving conservation of large tracts of wilderness 
through the founding of national parks. Dam projects were criticised for their 
intrusive disruption of river systems, while nuclear energy was seen as more 
self-contained and benign. Support for the ‘peaceful atom’ did begin to waver, 
however, in the US and elsewhere, when sites of specific interest to the 
conservation lobby were chosen (Wills 2001, cited in Herring, 2005: 39). 
Concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the non-Western 
world were exacerbated by India’s testing of the ‘Smiling Buddha’ in 1974, 
enabled originally through export of nuclear technology from Canada (Stoett, 
2003, Sovacool & Valentine, 2012). In 1979, the fallout from the accident at 
Three Mile Island in the United States brought many personal stories of the 
after-effects upon peoples’ health, livelihoods and the local animal and plant life 
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to national and international media attention, despite official denial of the 
seriousness of the incident (Herring, 2005; Hollyday, 1991). After Three Mile 
Island officials stalled two days on advice to evacuate pregnant women and 
young children. They later forced the resignation of the state’s secretary of 
health who had issued the advice, and who had also highlighted 
‘misstatements’ in the Kemeny Commission investigating the incident, 
remaining highly concerned about the long-term health effects of the accident 
(Hollyday, 1991:148-9).  
In the years following the disaster at Three Mile Island, the Thatcher 
government in the UK was very careful about public concerns over nuclear 
power and anxious to avoid conflict. According to leaked cabinet minutes, the 
government believed it ‘might make more rapid progress towards its objective 
by a low-profile approach, which avoided putting government in a position of 
confrontation with … protestors’ (O’Riordan et al., 1988, cited in Dryzek et al., 
2003: 62). This approach entailed symbolic inclusion of opposition groups in 
planning inquiries, thereby reducing confrontation and legitimizing decisions 
(Dryzek et al., 2003). While there were limited possibilities for inclusion in public 
consultations in the UK this tended to encourage adherence to the restrictive 
scientific and rationalist engagement with the issue, at the expense of important 
aspects of the politics of nuclear energy, perpetuating and reinforcing the 
understanding that the dominant narratives were ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’, while 
those resisting were ‘biased’ and ‘political’ (Herring, 2005). 
The public inquiries themselves were weighted against opposition to 
nuclear energy. At Windscale in 1977, objectors were required to bear the 
‘burden of proof’ in the challenge against the government which played the role 
of ‘both promoter and judge’ of the development proposals (Dryzek et al., 2003: 
62, Wynne, 2011: 92). Submissions were obliged to be of a technical and 
legalistic nature, which restricted the range of social actors able to participate in 
the debate. An OECD report (1979: 68, in Dryzek et al., 2003: 62) following the 
Windscale Inquiry concluded that this had worked against public engagement 
and served to ‘depoliticise and decrease public debate’.9 In responding in this 
way, the authorities failed to answer persistent questions which dated back to 
                                                     
9
 See also Saward on this (1992: 89): ‘the role of the objecting value and expert groups was a more or 
less symbolic or token one … objectors were co-opted into advisory and informational roles at the 
inquiry but the origins, structure and processes of the Inquiry militated against their views receiving a 
full and considered hearing’ (in Dryzek et al 2003: 62-63). 
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the first nuclear inquiry at Bradwell in 1956, that ‘why, if nuclear power stations 
were so safe, were they built in remote areas? And why [if low-level radiation 
posed no risk] were there such detailed emergency measures in the event of 
any release of radioactivity?’ (Herring, 2005: 199). Friends of the Earth were 
‘stung’ by their experience at the Windscale Inquiry where considerable 
resources, time and effort were invested. In the subsequent 1983 Sizewell B 
inquiry of the early 1980s they then limited their participation to safety issues, 
having come to the conclusion that the inquiries were acts of co-optation to 
neutralise opposition (Dryzek et al., 2003: 63). The government pre-empted the 
results of the 1983 Sizewell B Inquiry, demonstrating its commitment to nuclear 
power development ‘through its financial investment in the proposal process, 
and the Central Electricity Generating Board had even ordered parts for 
Sizewell B before the Inquiry had concluded’ (Dryzek et al., 2003: 63). 
As is clear from governments’ and other social actors’ support for nuclear 
energy throughout this period, dominant discourses of scientific and 
technological modernization and economic development linked to nation 
building and national security greatly reinforced the case for nuclear energy 
(Sovacool & Valentine, 2012). This, combined with the scientific and 
technological complexities of the issue served to depoliticise and further 
disempower those who sought to raise the social, political and ecological 
problems of the technology. This was the case even within social movement 
organisations. According to Tom Burke (cited in Herring, 2005: 160), the 
Friends of the Earth position of being mostly in favour of nuclear power only 
changed when  they became convinced by the arguments of Amory Lovins from 
the U.S., and Walt Patterson, a nuclear physicist from Canada, who ‘understood 
the technical arguments and convinced us’. It is noteworthy that in the earliest 
days of the industry, intellectual dissent came most strongly from within the 
industry, from those with concerns over too rapid industrial expansion, reactor 
choice and the potential economic problems (Herring, 2005; Hilgartner et al., 
1983). This reflects the extent to which nuclear energy was an issue 
predominantly confined to experts, an issue of scientific knowledge that 
appeared to be beyond the scope or relevance of politics and the power 
relations which structure political community. 
In the UK, Ernst Schumacher was one of the earliest to draw attention to 
the scientific and technological uncertainties of nuclear energy (Herring, 2005: 
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80-81, see also Schumacher, 1973). It was not until the early 1970s that 
literature emerging from the U.S. began to counter a general lack of awareness 
about safety hazards and potential dangers of emissions from reactors. 
Scientific dissent over safe levels of radiation then became a rallying point for 
opposition by the public (Herring, 2010: 47). The work of Ernest Sternglass 
about the widespread effects of low-level radiation from nuclear fallout upon 
children made headway in the media but was deemed sensationalist and 
exaggerating by many. However, the inquiry into that report by Gofman and 
Tamplin, commissioned, yet later suppressed by the U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC), was respected by most, including Walt Patterson, who had 
by then become a key player in Friends of the Earth in the UK (Herring, 2005: 
160-61). Patterson remained dubious about emphasising radiation issues as a 
campaigning tactic, and insisted that Friends of the Earth was not ‘anti-nuclear 
per se’ (Herring, 2005: 160-161).  
Both Friends of the Earth and the Conservation Society in the UK were 
extremely careful to present a rationalist, neutral scientific and technologically 
informed stance, opposing the specific type of reactor being proposed rather 
than the risks of nuclear technology per se. There was ‘an implicit assumption 
that only those with scientific and technological knowledge - preferably a PhD in 
nuclear physics - could speak competently and credibly about scientific issues’ 
(Herring, 2005: 130). This meant that especially in the UK, those concerned 
with aspects of nuclear energy which were excluded by the apparently 
‘objective’ and ‘neutral’ approaches, for example impacts of uranium mining, 
long-term nuclear waste and the risks of accidents upon environment and 
people, concern for those outside of the national community, and concerns 
about the present and future political and democratic implications of such 
centralised and dangerous power production, had great difficulty in raising 
them.  
According to opinion polls, the only factor consistently associated with 
anti-nuclear opinion has been gender; ‘women in all countries, in all time 
periods, were consistently more anti-nuclear than men’ (Herring 2005: 28; see 
also Keller, Visschers & Siegrist, 2012). The nuclear industry has made a 
concerted effort to address this, with targeted advertising and the engagement 
of prominent female spokespeople (e.g. see Nelson 1984; Hilgartner et al., 
1983). Within the anti-nuclear and green movements worldwide women have 
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played leading organising roles at the grassroots. However they have tended to 
be disproportionately marginalised in official movement literature and 
pronouncements. Exceptions, such as Alice Stewart and Rosalie Bertell, as well 
as Helen Caldicott discussed above, worked in the area of health - deemed a 
more acceptable domain for women (Herring, 2005).  
Historically, the tendency to assume that ‘men expressed “facts” while 
women expressed “emotions”’ persisted even in more radical circles and 
publications (Herring, 2005: 130). The 1978 autumn edition of Undercurrents 
(cited in Herring, 2005: 130) a radical ‘eco-freak’ magazine, contained a 
‘Special Issue on Women and Energy’ with just one contribution on nuclear 
power by Irene Coates who had participated in the Windscale Inquiry. The 
editors introduced this article with  
We have heard the arguments for and against Windscale, most of them 
written by men. It is hard for a woman, faced with her feelings about 
nuclear energy, to be listened to seriously. A feeling response to the 
environment is as valid a starting point for protest and political change as 
an argument based on intellect or economic analysis. It is time that such 
responses are given the credibility they merit. 
 
The separation of ‘emotions’ and ‘feelings’ from ‘intellect’ and ‘analyses’ has 
continued even where not directly and overtly attached to gender. It underlies 
the persistent separation of science from politics, and assumptions about the 
validity of scientific over political knowledge. The constrained nature of access 
to government and the ‘origins, structures and processes’ of the public inquiries 
(Saward, 1992: 89), as well as the dominant discourses of scientific and 
economic optimism of the time make it clear why such assumptions have 
prevailed. The cultivation of scientific expertise and the ‘rational’ approach was 
intended to avoid ‘the risk of being labelled “emotional” or “lunatic” your views 
discredited’ (Walt Patterson, cited in Herring, 2005: 130). 
The exclusion of explicitly ‘political’ and other socially (i.e. ecologically) 
important aspects of the issue occurred not only in the UK, but internationally, 
and as much for those within state structures as outside them. In Germany, the 
main political parties, although debating nuclear policy from the beginning, 
were, as elsewhere, heavily dependent upon advice from experts of the nuclear 
industry and government research centres, and, due to the scientific, ‘technical’ 
framing of the problem, the debates were admitted later by insiders to be only a 
‘ritual “mise en scène” for the general public’ (Haenscke, 1977, cited in Nelkin & 
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Pollak, 1980a: 141). Because nuclear energy, particularly in the aftermath of the 
oil crisis of 1973-74, was framed in terms of national security and economic 
development and therefore ‘considered as implementation of general energy 
and military policy’, there was little room for the major political parties to raise 
the distinctly political aspects of the issue (Nelkin & Pollack, 1980a: 128). 
Masking the inherent politics of nuclear energy and shoring up the illusion of 
neutrality which expert culture and the reliance upon abstracted scientific and 
economic facts and figures encourages, reinforced the existing dominant 
political narratives of national security in the cold war context, masking these as 
necessary and unavoidable. 
The entwining of state security and state economic development 
opportunities and the tensions between state security and the free market are 
particularly apparent in the history of the international regulation of the nuclear 
industry and trade in uranium. For many years and for various international 
political reasons uranium mining was not classified as part of the ‘nuclear’ 
industry, nor subject to the same regulations, particularly not by uranium 
importing countries. This had the effect that uranium producers, especially in 
Africa, were written out of the nuclear picture (Hecht, 2012). Levels of regulation 
have been negotiated or enforced and declared licit or illicit to suit the stronger 
party between former colonial and postcolonial countries, such as France and 
Niger, or to enable the hidden continuation of business in the face of increasing 
anti-apartheid pressures, as was the case with the US and the UK in relation to 
uranium from South Africa and Namibia in the 1980s (Hecht, 2012). This 
applies also beyond uranium, as even after nuclear development stalled in the 
US in the 1980s and 1990s Westinghouse pushed the technology abroad and 
maintained a monopoly, often pushing old versions of technology. In the case of 
the Philippines, for example, a US court ruled that safety developments and 
restrictions applying to the technology used at Three Mile Island need not apply 
elsewhere (Del Callar, 1991). 
A cumulative history of accidents in the course of the nuclear fuel 
process followed by official delayed responses and obfuscation of dangers as 
well as economic costs have contributed to public unease over the years. 
Chelyabinsk, Soviet Union (1957), Windscale, UK (1957), Three Mile Island, 
U.S. (1979), Saclay, France (1979), Chernobyl, Ukraine (1986), Rajasthan, 
India (1995), Sellafield, UK (2005), Jadugoda, India (2006), and Fukushima, 
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Japan (2011) are only a tiny fraction of the number of costly (in terms of either 
economics or human fatalities) accidents occurring worldwide (see Sovacool & 
Valentine, 2012: 252-65). The accident at Chernobyl in the Ukraine in 1986 was 
not reported to Moscow until two full days after, for fear of disrupting May Day 
celebrations, and even then the extent of the disaster was covered up, and only 
exposed after a Swedish radiation monitoring station 800 miles northwest from 
the plant reported abnormally high radiation levels (Sovacool & Valentine, 2012: 
143).  
The nuclear accident at Chernobyl, with its wide-reaching effects across 
Europe, and the publicity of the disaster, in part thanks to a stronger anti-
nuclear and green movement at this time, proved a blow to government and 
industry efforts to reassure the safe and low-risk nature of nuclear energy and 
maintain secrecy over accidents and controversies (Rucht, 1995; Radkau, 
1995; Rüdig, 2000). In some ways the incident in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic led to a ‘symbolic opening’ of the world nuclear industry to 
consideration by economists, investors and the public, with experts from the 
U.S., Japan and Western Europe advising and visiting nuclear plants in Eastern 
Europe and Asia ever since, knowing the impact on their industry should there 
be another serious leak or meltdown anywhere in the world (Scurlock, 2010: 
32).  
However this did little to change the expert culture and the continued 
assumptions of the ‘rational’ and ‘neutral’ character of these. Instead, failures in 
governance of such disasters have been characterised as a result of 
mismanagement to be corrected, and as political mistakes in contrast to a 
smooth functioning science, considered separable from political 
experimentation and bureaucratic bias (Renn, 1990). Despite concerted efforts 
to improve safety and perfect and scientifically guarantee risk management, 
scandals and incidents have persisted. In Britain, the on-going controversies 
since 1977 over the thermal oxide nuclear fuels reprocessing plant (THORP) at 
Sellafield (previously Windscale), have become ‘global bywords for controversy, 
mismanagement and misinformation over the nuclear fuel cycle’s most intensely 
problematic phase, plutonium (and uranium) extraction from spent reactor fuel’ 
(Wynne, 2011: 1). It is now finally scheduled to close in 2018 (BBC, 2012).  
It might be noted that given the extent of government and industry 
publicity in support of nuclear energy and secrecy regarding accidents, the level 
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of public debate and concern which did come about might not have occurred 
without the work of anti-nuclear and green movements at local, national and 
global levels. Despite protest and public engagement on the issue, including 
public debate encouraged by the predominantly pro-nuclear Labour Party and 
Tony Benn in particular,10 time and again important concerns of those opposed 
to nuclear power were not taken seriously or thoroughly considered in decision-
making in the final instance (Wynne, 2011). Concerns about nuclear energy 
continued to be dismissed as irrational by both government and industry, and it 
took the privatisation programme of Thatcher and the Conservative government 
in the UK to ultimately expose the economic cost of nuclear energy, and thereby 
limit nuclear development in the UK (Dryzek et al., 2003: 63). Although 
opposition can still in part be credited with having increased awareness of the 
risks and made the industry a less attractive proposition for investors in a 
liberalised market (Rucht, 1995), in the UK it is generally agreed that ultimately 
it was the privatisation and liberalisation of the energy industry which 
undermined most of all any further expansion of nuclear energy from the 1980s 
to early 2000s (MacKerron, 2011).  
In the U.S., which has the highest number of reactors in the world, the 
Price-Anderson Act, also applying to nuclear weapons installations, was crucial 
to nuclear energy development in the early years. This ensured that the law 
would ‘hold harmless the [nuclear] licensee and other persons indemnified’ from 
public liability claims arising from nuclear accidents causing total damages in 
excess of $560 million’ (Shrader-Frechette, 1980: 10). Development in the US 
stalled after Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, as a combination of economic 
privatisation and reduced state security increased public scrutiny and public 
opposition (Sovacool & Valentine, 2012). Although many complex and case 
specific factors contributed to the circumstances in each country, the levels of 
nuclear energy consolidation in France, China and even South Korea can be 
attributed at least in part to strong levels of centralisation and government 
control over energy production and distribution (Sovacool & Valentine, 2012). 
                                                     
10
 Tony Benn (2009) has since said:  ‘In 1955 when Eisenhower said he was going for ‘Atoms for Peace’ I 
became a passionate supporter of it. Having been brought up on the Bible I liked the idea of swords into 
ploughshares. I advocated nuclear power as Minister of Technology. I was told, and believed, that 
nuclear power was cheap, safe and peaceful. Having been in charge of nuclear power I discovered it 
wasn’t cheap, wasn’t safe and when I left office I was told that during my period as Secretary of State for 
Energy, plutonium from our nuclear power stations went to the Pentagon to make nuclear weapons. So 
every nuclear power station in Britain is a bomb factory for America. I was utterly shaken by that. 
Nothing in the world would now induce me to support nuclear power. It was a mistake’. 
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This has led to the situation in the UK where the government, due to its 
‘liberalised’ energy market, has been wooing and seeking to provide incentives 
for Chinese and French owned companies to invest in the UK energy 
infrastructure (Wintour, 2012; Fortson, 2013; DECC, 2014).  
Already in the early 1990s, some raised the possibility that nuclear 
energy might have a potential role to play in addressing global warming or 
climate change, with arguments of the relative merits in comparison to coal and 
oil, and in particular the possibilities for developing countries (Heidenreich, 
1991). Yet while at this time many argued that the nuclear industry had lost its 
legitimacy in those countries such as the UK and the US where development 
had stalled (Rucht, 1995; Stoett, 2003), by the mid-2000s, with emerging global 
scientific consensus about the severity of the problems and causes (if not the 
complex effects) of climate change, as well as the pressures of meeting the 
ever-rising energy demands of economies old and new there was talk of a 
‘nuclear renaissance’ (Elliott, 2010a).  
Hinkley C is one of the first major new infrastructure planning projects to 
be tested under the new fast-track planning regime brought in by the last 
Labour government and adapted and consolidated under the current coalition 
government. It has seen an emphasis upon ‘consensus’ at the cost of genuine 
consultation, and the limiting of public contributions to exclude questions 
already decided upon and set out in National Policy Statements (Johnstone, 
2010; Blowers, 2013).  The last Labour government has been characterised as 
‘clearly committed to an EM [ecological modernisation] approach to sustainable 
development’ (Barry & Doran, 2006: 256; see also Hajer, 1995; and Christoff, 
1996). However, in a pre-dominantly neo-liberal country such as the UK this has 
entailed attempts to resolve contradictions between the economy and the 
environment through state regulation to encourage predominantly ‘resource 
efficiency and technological and supply-side solutions’ (Barry & Doran, 2006: 
259). In this respect ecological modernisation has remained ‘weak’ with a 
tendency to look to technological solutions, rely upon technocratic policy-
making by scientific, economic and political elites and impose closed-end policy 
frameworks, rather than the more open approach, considering multiple 
possibilities, characteristic of  ‘strong’ ecological modernisation, which would 
involve more open, participatory and democratic decision-making and  broader 
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changes to the institutional and economic structures to integrate ecological 
concerns (Christoff, 1996: 490, in Barry & Doran, 2006: 255).  
Nuclear energy policy in particular, has been predominantly seen as an 
expert, technocratic issue. The building of consensus through limited 
possibilities for public engagement ‘where disruption or dissent is reduced to 
debates over the institutional modalities of governing, the accountancy calculus 
of risk, and the technologies of expert administration or management’ 
(Swyngedouw, 2009: 609) has been diagnosed as symptomatic of a ‘post-
political’ condition resulting from the hegemony of neoliberalism, particularly in 
the context of dominant constructions of climate change (Swyngedouw, 2010; 
Johnstone, 2013). The ‘colonization of the political sphere by incontestable 
scientific truths, neoliberal inevitabilities, and technocratic administration’ 
(MacGregor, 2013: 13) is certainly apparent.  
The process has seen participants ejected from consultation meetings for 
insisting upon raising matters of concern (Stop Hinkley, 2012), and the slicing of 
the planning application process with the effect that this evades clear 
assessment of the project in its entirety, and the questioning of nuclear energy 
as an option. Prior to receiving overall planning permission from the 
Infrastructure Planning Commission, the preparatory works consultation at West 
Somerset County Council (which did not allow for consideration of whether or 
not we need nuclear power) allowed for the bulldozing of the site and the 
beginning of the building of the foundations for the plant without consideration 
for the impact upon the local communities and wildlife or the possibility that the 
power plant might not be constructed (Morris, 2011; Vidal, 2011). All of these 
tendencies have led many concerned to assume that, as with nuclear projects 
in the past (Wynne, 2011), public consultation was simply a box-ticking 
exercise, and the project was a foregone conclusion (The Land, 2012). 
The ‘green’ case for nuclear energy in the UK gathered pace under Tony 
Blair. The 2003 Energy White paper said ‘not now, but not never’ and promised 
a full public consultation (DTI 2003, Bickerstaff et al., 2008). However, the 
emphasis upon climate change and ambitions to become world-leading in 
carbon emissions reduction, combined with concerns about energy security and 
the looming ‘energy gap’11 contributed to growing support for nuclear energy 
                                                     
11
 The ‘energy gap’ is a term used by others, especially nuclear proponents (e.g. Barry, 2005; EDF 2014) 
and taken up in news reports (Black, 2005, in Bickerstaff et al., 2008). This is the gap between projected 
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with certain influential scientists, within industry and in government (Bickerstaff 
et al., 2008). However, the energy policy review begun by the government in 
2007 was legally challenged by Greenpeace. In light of the promise of a full 
public consultation on the principle of the need for nuclear energy, this was 
ruled ‘very seriously flawed’, ‘seriously misleading’ and ‘unlawful’ (Royal Courts 
of Justice, 2007: 45; Johnstone, 2010).  
In the 2003 Energy White Paper the issues of substance considered 
important and requiring clarification had been economics and waste. For both of 
these, the government only released substantial information after the brief 
twelve week consultation period had ended. The consultation was particularly 
misleading with regards to the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management 
(CoRWM). It implied that they envisioned no problem with accommodating 
waste from nuclear new build. In actual fact CoRWM’s stance had been an in 
principle ‘yes, there is a technical solution’, but there should be a full and 
separate consultation for the new build proposals, taking into account ‘social, 
political and ethical issues, (for example the creation of further burdens on 
future generations)’ (Royal Courts of Justice, 2007: 42-43). CoRWM was 
especially keen to retain a distance from the issue of nuclear new build, due to 
its suggestion that geological disposal should happen ‘on the principle of 
volunteerism’, ‘an expressed willingness [by a community] to participate’: the 
decision to produce more nuclear waste might severely impact upon any 
willingness that did exist (CoRWM, quoted in Royal Courts of Justice, 2007: 44). 
 Tony Blair’s response to the court ruling was that they might have to do 
the consultation again, but this would not change the policy (Johnstone, 2010: 
96; MacKerron, 2011). There was a strong push from industry and scientists in 
the UK, including the Royal Academy of Engineering and the Institution of Civil 
Engineers, which helped strengthen an emerging consensus within government 
around the need for nuclear energy in the context of climate change (Leake, 
2005; Bickerstaff et al., 2008). At the same time, it is important to understand 
the context of a global industry pushing for expansion opportunities. Notable 
was the government’s emphasis upon the changed economic circumstances, of 
the recent resurgence in nuclear power and uranium prospecting in other parts 
of the world (DTI, 2007).  
                                                                                                                                                           
electricity supply and demand due to obligations to reduce carbon emissions, the closing of old oil and 
coal-fired power stations combined with the closing of most of the country’s old nuclear power stations 
over the next 20 years  (Black, 2005; EDF, 2014a). 
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There was much speculation in the early 2000s about a revival of the 
world uranium market with renewed prospecting in Africa and India, and with 
Australia on the verge of reopening development at Jabiluka (Katona, 1998; 
Falk et al., 2006). For the first time a uranium futures market was established, 
replacing the previously more limited spot price market. Previously the majority 
of uranium trade had taken place through contracts negotiated directly between 
buyer and seller (Hecht, 2010a). Hinkley C had become significant for EDF as 
launch pad for the EPR (European Pressurized Reactor) on the global stage 
(Greenpeace, 2012; Shalya, 2013). Success in the UK was particularly 
important because EDF was struggling with overruns and mounting costs on the 
EPR build at Flamanville in France by the end of the 2000s. AREVA (also 
partially owned by the French state) had been suffering similar setbacks on the 
same reactor design at Olkiluoto in Finland (Mitchell & Woodman, 2006; 
Greenpeace, 2012; Mason, 2009; Gosden, 2013b; Bird, 2013). 
By 2008 the UK government announced that including new nuclear 
energy in the UK’s future energy mix was in the ‘public interest’ (BERR, 2008: 
5). DECC (2009: 10) pronounced 
Nuclear power is low-carbon, economic, dependable, safe and capable 
of increasing diversity of energy supply and reducing our dependence on 
any one technology or country for our energy or fuel supplies. 
 
In the light of the challenges which renewable forms of energy, not to mention 
energy use reduction, pose to the existing economic and technical, never mind 
political or socio-cultural, energy structures in existence, nuclear energy is being 
touted as an important part of the future energy mix (DECC, 2011b: 27-8). 
Chris Huhne’s, (Secretary of State), Regulatory Justification decision for 
both Areva’s EPR and the Westinghouse AP1000 reactor designs cited carbon 
reduction in the context of the greater risks of climate change, and ‘security of 
supply and other economic effects’ (including the economic and job benefits of 
creating a globally competitive  UK nuclear supply chain) as the two major 
public interest points which outweighed risks and uncertainties over radiological 
health detriment and waste storage and ‘disposal’, as well as risk (understood in 
economic terms) of a severe accident (DECC, 2010). National energy security 
is particularly emphasised: ‘[t]he reliable and affordable supply of electricity is 
essential to the daily lives of the population and the functioning of business. It is 
difficult to overstate the extent to which quality of life is dependent on adequate 
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energy supplies’ and so ‘a secure, low carbon energy supply is of the highest 
national importance’ (DECC, 2010: 4). It was by means of such justification that 
the Energy Review Consultation Document ‘leapfrogged’ consultation on the 
substantive issue or principle of nuclear energy, and only allowed objections on 
particular concerns in relation to new build (Royal Courts of Justice 2007; DTI, 
2006). 
In the meantime, and whilst local consultations on the preliminary works 
for Hinkley C as well as the beginning of the overall planning inquiry were 
ongoing, the disaster in Japan occurred. The Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami 
on 11th March 2011 wreaked havoc and destruction, killing over 15,000 people 
with thousands more injured and missing. The earthquake and tsunami 
disrupted the cooling systems at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, 
leading to overheating, hydrogen explosions and meltdown at three nuclear 
reactors there (CNN, 2011; WNA, 2014). The accident was rated top level 7, 
(major accident) on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale 
(INES).12 100,000 people were evacuated from the area and although official 
'cold shutdown condition' was announced in December 2011, workers can only 
enter parts of the site for extremely short periods at a time and there are 
continuing problems with leaks of contaminated radioactive water. At time of 
writing the accident was raised again to INES level 3 (serious incident) as a 
result of uncontainable leaks of radioactive water from the site (WNA, 2014; 
BBC, 2013a). Over a thousand people have died as an indirect consequence of 
the Fukushima disaster, although once more the industry has attributed this to 
hesitance and inability of the government to correctly assess risks (WNA, 2014) 
The Weightman Review into the safety of the UK’s nuclear power plants 
in the aftermath of Fukushima explicitly stated that it would not address nuclear 
new build or energy policy issues (ONR, 2011). This meant that submissions 
made to the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) questioning whether, in the 
aftermath of Fukushima, new nuclear power should be part of the UK energy 
mix were not considered by Dr. Weightman’s reports. The government’s 
response to the consultation on its revised draft national policy statements on 
energy however referred to the Weightman review as conclusive on the issue of 
safety in the aftermath of Fukushima (DECC, 2011a).  
                                                     
12
 Event scale introduced by the IAEA in 1990. Levels 4-7 are described as accidents, ranging from an 
accident with local consequences (4) to major accident (7), and 1-3 described as incidents, ranging from 
anomaly (1) to serious (3) (IAEA, 2008). 
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There is evidence to suggest that following Fukushima the UK 
government was more concerned about the damaging effects this would have 
upon its policy for the development of new nuclear power stations than upon the 
lessons which might be learned about the safety of existing British nuclear 
plants. Government officials consulted with EDF, Areva, Westinghouse and the 
Nuclear Industry Association arguing that ’this  has the potential to set the 
nuclear industry back globally’, ‘we need to ensure the anti-nuclear chaps and 
chapesses do not gain ground on this. We need to occupy the territory and hold 
it. We really need to show the safety of nuclear’ and ’[w]e need to all be working 
from the same material to get the message through to the media and the public’ 
(DTI, 2011; Edwards, 2011). Two days after the tsunami and earthquake, while 
the disaster was still unfolding and there was a lack of clear understanding of 
what was happening as well as what was yet to come (the two major explosions 
had not yet occurred) the department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) 
emphasised that the situation was not as dramatic as the media was making 
out, that radiation release had been controlled and the reactor had been 
protected: ‘a good industry response showing the safety of nuclear’ was needed 
‘otherwise it could have adverse consequences on the market’ (Edwards, 
2011). 
With the energy market not directly under government control since 
liberalisation and privatisation in the 1980s and 1990s it has been an on-going 
challenge for the government to influence the energy market in the UK. There 
are important tensions between the prevailing discourses of neoliberalism and 
discourses of security, with the latter tending to work more in favour of nuclear 
interests (Toke, 2013c). However, as others have pointed out, the neoliberal 
agenda has tended to come hand in hand with ‘a more unaccountable state 
formation’ and a heightened security role for the state in certain areas 
(Johnstone, 2010; Stokes, 2007).  Because of dominant neoliberal discourse 
the 2010 Policy Statement insists that nuclear energy will not receive state 
subsidies. However the government was in protracted and difficult negotiations 
with EDF over the ‘strike price’, the price the government will guarantee for 
power generated by Hinkley C.  
For EDF, favourable results to these negotiations were crucial for 
receiving back up investment for its UK projects.  Centrica pulled out of the 
Hinkley project in 2012 and potential investors require more government 
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guarantees of returns on investment (Carrington, 2013). The government, on 
the other hand, though pushing for nuclear energy, was extremely wary of 
negotiating a high ‘strike price’ which would be guaranteed for the next 35-40 
years (Gosden, 2013a). The power station was given planning permission in 
March 2013. In October of the same year, after extremely protracted 
negotiations, the government agreed a ‘strike price’ of  £92.5 megawatt-hour for 
the energy produced there, at least twice the current market price, with 65% of 
its capital costs underwritten by loans guaranteed by the Treasury (Toke, 
2013b). Pending a ruling from Brussels as to whether this agreement 
contravenes state aid regulations the controversial, extensive preparatory 
clearing and excavation works, which EDF have already begun at the site will 
have successfully paved the way for the UK’s largest nuclear power plant 
(Chazan & Barker, 2013). 
Thus we see how the imperatives created by the science on climate 
change and the commitments to reducing carbon emissions create a force 
which subverts democratic process and underlines the non-negotiable ‘need for 
nuclear.’ This need is also justified according to the requirements of economic 
growth and in terms of national security. The science and the non-negotiability 
of economic facts and the taken for granted priority of national security ensure 
that the politics of the issue are obfuscated and the illusion of steering a 
‘neutral,’ ‘objective’ and therefore ‘rational’ course is sustained. This certainty 
provided by the inescapability of the ‘facts’ and the assurances of the experts 
has played a key role in the government’s failure to reconsider its nuclear new 
build policy in the wake of a successful legal challenge over  inadequate 
democratic consultation, and even in the wake of the disaster at Fukushima. 
The emphasis on addressing the ‘twin challenge of energy security and 
climate change’ (DECC 2011b: 18) increases a general sense of urgency and 
impending crisis which reinforces existing national and economic security 
discourses. The security emphasis, the no choice quality of the science on 
climate change and the priority of national economic interests and security also 
legitimise harsher policing and government control to minimise the role and 
effect of protest and civil disobedience in the context of democratic failures (see 
also Welsh, 2007). This has been seen to particularly affect the radical 
environmental movement as well as anti-nuclear protest.  
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Historically, the experience of environmental organisations in anti-nuclear 
politics in the UK has been a difficult and discomfiting one. Government support 
for nuclear energy has retained a veneer of legitimacy through the history of 
public inquiries on the issue, but was combined with a history of coercion and 
surveillance. Friends of the Earth were bugged by MI5 when involved in making 
the case against nuclear at the 1985 Sizewell B inquiry (Lamb 1996, in Dryzek 
et al., 2003: 50). In 1992 Greenpeace pulled out of plans to hold a protest 
concert at the Sellafield site after the threat of a legal injunction which could 
have resulted in the group’s assets being seized (Connelly & Smith, 1999, in 
Dryzek et al., 2003).  
More recently, the idea of energy security was used to justify the 
infiltration of environmental activist groups by undercover police officers (Day, 
2011). In 2008 a jury acquitted protestors accused of causing £30 million 
criminal damage by scaling Kingsnorth power station, on the basis that they 
were acting in the global interest (Vidal, 2008). E.ON had lobbied for 
‘dissuasive’ sentences in this case arguing that failure to impose tough 
convictions ‘could “impact” upon investment decisions in the UK’ (Ball, 2013). In 
2009 the rationale of ‘national energy security’ was used in inflationary manner 
by police in the case against activists who were pre-emptively arrested for a 
planned action against Ratcliffe-on-Soar coal-fired power station. In this case 
the Judge said ‘[i]t is right to emphasise that this planned action would have had 
no practical effect on the electricity supply’, contradicting police claims that the 
activists ‘were looking at taking out one of the biggest power stations supplying 
over two million people – hospitals, vulnerable people’, but these nevertheless 
featured strongly in the UK media (Day, 2011). This time the jury were not 
convinced by the defence’s argument that their intention was to prevent harm to 
human life and property which would result from climate change (Lewis, Hirsch 
& Evans, 2011; Platform & PIRC, 2011).  
In 2011, two EDF staff members were sent to jail and EDF fined 1.5 
million Euros by a French court for spying on Greenpeace activists campaigning 
against new nuclear reactors in France (Black, 2011). Prior to this case a 
private investigator claimed he was hired by EDF to hack into Greenpeace UK’s 
computers and also consulted with MI5 about the environmental organisation’s 
work (Booth, 2009). In the UK, the National Public Order Intelligence Unit 
(NPOIU) which coordinated undercover police operations within environmental 
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movements, including the infamous case of Mark Kennedy, has also been 
gathering intelligence on activists against nuclear new build (Edwards, 2012). 
The NPOIU ‘was established to support police forces in managing the 
intelligence around the threat to communities from public disorder connected to 
domestic extremism and single issue campaigning’ (NPOIU, 2013; HMIC, 
2012). It is part of a set of surveillance units founded with the aim of satisfying 
‘the needs of companies targeted by activists’ and is symptomatic of a broader 
blurring of boundaries between public and private interest and intelligence 
gathering (Lubbers, 2012; Evans & Lewis, 2013).  
In this section we have seen important continuities in the history of the 
politics of nuclear energy. Although the environment as an ‘issue’ has in some 
ways been successfully ‘mainstreamed’, for those concerned with the harms 
which are excluded from or devalued in the dominant abstracted scientific 
discourses, the same complications in the articulation of harms of nuclear 
energy persist. For the most part, the problem of our energy futures and the role 
nuclear power may play in this is discussed and addressed in similarly limiting 
ways, confining valuation of relevant knowledge to understandings of 
‘economics’ and ‘science’ which are deemed to be separate from the political 
conditions which produce them, and which exclude and devalue important 
aspects of political community. What has changed is the sense of urgency 
surrounding climate change. In September 2013, shortly before Cameron’s deal 
with the French and Chinese power companies over Hinkley C, the Liberal 
Democrat Party became the last major party in the UK to abandon its anti-
nuclear stance (the Conservatives changed their ‘last resort’ stance in 2010). 
Ed Davey argued for this on the basis of the ‘real and massive danger to the 
planet’ posed by climate change (BBC 2013b; Jowit, 2010; Vidal 2013).  
Recently, Paul Kingsnorth (2013) has characterised the present day split 
in the green movement as the emergence of ‘neo-environmentalism’, drawing 
parallels with the emergence of neoliberalism in the early 1970s. Advocates are 
‘attempting to break through the lines of an old orthodoxy that is visibly 
exhausted and confused’, and ‘emphasize scientific measurement and 
economic analysis over other ways of seeing and measuring’ (Kingsnorth, 
2013). ‘Neo-environmentalism’ is a response to crisis: ‘they are beginning to 
grow in numbers at a time of global collapse and uncertainty. And like the 
neoliberals, they think they have radical solutions (Kingsnorth, 2013). Yet as the 
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above discussion shows, many of their arguments and the values they implicitly 
adhere to are not new.  
Resistance continues. While often portrayed as irrational, intransigent, 
and extreme, anti-nuclear campaigners emphasise that their approach is more 
‘rational’. They highlight as ‘irrational’ pro-nuclear trust in risk assessments 
about the low probability of serious accidents, and faith in positive technological 
development and long-term stable government and industry control of 
dangerous waste. As much research suggests, there are different forms of 
rationality deriving, amongst other things from different value emphases and 
from different positions of power (Fischer, 2005; see also Jasanoff, 2005). 
Theo Simon of the folk band Seize The Day, was criticised by George 
Monbiot (2012) for his involvement in the occupation of the land at Hinkley in 
protest at the preparatory works there. In an animated exchange with Monbiot 
(2012), Simon seeks to reclaim ‘rationality’  
It is as if we were saying to our children “We have had to behave 
irrationally (nuclear) to avoid behaving even more irrationally (fossil 
fuels), because we didn’t care enough about you to take a rational, but 
more politically challenging, route”. To me this is the path of political 
expediency over ecological principles. 
 
He refuses to separate out rationality from politics and his words highlight two 
important points relating to how I characterise the problem of the dominant 
discourses of nuclear energy. Firstly, he emphasises the inherent politics of the 
issue and of any scientific and technological route taken, and secondly, he links 
the politics to ecological principles. This hints towards the possibility of another 
form of rationality which does not see science/politics as separate, nor the issue 
of nuclear energy as something that can only be debated in abstracted ‘neutral’ 
economic and scientific terms. Quite the opposite, it implies that a more 
ecologically grounded form of rationality requires that we take the politically 
more challenging route, and that rationality has nothing to do with the exclusion 
of politics.  
Limiting discussion to scientific and economic expertise and cultivating a 
carefully ‘neutral’, ‘rational’ approach which excludes emotions and politics has 
reinforced the separation of science/politics and nature/culture. Reductive 
understandings of science and economics have facilitated the continued 
naturalisation and non-questioning of dominant state security and economic 
development narratives which assume the need for man to conquer ‘nature’, 
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whilst taken-for-granted understandings of nature serve to justify and 
institutionalise the status quo. As I will point out in the final section of this 
chapter, this blocks important possibilities for change. Conceptions of 
economics for example, which assume the necessity of a growth economy 
(conventionally understood), exclude and devalue important human and 
nonhuman factors and effects, often simplifying opposition so that possibilities 
are characterised in dichotomous either/or terms such as growth/no growth, 
which serve to reinforce assumptions and stereotypes about opposition to the 
dominant understanding of economics as ‘political’, ‘radical’, ‘idealistic’ and 
therefore completely ‘unrealistic’. Yet as John Barry and Peter Doran (2006: 
251) emphasise, the crises which we face ‘render the distinction between what 
is ‘realistic’ and ‘radical’ problematic’, to say the least.  
This thesis emphasises that particularly given the uncertainties and 
problems we may face in the context of climate change, it is important that we 
have as clear a picture as possible of what is at stake in the politics of nuclear 
energy. Resistance is vital, and action on climate change is an urgent matter, 
but importantly, we need to find ways of linking up our understandings of the 
crises we face and find ways to articulate the harms that are being perpetuated. 
This entails linking up understandings of science, economics and politics as 
means of navigating these, as well as challenging dominant exclusionary 
understandings of security, in order to avoid the potential dangers of co-
optation, fragmentation, marginalisation, trivialisation, and even criminalisation 
within the dominant discourses. There is a danger that the urgency and what 
Michael Saward (1993: 64) has called the ‘no-real-choice quality’ of certain 
environmental discussions, particularly obvious in those based on the science 
of climate change (reinforced by and reinforcing ‘uncontestable’ and politically 
abstracted conceptions of economics and security) obscure important aspects 
of the politics of the issue. It is precisely these important political aspects to 
which many of the interlinking social movements of the 1970s and 1980s drew 
our attention. It is to these, and the intersectional ecological critique, which 
linked social injustices and environmental degradation, that I now turn. We can 
see the character of the contemporary debates and the history of nuclear 
energy as indicative of a broader failure of the radical ecological linking critiques 
articulated in the 1960s and 1970s to penetrate hegemonic discourses and 
structures over the past forty years.  
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Retrieving the radical ecological critique of the early green and anti-
nuclear movements 
 
It was in the context of severely restricted political terrain – the limited 
possibilities for participation in debates and decisions on nuclear energy – 
which saw the politicisation of nuclear energy and its emergence as a focal 
point and linking issue for various social movements in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. Although with varying strengths and degrees and much local 
differentiation, the contemporary diverse and diffuse green movements in the 
Western world, particularly Europe, the United States, and Australia, and the 
ecological critique associated with these, developed in conjunction with, and in 
part emerged out of, the early anti-nuclear movements. Nuclear energy 
constituted a focal point and linking issue for strands of all the so-called ‘new 
social movements’ (peace, environment, women’s, civil rights, indigenous 
struggles, anti-racism, autonomist/anarchist etc.). In fact, while these 
‘movements’ developed and have been theorised in relatively single-issue form, 
according to the fracturing effects of existing political opportunity structures and 
frameworks for thinking about them, in practice there was and still is 
considerable intersection and overlap between them and a linking of their 
critiques and capacities which is often lost in mainstream, non-participatory 
academic analysis (Welsh, 2001).  
There are certain key principles emphasised in attempts to define the 
distinctiveness of green politics or ‘ecologism’ (Dobson, 2007).  As well as the 
slightly more mainstreamed precautionary principle, such points include: 
‘holism’, or understandings of the complex interdependence of humans and 
nonhuman nature; understanding the ecological limits to conventional economic 
growth, production and consumption; respecting human and biodiversity; and 
appropriateness of scale, involving certain degrees of decentralisation where 
possible to increase accountability and reduce impact (Dobson, 2007). In more 
concise terms, according to green parties across the world, the ‘fundamental’ 
principles involve ecological awareness, grassroots democracy, nonviolence 
and social justice (Doherty, 1992; UK Green Party, 2013; Global Greens, 2012). 
Inherent in this is the ecological wisdom in attending to the ways in which 
different aspects of social and political life intersect and rebound upon each 
other, not only within the social and political world narrowly understood as the 
human world, but across the nature/culture, human/nonhuman divide. It is this 
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insight which has drawn together social movements and actors from across a 
whole range of ostensibly, but never actually, ‘single’ issues – disarmament and 
peace, women’s rights and feminism, ecology and environment, civil rights, anti-
racism and indigenous peoples’ struggles, and labour rights and social justice – 
since the anti-establishment uprisings in the 1960s. 
The seeds of both green and anti-nuclear politics can be traced in part to 
the work of early ground breaking thinkers such as Murray Bookchin (1962), 
Rachel Carson (1962), and Fritz Schumacher (1973). Such thinkers radically 
called into question the benefits of the dominance and influence of big industry 
and big technological and state technocratic solutions for both humans and 
nonhuman nature. Early radical green politics, which inspired even the more 
conventional wings of green politics as well as the early green parties around 
the world, contained within it strands of eco-anarchism and eco-feminism, all of 
which entail a fundamental critique of the impact of nuclear technology upon 
social relations (e.g. see FOE Canberra, 1984; Plumwood, 1984; Nelkin & 
Pollak, 1981).  From such perspectives nuclear power has authoritarian and 
repressive causes and effects, requiring an undemocratic centralised political 
system, a lack of scientific responsibility and reflexivity, and problematic 
assumptions about the controllability of people and nature (Pepper, 1993; 
Gordon, 2008, Plumwood, 1984). Despite the pro-nuclear tendencies of some 
eco-socialism,13 nuclear energy has also been criticised from this perspective 
due to its strengthening of state capitalism and monopolisation of resources 
(Plumwood 1984; Nelkin & Pollak, 1980b; Pepper, 1993).  
From an ecofeminist perspective, nuclear energy perpetuates dominant 
masculinist discourses of control, violence and the otherisation of women and 
nonhuman nature. For example, Ynestra King (1983, cited in Sturgeon, 1997: 
62) recalls the media coverage of Three Mile Island: ‘male technocrats talk 
about slamming rods into the core to stop the reaction, referring to the runaway 
nuke as a “her” who needed to be “cooled down”’. This critique has tended to 
consistently attack the patriarchal features behind both nuclear energy and 
weapons, seen to epitomise male violence against both women and the world. 
Such critiques highlighted the ways in which nuclear energy perpetuated and 
exacerbated asymmetrical power relations. They pointed to the harmful effects 
                                                     
13
 The UK Workers Revolutionary Party, for example, influenced by Stalinism, supported nuclear power 
in the 1970s, suggesting that it might be beneficial under socialism (Herring, 2005). 
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of the dominant understandings of science, nature and society, beginning to 
unmask these as socially produced rather than as a result of the ‘natural’ order 
of things. In this way, they began to problematize the science/politics and 
nature/culture separations within the dominant discourses. 
Developing from such critiques, the emphasis upon appropriate and 
sensitive technology and the acceptance of the precautionary principle, even 
within more mainstream green politics, has tended to militate strongly against 
nuclear energy due to the many still unknown long-term risks that it entails - 
most of all the unsolved problem of what to do with the waste over thousands of 
years.  Green politics has tended to pose a more radical challenge to existing 
social relations with the nonhuman world as well as relations within the human 
world, and has questioned received understandings of inevitably beneficial 
economic and scientific ‘progress’ in the ‘Promethean’ sense rooted in dominant 
strands of the Western Enlightenment (Dryzek, 2005). Such questioning entails 
a degree of ambivalence towards the promises of science and the technologies 
developed by it. In particular, this entails a suspicion of aspects of science and 
technology that tend to increase overall levels of consumption of non-renewable 
resources or production of hazardous waste, and otherwise exacerbate 
entrenched asymmetrical power relations both between humans, and between 
human and nonhuman nature.  
The joined-up critique of science, ‘nature’ and politics has been 
especially apparent in resistance to nuclear energy. For example, in Germany 
opposition to nuclear energy arose at local levels in the early 1970s and 
developed into mass demonstrations and violent confrontations with the police 
(Nelkin & Pollak, 1980a; Dryzek et al., 2003). New citizen groups formed in this 
process, including the German Federal Association of Citizen’s Initiatives for the 
Protection of the Environment (Bundesverband Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz, 
or BBU) in 1972. The latter constitutes a prime example of a key green and anti-
nuclear movement arising in one. Even largely apolitical German government-
funded environmental organisations, such as Deutscher Naturschutzring, 
Deutscher Heimatbund and Bund Umwelt- und Naturschutz, became politicised 
by the nuclear issue and criticized aspects of nuclear policy (Nelkin & Pollak, 
1980a: 129-30; Dryzek et al. 2003). Such politicization highlights the way in 
which this issue forced ecology and the environment to be understood as 
properly political. Although the paths of Germany and France diverged in terms 
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of their actual nuclear policies, a similar process of the ecology movement 
developing as almost inextricably entwined with anti-nuclear politics (and 
feminist, youth culture and regional autonomist movements) occurred there too 
(Nelkin and Pollak, 1980b, 1981).14   
In the UK and the US, as in mainland Europe and elsewhere there was 
considerable practical and theoretical overlap between the peace (anti-nuclear 
weapons) and the anti-nuclear power movements, although in practice the more 
mainstream strands of the movements retained a distance from each other for 
reasons of style, tactic and constituency (Herring, 2005). In the UK in the 1960s 
and 1970s, the political structure was such that in order to retain limited informal 
access to important pressure points in government, the main social movement 
organisations had to distance themselves from grassroots confrontational direct 
action and civil disobedience tactics being developed elsewhere at the time 
(Dryzek et al., 2003), however even here there is evidence to suggest 
considerable linking across issue areas, with Greenpeace UK arising out of 
direct action against nuclear weapons testing, and early protests against the 
building of Torness nuclear power station influencing environmental 
organisational tactics both radical and more moderate in the 1970s (Welsh, 
2001; Dryzek et al., 2003; Herring, 2005). The linking of radical green politics 
with the anti-nuclear movement is also highlighted by the fact that one of the 
first actions by Earth First! (UK) occurred at Dungeness nuclear power station in 
the early 1990s, with a particular emphasis on the ecological impacts (Wall, 
1999).15 At the level of action and capacity building, Earth First! and other direct 
action activist groups remain strongly interlinked with the radical peace 
movement, particularly the feminist strands emerging from women’s activism, 
including the peace camps, at Greenham Common, and more recently Faslane 
(Wall 1999; Earth First!, 2014). 
In Australia, where nuclear power has not (yet) been developed as an 
energy source, activism was linked around the global dangers of nuclear 
weapons and proliferation from the supply of uranium, and the impact of 
uranium mining upon aboriginal peoples  and environment (Martin, 1982, 2007; 
                                                     
14
 For consideration of the differences and causes of differences in outcome between different countries 
see Nelkin and Pollak 1981; Dryzek et al. 2003; Sovacool & Valentine, 2012. 
15
 This action was framed from a deep ecology perspective with a press statement observing that the 
area contained 'the best example of a cuspate foreland in the world.. home to over 600 species of flora 
and fauna, some of which are rare’ (Green Anarchist 1991 (28): 24, cited in Wall 1999: 46-47). 
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MacLeod, 1995; Plumwood, 1984). Early anti-nuclear action here was strongly 
connected to the trade union movement and the grassroots of the Australian 
Labor Party (Martin, 2007), which was also more strongly ecological than 
elsewhere (Haskell, 1977; Martin, 1982). Here environmental organisations 
such as Friends of the Earth played a more radical grassroots role than, for 
example, in the UK, by-passing state institutions and emphasising 
transformative structural change, education and capacity-building  from below 
rather than influence of existing elites (e.g. see FOE Canberra, 1984).  
There was much linking of the anti-nuclear movement at the international 
level, with people like Amory Lovins (US), Walt Patterson (Canada) and Helen 
Caldicott (Australia) invited to speak at public meetings around the world 
(Martin, 1982). In another example of international solidarity, in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, in the period running up to and after the end of Apartheid and 
independence from white South Africa, trade unionists at the Rossing uranium 
mine in Namibia worked together with European environmental, peace and 
social justice activists (Hecht, 2010b).  
The linking of struggles against both social injustice and environmental 
degradation has been apparent once again in the multiple uprisings of the ‘alter-
globalization’ or ‘global justice’ movements at various places such as Chiapas, 
in the majority ‘less economically developed’ world, at international and global 
summits in the 1990s and early 2000s, and at the protests and events 
surrounding the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the end of that 
decade. This includes the numerous environmental justice and climate justice 
campaigns around the world (cf. Schlosberg, 2007, 2013; Kingsnorth, 2004). 
Such interlinking indicates an awareness of and frustration with the existing 
structures and institutions for their capacities, let alone incentives, to address 
the root causes of complexly interlinked damages to both humans and 
nonhuman nature.  
Green opposition to the institutions and technologies which supported 
and embedded the dominant Promethean ideals of economic and scientific 
progress causing widespread harms to both human and nonhuman nature has 
often led to the accusation of ‘green luddism’ as a put-down term. Yet this 
simplifies and misunderstands the luddite demand to ‘put down all machinery 
injurious to the commonality’ (Monbiot & Simon, 2012; Gordon, 2008: 129; Sale, 
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1996). The idea of the ‘commons’ has been important in radical green theory 
and practice. It tends to transcend the dichotomous and limiting culture/nature 
and human/nature divides (Paterson, 2005). In Small is Beautiful. A study of 
economics as if people mattered, Schumacher had coined the term 
‘Intermediate Technology’ to describe possible types of technology which were 
accessible to all. Influenced by such ideas, the predominantly green Alternative 
Technology (AT) movement emerged, again strongly intertwined with the other 
counterculture movements of the 1970s and concerned with developing 
technologies that were not harmful to humans or nonhuman nature (Herring, 
2005: 45; Smith 2005; Toke, 2011). The AT movement were among the first in 
the UK to ‘adopt and promote the anti-nuclear position’ (Herring, 2005: 4). The 
emphasis upon alternative technology demonstrates that rather than being anti-
technology, many green and anti-nuclear activists were instead aware of the 
inherently politically-effective and socially-embedded character of technologies; 
that technology is never ‘neutral’. While such an understanding is taken for 
granted, for example, in mainstream technology studies, it is not generally 
reflected upon in the mainstream of everyday political and environmental 
discourse (Gordon, 2008). 
The importance and cross-cutting character of the issues raised by the 
ecological critique is underlined by the increased attention to and 
mainstreaming of ‘the environment’, with government departments, global 
institutions and the Earth Summits organised to focus upon it. Yet greens 
remain divided over whether this constitutes genuine progress in addressing the 
issue.  Within green political thought there have been clear and useful efforts to 
distinguish between environmentalism and ecologism (Dobson, 2007), or 
varying degrees of anthropocentrism and ecocentrism (Eckersley, 1992) to 
highlight the differences between the more radical transformative politics 
adhering to the key principles or values described above and those which have 
ostensibly green features but are not thoroughgoing in their critique and 
proposed solutions.  
For Dobson ‘environmentalism argues for a managerial approach to 
environmental problems, secure in the belief that they can be solved without 
fundamental changes in present values or patterns of production and 
consumption’, whereas ‘ecologism holds that a sustainable and fulfilling 
existence presupposes radical changes in our relationship with the nonhuman 
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natural world, and in our mode of social and political life’ (2007: 2-3, emphases 
in original). In practice, the distinctions between these are not always so clear 
cut, as debates about different shades of ecological modernisation also show. 
Not all subscribe to the more ecological, linked up understandings of politics 
described above and splits within green politics are nothing new. This was 
clearly apparent in the Fundi-Realo splits in various green parties in the 1980s, 
for example (Doherty, 1992). As with similar splits in other radical politics, the 
former tend towards a more robust adherence to the basic values and critique, 
while the latter take what has been defended as a more pragmatic realist 
approach, willing to sacrifice certain principles with the aim of advancing green 
politics institutionally and culturally (Cudworth, 2003; Dryzek et al., 2003; 
Doherty, 1992). The question of how pragmatic and realist the sacrifice of core 
principles ultimately ends up being is an ever present tension and matter for 
continued consideration (e.g. see Dobson 2007: pp. 189-202; Barry & Doherty, 
2001). 
Given that splits within green politics are nothing new it should not be 
surprising that certain environmentalists now advocate nuclear energy, 
particularly in the context of climate change. As discussed in the previous 
section, the penetration of the ecological critique was not consistent within the 
movements, as the strategic ‘expert’ and ‘scientific’ type of opposition and the 
ambiguity of many environmental activists in the UK and elsewhere in the early 
days shows. In the UK the environmental organisations such as Friends of the 
Earth were much less radical and much more ‘institutionalised’ than the green 
party (Dryzek et al., 2003).  
It is clear that although the basic green or ecological principles and the 
linking of social justice and ecological critique have to a certain extent become 
enshrined in the green parties of today these principles have never fully and 
consistently penetrated and manifested in much green and environmental 
strategy and action against the status quo. It is ironic, as Dobson points out, 
that ‘green parties are seen as single-issue when ecologism from which they 
stem is devoted to showing the connections between various aspects of social 
and political and economic life that produce environmental problems’ (2007: 
25). It is these connections which I argue are lacking in the emphases upon 
economics and science as separate from politics, which dominate in the 
prevailing discourses of nuclear energy. Despite the emphasis in theory upon 
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the linking and integration of issues, this is extremely difficult according to the 
logics of the dominant discourses and institutional structures. The difficulties are 
exemplified by the ways in which greens past and present have engaged with 
the nuclear energy issue.  
As Kingsnorth (2011) has also pointed out, according to the dominant 
discourses it is difficult for environmentalists ‘to do anything but argue about 
which machines they would prefer to use to power an ever-growing industrial 
economy.’ Those that attempt otherwise are 
accused of wishful thinking if they talk about zero-growth economies; 
called snobs and hypocrites if they criticise consumerism; attacked as 
terrorists if they engage in direct action to protect wild nature; called 
naive idealists if they ask whether planning for a future much like the 
present is really such a good idea (Kingsnorth, 2011). 
 
While the main environmental groups and the UK Green Party are still officially 
anti-nuclear, their emphasis has become much more focused on cost and 
economic and scientific-technological feasibility than on the harms to both 
humans and nonhuman nature and the impact upon social relations (Vidal, 
2013, Bennett, 2012).Yet as I discussed in the first and second sections of this 
chapter, as it has turned out, the restricted terrain of argument and the 
governmental and industry power in promoting nuclear energy has meant that 
often green organisations, at least in the UK, have had their fingers burned 
regardless of whether or not they restricted themselves to the ‘technical’ 
scientific and economic arguments. The concern is that by engaging according 
to the terms of the dominant discourses, and neglecting to clarify and unmask 
the inherently political aspects of the issue more forcefully, we ultimately 
reinforce the dominant discourses at the expense of the very ecological political 
aspects which motivate us in the first place.  
Along the way, the emphasis upon ‘the connections between various 
aspects of social and political and economic life that produce environmental 
problems’ (Dobson, 2007: 25), the ecological critique of existing structures, 
values, and relationships involving an integrated understanding of ‘science’ and 
‘politics’ across the culture/nature divide has been persistently discounted, 
weakened or lost. Ingolfur Blühdorn and Ian Welsh (2007), echoing the analysis 
of the ‘post-political’ discussed briefly above, describe aspects of this as the 
‘post-ecologist turn’. This is the manifestation of the overwhelming tension and 
contradiction inherent in the fact that the all-round importance and impacts of 
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ecological crises have become painfully evident, moving eco-political issues to 
the centre of global politics. Yet precisely because these issues challenge the 
very bases of the existing systems of state-backed consumer capitalism in the 
wealthiest and most technologically advanced countries and the dominant 
paradigm of development in the rest of the globe, strategies of ecological 
modernisation and environmental management as attempts to tackle them 
persist in only addressing the symptoms rather than the root causes (Blühdorn 
& Welsh, 2007: 253). This is due to ‘the unprecedented consensus of defence 
that protects the ‘blessed way of life’ (Fleischer, 2001, cited in Blühdorn & 
Welsh, 2007) and which ‘resolutely obstructs the exploration of any socio-
economic alternatives’ (Blühdorn & Welsh, 2007: 253).  
The importance of taking the ‘politically more challenging’ route (Monbiot 
& Simon 2012, above) is something that has been understood by many greens 
since the 1960s at least, and explains why, in Lynas’ (2008) terms, the recent 
public move by some environmentalists to support nuclear energy appeared as 
‘green heresy’  to some. As this section has shown, the harmful, yet socially 
produced effects of nuclear energy have been consistently challenged by a 
green critique which draws attention to the ecological links between ostensibly 
single-issue problems and highlighting the political and ecological limits and 
deficiencies of dominant strands of modern technological and economic 
development.  
Yet as this chapter as a whole has shown, this critique tends to be lost in 
the dominant debates where there is an over reliance upon scientific and 
economic ‘facts’ understood to be separate from considerations of political 
community and the relations both between humans and between humans and 
nonhuman nature. Nested within the broader problem of the failure of 
penetration of the ecological critique and the limited political terrain available for 
responding to ecological problems are the dominant discourses for nuclear 
energy which circumscribe possibilities and which neglect, devalue and exclude 
vital aspects of the politics of this important issue. It is not that green politics is 
necessarily dogmatic in its opposition to nuclear energy, but that the ecological 
critique of nuclear energy and the dominant status quo which it reinforces is 
difficult to communicate according to the dominant discourses. How can we 
articulate the harms to both humans and nonhuman nature so that they become 
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relevant to the dominant discourses in ways which link up the issues so that we 
don’t end up with only single-issue victories which are often counter-productive?  
It is this problem which my thesis, with its attempt to open up and 
redescribe the problem of nuclear energy, will seek to address. The 
intersectional ecological critique apparent in early anti-nuclear and green 
movements is still alive and kicking in more radical green, anti-nuclear and 
other forms of resistance politics today and constitutes an important source of 
knowledge about the problem of nuclear energy which is neglected within the 
dominant discourses.  The next chapter explains my ecological approach which 
more clearly problematizes the science/politics and nature/culture separations, 
and sets out my framework for articulating injustices of nuclear energy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 
 
Chapter Two 
Towards Articulating Ecological Injustices 
 
I suppose my thinking began to be affected soon after atomic science was firmly 
established. Some of the thoughts that came were so unattractive to me that I 
rejected them completely, for the old ideas die hard, especially when they are 
emotionally as well as intellectually dear to one. It was pleasant to believe, for 
example, that much of Nature was forever beyond the tampering reach of man 
– he might level the forests and dam the streams, but the clouds and the rain 
and the wind were God’s.     
(Rachel Carson, 1958, in Garb, 1996: 250) 
 
The old ideas die hard. As discussed in the previous chapter, this is something 
which those currently promoting nuclear energy as a solution to climate change 
also emphasise. In the face of the magnitude of the problems we face, the 
temptation to fixate upon clear-cut explanations and solutions is great. The loss 
of ideas of ‘God’, or ‘nature’, or ‘science’ as something separate from our messy 
and complicated political worlds is traumatic. Conceptions of science and 
economics as separate from and above difficult and ‘dirty’ politics are so 
seductive because they are linked to the deeply embedded separation of 
nature/culture that many of us rely upon for understanding and ordering the 
world. However, as I seek to show in this chapter, it is important that such 
conceptions are resisted, because these separations reinforce and mask the 
positions of the powerful whilst fragmenting, and limiting the political efficacy of 
those struggling to resist the harms produced by the dominant discourses and 
structures. If we continue to debate the various scientific and economic ‘facts’ of 
nuclear vs. fossil fuels vs. renewables (which also affect ‘the clouds and the rain 
and the wind’) as if they are separate from and above politics, we fail to address 
the difficult, inherently political questions about how these and other options 
affect the relations we as humans have both with each other, and with the many 
other ecological entities of which we are a part and with which we live.  
 The difficulties of challenging the dominant reductive narratives of 
science and economics which reinforce the naturalisation of dominant political 
relations in discourses of nuclear energy should now be clearer. As the previous 
chapter sought to show, the ecological critique which draws attention to the 
neglect of significant linked harms to both humans and nonhumans resulting 
from nuclear energy has failed to penetrate dominant discourses. In this chapter 
I show how the hierarchical separation of science/politics reinforces 
unsustainable relations of domination perpetuated by the separation of 
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nature/culture and perpetuates harms to both humans and nonhuman nature. I 
argue that these linked harms may be more effectively understood as injustices 
which need to be articulated and taken into account as relevant to our 
understandings of political community, or common life. I explain the ecological 
approach which holds my ontological and normative commitments to address 
the separation of nature/culture, and which I use to develop an open heuristic 
framework for articulating injustices. I suggest that opening up space for 
ongoing articulation of injustices in ways which cross the nature/culture 
separation presents possibilities for strengthening the position of both humans 
and nonhuman nature which undergo harms, resistance to which is currently 
fragmented and pacified within the dominant discourses. Articulating injustices 
can help to facilitate points of solidarity, although always contingently, remaining 
open to ongoing contestation.    
In the first section of the chapter, I clarify my ecological approach to 
understanding the problem described in Chapter One. In part, this ecological 
approach emerges from the early radical ecological critique discussed at the 
end of Chapter One, but here I draw upon academic theory, particularly the 
work of Bruno Latour (2004) and Val Plumwood (1993, 2002), to consider how 
we may move beyond the limiting hierarchical separation of science/politics and 
nature/culture which restricts our understanding of the politics of nuclear 
energy, naturalising and neglecting socially produced harms to both human and 
nonhuman nature. I point to the limits of the hierarchical separation of an 
understanding of ‘science’ understood to be about ‘what is’ which is positioned 
above, and used to cut through an understanding of ‘politics’ which deals with 
‘what could be’ and the power relations which make up political community.  I 
argue that it is more helpful to think about the inherently political processes of 
knowledge construction. These inherently political processes consist of, firstly, 
the process of taking all affected into account, involving perplexity and 
consultation and asking ‘how many (and who) are we?’ and secondly, the 
process of putting in order, involving institutionalisation and the process of 
answering the question ‘how might we live together?’ Although these are 
inextricable in practice, the analytical separation is important so that we can 
guard against the latter pre-empting the former, particularly in the interests of 
the powerful. 
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In the second section, I describe the main components of the open 
heuristic framework which I develop for articulating injustices: distribution, 
recognition and representation. I gather these from a consideration of David 
Schlosberg’s work which helpfully draws together academic theory and activist 
practice in struggles for environmental and social justice. My work differs from 
his as I understand distribution, recognition and representation as images of 
politics which can provide the tools for articulating diverse injustices beyond the 
separation of nature/culture.  
In the last section, I explain the steps I take to develop my open, heuristic 
framework for articulating injustices. My ecological approach to challenging the 
separation of nature/culture informs this framework as it seeks to re-examine 
the question of ‘how many (and who) we are’ and take all affected (as far as 
possible) into account, so as to take a fresh look at the possibilities for the 
process of putting in order and answering the question of ‘how we might live 
together.’ This paves the way for Part II of the thesis which uses my ecological 
approach to develop the framework in detail.  
 
An ecological approach:  
knowledge beyond science/politics and nature/culture 
 
Knowledge of the harmful, socially produced effects of nuclear energy and the 
broader political links between damage to humans and nonhuman nature raised 
by anti-nuclear and green movements has been lost or devalued in the 
dominant debates which play out in more abstract scientific and economic terms 
considered to be above politics. Here I propose an ecological approach to help 
address this problem. Firstly I describe how the hierarchical dichotomy of 
science/politics is rooted in the separation of nature/culture and how the 
elevation of science above politics has been used to naturalise domination, to 
enable particular forms of knowledge to appear ‘neutral’ and objective at the 
expense of the knowledge of others affected adversely by the relations of power 
which constitute political community.  
Secondly I describe an explicitly political understanding of the 
construction of all knowledge and the possibilities of generating ecological 
knowledge through processes of political contestation of the knowledge of all 
affected. This involves attending to knowledge of both ‘what is’ (the domain 
traditionally associated with science and nature) and of ‘what could be’, 
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knowledge which is sensitive to the power relations which make up political 
community (the domain traditionally associated with politics and culture). These 
‘domains’ are not actually separate for they each impact upon the other in the 
processes of ‘common life’ on this planet. I draw upon Latour (2004) to move 
beyond a hierarchical binary separation of science/politics in the construction 
and valuation of knowledge. Moving beyond this separation can help us to 
envision a constantly evolving process of working out ‘how many (and who) we 
are’ (aimed at perplexity and consultation in order to take knowledge of all 
affected into account), and ‘how we might live together’ (aimed at institution and 
decision which temporarily ends contestation and enables action). Thirdly I draw 
upon the problem of nuclear energy to show how the hierarchical dichotomy of 
science/politics is being used to short-circuit these contestatory processes of 
knowledge construction. The second stage of knowledge construction 
(consisting of assumptions about how we might live together), is used to short-
circuit the first stage (taking into account and gathering the situated knowledges 
of all affected). As illustrated in the problem of the politics of nuclear energy this 
means that full contestation of knowledge does not occur. This lack of 
consultation limits possibilities for understanding the conditions and possibilities 
of common life and perpetuates significant socially produced harms to both 
humans and nonhuman nature. 
 Bruno Latour (2004) gives a clear depiction of how in Western culture the 
separation of a ‘natural’ sphere from a ‘cultural’ sphere has functioned as a 
powerfully constitutive framework for ordering and understanding the world. 
Nature, associated with science, has been broadly understood as the domain of 
objects, the environment, objective knowledge, matters of fact, and necessity. 
The cultural sphere, associated with politics and society, has been broadly 
understood as the realm of subjects, of humans, of values, matters of 
discussion, and freedom. Dominant understandings of legitimate knowledge 
have been associated with ‘the natural’ state of things, with nature, facts and 
things as opposed to culture and political values. 
 The separations of science/politics and nature/culture reinforce and 
reproduce exclusionary and hierarchical binary constructions of reality which 
elevate particular conceptions and organisations of political community. Such 
hierarchical binary constructions mask the particular politics of dominant 
discourses, naturalising these at the expense of others. As ecofeminists and 
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others, including some of the Frankfurt School thinkers have pointed out, 
throughout Western history exclusions and hierarchies of domination based 
upon similarities and differences between entities have been ‘naturalised’, with 
reference to nature, thereby justifying the status quo and all manner of unjust 
states of affair by implication (Plumwood, 2002; Stone, 2006). The dominant 
scientific and economic rationalities have naturalised the objectification and 
instrumentalisation of women, slaves, and non-whites as well as the 
instrumentalisation and exploitation of the nonhuman world. Othering 
discourses and practices of many kinds, including exclusionary security 
discourses discussed in Chapter One have been naturalised by the complex 
dynamics of the hierarchical separation of science/politics and nature/culture 
which have worked in favour of the dominant. Certain spheres associated with 
objectified and instrumentalised humans and nonhumans, such as the 
reproductive sphere, have been ‘backgrounded’ or separated from other 
spheres in ways which disguise dominance and dependency (Plumwood, 1993: 
48-49, 153). Such separation is maintained and justified through recourse to a 
separate and firm ‘truth’ about the way things are, provided by the idea of a 
single ‘nature’ (Latour, 2004: 14, 45).  
 Common to both dominant scientific and economic rationalities are the 
ideals of disengagement and an emphasis upon neutrality and objectivity 
achieved through separation from politics. The dominant forms of social 
organisation and understandings of reality are able to deny their own ‘political’ 
character and assume the appearance of the natural order of things, the way 
things are. Thus the hierarchical separation of science/politics enables the 
continuation of dominant forms of knowledge and social organisation whilst 
enabling these to deny their own situatedness within political power relations. 
This means that even though the separation of the domains of science and 
politics is supported in most cases precisely because the intention is to avoid 
power politics influencing scientific knowledge production and ‘corrupting’ it, 
there is a problem because disengagement and neutrality have the perverse 
effect of creating a ‘commitment vacuum’ even where genuine neutrality is 
intended (Plumwood, 2002: 41). Insisting upon ‘emotional neutrality and ethico-
political disengagement’ contains an inescapable, ‘paradoxical politics in which 
an appearance of neutrality conceals capitulation to power’, and  
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‘the fully ‘impartial’ knower can easily be one whose skills are for sale to 
the highest bidder, who will bend their administrative, research and 
pedagogical energies to wherever the power, prestige and funding is’ 
(Plumwood, 2002: 43).  
 
In this way, impartiality and neutrality work against the inherent politics required 
for social and political responsibility. Scientific knowledge which questions the 
dominant political status quo is often tarred with the brush of politics and 
subjectivity, whilst science which confirms dominant understandings of the way 
things are is more likely to appear as neutral and unproblematically ‘objective’. 
However within democratic theory there is an understanding of a kind of 
legitimate political knowledge and ‘objective’ knowledge of and for the social 
whole developed through democratic political process. Critical theories of 
democracy emphasise the importance of the political public sphere understood 
as a space within which public opinion, drawing upon and developing 
understandings of the common good, is generated. In an increasingly ‘global’ 
age of cross-cultural politics and increasing awareness of interconnectedness, 
the realm of politics has been extended to include ’all-affected’ (Fraser, 2008: 
24). In radical democratic and social justice theory, the ‘all-affected principle’ 
may be understood not so much as ‘an abstract causal criterion’, but more as 
an ‘animating political intuition’ (Barnett, 2012: 682; Fraser, 2008). To achieve a 
better, more comprehensive understanding of the political relations and 
contradictions which make up the ecological world it is important to pay 
attention to all affected, to all areas that have been separated from traditional 
political life.  The ‘objectivity’ and legitimacy of knowledge claims resulting from 
inclusive and fair democratic communication and contestation which includes all 
affected is brought about through publicity (the exposure of different 
perspectives and viewpoints to each other and others in the public realm) which 
‘is supposed to discredit views that cannot withstand critical scrutiny and to 
assure the legitimacy of those that do’ (Fraser, 2008: 76).   
Due to the understanding that science is separate from politics and 
therefore elevated as a legitimate source of knowledge of ‘nature’ or ‘what is’, 
the status (hence legitimacy) of the types of knowledge generated in democratic 
processes is seen as less. However, as Latour (2004: 49) points out, ‘no culture 
except that of the West has used nature to dictate its political life in this way’ 
and contra to romantic understandings ‘traditional societies do not live in 
harmony with nature; they are unacquainted with it’. He argues that we need to 
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stir together nature and culture into a new collective ‘that is heir to the old 
nature and the old society’ (Latour, 2004: 232).  This involves attending to 
knowledge of both ‘what is’ (the domain traditionally associated with science, 
nature and facts), and of ‘what could be’, knowledge which is sensitive to the 
power relations which make up political community (the domain traditionally 
associated with politics, culture and values). Taken together we can understand 
this to involve ecological knowledge of ‘common life’ (Latour, 2004: 89). Latour 
(2004: 1, 185) argues that we should let go of an understanding of nature as 
‘sword of Damocles’, that which separates human cultures from nonhuman 
nature and through the separation of science and politics allows the use of 
understandings of nature to dictate political life. Nature conceived of as 
separate and above politics has been used as a ‘cipher for objectivity’ (Dobson, 
2010: 757; Saward, 1993), to produce dominant, apparently neutral and 
unchallengeable knowledge which has been used to transcend politics and 
‘reduce public life to a rump parliament’ (Latour, 2004: 232). 
Donna Haraway (1988), in particular, has been influential in proposing 
that we understand the unavoidably situated character of all knowledge. It is not 
through separation of subject and object that objectivity may be achieved, but 
through awareness of the connections, the groundedness of perspectives and 
the weighing up of many different perspectives in relation to each other. This 
resonates with what Lorraine Code (2006) terms ‘ecological thinking’. This is ‘a 
revisioned mode of engagement with knowledge, subjectivity, politics, ethics, 
science, citizenship, and agency that pervades and reconfigures theory and 
practice’ (Code, 2006: 5).  Ecological thinking is about ‘the politics of epistemic 
location’, acknowledging the partiality of knowledge about selves and others 
(Code, 2006). It does not seek ‘a priori or transcendent principles or truths; but 
neither is the language of “context” and “contextualization” adequate to explain 
it’ (Code, 2006: 5).  
Ecological thinking contains the inherent ‘politics of epistemic location’ 
(Code, 2006). It is a grounded form of knowledge which acknowledges relations 
and connections and the ways in which ‘knowledge is made, negotiated, 
circulated’ (Code, 2006: 5). This kind of approach is critical and wary of the 
separate and aloof ‘subject positions of the self-invisible and the discursive 
sites, the 'laboratories,' of the credible, civil man of science’ (Haraway, 1997: 
270, in Code 2006: 21) which have acted as the guarantors of legitimate 
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knowledge but which have disguised relations of domination and neglected and 
devalued important aspects of ‘what is’. On this reading the only ‘irrational’ 
knowledge is that which claims to be above politics and succumbs to the 
fantasy of the ‘One’ truth, of pure or universal knowledge (Haraway, 1988: 581).   
I therefore refer to situated, political, relationally generated knowledge as 
ecological knowledge. I use the word ecological to broadly encompass both the 
relations between humans and between humans and nonhumans as well as 
those relations between ecological entities which may not involve humans 
(although the extent to which we can know about these without being involved 
is questionable). Although the word ecological tends to be associated with the 
sciences it was used by green movements precisely to draw attention to the 
links between humans and nonhumans and the ecological situatedness of 
humans within the nonhuman world. Stewart Brand (2009), one of the old 
greens of the 1960s who has come out in favour of nuclear power, recently 
stated that it was good that ‘environmentalists don’t call themselves ecologists 
any more’ because  
most weren’t, and most people who said they were part of the ecology 
movement wouldn’t know one trophic level from another, or what a 
trophic level is, or what a food web is, or why a niche is a niche, or much 
less why horizontal transgenic gene transfer is natural rather than 
unnatural (Brand, interviewed by Woody, 2009). 
 
Whilst ignorance and presumption by non-scientists may be frustrating for those 
engaged in the complex ongoing practices of the sciences, and it is important to 
note that expert and specialised knowledge still plays an important role in a 
more ecological and democratic understanding of knowledge production and 
contestation, this statement by Brand demonstrates the dismissive attitude to all 
knowledge which is not ‘scientific’ in the reductive sense of the word, and the 
use of ‘nature’ as a means of policing the problematic line between ‘what is’ 
(traditionally the realm of science) and understandings and experiences of ‘what 
could be’, knowledge sensitive to the power relations which make up political 
community (traditionally the realm of politics). The typical definition of ecology 
as ‘the scientific study of interactions among organisms and their environment, 
such as the interactions organisms have with each other and with their abiotic 
environment’ (Ernst Haeckel, in Begon, Townsend & Harper, 2006: xi) can be 
applied to both the human and the nonhuman world, and as such crosses the 
science/politics divide. It is important to bear in mind that the word ‘science’ has 
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its roots in the Latin for ‘to know’. Knowledge is inherently political because it is 
always situated and constructed from within power relations between ecological 
entities. 
Awareness of partial objectivity and the situated and political character of 
all knowledge challenges the science/politics divide and helps to underline the 
importance of political contestation by all in processes of knowledge 
construction. Understood in this way ‘the virtue’ of processes of democratic 
contestation of the knowledge of all affected ‘may not lie in claims that it 
resolves conflicts but in its tendency to reveal them (O’Neill, 2006: 276). Thus, 
rather than emphasising consensus, this type of knowledge production is 
intended to uncover ‘structural conflicts of interest’ and contest the ways in 
which other situated knowledges construct notions of political community and 
common interest (Young, 2000: 120). It is important to pay attention to ‘matters 
of concern’ (Latour, 2004: 24) or grievances rather than ‘to suppress them for 
the sake of some people’s definition of the common good’ (Young, 2000: 120). 
As such the process of democratic political knowledge construction  
is inclusive, not by formally including potentially all affected individuals in 
the same way, but by attending to the social relations that differently 
position people and condition their experiences, opportunities and 
knowledge of the society’ (Young, 2000: 84, emphasis added).  
 
Although Young refers here only to the human and political realm, Donna 
Haraway’s work (1988), upon which Young draws, is explicitly concerned with 
developing broader understandings of ‘science’ and knowledge construction 
which move away from the nature/culture and science/politics separation. If we 
take on board Latour’s (2004: 24, 66) broader emphasis upon ‘matters of 
concern’ and ‘entities’ ecologically conceived we can apply this approach as 
relevant to knowledge of both the traditionally ‘natural’ and ‘cultural’ spheres. 
An ecological approach requires a more complex interrelational 
understanding of knowledge, both ‘political’ and ‘scientific’. This is not simply a 
question of ‘downgrading’, or rather altering, the perception of science, from 
objectivity and certainty to something more nuanced (and ecologically 
responsible), admitting the inherent politics within the endeavour, whether 
desired or not. It is also about ‘upgrading’ the status of politics (and associated 
values), to that of legitimate knowledge. This is especially the case when it 
comes to understanding issues, such as nuclear energy, which are understood 
to be traditionally ‘scientific’ matters, separate from politics. Science is 
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inherently political and for this reason it is important to counterbalance this, to 
‘ecologically correct’ it with awareness of the importance of political knowledge, 
awareness of the power relations which affect our understandings of the 
relations which constitute ‘what is’. It is for this reason that Plumwood (2002: 
73) and others critique remote forms of knowledge and governance, understood 
both as remote from the direct consequences of decisions, and in the 
communicative and epistemological sense, as remoteness from news and from 
knowledge, including communication and understanding barriers (see also 
Plumwood, 1995). These barriers to understanding are only reinforced by the 
hierarchical separation of science/politics which structure our understandings of 
reality and tend to reinforce the position of the dominant at the expense of the 
marginalised. 
Knowledge can only claim legitimacy then, if it is sensitive to the inherent 
politics of life. Ultimately this is important because it is about keeping a check 
on concentrations of power. Realising the implications of the embodied, 
relational, ecological character of knowledge, reveals that artificial separations 
such as emotional disengagement, and the separation of ‘science’ from 
‘politics’, are no longer tools for the advancement of knowledge but in fact work 
to epistemically remove us from the complex connections of what is. All 
knowledge is political because it is produced ecologically through the power 
relations which make up common life. In Haraway’s (1988: 590) words ‘[r]ational 
knowledge is power-sensitive conversation’. 
As discussed, part of the problem of the ‘transcendence of nature’ 
(Latour, 2004: 121) is that the maintenance of certainty and order through 
recourse to a separate realm of knowledge about the nature of things, of facts 
about ‘what is’, tends to work in favour of the dominant status quo and those 
currently in power. However, drawing attention to the inherent politics of all 
knowledge, and confronting the science/politics separation in the evaluation of 
knowledge tends to raise alarm bells, particularly with concern for the 
independence of science from political machination or expedience. The 
separation has existed for good reason, for it has enabled a degree of order and 
certainty required not only for the legitimacy, but also for the efficacy of 
knowledge required for common life. The intention here is not to remove the 
separation per se, but to challenge the current hierarchical binary separation 
which falsely places science above politics. It is the hierarchical distinction 
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between science and politics which perpetuates the nature/culture divide, and 
enables politics to affect science and science to affect politics ‘surreptitiously’ 
(Latour, 2004: 1), and therefore in ways which suit the dominant powers 
perpetuating an ecologically insensitive and damaging status quo. An ecological 
approach suggests that we openly acknowledge the politics inherent in scientific 
knowledge of ‘what is’, but also openly acknowledge that scientific knowledge of 
‘what is’ is of vital importance for our political negotiation of common life, of 
understandings and experiences of the power relations which make up political 
community. Questions of ‘what could or ought to be’ and ‘what is’ are not so 
easily separated.  
 Lest there be concerns about the collapsing of the traditional separations 
which have been important for a degree of order and certainty which is central 
to the efficacy of common life, Latour (2004) helpfully breaks down the 
conflicting processes of knowledge construction inherent in both scientific ‘facts’ 
and political ‘values.’ He identifies aspects of each which can be rearranged so 
that the hierarchical separation of science/politics which reinforces 
nature/culture can be circumvented. While scientific (or economic) facts are 
considered unified and absolute in popular understandings, this fails to account 
for how ‘facts are made’ (Latour, 2004: 95). The scientific process involves peer 
review and the exposure of knowledge claims to critical discussion and debate. 
Facts contain the contradiction of both ‘perplexity’ motivating discussion, and 
‘institution’ which brings an end to discussion. Institutionalisation of facts, and 
science’s recourse to a transcendental ‘nature’ to do this, works to obscure the 
more political, uncertain and constructed aspects of scientific facts (Latour, 
2004).  
In contrast, political values are positioned on the lower end of the 
hierarchical binary, in a ‘position of weakness that obliges them always to wait 
behind the fluctuating border of facts’ (Latour, 2004: 97). Latour (2004: 98) 
points out that  
by limiting themselves to facts, the scientists keep on their side of the 
border the very multiplicity of states of the world that makes it possible to 
form an opinion and to make judgements at the same time about 
necessity and possibility, about what is and what ought to be. 
 
This leaves those who are not scientists with a dilemma, for not being privy to 
the construction of factual knowledge, there remains little in which to ground 
political values, either about ‘what is’, or ‘what could, or ought to be’.  
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Yet political values contain a similar contradiction to that contained in the 
notion of scientific facts. The assertion of politics and appeal to values usually 
involves a ‘challenge to the ways in which powerful parties have neglected to 
take into consideration certain associations of humans and nonhumans’ (Latour, 
2004: 106). This neglect points to the need for consultation and involvement or 
participation in discussion which might be compared to the stage of perplexity 
and discussion inherent in the construction of scientific facts. Like facts, political 
values also contain a moment where discussion ends, where something like 
‘the right order of priorities’ must be decided (Latour, 2004: 107). Latour (2004: 
243) calls this the composition of hierarchy,  
a matter of arranging propositions, which are by definition heterogeneous 
and incommensurable, into a single homogenous order and according to 
a single relationship of order, an obviously impossible task that will have 
to be taken up again at the next iteration. 
 
I would term this the moment in the processes of value construction which 
constitutes political community, a sense of the ‘common’, for as Latour (2004: 
107) describes it, it involves consideration of how these propositions might ‘be 
articulated with those which already exist’ (Latour, 2004: 107).  
Thus Latour deconstructs the processes of establishing both scientific 
facts and political values, through perplexity, consultation and discussion to 
institution and the constitution of political community. From the rubble of this 
deconstruction Latour (2004: 109) suggests a ‘new separation of powers’ to 
enable due process in the construction, contestation and evaluation of 
knowledge claims. This new separation avoids the limiting hierarchical 
dichotomisation of the science/politics divide. It consists of ‘the power to take 
into account’ and the ‘power to put in order’ (Latour, 2004: 109). For the 
purposes of this thesis we can understand the former to involve the process of 
taking all affected into account, the process of posing answers to the question 
of ‘how many (and who) we are.’ The latter we can understand as the process 
of deciding what to do after the first stage has been completed, answering the 
question of ‘how we might live together’ (adapted from Latour, 2004: 111). 
Importantly, the second must not ‘short-circuit’ the first (Latour, 2004: 126). The 
process of taking into account incorporates from science (and the realm of 
facts) the avoidance of simplification, the importance of perplexity for enabling 
discussion, while from politics and the realm of values it incorporates the 
consultation of all affected. The process of putting in order incorporates from 
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politics (and the realm of values) the discussion of the compatibility of entities in 
the common world so that all achieve their legitimate place, and from science 
and the realm of facts it incorporates the understanding of institution, that once 
propositions have been instituted, their legitimate presence in common life need 
no longer be questioned (adapted from Latour, 2004: 109). Or at least, they 
need no longer be questioned once all affected have been taken into account, 
and as this is never complete the processes continue. 
 This reformulation of the problem of contesting, evaluating and 
constructing knowledge of the world provides common ground and a potential 
way of integrating the processes of knowledge construction involved in both 
science and politics as they have been traditionally understood, without 
delimiting science to ‘nature’ and politics to ‘culture’ and thereby perpetuating 
the hierarchical divisions which have been instrumental in causing the 
ecological crises we face in the first place. If we think about the construction of 
knowledge in this way we might learn to cease ‘to tie politics to humans, 
subjects, or freedom’, and ‘[s]cience to objects, nature or necessity’ (Latour, 
2004: 89).  
The hegemony of certain forms of knowledge has obscured awareness 
of vital ecological relations of domination and dependency, interlinking and 
complex interdependence, between humans and nonhuman nature. This can 
and has been displaced continuously, for example, through a mass potential 
workforce, plenty more women, plenty more animals, plenty more oil, plenty 
more uranium. However, on a finite planet and with the scale of the 
instrumentalisation of both human and nonhuman nature this displacement 
sooner or later causes ecological crises which conventional dominant 
dispassionate understandings of knowledge and objectivity cannot solve. 
Continuing to subscribe to the separation of nature/culture and science/politics 
is misleading and counter-productive as human effects upon the biosphere 
increasingly show consequences which disturb human life and the ‘politics of 
nature’ becomes harder to ignore. The displacement of effects of instrumental 
relations of domination becomes more difficult, and ‘objectivity’ on the problems 
is no longer achievable as the inherent politics which lies behind the neutral 
mask of science becomes harder to deny. This is what Latour (2004: 24-5) 
implies when he says that the ‘ecological crises’ we face are ‘objectivity crises’: 
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[w]e are not witnessing the emergence of questions about nature in 
political debates, but the progressive transformation of all matters of facts 
into disputed states of affair, which nothing can limit any longer to the 
natural world alone – which nothing, precisely, can naturalize any longer 
(Latour, 2004: 24-5). 
 
He highlights how ‘matters of concern’ such as the BSE crisis in the UK and 
controversies around climate change reveal that science is not the realm of 
certainty and objectivity which the ruling distinction portrayed it to be (Latour, 
2004: 263; see also Hinchcliffe, 2001). 
  This applies also to the problem of nuclear energy in the context of 
climate change discussed in Chapter One. As we have seen, the nuclear 
energy issue crosses both science and politics (nature and culture), and 
appealing to simple ‘matters of fact’ is often impossible because it brings 
conflicting facts to the fore. As debate and decision making in the UK currently 
stand, science, economics, and the domain of experts, expressed as matters of 
technical economic ‘fact’ understood as above or separate from a more ‘value-
driven’ politics, dominate coverage of the issue, with an aura of objectivity and 
neutrality. The mainstream debates are so bewildering and/or frustrating for 
experts and non-experts alike, because conflicting claims to objectivity and 
appeals to the ‘facts of the matter’ fail to openly acknowledge the inherent 
social, political and ecological underpinnings on all sides. This denial of political 
knowledge has the effect that important aspects of the debate are neglected, 
devalued or excluded and this is justified according to the dominant narratives 
which reinforce the problematic separation between ‘nature’ and human-centred 
‘culture’.   
Within the dominant discourses of nuclear energy, scientific and 
economic facts which pre-constitute political community and determine ‘what is’, 
have already implicitly answered the question of ‘how we might live together’ 
and are inserted into politics in ways which by-pass democratic contestation of 
these problems. The dominant scientific knowledge and the political response to 
this is not deemed challengeable. As Tony Blair stated after the Supreme Court 
ruling in 2007, the government might have to consult the public again, but this 
would not change the policy (Johnstone, 2010: 96). The policy was already 
decided upon and justified according to incontestable scientific facts about the 
necessity and safety of nuclear energy, the imperatives of economic growth and 
the dominant political concerns about national energy security. Dominant 
88 
 
narratives insist that the knowledge with which we make these decisions cannot 
be political if we are to achieve objectivity and gain the most comprehensive 
understanding of the issue (Lynas 2013; MacKay, 2009). For while there is so 
much caution on the part of ‘neo-environmentalist’ greens (Kingsnorth, 2012) 
such as Mark Lynas about the potential political bias of scientists, the fallacy of 
a ‘pure’ and detached science is being used as a transcendental force to ‘abort 
politics’ (Latour, 2004: 19). Reductive understandings of science as apolitical 
are used as a force which by-passes the political contestation required to 
mitigate and address problematic power asymmetries within the political 
community. Democratic political contestation is intended to avoid the 
totalitarianism of the use of a transcendental force above political contestation, 
but it is a temptation which is difficult to shake. 
Although the knowledge of industry and scientific experts is also 
positioned politically and is also partial, it is able to masquerade as neutral and 
objective. This means that certain knowledge of harm and concern (for 
nonhuman nature, future generations, those in other countries, alternative 
cultures and ways of living) are doubly disadvantaged, for they are not taken 
into account either in the construction of the scientific validity or in the dominant 
processes and constructions of political community. The knowledge and 
reasoning produced through democratic political process has been relegated to 
the cultural sphere, to second place, to deal with the scientific facts after they 
have been established. This is evident in the lack of truly open public 
consultation and opportunities for public contestation of the nuclear energy 
issue. The hierarchical binary opposition of science/politics limits the political 
choices available and confronts us with seemingly intransigent either/or choices 
(such as nuclear/coal). 
Resistance and protest against nuclear energy in the UK has shown the 
inherently political and contestable character of the issue nonetheless, pointing 
to the entrenched power asymmetries which reproduce harms to both human 
and nonhuman nature. However it is difficult to forcefully express these harms 
as relevant to both science and politics according to the dominant narratives 
which fragment responses to the problem. Knowledge claims about the risks of 
low-level radiation, of accidents, of the future long-term waste problems are 
accounted for, subordinated and justified according to the dominant 
understandings of political community, and faith in the solutions produced by 
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scientific progress. In discourses of national security a certain definition of the 
good of the political community is discussed in reductive scientific and 
economic terms which naturalise it and mask the reproduction of socially 
produced harms. The powerfully constitutive increasingly globalised discourses 
of state security in conjunction with prevailing economic and techno-scientific 
rationalities tend to pose as neutral and objective forms of knowledge, simply 
reflecting the nature of things, the way things are, yet they mask unnecessary 
harms perpetuated by avoidable human/human and human/nonhuman relations 
of domination.  
This is seen in Chris Huhne’s Regulatory Justification (DECC, 2010)  for 
the new nuclear reactors at Hinkley C. The harms are acknowledged but 
justified as necessary according to the logics of the dominant scientific and 
economic facts. These facts are used to delimit our understanding of the 
possibilities of political community to national energy security under conditions 
of capitalist economic growth and the need to reduce carbon emissions 
reduction in the context of climate change. The concerns which many have 
about nuclear energy are then categorised by industry and government experts 
as irrational and due to a lack of knowledge or misplaced politics. The dominant 
discourses deny or limit understanding of the extent of social and political 
embeddedness of science and economics, whilst also limiting understanding of 
the ecological embeddedness of political community. The knowledge of 
activists, those resisting and raising concerns for future generations, for the 
nonhuman, and those in other countries, is not considered relevant to our 
knowledge of the issue of nuclear energy because tainted by politics and/or 
because it is deemed out of touch with the realities of how things are; therefore 
demanding unreasonable changes. Such knowledge has suffered short-
circuiting both in the realm of science and the dominant politics, as the process 
of taking into account ‘how many (and who) are we’ has been cut short and pre-
empted by assumptions about ‘how we might live together’. 
However, if we gain an understanding of the politics inherent in 
understandings of ‘what is’, and challenge the short-circuiting of the process of 
taking all affected into account (how many, and who are we?) with the process 
of constituting political community (how might we live together?) then we can 
denaturalise the conditions which produce harms to both humans and 
nonhuman nature, and begin to challenge them as unnecessary and avoidable, 
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because politically produced. This involves paying attention to important 
knowledge about these harms. In order to gain a better picture of the politics of 
nuclear energy we must expand our conception of political community to include 
that previously excluded as ‘nature’.  An ecological process of knowledge 
construction which attends to the problem of ‘how many (and who) we are’ 
before seeking answers to the question of ‘how we might live together’ enables 
both legitimacy and efficacy of knowledge. 
Yet in this process we must be aware of the intertwining of these and the 
ever present danger of the latter short-circuiting the former; the question of ‘how 
many (and who) we are’ is not only a matter of counting but is also explicitly 
political involving questions of ‘who we are’, which has direct bearing upon 
questions of ‘how we might live together’. Rather than simply inserting matters 
or entities from the nonhuman world as objects or matters of fact into politics, as 
a stick with which to beat politics and delimit freedoms and possibilities, there is 
potential for more ecological (i.e. political) awareness as we face ‘matters of 
concern’ which cross the nature/culture divide, which provoke perplexity and 
contestation. By emphasising the process of taking all affected into account 
across the science/politics divide we can open up the possibility that ‘harms’ 
which are treated and dismissed as regrettable and unavoidable in prevailing 
scientific and economic discourses (which implicitly shore up the dominant 
political discourses) might be understood as unnecessary injustices when 
considered in terms of an explicitly political ecological approach, and therefore 
explicitly politically challenge the dominant status quo.  
Due to the entrenched character of existing political power relations 
which pervade dominant discourses however, it is especially important that the 
process of putting in order (assumptions about how we live together) does not 
block the process of taking into account (questions of how many, and who, we 
are). The alternative ‘separation of powers’ (Latour, 2004) should ensure that 
the process of putting in order (hierarchy and institution) does not short-circuit 
the process of taking into account (perplexity and consultation) as has been 
occurring in the case of nuclear energy. However, the problem remains, how 
can we maximise perplexity and consultation of all affected, given the 
hegemony of the separative, reductive discourses and the preponderance of 
power in the hands of those with an interest in keeping the power of ‘nature’ to 
maintain the old order of things? Latour (2004: 125) argues that ‘the power to 
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take into account’ needs to be ‘sensitive and alert’ to that which has been 
excluded in the process of putting in order. Ideally, those entities which have 
been excluded in the processes of deciding how we might live together (given 
the new combination of knowledge claims about the constitution of common life) 
will come back to haunt us, as long as the process of taking into account ‘is 
sensitive and alert enough’ (Latour, 2004: 124). Latour (2004: 81, 77) argues 
that inhabitants of both the human and nonhuman world have the capacity to 
act as ‘social’ actors, and that they are also defined by ‘reality and 
recalcitrance’.  
Resistance tends to be a sign that we need to pay attention to harms 
which may appear ‘natural’ and therefore necessary but are actually politically 
produced, resulting from contingent relations of domination between selves and 
others. Sensitivity to such resistance is needed if we are to take all affected into 
account and achieve more knowledge of what is at stake in the politics of 
nuclear energy. The harms resulting from social relations of domination require 
expression as injustices in order to register in the public sphere as political, as 
knowledge pertaining to political community. However, injustices must be 
understood not only as relevant to the sphere of politics, but also to the sphere 
traditionally ascribed to science, to our knowledge of ‘what is’, as aspects of the 
effects of common life not taken into account (in a way which avoids the 
hierarchical separation of science/politics, nature/culture). 
Given existing entrenched power asymmetries in prevailing discourses, 
listening and attending to the politics of ‘what is’, to ‘recalcitrance’, to resistance 
to the status quo, is vitally important. Faced with ecological crises where we as 
human beings are forced to realise our own political situatedness in power 
relations with nonhuman nature, we require the ‘best available knowledge’ we 
can get (Barry 2012: 10). The entities and knowledge claims excluded from the 
dominant discourses may be recalcitrant and provide resistance to the status 
quo. However, resistance does not always arise automatically and even when it 
does, experiences and senses of harms require articulation as injustices in 
terms which rethink and challenge existing conceptions of the political 
community (Honneth, 1995: 139; see also Barnett, 2012). The need for a 
careful weighing up of knowledge, perspectives and possibilities for common life 
(the integration of ‘what is’ and ‘political community’), particularly that 
knowledge which has been ‘sequestered’ (Giddens, 1991, in Barry, 2012: 37) 
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devalued, or excluded, requires a sensitivity which I propose necessitates a 
clearer understanding and articulation of potential and existing injustices and 
attention to, in Latour’s terms (2004: 80, 77) ‘actants’, ‘realities and 
recalcitrance’ on the ground.  We need to develop ways to heighten sensitivity 
to potential points of neglect and power asymmetries, as well as points of 
connection and contradiction, bringing important political knowledge to the fore, 
in order to enable a more adequate response to ecological crises. 
The framework which I develop in this thesis is intended to help in this 
process, to enable clearer attention to and expression of injustices so that they 
become relevant to our understandings of common life, including the 
overlapping domains of both science (‘what is’) and politics (political 
community). It is a framework which is intended to enable participation or 
inclusion in the contestation process; it is intended to heighten sensitivity and 
awareness on the part of those who do have some power within existing 
political relations, to enable perplexity and to broaden consultation. This 
process of asking ‘how many (and who) are we?’ in order to try to take all 
affected into account mirrors the first part of my two part research question: how 
might we become more aware of the injustices produced by nuclear energy? 
Making sure that all affected are taken into account in the political process of 
the contestation of knowledge claims serves to ensure the legitimacy of 
knowledge. The second part of my research question, which is concerned with 
how we might become more aware of how these injustices intersect, relates to 
the problem of the efficacy of knowledge and the relation between the 
processes of taking into account and putting in order (considerations of how we 
might live together, not only how we might find a language to express injustices 
but how we might articulate them), This will be clarified in the third section of 
this chapter. In the next section, with a view to gathering the tools to develop 
the framework for attending to and articulating injustices I turn to David 
Schlosberg (2007) who breaks important ground in paying attention to 
ecological and social justice claims of those engaged in political resistances on 
the ground, who have important knowledge about the harms reproduced by the 
current dominant conceptions of both politics and science, political community 
and ‘what is’. 
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A ‘shared toolbox’ for articulating injustices:  
distribution, recognition and representation  
 
In seeking to enhance our sensitivity to harms which are not ‘natural’ but 
reproduced by situated historic configurations of knowledge and political 
relations, it is important to listen to those who, in Latour’s words (2004: 144), 
‘knock at the door’ demanding more perplexity and consultation, or that prove 
recalcitrant, resisting the easy running of the status quo.  A number of feminist, 
marxist and green theorists have emphasised the importance of sensitivity and 
attention to the struggles of social movements against injustices (Young, 1990; 
Fraser, 1997, 2008; Harvey, 1996; Schlosberg, 2007). The work of David 
Schlosberg (2004; 2007; 2013) provides a particularly rich resource from which 
to develop a framework for articulating injustices, for he is especially attentive to 
the knowledge claims of those engaged in grassroots environmental justice 
activism at both local and global levels, whilst also bringing together the work of 
a variety of theorists in this area. He highlights the importance and value of 
multiple knowledge claims, emphasising that one should be ‘open to examining 
and emphasising various conceptions of justice – and experiences of justice – 
on different issues’ (2007: 172-3). 
Schlosberg also extends the discourse of justice to nonhuman nature, he 
explicitly aims to ‘expose a common language of justice, an overlapping set of 
discourses, and a shared toolbox, which we can use to address issues of both 
environmental and ecological justice’ (2007: 130-131, my emphasis).16 He 
doesn’t argue that all conceptions of justice must be present in every case, but 
that they should be considered, that one should be open to examining and 
emphasising various conceptions of justice – and experiences of justice – on 
different issues’ (172-3). He gives an example: 
In the case of the use of reclaimed wastewater to make snow at a ski 
resort on a mountain sacred to local tribes we can easily see 
distributional (Native Americans get more environmental bads than 
others), recognition-based (lack of acknowledgement of tribal cultures), 
participation-focused (exclusion from decision-making and lack of 
material in tribal languages), and capabilities-based (the impact on the 
tribes capability to retain cultural meanings and teachings) notions of 
environmental justice; we can also see distributional (water moved from 
one watershed to another), recognition-based (nature’s processes 
                                                     
16
 Schlosberg does not use the word ‘ecological’ as I do, to explicitly challenge the separation of 
nature/culture. As discussed in the first section of this chapter my own use of the word 
ecological aims to be explicit about the intersections between, as well as the injustices 
perpetuated by such powerfully constitutive symbolic separation.  
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ignored), participation-focused (no proxies for impacted species or 
communities), and capabilities-based (what will water laced with 
pharmaceuticals do to the reproductive capacity of local animals and 
plants) notions of ecological justice. All of these exist simultaneously in a 
single snowmaking proposal (Schlosberg, 2007: 172). 
 
Thus he states the intention that ‘[u]sing the range of theories available to us 
and understanding how they overlap and interact, will illuminate problems more 
thoroughly’ (Schlosberg, 2007: 173). While he continues to treat human and 
nonhuman nature as separate, and he focuses upon bringing together thinking 
about justice, he draws extensively on the knowledge of those resisting 
injustices and breaks important ground for my own work by bringing together 
different understandings of justice which I will use and develop as useful ways 
for thinking about politics in my heuristic framework for articulating injustices of 
nuclear energy. In what follows I elaborate on the three main understandings of 
politics which are either explicit or implicit in his work: i) distribution, ii) 
recognition, and iii) representation, and which I will draw upon in developing my 
own heuristic framework for articulating injustices of nuclear energy. 
 Firstly, I draw from Schlosberg (2004, 2007) the importance of thinking 
about distribution. He does not need to spend much time defending the 
conception of justice as distribution, given that this dominates political thinking 
about justice. In fact he spends much time defending the need to pay as much 
and separate attention to recognition and participation or procedural justice, for 
it is generally assumed by distributive justice theorists that the latter either 
follow from, or are preconditional to just distribution (Rawls, 1971; Miller, 1999). 
Schlosberg is careful to emphasise however, that whilst defending the need for 
a focus upon recognition and other conceptions of justice this does not mean 
that he is rejecting or setting aside distribution as an important concern.17 He 
grounds his discussion in the knowledge claims of environmental justice social 
movements in the US where 
the most often cited, and most obvious, evidence of environmental 
injustice is in the realm of distribution – speciﬁcally the inequitable share 
of environmental ills that poor communities, indigenous communities, 
and communities of colour live with (Schlosberg, 2004: 522). 
 
                                                     
17
 He also emphasises that this was not the intention of any of the recognition theorists he draws 
upon, Fraser (1997) being an obvious case in point, but also Young (1990) and Honneth (2007: 
24-5). 
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While industry and government deny discrimination claims due to the 
‘unintended’ or accidental character of the harm, Schlosberg (2007: 59) 
counters this with a systemic analysis, arguing that even if ‘the distribution is 
caused by, for example, market forces rather than targeting minorities it does 
not mean that the overall process is just’. 
Attempts to define what he and others term ‘ecological justice’ or justice 
to nonhuman nature in political theory (e.g. Baxter, 2005) have often relied upon 
the liberal paradigm of distributive justice. Schlosberg (2007) finds theorists 
attempts to expand the liberal distributional framework to include nonhumans to 
be lacking. The liberal framework, itself is biased towards anthropocentrism and 
is difficult to expand in this way, although it has been done most successfully 
through exploring loopholes in the framework, such as the possibility of 
including future human generations (which would have a positive side-effect for 
nonhuman nature), or, as Baxter does, through extending the community of 
justice procedurally so that nonhuman nature may be considered a non-
participating recipient of distributive justice, just as some members of the 
human community must. As Schlosberg (2007) points out, however, exploring 
such loopholes already moves beyond the bounds of distribution and begins to 
include recognition, procedural justice and participation (or as I would 
emphasise, representation).  
As we can see from the ski resort example above, Schlosberg (2004; 
2007) focuses specifically upon the distribution of environmental goods and 
bads. Yet his work also illustrates how social movements emphasise that 
distributive injustices to both human and nonhuman nature are linked. In 
examining the knowledge claims of those in global justice movements he points 
out that ‘social justice, environmental justice, and ecological justice are tied 
together in these critiques, as the poor suffer both social and environmental 
inequity and nature is drained of resources for economic gain’ (2004: 524). That 
which others have argued goes for environmentalism in general, so Schlosberg 
argues is even more the case with the environmental justice movements: their 
struggles are not just about single environmental issue politics but instead 
‘challenge multiple lines of domination’ making it hard to differentiate the 
environmental aspect of struggles from other dimensions (Pulido, 1996 in 
Schlosberg, 1999: 117). 
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Like Shrader-Frechette (2002), Schlosberg argues that distributive 
environmental justice assumes that ‘all things being equal, rich and poor, 
colored and white, educated and non-educated, be treated equally in the 
distributions of society’s environmental benefits and burdens’ (Shrader-
Frechette 2002: 24-5, in Schlosberg 2007: 56). This makes some sense within a 
single-issue anthropocentric understanding of ‘environmental justice’, and is 
also important as a means of challenging the emphasis upon economic and 
social goods alone within the dominant theories of justice. However, when 
referring to the movements Schlosberg (2004: 522) himself points out that ‘the 
call for “environmental justice” focuses on how the distribution of environmental 
risks mirrors the inequity in socio-economic and cultural status.’ This begins to 
highlight the limits to the single-issue focus and of thinking in terms of 
distribution alone. An assumption of equality with regards to the deeply 
ingrained differences (and inequalities of class, race/ethnicity etc.) appears 
absurd for in reality such inequalities tend to correlate with each other, 
intersecting with and reinforcing other injustices which cannot be 
conceptualised in terms of equality of distribution alone, but have as much to do 
with issues of recognition, participation and representation. 
As we have seen in the first section of this chapter, ingrained differences 
in status which have knock on effects upon distribution are also shored up by 
the nature/culture distinction and both humans and nonhumans have suffered 
from being categorised as part of the realm of objects and ‘nature’ to be used 
instrumentally and exploited (as ‘goods’) for the gain of dominant humans. 
Class and racial bias are reflected in distribution of environmental ills ‘[b]ecause 
they reflect the distribution of power in society, they cannot be expected to 
produce an equitable distribution of goods’ (Hamilton 1993: 69, cited in 
Schlosberg 2007: 60). Thus Schlosberg’s work points to some of the limits of 
thinking about justice only in terms of distribution of environmental benefits and 
burdens. The correlations and tensions resulting from the ways in which 
different types of distributive injustices, not only ‘environmental’ but also ‘social’ 
and ‘economic’, intersect with each other, however, deserves closer 
examination, not only within the confines of thinking about injustices to humans 
but also to nonhuman nature. The latter must in part remain a ‘good’ to be 
distributed (e.g. water, wood, etc.) yet must also be understood as a recipient of 
97 
 
goods and bads (e.g. river or forest ecosystems and individual animal and plant 
life within these). 
 This takes us to thinking about the second concept I draw upon: 
recognition. Schlosberg (2007) spends much time defending this as a valid and 
analytically separate area of inquiry. He argues that ‘[j]ust as distributional 
theorists do not want their key concern subsumed in a theory of justice focused 
on recognition, recognition cannot simply be subsumed, or assumed, in a theory 
of distribution’ (Schlosberg, 2007: 24). Following Nancy Fraser he emphasises 
that thinking about ‘the ‘identity politics’ of social movements or the post-
material critiques of the ‘cultural’ left’ is not antithetical to thinking about the 
traditional material concerns of the left, and that, as Fraser (1997: 12) argues, 
‘[j]ustice today requires both redistribution and recognition, as ‘neither is 
sufficient’ (1998: 5). Even Axel Honneth (1995), who has written extensively on 
recognition, does not dismiss the problem of material inequity. Honneth (1995: 
165) acknowledges ‘the more utilitarian struggle over the equitable distribution 
of goods, including cultural goods, as a motivator for collective action’ and 
emphasises that ‘this second model of conflict, based on a theory of 
recognition, should not try to replace the first, utilitarian model but only extend it’ 
(cited in Schlosberg 2007: 25). 
 The problem with focusing only upon distribution and an ideal ‘basic 
structure of society’ (Rawls 1971: 9-10) alone, is that patterns of distribution 
thus generated do not help us to examine social and historical context. As 
Young  (1990: 18) pointed out, simply theorising ideal patterns of distribution 
does not account for the underlying reasons for present distributional 
inequalities, nor the reality of actually existing domination and oppression which 
perpetuate injustices of different kinds, not only distributional inequity. 
Distributive theorists, such as Rawls may include recognition partly as ‘an 
assumption or precondition of distribution’ and partly as ‘a good to be 
distributed’ (Schlosberg, 2007: 20; Rawls, 1971), but the problem with assuming 
recognition is that it ‘is simply not assumed in the real world of injustice’ 
(Schlosberg, 2007: 21).  This is therefore ‘problematic on pragmatic and 
empirical grounds’: ‘[i]f the interest is about attaining justice, rather than 
attaining a sound theory of justice, recognition is central to the question and the 
resolution – and is not simply to be assumed’ (Schlosberg, 2007: 22). 
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Young also critiques the conceptualisation of the benefits and burdens to 
be distributed as static entities, instead emphasising that they are the outcome 
of social and institutional relations, particularly a lack of recognition of group 
differences by social structures, cultures and institutions (1990: 18). Young 
argues that recognition simply cannot be quantified and distributed as a ‘good’ 
in the way that some distributive theorists envision, precisely because it is ‘a 
relationship, a social norm embedded in social practice’ (Schlosberg 2007: 23; 
Young 1990: 27). Recognition cannot be distributed in the same way as 
education or housing support, 
[a] state may set an example of recognizing a socially demeaned group 
and validate difference in the political realm (through voting, or marriage 
rights, for example), but recognition must happen as much in the social, 
cultural, and symbolic realms as in the institutional ( Schlosberg, 2007: 
23). 
 
This moves attention away from the state alone as a focus for redressing 
injustice ‘and brings justice theory squarely into the political space beyond the 
state’ (Schlosberg, 2007: 23). This is also important within the context of 
globalization and the need to acknowledge other social forces beyond the state 
such as the market (e.g. see Dryzek, 2000, also Barnett, 2012). 
 Rawls maintains that recognition is preconditional for membership in the 
political community (Schlosberg, 2007: 23; Rawls, 1971), but recognition is a 
more complex issue than simple inclusion or exclusion, relating also to the 
hierarchical structures within political communities. As Schlosberg points out 
there is a need to ‘examine the range of social and cultural values and practices 
that impede full recognition of a group as an accepted member of the moral and 
political community’ (Schlosberg, 2007: 16). These include both the internal 
effects of intersubjective relations upon the ‘self-worth’ of individual subjects 
(Taylor, 1992; Honneth, 1995), and the external structural effects of social 
relations upon the social status of individuals, ‘institutionalized relation[s] of 
subordination’ within broader social structures (Fraser, 2000: 113). Disputes 
between these conceptions notwithstanding (Fraser & Honneth, 2003), they are 
actually linked. As Schlosberg (2007: 20) points out  
civil rights protesters who carried signs proclaiming, simply and 
poignantly, ‘I am a Man’ – certainly a call for more than education and 
voting rights – conveyed the issues of both individual self-worth and 
institutional and cultural status. 
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Sojourner Truth’s words ‘Ain’t I a Woman?’ and bell hooks’ book of the same 
name do this too, with the latter in particular highlighting the intersections 
between injustices of race/ethnicity and gender and the particular struggle of 
non-white women in the context of a predominantly white and middle-class 
feminist movement and a male focused civil rights movement (hooks, 1981).  
Each of the above examples, in having to proclaim the status of non-
whites (and women) within the moral community of ‘man’, highlight the ways in 
which the nature/culture divide, in delineating ‘what is’, has also circumscribed 
the boundaries of political and moral community. Non-whites and women were 
considered ‘by nature’ of lower status, and indeed associated with (nonhuman) 
nature, as primitive and mentally undeveloped, identified and objectified by 
means of their bodily attributes. The struggles to be included within the realm of 
‘man’ have broadened understandings of political and moral community, but 
‘nature’ (and/or ‘reason’) as ‘sword of Damocles’ (Latour, 2004: 1, 185) still 
divides human and nonhuman nature in terms of whether and how they are 
recognised within moral and political community. 
Schlosberg argues that recognition ‘has a particularly useful role to play 
in expanding conceptions of justice to nature’ (2007: 129-120), and while much 
has been written on ‘recognition or respect for the intrinsic value in nature in 
order to justify an extension of our moral and ethical community to nature’ 
(Schlosberg, 2007: 159), this has hardly been done in connection with thinking 
about justice. Indeed environmental ethics, including much ecofeminist theory, 
has been criticised for its failure to speak to politics (Schlosberg, 2007: 159; 
Light & de-Shalit, 2003; MacGregor, 2003). Underlying any attempt to extend 
justice to nonhuman nature presupposes recognition of nonhuman nature, and 
while this is a good start, the recognition of nonhuman nature ‘is undertheorized’ 
and there is a need to address the ‘underlying social, cultural, and political 
issues around this recognition of nature – something absolutely necessary in 
order to transform such a theory into social practice’ (Schlosberg, 2007: 132).  
Schlosberg in particular draws attention to the possibilities of extending 
Fraser’s thinking on status injuries to nonhuman nature. These are ‘based in 
social mis- or mal-recognition’ rather than ‘individual psychological feelings on 
the part of the victims of injustice’ so that the focus is less about valorising 
individual or group identity and instead aimed at ‘overcoming subordination 
(Fraser, 2000: 114, in Schlosberg, 2007: 139). As Schlosberg (2007: 139) 
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points out, ‘[w]e can see nature injured, its interests ignored, autonomy 
dismissed, or its integrity damaged’: 
The point is to examine the range of social and cultural values and 
practices that impede the full recognition of a group as an accepted 
member of the moral and political community. We focus not simply on 
the similarity of characteristics of humans and nonhumans, but on the 
commonality of patterns of oppression and status injuries in political, 
social, and cultural realms (Schlosberg, 2007: 141).  
 
These institutionalised social, political and cultural structures position humans 
and nonhumans differentially within our knowledge and understandings of both 
‘what is’ (science) and political community (politics). As the first section of this 
chapter, and the nuclear energy issue, make clear, these are not as separate as 
we have been conditioned to think.  
Recognition is about the social bonds or relations which make up political 
community. While some are concerned with those bonds breaking down under 
the pressures of globalization (Lash & Featherstone, 2001), and others see it 
expanding in more cosmopolitan fashion to include all of humanity (Archibugi & 
Held, 1995; Fraser, 2008), Schlosberg’s (2007: 142) concern is that 
‘[m]odernity’s social bond [never went far enough, and] is unsustainable without 
a simultaneous recognition of, and bond with, the rest of the natural world’. 
Indeed, as Plumwood’s analysis has shown, strategies of inclusion predicated 
on similarities to morally considerable insiders and differentiation from morally 
non-considerable outsides can backfire upon devalued others who have just 
about made it through the ‘trap-door’ of considerability (Plumwood, 1993, 2002; 
see also Crenshaw, 1991). 18 This is because such strategies of inclusion fail to 
challenge the continued separation between humans and a separately 
conceived ‘nature’ (Latour’s (2004: 1,185) sword of Damocles – science/politics, 
nature/culture). 
The implications of this in terms of recognition-based injustices to both 
humans and nonhumans, deserves further consideration, particularly in the 
context of addressing the problem of the nature/culture divide. The lesson most 
commonly taken from Latour (2004) is that we must let go of ‘nature’, but 
equally important is his suggestion that we must lose the ‘culture’ distinction. To 
some extent this has already occurred with the recognition of other cultures and 
                                                     
18
 Kimberle Crenshaw (1991: 61) uses the analogy of a trap-door to illustrate how the problem of 
‘intersectionality’ or ‘multiple burdening’ makes it harder for some others, e.g. black women to 
achieve recognition (1991: 61). 
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the rise of ‘multiculturalism’, but Latour (2004: 130) emphasises that the latter 
will continue to be problematic as long as it is posed against ‘mononaturalism’, 
the background of a single ‘nature’.  
The emergence of multiculturalism and certain more respectful attitudes 
towards the knowledge and values of other cultures, whilst constituting a move 
away from certain types of othering (devaluing social and institutional norms 
which limit recognition of some social groups), is incomplete without the move 
away from ‘mononaturalism’ (Latour 2004: 48), towards an understanding of the 
multiple natures which make up reality. Mononaturalism provides a backdrop 
against which the old forms of othering between human cultures can slip back 
in. All that has been consigned to ‘nature’ has tended to be devalued and 
‘nature’ and the nonhuman world of things has been backgrounded in western 
culture ‘as the taken-for-granted backdrop to market [and other human] 
activities, as absorber of wastes and provider of limitless resources, noticed 
only when it threatens to fail to perform as required’ (Plumwood, 1993: 153). 
Dominant discourses of state security and economic and scientific rationalism 
rely upon the distinction between nature and culture, and thus reinforce these 
recognition-based injustices. 
Schlosberg’s research indicates that many of the claims made by global 
environmental justice activists highlight ‘the danger of a growing global 
monoculture’, not simply protesting against the homogenising destructive force 
of neo-liberalism, but also against the ‘present and coming loss of diverse 
cultures’, and calling for ‘recognition and preservation of diverse cultures, 
identities, economies, and ways of knowing’ (Schlosberg, 2004: 524, see also 
Shiva, 1997, 2000). Crucially, the spread of the dominant culture is reinforced 
by the wielding of science and by its status as the pinnacle of progress, ‘the end 
of history’ (Fukuyama, 1992). These narratives are normalised and naturalised 
by the nature/culture separation. Other cultures are deemed more primitive and 
backward in contrast to the neoliberal development discourses. The destruction, 
for example, of localised cultures of farming, is about more than simply ‘culture’, 
but also the loss of biodiversity as local agriculture is replaced with seed 
monocropping.  Loss of culture is bound up with the loss of the ways in which 
other cultures relate to the nonhuman world; ‘globalisation creates 
‘development’ and ‘growth’ by the destruction of the local environment, culture 
and sustainable ways of living’ (Schlosberg, 2004: 525). 
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 A key response to this lack of recognition of diverse cultures and ways of 
living which do not adhere to the science/politics and nature/culture separations 
has been to demand more participation, to claim legitimate voice within the 
discourses and structures which govern common life. This takes me to the third 
and final understanding of politics which I draw from Schlosberg, the importance 
of thinking about representation. Drawing upon both social movements, and the 
work of Iris Young and Nancy Fraser, Schlosberg (2007: 26) discusses this in 
terms of procedural justice and participation and emphasises the importance of 
paying attention to ‘demands for more broad and authentic public participation.’ 
However, the ecological approach, described in section one of this chapter, 
prompts me to accentuate more clearly, as others have done, that we cannot, 
and should not seek to, escape representative processes (Spivak, 1988; Alcoff, 
1991; Plotke, 1997; Young, 2000; Eckersley, 2004; Fraser, 2008; Saward, 
2010). An ecological approach which moves beyond the hierarchical separation 
of science/politics and nature/culture, involves acknowledging that ‘seeking to 
break the boundaries of representation, to find directness, engagement, 
contact, authenticity’ (Saward, 2006: 195) falls back upon an understanding that 
it is possible to achieve direct and incontestable knowledge about the ‘nature’ of 
things.  
It follows, then that the importance of paying attention to representation 
is not only a matter of scale. Scale is Fraser’s (2008) main reason for 
acknowledging the need for representation at the global level in the context of 
transnational structures and forms of organisation in which most have no voice 
or impact upon the representative processes therein. Participation of those 
affected is undoubtedly vital. Green thinkers such as Dryzek (2000) have also 
emphasised this, insisting that participation must occur in various social and 
cultural institutions, not only in the traditional arenas of government. 
Acknowledgement of unrepresentative institutions and practices at state and 
international levels, as well as the abuses and insensitivity of many 
representations reflected in the ‘crisis of representation’ in academic theory 
(Alcoff, 1991: 7), means that participation is of great importance. However, it is 
important not to lose sight of how participation always takes place within 
broader representative processes.  Speaking for oneself always also entails 
representations which impact upon others (Alcoff, 1991). Participation and 
representation are not mutually exclusive (Young, 2000; Saward, 2010), rather 
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it is helpful to think instead in terms of possibilities for participation within 
processes of representation. 
I therefore take from Schlosberg the importance of thinking about 
participation, but I understand participation as part of a broader understanding 
of politics as representation. Schlosberg (2007: 71-70) looks at movement 
demands for participation, and the chance to speak for (or represent) 
themselves and others like them, and identifies a range of participatory 
practices seen as important to the US environmental justice movement; access 
to information, inclusion in traditional policymaking and environmental decision-
making processes, and an increase in ‘community-based participatory research’ 
where communities have worked together with scientists for community health 
surveys. Importantly, Schlosberg (2007: 70) highlights that in contrast to the 
liberal justice paradigm, there is not the same emphasis in environmental and 
global justice movement discourses upon liberal individualism, with a much 
greater focus on the importance of participatory justice at both the individual 
and community level; ‘[t]he relationship between individual experience and 
community achievement is crucial to the practice of participation as an element 
of environmental justice.’ Empowerment is also seen as a vital part of this.  
Schlosberg’s emphasis upon the links between individual and community 
relates to my concern with emphasising representative processes, and not only 
participation, for it is these broader processes which enable the constructions 
and representations of individual and community identities and norms which 
structure and enable participation. If we understand that representative 
processes make up our understandings of ‘what is’ as well as ‘what could be’, 
and are present at every level, starting with the very language we use to 
understand and order the world, then we can concede that representation is not 
something to be avoided. We cannot escape representation and it must 
therefore be addressed head on, particularly if we wish to articulate injustices 
relating to it. 
As Schlosberg (2007: 97) points out, social movement critiques of global 
institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank have made clear  
that there would not be satisfaction  with minimal participation – a seat at 
the table or participation in an unempowered working group on one issue 
or another. The current development model cannot be ‘fixed’ simply by 
letting some folks speak at WTO meetings. 
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He emphasises how these movements challenge ‘the social and ecological 
devastation the development model engenders – the destruction of nature, 
culture, and existing modes of relation between the two’ (2007: 97). The 
underlying issue here is that this is not only a problem of participation in formal 
institutional structures, but is about the very ways in which representative 
processes influence our understandings of the world, with ‘the current 
development model’ representing both ‘what is’ and ‘what ought/ought not to 
be’, based upon conflicting understandings of ‘nature’ and ‘culture.’  
 As Iris Young (1990: 34) has argued, ‘[f]or a norm to be just, everyone 
who follows it must in principle have an effective voice in its consideration and 
be able to agree to it without coercion’. If we consider the ‘current development 
model’ as a norm, it is clear that not all have been able to participate in its 
construction and there are certainly coercive factors at the international level 
which paint a far from benign picture of its impact upon social relations. It is 
useful at this point to return to the discussion of the construction of knowledge 
in the first section of this chapter.  The current development model predicated 
on ideas of capitalist state security and neoliberal conceptions of the conditions 
of economic growth and human well-being, is not only an idea of ‘what is’ and 
‘what could be’, but is embedded in and emerges from social practices.  
The point is that the norm, or idea, cannot be detached from the 
ecological relations from which it emerges, relations which are in ongoing 
process. For this reason, representations are always incomplete and 
contestable. Young (1990: 34) goes on to say that ‘[f]or a social condition to be 
just, it must enable all to meet their needs and exercise their freedom; thus 
justice requires that all be able to express their needs.’ Yet is important to be 
aware that these ‘needs’ are not straightforward or immediately self-evident, 
and that there is always a degree of construction and interpretation in both the 
recognition and the representation of these needs. To allow an understanding of 
external or transcendent ‘nature’ to dictate these needs may exacerbate 
injustices. However, if human needs themselves are considered independent 
from a ‘nature’ externally conceived, this may also pose injustices to both 
humans and nonhuman nature. These issues will be explored further in the 
following three chapters. 
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Implicit in the above line from Young then is also a sense of how 
understandings of justice as distribution, recognition and representation 
intersect in practice. Schlosberg (2004: 537) too has emphasised how the 
‘articulations of global environmental justice’ in the knowledge claims of social 
movements illustrate 
that these conceptions are thoroughly linked. It is not simply that the 
justice of environmental justice in political practice includes issues of 
equity, recognition, and participation; the broader argument here is that 
the movement represents an integration of these various claims into a 
broad call for justice. 
 
This is also apparent in his description of the ‘single snow making proposal’ 
described at the beginning of this section (Schlosberg, 2007: 172). Indeed, as 
will become clear, it is this insistence that distribution, recognition and 
representation intersect, which makes them particularly suited to my attempt to 
articulate injustices beyond the limiting separations of nature/culture and 
science/politics, in a more ecological manner.  
In his description of the snow making proposal above Schlosberg also 
includes a capabilities-based notion of environmental justice. While the 
capabilities-approach has important political currency (Sen, 2010; Nussbaum, 
2006), and Schlosberg (2009, 2010) has fruitfully pursued this avenue, I have 
chosen not to include this as a basis for the heuristic framework I develop in this 
thesis. I do not consider that the capabilities-approach provides me with the 
same rich tradition of political theory and practice for articulating injustices 
which accompany the concepts of distribution, recognition and representation. 
Schlosberg’s (2009, 2010) exploration of capabilities, which he has deepened in 
recent years, is particularly interesting and apt for his own work. As Schlosberg 
and Carruthers (2010: 16) argue, there is much potential for thinking about 
capabilities as a way ‘to define environmental justice’ because it potentially 
‘includes such a wide range of concerns.’ However, as they also point out, 
Amartya Sen’s, and Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approaches, while 
expanding on ‘a purely equity-based notion of justice [..] remain squarely liberal’ 
(Schlosberg & Carruthers, 2010: 15). While Sen (2010) is cautious about 
defining sets of capabilities for all, emphasising public reasoning to determine 
what is needed, and Martha Nussbaum (2006) does defend the idea of 
guaranteeing a set of capabilities to protect minorities who may not be in a 
position to deliberate, both retain a focus ‘on the freedom and functioning of 
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individuals’ (Schlosberg & Carruthers, 2010: 15). Schlosberg (2007) moves 
away from this liberal approach, broadening out an understanding of capabilities 
to include the linking of individual and community in conceptions of justice. This 
includes concerns about ‘traditions, practices, cosmologies, and the 
relationships with nature that tie native peoples to their ancestral lands’ 
(Schlosberg & Carruthers, 2010: 13). 
However, in seeking to more thoroughly push through the implications of 
an ecological approach, my work differs from Schlosberg’s concern with 
conceptions of justice, as I seek to adopt and adapt aspects of the ‘shared 
toolbox’ which he offers, in order to articulate injustices beyond the limited 
separations of science/politics and nature/culture. As such, it is interesting that 
Schlosberg’s work suggests that demands for equity, recognition, and 
participation are all linked up within a broader understanding of capabilities as ‘a 
concern for the basic functioning of nature, culture, and communities’ 
(Schlosberg & Carruthers, 2010: 13). However, rather than consider distribution, 
recognition and representation as ‘conceptions of justice’, or as ‘capabilities’ 
within more plural definitions of environmental justice, my aim is to draw upon 
these as ‘images’ of politics, which help to give different understandings of the 
problem of nuclear energy. In using these images to redescribe the problem of 
nuclear energy the aim is ‘not to develop a normative theory’, but rather ‘to 
disclose the conditions of possibility’ within the problem (Tully, 2002: 534). 
I take the language of ‘images’ from Ingram (2008). My approach 
involves an interest in the practices and discourses which reproduce injustices, 
rather than the development of abstract principles, or even more grounded 
conceptions which define justice. Like Ingram (2008: 402) I refer to different 
understandings of politics as ‘images, rather than ideas or concepts, because 
they grow out of largely implicit assumptions about the nature of politics and 
political theory.’ The three images of politics I focus upon – distribution, 
recognition and representation – are analytically useful because they reveal and 
conceal different problems and possibilities for practical courses of action. Each 
image helps to redescribe the problem of nuclear energy, drawing out and 
unmasking aspects which have been taken for granted or deemed necessary. 
They help to uncover different aspects of the contingent, historically and 
spatially situated relations between ecological entities, helping to expand and 
shift our understanding of the problem and the possibilities for addressing it.  
107 
 
I therefore seek to develop an open heuristic framework using 
distribution, recognition and representation as images of politics which help us 
to more clearly attend to the injustices produced by nuclear energy and 
consider these from different points of view. This suits my ecological concern 
with developing a grounded, situated, explicitly political and contingent form of 
knowledge which is contestable in theory and practice. My ecological approach 
has arisen from my own personal engagement in the disorderly world of praxis. 
Similarly, the language relating to representation, recognition and distribution 
has arisen from this reflexive relation to practice (Drake, 2010; Schlosberg, 
2007).  
Schlosberg (2007) emphasises the importance of being able to consider 
multiple diverse claims which draw our attention to injustices. This is especially 
important from an ecological point of view which seeks to overcome the 
hierarchical binary separations of science/politics, nature/culture. Only through 
considering the diversity of human and nonhuman life and the complex 
interconnections between, can we even attempt to approach any kinds of 
ecologically sensitive solutions to the problems we face. By adopting and 
adapting aspects of Schlosberg’s approach, drawing out distribution, recognition 
and representation as important and useful images of politics which help us to 
understand diverse claims of injustice I hope to more clearly address the 
problems which the separations of science/politics and nature/culture pose to 
our understanding of the problems we face.  
Emerging from the theory and practice of justice and liberation struggles, 
these three images of politics have considerable political currency. I use them in 
order to reflectively engage with practice in the spirit of critical political theory 
described by James Tully (2002), and engaged in by others who have sought to 
develop thinking about different kinds of injustice explicitly aiming to bridge the 
gaps between theory and practice (e.g. Fraser, 1997; Feldman, 2002; 
Schlosberg, 2007; Eschle & Maiguashca, 2010). The inclusion of these images 
of politics in my framework helps begin to address the first part of my research 
question, namely, how might we become more aware of the injustices produced 
by nuclear energy and express them so that they are more clearly discernible 
as injustices in public debates and decision making on nuclear energy? The 
final section of this chapter explains in more detail the open heuristic framework 
108 
 
I develop as well as how the ecological approach influences the steps I take in 
its development. 
 
Developing a heuristic framework for articulating ecological injustices  
 
So far in this chapter I have described the ecological approach I take to 
addressing the separation of science/politics, and explained the reasons for 
drawing upon the three images of politics - distribution, recognition and 
representation – to more clearly get at and understand the harms produced in 
the politics of nuclear energy as different kinds of injustices. The latter is part of 
the first stage in the ecological process of the construction and contestation of 
knowledge. Attending to ‘due process’ in an ecological sense involves an 
ontological commitment to the situated, relational character of knowledge, and a 
normative commitment to opening up our understanding of those affected in the 
processes of common life. The first stage involves asking ‘how many (and who) 
are we?’ and taking all affected (as far as possible) into account. The second 
stage, the process of ‘putting in order’, considering possible answers to the 
question of how we might live together, responds to the relational and 
negotiated character of common life, which we can only understand by means 
of situated and relationally produced knowledge. These processes are 
inextricably related to each other and difficult to separate out analytically, but 
the purpose of doing so is to guard against the ever present potential that the 
process of putting in order (of hierarchy and institution: ‘how might we live 
together?’) will pre-empt the process of taking all affected into account (of 
perplexity and consultation: ‘how many, and who are we?’), and to address the 
concern that the latter might paralyse or unduly disrupt the former.  
The ecological approach to addressing the science/politics and 
nature/culture separations is part of the ‘critical attitude’ (Tully, 2002: 549) which 
I bring to the problem of nuclear energy described in Chapter One. From this 
ecologically critical perspective I seek to redescribe the problem in a way which 
helps to provide another ‘language of self-understanding’ for those struggling 
within it (Tully, 2002: 549). Table 2 (below, p.111) outlines the open, heuristic 
framework for articulating injustices developed in this thesis. The aim is to 1) 
ecologically reformulate the image of politics; 2) articulate the political intuition 
of injustice with specific examples from the struggle against nuclear energy; 
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and, 3) evaluate the political efficacy of each articulation in terms of the practical 
political work it does, and its limits. In the remainder of this chapter I clarify 
these moves and explain how the ecological approach influences the 
development of this framework. I suggest that articulating injustices opens up 
possibilities for strengthening the voices and positions of those currently 
fragmented and pacified within the dominant discourses. Awareness of the 
intersections between injustices (the second part of my research question) can 
help to produce solidarity, although always in contingent fashion, open to the 
ongoing contestation of injustices. 
 
The first step I take (see Table 2, row 1) is to consider how each image 
of politics shifts when we take an ecological approach to understanding it. The 
first section of each of the following three chapters considers the image of 
politics and seeks to reformulate this in terms of the ecological approach of 
taking all affected interests into account. I turn to existing theory which goes into 
detail about each image of politics. The distributive view relies on an image of 
politics as ‘who [or what] gets what’19 (Lasswell, 1958 [1936]) and ‘the just state 
of affairs [as] that in which each individual has exactly those benefits and 
burdens which are due to him’ (Miller, 1976, in Simon, 1995: 8). The image of 
politics we get from the recognition perspective addresses politics as ‘who [or 
what] counts as what’ (Taylor, 1992), while the image we get from the 
representation perspective addresses politics as ‘who [or what] speaks, decides 
or acts on behalf of whom [or what]’ (adapted from Saward, 2010). The images 
chosen are not intended as essential or ontological claims about reality, but 
rather as useful, flexible, and open heuristic devices which are connected to the 
political imagination.  
By looking at the problem of nuclear energy in terms of the three different 
images the intention is to gain alternative perspectives on the issue and an 
                                                     
19
 The distinction between ‘who’ and ‘what’ relates to the distinction between object and subject, 
relating to different types of identity: selfhood and sameness. This can be understood better if 
we think of the difference between the question of ‘who human beings are’ in terms of their 
individual identities, and the question of ‘what they are’ in terms of their membership of a 
species, for example. This distinction also tends to be a distinction in animacy, based on how 
sentient or alive the referent is considered to be. This distinction is based upon context, but it 
tends to correspond with the nature/culture separation (Salleh 1997; Plumwood, 2002). I use 
both because I wish to circumvent this separation and I not only refer to humans but also 
nonhumans, and depending on context, not only individual members of a species with particular 
identities, but also groups/assemblages of these (which may or may not be species). 
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understanding of the different, analytically distinct, yet actually ‘tangled,’20 
political processes which generate harms. Schlosberg (2007: 74) points out 
how, in practice, recognition, distribution and representation are intertwined: 
one must have recognition in order  to have real participation; one must 
have participation in order to get equity, further equity would make more 
participation possible, which would strengthen community functioning.  
 
In this thesis my concern is with finding ways to more clearly communicate the 
harms which emerge in the practices and discourses of nuclear energy. While 
distribution, recognition and representation are inextricably interrelated in 
practice, we can distinguish between them analytically in order to tease out 
different aspects of the multifaceted politics involved. These analytical 
distinctions help us to better understand the complex political processes which 
produce the harms of nuclear energy.  
The second step (Table 2, row 2) in the development of this open, 
heuristic framework is to find a language from within each ecologically 
reformulated image of politics to articulate the injustices of nuclear energy. Our 
intuitions of injustice to both ourselves and others provide a form of political 
knowledge, a means of determining legitimacy and weighing up right or wrong 
action. While injustice remains under-theorised (Shklar, 1990), much of the 
justice literature, having at root always been motivated by injustices, provides a 
rich supply of language with which to address this. I suggest that working on 
understanding and expressing different aspects of injustice can give us a more 
grounded and politically responsive picture of the problems we face. As Miranda 
Fricker (2007: 5) has pointed out, although ‘any claim of injustice must rely on 
shared intuition,’ analysing ‘the nature of the wrong inflicted’ can help us to 
‘achieve a clearer idea of why something constitutes an injustice.’ 
Understanding the political processes which produce harms helps us to 
articulate them as injustices. 
Paying attention to different kinds of injustices can make an important 
contribution to clarifying discussions on nuclear energy, given the connected 
and situated character of all knowledge. The intention behind articulating the 
 
                                                     
20
 I take this from Latour (2004: 22, 255), who has adapted it from work in anthropology 
(Thomas, 1991). Drawing also on Ulrich Beck (1992), Latour uses it to depict how in times of 
ecological crisis, subject-object relations which were previously understood to be ‘risk-free’ have 
given way to an awareness of ‘risky attachments’ which are difficult to articulate within dominant 
‘modernist’ discourses. 
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Table 2: Articulating ecological injustices of nuclear energy 
 Distribution Recognition Representation 
Ecological 
Politics 
 
‘Who or what gets 
what?’  
Distribution includes 
future generations, 
non-nationals and 
nonhuman nature. 
This highlights 
unequal distribution 
of burdens as well as 
goods and the limits 
of human and 
nonhuman capacity 
to sustain this. 
‘Who or what counts 
as what?’   
Recognition involves 
continuities as well as 
differences in 
interaction between 
selves and others, 
pointing to 
unpredictability and 
limits of human 
independence from 
and control of other 
human and 
nonhuman nature. 
‘Who or what acts for 
what?’  
Representation entails 
constitutive forms of 
communication, 
involving speech as well 
as other forms of action, 
pointing to multiple 
human and nonhuman 
authorities and 
possibilities for both 
constructive and 
destructive 
collaborations. 
Injustices of 
nuclear 
energy 
 
Deprivation of basic 
necessities for future 
generations, non-
citizens and 
nonhumans caused 
by unequal 
distribution of the 
burdens as well as 
goods produced by 
nuclear energy and 
the dominant 
contemporary forms 
of social organisation 
Disrespect for 
integrity in self/other 
relations is reinforced 
by nuclear energy 
which denies human 
vulnerability and 
fallibility and 
perpetuates the 
illusion of 
independence from 
and control of 
unpredictable 
interaction between 
selves and others. 
Denial of multiple 
authorities is 
perpetuated as 
government, industry 
and scientists promoting 
nuclear energy 
monopolise authority in 
disengaged form which 
denies the authority of 
other humans and of 
nonhuman nature. This 
inhibits reflexivity and 
possibilities for 
responsible 
collaboration. 
Political 
Efficacy  
Enables contestation 
of benefits and 
burdens to being 
across time and 
space and is 
commensurate with 
dominant economic 
modes of thinking.  
 
BUT, meaning of 
‘benefit’, ‘burden’ and 
‘basic necessities’ will 
remain contestable –
recognition contests 
quality of relations, 
representation 
contests authority. 
Enables contestation 
of values that 
structure interaction 
and critique of human 
domination of 
nonhuman nature 
and how this affects 
human-human 
interaction.         
 
BUT domination and 
alienation are 
inevitable possibilities 
–representation 
contests authority, 
distribution contests 
benefits and burdens 
to being. 
Enables contestation of 
authority in terms of 
both speech and action, 
is commensurate with 
discourses of 
democracy.          
                             
BUT representation is 
always incomplete but 
has a tendency to 
totalise – to keep the 
process open we still 
require contestation of 
the distribution of 
benefits and burdens to 
being, and contestation 
of the quality of 
self/other relations. 
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harms as injustices is to make them more readily understood as problems of 
political community and thereby help to resist and contest their naturalisation 
(and hence also political fragmentation and pacification) within the dominant 
discourses. By articulating harms as injustices I seek to amplify the knowledge 
of those resisting injustices of nuclear energy in order to give a thicker 
description of the ecological politics of nuclear energy. Taken together, and 
considering the links and overlaps between them, we can take into account 
more knowledge claims about the politics (power relations) leading to any given 
injustice than we would have had we taken just one or two of these images of 
politics. 
In critical democratic theory, the idea of all affected interests has been 
used and understood ‘less as an abstract causal criterion’ (for justice) and ‘more 
like an animating political intuition, as a worldly normative force generating 
political claims and counter-claims’ (Barnett, 2012: 682; Fraser, 2008). It is in 
this more ‘worldly normative’ spirit that I suggest articulations to express ‘felt 
senses’ and experiences of injustice (Barnett, 2012: 684), which may be taken 
up (and contested) by those affected. In seeking to attend to and articulate 
injustices I am interested in doing more than simply pointing out whose interests 
have been left out or not taken into account. I also seek to address the 
possibility of articulating multiple injustices in relation to each other, to uncover 
contradictions but also possibilities for solidarity in countering the contemporary 
hegemonic discourses. This is about engaging in the second part of the 
ecological knowledge construction process outlined at the beginning of this 
chapter, asking the question ‘how might we live together?’ and it relates to the 
second part of my research question namely, how might we become more 
aware of how these injustices intersect? 
Amplifying the perspectives of those suffering injustices is not to 
essentialise injustices or the positions of those who suffer from them:  
[a] voice is privileged to the extent that it is constructed from a position 
that enables it to spot distortions, mystifications, and colonizing and 
totalizing tendencies within other discourses’ (Cheney, 1991: 24).  
 
As discussed in section one of this chapter, the point of disclosing the 
knowledge of those undergoing injustices is to bring out the contradictions 
which emerge for many under the conditions of the dominant discourses which 
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split science/politics and nature/culture. Heightening sensitivity to potential and 
existing power asymmetries and points of neglect will help to clarify the points of 
connection and contradiction and enable a more practical, more democratic, but 
crucially, also more ecological response to the nuclear energy controversy. As 
Markell (2003: 178) has pointed out, attention to injustices will not necessarily 
put an end to political controversy nor give definitive prescriptions for action, but 
it can help us see different possibilities for action. 
In bringing out and responding to these injustices I draw upon the term 
‘articulation’ in its two senses ‘of language-ing, of expressing’ and of 
‘connecting’, of ‘a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and 
essential for all time’, but rather is a possibility, ‘under certain historical 
conditions’ (Hall, 1996: 141). Understood in this way the knowledge claims of 
injustice articulated in this thesis are intended to help empower, to offer some 
possibilities for making sense of contemporary conditions, without falling into 
the trap of reductionism (Hall, 1996: 142). Ariel Salleh (1997: 177-178) has 
helpfully emphasised the contradictory character of the ‘subject-in-process’ 
inherent in an understanding which moves beyond the nature/culture divide. For 
example, she describes how ‘an exploited worker might be empowered to move 
from subjective anger to ‘objective’ consciousness of her unity with a class of 
others’ (1997: 177), or how in an inherently practical sense, the possibilities of 
ongoing processes of ‘labour-in-reciprocity’ privilege ‘neither worker nor matter’ 
but  foster ‘the subjectivity of others, including nature’s constant flux.’ 
Articulation is appropriate from an ecological perspective because it aims at 
greater sensitivity to practice, action and process, as well as helping to increase 
awareness of possible linkages and points of effective political solidarity.  
This takes us to the third step (Table 2, row 3) in the development of the 
heuristic framework of this thesis, which involves evaluating the political efficacy 
of each articulation of injustice. The important point here then is not only the 
status (legitimacy) of knowledge claims in a democracy, but also the efficacy of 
these claims. The public sphere is understood not only as space for critical 
scrutiny and the processes of legitimation of ideas and practices, but in terms of 
its efficacy, as ‘a vehicle for marshalling public opinion as a political force’ for 
holding people and institutions and structures with decision-making powers 
accountable’ (Fraser, 2008: 76). 
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As discussed above and in Chapter One, those claims, concerns and 
entities which have been excluded from the dominant knowledge construction 
process may be ‘recalcitrant’ and resist the status quo. However, those resisting 
are also often split and pitted against each other according to the logics of the 
dominant discourses. Resistance is not automatic and to be effective harms 
need to be articulated as injustices in solidarity with others, so as to challenge 
or shift existing dominant conceptions of political community (Honneth, 1995: 
139). At the same time, because articulation aims at greater sensitivity to 
practice, action and process, it is important to emphasise that articulations are 
always partial, that other articulations are always possible. 
Understandings and interpretations of the legitimacy of knowledge claims 
are closely linked with their political force. Solidarity is only part of the story 
here. As the previous chapter shows, activists and those seeking to bring about 
social and ecological change have felt the need to achieve legitimacy and 
therefore more political force by making their points according to the dominant 
forms of reductive scientific and economic rationality. Perhaps the traditional 
‘political’ sphere - the public and government - have found the uncertainties and 
the inherent politics of scientific knowledge production (as opposed to the reified 
transcendent ‘fact’ which is often wielded bluntly) particularly difficult to deal 
with because it is difficult to act upon uncertainty. And in today’s policy-making, 
with so many pressing problems, the desires and pressures for action are surely 
and understandably great, none less so than in the context of energy policy and 
climate change. As discussed, there are grave concerns about challenging the 
hierarchical separation of science/politics, but this is not only a problem of 
ascertaining the legitimacy of knowledge claims, but also the efficacy. Once we 
arrive in this understanding of a realm of contestable and contested knowledges 
and more obviously difficult to predict natures and realities, the question is how 
to achieve a measure of certainty about knowledge claims, certainty which is 
actionable at least, around which one can make decisions?  With the problems 
confronted by energy policy in the context of climate change it is the 
combination of existential imperative (and urgency) and moral obligation which 
makes the integration of science/politics, nature/culture such a potentially 
dangerous and inherently difficult operation. The neglect of one side or the 
other can either lead to surrender, paralysis and inaction in the face of the 
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status quo, or authoritarianism. Efficacy must not substitute for legitimacy, and 
vice versa. 
To assist in this problem we can understand the due process described 
in the ecological approach of first taking all affected into account, asking ‘how 
many (and who) are we?’ and then the process of putting in order, articulating 
political community and asking ‘how might we live together?’ as a ‘feedback 
loop’, a dynamic understanding of common life (adapted from Latour, 2004: 
125). The point of such a dynamic understanding of common life is that to an 
extent it continues the inside/outside separation required for ordering the world 
and with this ensures a degree of certainty and stability, but crucially, it allows 
for process. It has the potential to avoid the fixity of understanding and 
reinforcement of entrenched power asymmetries of the status quo which 
characterised the old divide, it accounts for change. This reformulation of the 
knowledge construction process challenges the old conception of society ‘in the 
midst of an inert nature made up of essences whose list would be fixed once 
and for all, expecting from moral values a salvation from on high so it can 
extricate itself from mere matters of fact’ (Latour, 2004: 125). In the context of 
the rise of multiculturalism and the decline of a sense of certainty, universality 
and transcendence of political values, the ecological reformulation also 
challenges the use of ‘nature’ and facts as transcendental power to cut through 
uncertainties and enforce particular notions of common life (culture) at the 
expense of others (Latour, 2004).  
The feedback loop between the process of taking into account and the 
process of putting in order insists on the continuation of relations and processes 
between the inside and outside of constructions of political community, and it is 
this awareness of relation and process between the inside and outside of 
political community which provides clearly, ‘within reach’, not a transcendental 
force, but a relationally grounded and negotiated sense of limits which provides 
‘[a]ll the transcendence one needs, in practice, to escape the straightjacket of 
immanence’ (Latour, 2004: 125). It is the interaction, which provides the 
corrective, the relations between selves and others, and which enables 
negotiated judgement and the means for judging legitimacy and politically 
effective possibilities for action in context. Legitimacy and efficacy of knowledge 
are therefore linked.  
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As Lorraine Code (2006: 6), has argued, ecological thinking begins with 
‘ecological situations and interconnections of knowers and knowings – be they 
benign, malign, or merely equivocal’ (Code, 2006: 6). This approach to 
knowledge ‘works with affinities from location to location, imaginatively and 
interpretively discerned’ (Code, 2006: 6). Such an approach is ‘practice-
dependent, communicative, deliberative,’ critically reflexive and grounded in the 
“givenness” of the physical, historical, corporeal Lebenswelt’ and this guards 
against ‘the subjectivism and/or relativism that have deterred philosophers from 
granting epistemic significance to place, particularity, imagination and 
interpretation’ (Code, 2006: 6). It is to this relational reflexivity in self/other 
relations beyond the nature/culture divide to which Dobson (2010) implicitly 
draws our attention when he emphasises the listening dimension of politics. 
This is why I suggest that an open, heuristic framework for attending to, 
articulating and contesting injustices is so important, in contrast to a focus upon 
transcendental, universal moral values.  
In evaluating efficacy I consider how each articulation might help us to 
navigate manifold claims of injustice by relating them to each other and 
exposing the intersections between them in opposition to the dominant 
discourses. The articulation of injustices is vital to the processes of political 
contestation, for it provides a kind of relational accountability and check on 
decision-making processes rather than a transcendental objective knowledge 
which by-passes politics. Articulating injustices is important because we must 
not lose sight of the problem of the constitution of political community and the 
inevitable political power relations inherent in common life. We need to bear in 
mind the continued temptation for dominant perspectives to parade as neutral 
and objective as a result of the nature/culture separation. It will likely be difficult 
to shift what Haraway (1988: 581) terms the ‘myth of the One’, the claimed 
objectivity and universality of knowledge produced by ‘the gaze that mythically 
inscribes all the marked bodies, that makes the unmarked category claim the 
power to see and not be seen.’ Shifting the hegemonic discourses which claim 
objective knowledge of the nature of things is a difficult task, particularly when 
the dominance is bound up in so many of the institutional structures which exist.  
The framework developed in this thesis is grounded ‘in the ontological 
picture and the diagnoses of injustice’ (Markell, 2003: 178). Rather than ‘settle 
political controversies or prescribe courses of action’, thinking about existing 
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and potential injustices helps to alter the ‘view of the problems we confront’, 
which might ‘lead us to see hitherto unnoticed dangers in some political options, 
and to discover unappreciated promise in others’ (Markell, 2003: 178). In 
emphasising the inherent politics of all knowledge, the ecological approach 
entails awareness that injustices in the negotiation of common life are 
inevitable. Opening up possibilities for ongoing contestation of injustices 
perpetuated by the nature/culture separation is the task of the next three 
chapters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
118 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II 
 
 
 
 
 
I learned to make my mind large, as the universe is large, so that there is 
room for paradoxes 
                                                             (Maxine Hong Kingston, 1977: 35) 
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Chapter Three 
Articulating Injustices of Distribution:  
Who gets what in the politics of nuclear energy? 
 
Nuclear energy is being proposed as a necessity within the dominant 
discourses discussed in Chapter One of this thesis. It is seen as an essential 
component of the answer to our energy and climate problems because it is low-
carbon, because it is efficient and reliable (when nothing goes wrong), and 
because it kills less people than fossil fuels. Nuclear energy is therefore 
needed, say government, industry and some prominent environmental 
spokespeople, to meet inevitable increases in energy demand, not only in the 
UK, but globally. 
 This framing of the problem ostensibly makes a nod to all affected, both 
the global population, and implicitly, future generations and nonhuman nature. 
However it does so in a reductive manner which quantifies and normalises 
important aspects of all affected in the energy and climate problem, and so 
neglects significant socially produced harms to humans and nonhumans, future 
generations, and those in other countries. Although claiming legitimacy and 
quantifying distributions with expert facts and figures, this framing of the 
problem reflects a particular understanding of the goods and burdens of 
common life which short-circuits and therefore limits our understanding of who 
is affected and how they are affected, failing to take these adequately into 
account. 
 In this chapter I develop in detail the first part of my heuristic framework 
for articulating injustices. Guided by the ecological approach which seeks to 
take all affected into account, I consider how we might articulate what is at 
stake in terms of an image of politics as distribution and thereby gain a different 
perspective on the problem. An ecological image of politics as distribution 
involves consideration of how future generations, those in other countries, and 
nonhuman nature are affected by distributions in common life. I argue that we 
can articulate distributive injustices of nuclear energy as the deprivation of basic 
necessities experienced by many due to unequal and compounding distribution 
of the burdens, as well as the goods produced by both nuclear energy and 
modern industrial society as a whole.  
 In section one I draw upon justice and green theory to rethink the image 
of politics as distribution in terms of the ecological approach. I claim that as we 
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incorporate those in other countries, future generations and nonhuman nature 
into our understanding of distributive politics we become more aware of the 
burdens of political association, including the negative impacts of both the input 
and output of productive processes aimed at producing the goods for common 
life. Taking into account all affected by burdens as well as goods in distributive 
processes makes apparent the connections between inequalities in the 
distribution of goods and burdens. Inequalities of one sort, for example in 
access to resources, tend to correlate and compound inequalities of other sorts, 
for example exposure to environmental hazards, pointing to the limits to both 
human and nonhuman capacities to sustain such distributions. I argue that a 
more relational understanding of that which is to be distributed, which takes the 
connections between both the benefits and the burdens of common life into 
account, would enable a more profound critique of nuclear energy in terms of an 
image of politics as distribution. 
 In section two I build upon the ecological reformulation of distributive 
politics described in the first section. When we consider an image of politics as 
distribution we become aware of injustices which can be broadly articulated as 
deprivation of basic necessities. I develop an open, relational and contestable 
understanding of basic necessities which includes both the goods which are 
needed for the existence of an ecological entity, and the burdens which may 
limit that existence. I then consider how this helps redescribe the politics of 
nuclear energy discussed in Chapter One, and enables better contestation of 
what is at stake. While nuclear energy is posed as a necessity for ‘all of us’ in 
the context of climate change, this framing obscures unequal deprivation of 
basic necessities resulting from this form of energy. Those who benefit from the 
production of electricity from nuclear power plants are not those who suffer, and 
will suffer, most from the burdens of uranium ore extraction, waste production, 
or disaster when things go wrong. From the points of view of all affected, the 
cumulative effects of these distributive injustices, which tend to combine with 
other distributive injustices of common life, raise serious concerns about the 
suitability of nuclear energy as a response to the problem of climate change and 
the role it can play in rethinking how we might live together in these times of 
ecological crisis.  
 In the final section of this chapter I evaluate the political efficacy of this 
articulation. I consider how articulating the deprivation of basic necessities 
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provides a common language so that diverse understandings of both the goods 
and burdens affecting various existences may be taken into account as relevant 
to our political negotiation of common life. This articulation has the potential for 
building common ground amongst those deprived, vis-à-vis those who benefit 
disproportionately from the effects of nuclear energy production, thereby 
strengthening challenges to the hegemonic discourses which describe nuclear 
energy as a necessity for the benefit of all. Identifying the effects of nuclear 
energy as exacerbating the deprivation of basic necessities has transformative 
potential for contesting the benefits and burdens of common life on this planet 
by enabling broad brush-stroke comparisons of structural inequalities across 
both time and space. This can help to draw attention to severe and ultimately 
unsustainable inequalities and exposes serious problems not only with nuclear 
energy but with prevailing forms of organisation, for example in prevailing 
capitalist market and state systems, which cannot be understood separately 
from nuclear energy as it currently stands. Such articulations can be politically 
effective in so far as they may in some cases enable compensation and 
mitigation of deprivation and in others may work against developments out of 
precaution.  
 
Ecologically reformulating distribution: understanding all affected by the 
connections between goods and burdens 
 
Politics has traditionally been understood in terms of distribution: ‘who gets 
what, when and how’ (Lasswell, 1958 [1936]). As discussed in Chapter Two, 
justice has also been conceptualised predominantly in these terms, with a focus 
upon the distribution of both material and nonmaterial goods amongst the 
members of political community. In this section I argue that because 
ecologically rethinking the image of politics as distribution alters perception of 
the ‘who’ and the ‘what’ of distribution, this has implications for ‘how’ we think 
about distributive processes. An ecological approach which takes all affected 
into account involves expanding our understanding of ‘who’ should be counted 
within political community beyond traditional anthropocentric state boundaries, 
across time and space, so as to include those in other countries, future 
generations, and nonhuman nature. Taking all affected into account helps us to 
refocus our understanding of distributive processes so that we i) pay as much 
attention to the burdens, as well as the goods of political association, for 
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example, the negative as well as the positive impacts of producing more 
energy, and ii) become more aware of the connections between distributive 
inequalities of goods and burdens, and therefore also of the limits to both 
human and nonhuman capacities to sustain these. This leads me to suggest 
that it would be helpful to expand potential understandings of basic ‘needs’ or 
‘necessities’ so that these can take both benefits and burdens of common life 
(various conceptions both of what entities need and what they don’t need) into 
account. 
Particularly when approaching matters of justice, political theorists dating 
back to Aristotle have tended to think about the benefits and burdens of political 
association (Fleischacker, 2004; Warren, 2000). For Aristotle this was primarily 
a matter of political goods, i.e. characterizing the constitution of the state, how 
rights to vote and hold office were distributed (Fleischacker, 2004: 23). Yet at 
least in part due to the expansion of politics to include those previously 
excluded from the political community, this shifted from a concern with only 
political goods to an understanding of politics as a struggle over the distribution 
of ‘scarce goods’ (Drake, 2010: 159; Beck, 1992). This was also partly because 
within much political economic thinking scarcity was seen as ‘the main 
regulatory mechanism of society’ (Drake, 2010: 159). We can also think about 
distributions of cultural capital, knowledge, skills, commitment, energy and time, 
of which some are easier to redistribute than others, but thinking about and 
articulating them in distributive terms can be a useful tool (Gordon, 2008: 55-
61). Often these are connected to distribution of material goods and burdens. 
Much liberal theory has tended to focus upon abstract notions or ideals 
of justice as distribution. For Rawls, (1999 [1971]: 130) ‘[a] conception of justice 
is a set of principles for choosing between the social arrangements which 
determine [the] division of [benefits produced by society] and for underwriting a 
consensus as to the proper distributive shares’ (in Fleischacker, 2004: 111). As 
such, theorists ask ‘[a]re there any clear principles from which we may work out 
an ideally just distribution of rights and privileges, burdens and pains, among 
human beings’? (Sidgwick, 1981, in Fleischacker, 2004: 105). 
A major modern basis for thinking about distribution has been the 
assumption of basic equality of some kind. Two basic egalitarian principles are 
basic equality, involving the right to life and liberty, and basic need, involving the 
right to adequate food, clothing and shelter (Warren, 2000: 176). These reflect 
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both the material and nonmaterial understandings of the benefits of political 
community, but as we will see, they are intrinsically related to each other. 
Accounts appealing to equality ‘include Marx’s theory of capitalist exploitation, 
John Rawls’s account of justice as fairness in the choice of principles governing 
the distribution of “primary goods,” Amartya Sen’s view that justice requires 
ensuring that people have equal  “capacities to function,” and Ronald Dworkin’s 
view that it requires equality of resources”’ (Fraser, 1997: 13). Non-egalitarian 
principles include merit/desert, ability, compensation, utility and effort (Warren, 
2000: 176). 
Historically, and with more currency again more recently, distribution was 
as much about just deserts based on merit as upon equality (Fleischacker, 
2004: 5). Even the idea of just distribution based on labour, found in Locke, 
Marx and Proudhon, for example, is tied to the idea of merit rather than simply 
basic equality (Fleischacker, 2004: 82). The struggle for redistribution has been 
very much associated with class politics, and in Marxist and social democratic 
terms, the focus has tended to be upon shares of profit or wage: ‘[o]rganized 
labor has traditionally fought to reduce the rate of exploitation of the workforce 
and to increase the wages and wage premiums paid to workers’ (Gibson-
Graham, 2006: 176). 
Yet equality has emerged as a vital principle. Movements for, and 
historical legal consolidations of, equal suffrage are prime examples of state-
oriented and state-enforced distributions of the right to decide according to the 
modern sense of basic equality rather than Aristotle’s conception of political 
rights based on merit (Fleischacker, 2004; Drake, 2010: 18). Fleischacker 
traces the development of justifications of distribution based on equality, as 
originating in a shift in popular consciousness culminating in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (Fleischacker, 2004: 83; Rawls, 1971). 
The UDHR covers both material and nonmaterial goods, with much emphasis 
upon liberty, but also taking into account ‘standard of living adequate for health 
and well-being’ (UN General Assembly, 1948). 
The Human Rights Declaration was later theoretically justified by John 
Rawls (Fleischacker, 2004: 83, Rawls, 1971). Rawls emphasises equality of 
basic liberties compatible with similar liberty for all, and justifies social and 
economic inequalities as long as they are of greatest benefit to the least 
advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle (saving of sufficient 
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material capacity to maintain just institutions over time), and are attached to 
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity 
(Arneson, 2008; Rawls, 1971). Rawls’ latest version of the savings’ principle is 
based upon self-interest and mutual disinterest, so that ‘[i]t is simply rational for 
goal-maximising individuals to seek the mutual benefit of a savings principle’ 
(Wissenburg, 1999: 189). For Rawls, ‘[d]istribution’ of liberty takes priority over 
all distribution of economic and social goods’ (Fleischacker, 2004: 115). While 
both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Rawls’ work have since 
been challenged for their cultural (Western liberal capitalist, as well as 
masculinist and anthropocentric) bias (Warren, 2000: 127-8; Young 1990: 18-
27), the basic emphasis upon freedom and equality carries much political force 
(Sen, 2010: 64).   
Ecological problems have shifted our attention away from a 
predominantly one-sided focus upon goods to be distributed, towards 
awareness of the environmental burdens, risks and hazards, as well as the 
limits to certain goods, which have emerged as unwelcome side-effects of much 
‘goods’ production (Beck, 1995; Schlosberg, 2004; Dobson, 1998). Awareness 
of the gravity of some of the burdens produced by industrial modernity, the 
dominant mode of political, economic, social and cultural organisation, has 
highlighted the problems with prioritising liberty and goods production over other 
forms of social well-being. As Marcel Wissenburg (2006: 429) puts it,  
social justice as a motive in politics has been too one-sidedly construed 
as a matter of just distribution of the benefits of the output of the 
productive process. Apart from the issue of taxes, both governments and 
philosophers would have ignored the input side and the burdens of 
production, and it is there that we find the disadvantages of the 
incomparable growth in welfare on planet Earth since the 1950s. 
 
Concerns about the earth’s resources being finite, and the ecological 
imbalances caused by excessive production and consumption of material goods 
forces a reconsideration of the scope of political community involved in the 
politics of distribution, challenging conventional understandings of the politics of 
distribution to consider distributions across both space and time.  
An ecological understanding of politics has brought in a ‘“new” form of 
distributional politics based on the “future rights” of succeeding generations to 
existing resources and environments (Gibson-Graham, 2006: 178).  It reminds 
us of connections across time, of the old partnership highlighted by Edmund 
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Burke (1982 [1790]) ‘between those who are living, those who are dead, and 
those who are yet to be born’ (in Dobson 1998: 104). The renewed emphasis 
upon scarcity highlights the limits to the goods to be distributed, so ecological 
sustainability must lead to consideration of the loss of possibilities for future 
generations to access dwindling resources. Linked to this, the production and 
distribution of ecological burdens, including major environmental risks and 
hazards across time, raises the moral problem that people in the far off future 
will suffer harms caused by the actions of present generations. The problems 
which the notion of sustainability and the need to consider the future pose for 
understandings of distributive justice are particularly obstinate, and have been 
much discussed in political theory. As James Fishkin (1992: 9) has argued, we 
cannot today ‘neglect the fact that people are born and die and that our actions 
may have serious effects on the interests of those yet to be born’.  Growing 
awareness of climate change has demonstrated the impacts of actions past 
(and present) generations upon distributions of risk and harm, as the ‘climate 
change the earth is currently experiencing is primarily the result of emissions 
from some time in the past,’ while ‘the full, cumulative effect of our current 
emissions will not be realized for some time in the future (Gardiner, 2008: 31-
32).  
Growing awareness of the burdens of industrial economic growth through 
climate change not only draws our attention to connections in distributions 
between goods and burdens across time, but also to connections across space. 
Distribution of burdens is not confined to the places of production and 
consumption. The complications of distributions across both time and space are 
exemplified in conflicts at the global level over responsibilities for action on 
climate change between industrialised and industrialising countries. Attention to 
the uneven distribution of contemporary, historical, and future industrial 
economic growth has brought issues of transnational injustice in the distribution 
of the goods and burdens of contemporary life into focus. The consolidated 
wealth of industrialised countries in large part results from unrestricted 
industrialisation, accompanied by unchecked colonial exploitation and 
ecological degradation. The inequitable global distribution of wealth, seen both 
historically, and into the future, has caused conflicts over emissions caps, with 
the more powerful industrialising countries such as India and China arguing for 
the ‘right to develop’ (Vanderheiden, 2008b: 55-56). 
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Globally apparent ecological problems such as climate change thus 
highlight the limits to contemporary distributive processes, for ‘there is not world 
enough’ for all to continue as we have been (Athanasiou & Baer, 2002: 128). 
Growing awareness of the limits to the capacities of nonhuman nature to 
sustain past, present and future distributive processes also raises the problem 
of distributive injustices to nonhuman nature. Goods are extracted and burdens 
produced which limit possibilities for the further existence of aspects of 
nonhuman nature. The damages of, for example, deforestation, ocean pollution, 
and biodiversity loss do not only constitute distributive injustices to humans.  
Indigenous peoples and environmental justice activists have long 
highlighted the limits of the world, emphasising the broader problem of 
distributive injustices to nonhuman nature beyond climate change: the effects of 
both resource depletion and environmental risks and hazards upon ecological 
systems upon which both humans and nonhumans depend (e.g. Katona, 1998; 
Schlosberg, 2007; Di Chiro, 2007; Schlosberg & Carruthers, 2010). 
We are seeing increasingly ‘hybridised material relations of inequality’ 
(Luke, 2008b: 133) in the context of climate change and accelerating ecological 
degradation more broadly. Climate change is indicating the combined limits of 
both human and nonhuman capacities to sustain the production of goods and 
burdens across time, as ‘the climate carries the byproducts of present and past 
combustion with all the negative implications into the future long after the 
production and consumption of “goods” took place (Luke, 2008b: 137-8). 
Traditional justice theorists might object to thinking about distributive justice 
beyond the bounds of the traditional political community of the nation state, 
because justice is understood to require reciprocity (Simon, 1984, in Dobson, 
1998: 90). Yet although ‘reciprocity may have been hard to identify in the past, 
the contemporary globalization of political life’ makes interconnectedness and 
relationship undeniable’ (Dobson, 1998: 90). Indeed, an ecological approach 
which acknowledges the political importance of all affected, across time and 
space, as well as the human/nonhuman divide, exposes the interdependence 
and therefore implicit and involuntary reciprocity which exists across these 
areas previously not considered within the ambit of distribution. This draws our 
attention, not only to the links between goods and burdens, but also to an 
understanding of all affected by distributions of goods and burdens which is less 
definite (Barnett, 2012). The indefinite character of all affected is apparent when 
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‘[t]he actions of a large multinational corporation or of institutions that regulate 
financial markets influence the life possibilities of indefinite others – as when, for 
example, decisions in China affect workers in many, but not all, locations’ 
(Bohman, 2007: 25). These indefinite others are not only human. 
Because an ecological approach seeks to take all affected, including that 
which may also be distributed, into account, it poses a fundamental challenge to 
liberal capitalism for its faith in limitless economic growth as provider of human 
well-being and mechanism for justifiable distributions. While there has been 
much consideration of the relations between goods and burdens in terms of the 
concept of citizenship and thinking about reciprocity in terms of the entitlements 
and responsibilities of membership of a political community (Drake, 2010), this 
can have a tendency to put the onus upon abstracted individuals rather than 
clarifying our understanding of the ways in which distributive inequalities in 
some areas are often compounded by distributive inequalities in other areas. 
Liberty cannot be prioritised over basic necessities because these are not as 
separate as much liberal theory would suggest. Liberal understandings of liberty 
and goods, such as private property and financial capital for some, have 
burdening, and ultimately unsustainable effects upon the basic needs and 
liberties of others, both human and nonhuman.  
Completely separating goods from burdens is unhelpful from an 
ecological point of view of taking all affected into account. Rather than focusing 
simply upon the distribution of ‘burdens’ or ‘goods’ in isolation, it is more useful 
to consider how these relate to each other.  An understanding of the 
intersections and relations between distributions of goods and burdens is 
particularly evident in the claims of environmental, climate and energy justice 
movements worldwide, for they emphasise how distributive injustices in 
economic, social and other resources tend to intersect with unjust distributions 
of environmental burdens (Schlosberg, 2007; Falk et al., 2006; Salleh, 2009; Di 
Chiro, 2007). Ulrich Beck may have argued that ‘poverty is hierarchical, while 
smog is democratic’ (1995: 60), yet others have since emphasised that smog 
and ‘even highly diffuse’ environmental bads such as climate change are 
distributed unevenly, disproportionately affecting ‘those who already suffer from 
a social distribution deficit’ (Plumwood, 2002: 84). The idea of international 
community, that we are all in it together, aims to critique liberal democratic 
failings to imagine a common good (or equal basic needs) at the global level, 
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but it also can serve to mask injustices and responsibilities, creating the illusion 
that environmental bads are an ‘innocent and accidental distribution of damage 
affecting everyone more or less equally’ (Plumwood, 2002: 84).  
The Environmental Justice and Environmental Racism literature as well 
as articulations by global justice movements illustrate that this is certainly not 
the case (Taylor, 200; Schlosberg, 2007; Di Chiro 2008). As Bullard (1999: 33) 
points out, environmental harms follow the path of least resistance.  Prevailing 
forms of economic organisation enable ‘a set of impersonal NIMBY 
mechanisms which guarantee that an important range of ecoharms, from both 
redistributable and collective sources, are redistributed to marginalised groups’ 
(Plumwood, 2002: 86). Inequality tends to create ‘systematic opportunities and 
motivations to shift ecological ills onto others rather than prevent their 
generation in the first place’ (Plumwood, 2002: 86, 81). An ecological approach 
to distribution, taking all affected into account means that we can no longer 
neglect the links between the production of ‘goods’ and ‘burdens,’ nor the 
correlations in their distributive impacts. We require a more far-reaching and 
less one-sided understanding of distributive effects. 
Paying attention to the correlations between distribution of goods and 
burdens highlights the tendencies for inequalities to intersect, so that those who 
are economically worse off are also more likely to be on the receiving end of 
many burdens, as well as having their labour power (a ‘good’ in itself) exploited. 
Conversely, those who benefit from uneven distributions of all kinds of goods 
can afford to avoid the worst forms of environmental degradation. They can 
move away from degraded areas and are able to take advantage of ‘wider 
supply sources and markets that continue to deplete distant communities in 
ways that elude knowledge and responsibility’ (Plumwood, 2002: 85). The 
impacts of climate change are arguably already being felt by many, and even in 
the industrialised world the most disadvantaged suffer the most. This could be 
seen, for example, in the overwhelming impacts of Hurricane Katrina upon 
those who were ‘poor, minority (most often African-American); less likely to be 
connected to the workforce; and more likely to be educationally disadvantaged 
(i.e., not having completed a high school education)’ (Gabe, Falk & McCarty, 
2005: 13). At the global level, poorer, less industrialised countries are less 
equipped to deal with disasters influenced by climate change (Timmons 
Roberts, 2007). 
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While the worst off tend to be doubly impacted (see also King, 1988), 
groups who benefit from uneven distributions ‘consume (both directly for their 
own use and indirectly for income generation) the greatest proportion of 
resources’ and they ‘have the strongest economic stake in the sort of 
accumulation which generates environmental harms’ (Plumwood, 2002: 85). 
Those who benefit from unequal distributions are positioned so that they can 
‘most easily purchase alternative private resources, (clean water, for example)’ 
and therefore ‘have the least interest in maintaining in generally good condition 
collective goods and services of the sort typically provided by undamaged 
nature [sic]’ (Plumwood, 2002: 86). Through privatisation, collective goods may 
be further redistributed in favour of those who have the resources to afford 
them, thereby guaranteeing them ‘superior access and insulat[ing] them from 
many kinds of limits and scarcity’ (Plumwood, 2002: 86).  
It is important also to note the gendered and classed dimensions of 
uneven distributions, as reproductive and care jobs, as well as manual and 
agricultural labour, are heavily impacted in times of crisis and unrest which 
expose human dependencies upon the goods, and vulnerabilities to the 
burdens of common life (Salleh, 2009; Warren, 200; Di Chiro, 2008). The 
connections between goods and burdens, and the ways in which these 
correlate and concentrate upon already disadvantaged or overburdened 
humans and nonhuman nature (Salleh, 1997), exposes the limits of these to 
sustain uneven distributions. The correlating effects of distributive burdens upon 
reproductive systems has also been especially apparent to indigenous cultures 
which depend upon the land, for when land and country are degraded, so is 
their culture (Katona, 1997; Charley, 2004; LaDuke, 2009). 
By taking nonhuman nature into account, an ecological approach alters 
the liberal understanding of ‘goods’ and ‘burdens’ to be distributed, challenging 
the subject/object boundary. Given this tension, goods and burdens cannot then 
be understood as completely non-relational, disconnected, static entities 
(Young, 1990: 19-30). Expanding the political community to include nonhuman 
nature both as limited or damageable good and as recipient of both good and 
bad distributions brings into focus the overlaps and tensions between ‘what X is 
to be sustained’ and ‘what X is to be distributed’ (Dobson, 1999: 5). What unites 
these is an understanding of interdependent productive and reproductive 
130 
 
distributive processes which cross space, time and the human/nonhuman 
divide.  
As discussed, traditional liberal understandings of distribution tend to 
separate out the distribution of equal liberties from basic ‘needs’ or necessities. 
For example, David Miller (1999) draws upon Rawls’ conception of primary 
goods, expanding this to include certain ‘environmental goods’. However, an 
ecological approach, attentive to the correlations between distributive injustices 
highlighted by environmental justice movements, shows that life and liberty – of 
future generations, those in other countries, and nonhuman nature - are 
dependent upon certain basic necessities and that separating these out 
perpetuates and exacerbates distributive inequalities; expropriations and 
exploitations of many kinds. This suggests that rather than simply incorporate 
‘environmental’ goods and burdens as single-issues into existing distributive 
processes we need to fundamentally rethink and open up our conception of 
basic necessities so as to integrate and accommodate different understandings 
of both material and non-material goods and burdens.  
Ted Benton (1999: 227) has argued against simply incorporating 
nonhuman nature and other aspects of social reproduction into the dominant 
distributive processes, for example by commodifying nonhuman nature as 
‘environmental goods’, suggesting instead that we rethink the idea of ‘need’ so 
that it not only includes basic physical sustenance for ‘human individual and 
social flourishing’, but also includes spiritual, and aesthetic needs, which 
nonhuman nature plays a role in. This resonates with Tim Hayward’s (1998: 
151) recommendation that we consider distribution of ecological values as 
attached to human interests so that ‘they can be brought under distributive 
principles’ with the advantage that they can then often ‘lend themselves to 
protection as rights.’ Ecological values are thus seen as social goods whose 
distribution can be understood to be a matter of social justice.  
However, this will not solve the distributive problems we face in an 
understanding of political community that includes nonhuman nature as subject 
as well as object of distribution. As in Schlosberg’s (2007: 172) example of the 
ski resort discussed in Chapter Two, we also need to be able to articulate 
distributive injustices to nonhuman nature, where certain basic properties such 
as water, necessary for a certain ecological entity or ecosystem, is ‘moved from 
one watershed to another.’ In an ecologically revisioned image of the politics of 
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distribution we require a more open and contestable, as well as relational 
understanding of the ‘X’ to be distributed, which takes the connections between 
both the benefits and the burdens of common life into account. 
  
Articulating distributive injustices: deprivation of basic necessities in the 
politics of nuclear energy 
 
If we broaden our understanding of distributive processes to include a relational 
understanding of goods and burdens and the implications of these for all 
affected within a broader understanding of political community including future 
generations, those in other countries, and nonhuman nature, then we may 
acknowledge that all have need for certain basic necessities which are required 
for a certain form of existence or development. The right to life and liberty 
enshrined in liberal understandings of basic equality is dependent upon certain 
basic necessities, which includes certain kinds of goods, but also freedom from 
certain burdens which may limit life and liberty and/or exacerbate other 
inequalities. From an ecological perspective which takes all affected into 
account it is clear that ‘need’ for such necessities must be prioritised over 
‘wants’ for other things, particularly if they deprive others of their basic 
requirements (Dobson, 1998). As discussed in Chapter Two we must not 
neglect the dangers in ascribing specific ‘necessities’ to individuals, groups or 
other entities. As Ross Fitzgerald (1985: 101) points out 
If “need” is merely a concept referring to certain  physiological or 
psychological processes – nothing else, there is no way of regarding 
these processes as desirable or undesirable without introducing some 
normative premise or some notion of human [or other] excellence. 
 
The idea of certain basic ‘necessities’ required for the ‘self-actualization’ or 
flourishing of ‘what is’ (traditionally understood in terms of science) very easily 
substitutes for ‘what ought to be’ (traditionally understood in terms of politics 
and political community). The concern is that ‘no social good serves or can 
serve as a means of domination’ (Walzer, 1983: xiv). Yet as both the quote 
above, and the discussion in Chapter Two emphasise, these simply cannot be 
neatly separated. It is for this reason that an articulation of distributive injustice 
is so important, for it enables ongoing contestation of the outcomes of 
distributive processes which cannot be decided in the abstract once and for all, 
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but require constant attention to distributions both in terms of what is needed, 
(goods) and what is not needed (burdens). 
 I therefore suggest that the injustices which arise in the politics of 
distribution may be articulated as deprivation of basic necessities. This entails 
an understanding of basic necessities which includes both goods, which are 
necessary for the well-being of an ecological entity, as well as freedom from 
certain burdens which may limit flourishing. For Nancy Fraser (1997: 13) this 
entails deprivation of an ‘adequate material standard of living.’ Michael Walzer 
(1983: 84) discusses the existence of basic needs which are preconditional for 
human security, welfare and life itself, emphasising that ‘every political 
community must attend to needs of its members as they collectively understand 
those needs; that the goods that are distributed in proportion to need; and that 
the distribution must recognize and uphold the underlying equality of 
membership’. Exact necessities must be left open to definition depending upon 
context and circumstance, for ‘[i]f I am fasting I do not need food. And if I intend 
to commit suicide I do not need to breathe’ (Fitzgerald, 1985: 101), and ‘[t]here 
is no single set of primary or basic goods conceivable across all moral or 
material worlds’ (Walzer, 1983: 8). And yet, as Dobson (1998: 142) argues, 
while it has myriad different forms and cultural uses, ‘the suspicion that food will 
always be regarded as of fundamental value lingers on; it is a “necessary 
good.”’  
If we consider entities in nonhuman nature then ‘food’ as we understand 
it may not always be a relevant necessity, but we may still, depending on 
context, be able to pinpoint certain basic necessities that are required for 
functioning or existence and which also include the necessity of being free from 
disruption or burdening. Deprivation of basic necessities then involves 
dispossession, expropriation or despoilation of the necessary healthy and 
sustaining conditions for the existence or flourishing of entities. For example, 
Plumwood (1999: 200) attributes intentionality to a tree as ‘a striving 
(teleological) and adaptive being.’ From an ecosystems perspective, it is 
possible to consider conditions of non-flourishing, of disruption to ecological 
systems, such as desertification, eutrophication, various forms of pollution etc. 
(Dryzek, 2000). 
We can understand deprivation of basic necessities as a relational 
articulation encompassing both goods and burdens. In a manner similar to 
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Walzer’s (1983: 17) ‘complex equality’ this is not about straightforward or 
universalistic equality, rather it is about articulating problematic forms of 
inequality, where an imbalance occurs between entities, which disrupts the 
distribution of goods and burdens and therefore the conditions for being, for 
sustaining that entity or ecological process. It is possible to consider that a 
‘multiplicity of goods is matched by a multiplicity of distributive procedures, 
agents and criteria’ (Walzer, 1983: 3). Disruptions to distributive processes are 
inevitable and distributions will always be unequal. However, articulating 
deprivation of basic necessities allows these to be contested when problematic 
imbalances occur. So while the broader question of what is needed for a 
healthy continued existence varies significantly across cultures, across time, 
and between entities across human/nonhuman nature, the possibility of being 
able to contest deprivation of basic necessities, whatever they may be, is of vital 
importance. 
 If we now recall the thesis problem, important harms of nuclear energy 
are naturalised and justified within dominant discourses and within green 
politics. On the one hand, nuclear energy is being put forward as a necessity 
‘for all of us’ if we are to reduce carbon emissions and mitigate the dangers and 
risks of climate change. However, this necessity requires contestation, for it 
obscures the highly unequal effects that this solution would have in terms of 
limiting the basic necessities of others across time, space and the 
human/nonhuman divide. It entails a particular understanding of the necessities 
for human (and of course nonhuman) flourishing predicated on the continuing 
rise in the use of energy, and continued capitalist growth in production and 
consumption of economic goods and burdens, and it obscures certain unequal 
distributions from which the dominant are able to profit. As environmental and 
global justice movements discussed in the first section of this chapter point out, 
inequalities are rising and both humans and nonhumans are suffering 
intensifying exploitation and deprivation of basic necessities for flourishing.  
The nuclear industry and mining companies, historically state-supported 
with risks borne by consumers and state governments, make enormous profits, 
and those in the rich world, who can still afford to pay for an abundance of 
electricity, use and waste more than they actually need. And yet, indigenous 
peoples worldwide are disproportionately burdened by uranium mining and 
nuclear waste upon their lands, future generations will be exposed to the long-
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term effects of rising levels of background radiation as well as the risks of 
uncertain long-term storage of high-level radioactive wastes. These injustices 
tend to exacerbate other distributive injustices, depriving those in other 
countries, future generations, and parts of nonhuman nature, of basic 
necessities for flourishing and continued existence. 
Indigenous peoples worldwide have highlighted the fact that they are 
unequally burdened and deprived of basic necessities by the effects of uranium 
mining and nuclear waste upon their lands. At indigenous peoples’ summits 
distributive injustices of uranium mining and processing has been emphasised, 
a crucial yet neglected aspect of nuclear power production (Mining Watch 
Canada, 2006; LaDuke, 2009; Galloway McLean et al., 2009). For example, the 
Indigenous World Uranium Summit held in Window Rock, Arizona in December 
2006 was proclaimed as ‘a vindication of the Navajo Nations’ ban on uranium 
mining in their territory and a regrouping of Indigenous opposition to uranium 
mining globally’ (Mining Watch Canada, 2006). Indigenous peoples from all over 
the world emphasise the effects on the local ecology and upon the health of 
local people and ways of life (Minchin & Murdoch, 2006; Schlosberg, 2007; 
Tufts, 2010).  
The broader question of what is necessary for a healthy human life 
varies significantly across cultures and has been especially apparent in clashes 
between indigenous cultures and encroaching dominant industrialising, 
technologically apparently more progressive, cultures originating in Europe and 
the ‘West’. This problem was starkly apparent in the report on the consultation 
over the Ranger uranium mine in Australia in the 1970s, where a panel of white, 
westerners, aware of their difference to local aboriginal cultures, nevertheless 
ruled that the aboriginal protest should not be allowed to prevail (Lichacz & 
Myers, 1977: 62). This is an ongoing problem, not confined to the past. 
To more clearly articulate these injustices as international distributive 
injustices it is again helpful to consider the idea of basic necessities 
ecologically, so that our understanding of deprivation is linked to the problem of 
unequal exposure to ecological bads. Indigenous peoples and others are 
deprived of basic necessities such as safe drinking water and other aspects of a 
healthy ecology within which to sustain their lives either traditionally or 
otherwise. While cultural differences exist, the basics requisite to health may be 
broadly agreed upon, even if these are considered in process. 
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The principle of basic equality is violated as the benefits and burdens of 
nuclear energy production are distributed unequally. Those who benefit from the 
production of electricity from nuclear power, deemed a necessity, are not those 
who suffer the burdens of uranium ore extraction. Even all other things being 
equal, the benefits and burdens of nuclear energy processes are unequally 
distributed. Taking the example of Hinkley, both short and longer-term benefits 
of nuclear energy production will be reaped by British energy consumers 
(leaving aside local ecological and economic costs and risks of nuclear energy 
production for the moment). British energy consumers will ostensibly benefit 
from energy supply and concomitant economic and national security which is 
considered of greater importance than the well-being of those living in the 
vicinity of uranium mines. The latter may receive initial local investment and 
jobs but this is outweighed by the deprivation of basic ecological needs to 
support traditional ways of life, as well as a generally healthy or tolerable 
working and living environment (Perera & Pugliese, 1998; Shrader-Frechette, 
2002a). Deprivation of basic necessities thus includes the unequal distribution 
of burdens, and needs to be considered relationally in contrast to the profits and 
power of the nuclear and mining industries. 
This type of inequality tends to be justified within nations on the basis of 
utilitarian calculation on the grounds of a greater benefit to the national security 
or economy and thus for the greater good. At the international level the same 
argument, particularly in relation to the risks of climate change, is made, but 
here the multiple interlinked problems of compounding unequal deprivations 
becomes even more starkly apparent, further undermining utilitarian 
justifications which are based upon single-issue conceptions of well-being. It is 
important with regards to all the above points, to be aware of the correlations 
between different distributive injustices – how social and ecological deprivation 
tend to correlate with ecological burdens, thereby reinforcing the importance of 
including exposure to ecological burdens within our understanding of 
deprivation of basic necessities. 
The Mirrar people in Australia have long struggled with Energy 
Resources Australia (ERA), majority owned by Rio Tinto. Their struggle 
highlights the distributive processes of common life across space, time, and 
human and nonhuman nature, as well as the multiple effects of exacerbating 
distributive injustices which uranium mining has brought them. They have 
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expressed regret that uranium from their land was in part responsible for the 
problems faced by those living around Fukushima: ‘‘it is likely that the radiation 
problems at Fukushima are, at least in part, fuelled by uranium derived from our 
traditional lands. This makes us feel very sad’ (Gundjeihmi Aboriginal 
Corporation, 2014). In opposition to the mine at Jabiluka they have pointed out 
Mirrar do not argue that mining alone is impacting on living tradition – 
Mirrar argue that mining and its associated social, economic, and political 
impacts are the single greatest impact and that an additional mine will 
push Bininj culture past the point of cultural exhaustion to genocidal 
decay (Gundjeihmi Aboriginal Corporation, 2011a). 
 
The emphasis upon the links between human culture and the health of the land 
demonstrate the linking of healthy ecosystems with a healthy culture, how the 
burdening of both humans and nonhumans is linked beyond the separation of 
nature/culture. As Delia Lowe (cited in Perera & Pugliese, 1998: 97), of another 
Aboriginal community, has pointed out ‘[p]eople go together with plants and 
animals, or flora and fauna. There’s no separation; we’re not separated’. There 
is also an understanding of reciprocity or relation across time, past and present. 
The Mirrar people have emphasised ‘their knowledge of land and culture 
inherited from ancestors since time immemorial and from their experiences of 
the ranger uranium mine over the past twenty years’ (Gundjeihmi Aboriginal 
Corporation, 2011a). 
Green thinkers have argued that ‘future needs should take precedence 
over indulging present wants’ (Dobson, 1998: 112). To more clearly articulate 
distributive injustices to future generations, we are concerned with a potential 
deprivation of the basic necessities of future generations for certain conditions 
for a healthy and sustaining environment, as a result of exposure to high-level 
radioactive wastes or the legacy of uranium mining. In discussions over the 
high-level nuclear waste repository at Onkalo in Finland, designers struggled 
over how and whether to communicate the dangers and risks to future 
generations tens of thousands of years from now, with even the consideration 
that it might be safer not to draw attention to it at all, for fear that it might have 
the completely opposite effect to that intended, and incite intense curiosity (Into 
Eternity, 2010; see also Hoffman, 2001). The idea of a cursed tomb appears 
especially apt in this context. While cultural differences will no doubt exist, the 
basic danger and necessity of avoiding it for reasons of health will remain.  
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The issue of future generations is also commonly highlighted by anti-
nuclear campaigners and activists in the UK. Here it tends to be raised in 
relation to the waste problem. Greenpeace UK (2013) emphasises that  
[a]llowing ten new reactors to be built would add threefold to the amount 
of highly radioactive waste we already have to deal with. This waste will 
remain dangerous for up to a million years: an outrageous legacy to 
leave for many generations to come.  
 
And at protests at Hinkley and Sizewell in the UK it is common to see placards 
with messages such as ‘no new nuclear for our future generations’ and ‘don’t 
nuke the future’.  
The benefits and burdens of present nuclear energy production are 
distributed unequally across time. Present generations reap the short-term 
benefits such as energy supply, jobs and local investment, while the long-term 
costs are displaced onto future generations who are likely to be even less well-
placed to deal with the consequences if present ecological degradation and 
technological dependency in all other areas continues apace. If we consider the 
problem of nuclear waste ecologically, that is, refusing to consider it in isolation 
from other ecological problems such as climate change, deforestation, soil 
erosion, water shortages and biodiversity loss, the links between the deprivation 
of basic necessities including unequal exposure to ecological burdens becomes 
even more apparent. 
 Deprivation of basic necessities to nonhuman nature is a problem which 
is likely to be exacerbated rather than ameliorated by turning to nuclear energy 
as a solution to climate change. Not only does nuclear energy encourage us to 
continue to produce and consume as much energy, if not more, than we have 
done, it also has knock on effects upon other important resources. Thermal 
pollution from nuclear power plants deprives parts of nonhuman nature of basic 
necessities (cool water) for flourishing, and in the context of climate change and 
increased water stresses this is of great concern for all manner of ecological 
systems  (Averyt et al., 2011), as well as those humans who do not have 
access to privatised water sources. Uranium mining is regularly impacted upon 
by flooding, which in turn impacts upon local human and nonhuman 
communities and individuals (Moore, 2009; Dowie, 2009; Kelly, 2012).  The 
possibility of increases in flooding in the context of climate change once more 
raises concerns about the exacerbation of existing distributive injustices. 
138 
 
 Taking all affected into account forces us to consider the cumulative 
effects of these distributive injustices. The ways in which the burdens of nuclear 
energy exacerbate other forms of deprivation of basic necessities and correlate 
with other distributive injustices described above raises serious questions about 
whether or not it can provide an adequate ecological response to the problem of 
climate change. In the next section I consider the efficacy of articulating 
injustices of nuclear energy from the perspective of those affected. 
 
 
Political efficacy of articulating distributive injustices: transformative 
possibilities for reconsidering the benefits and burdens of common life 
 
This chapter has suggested an open understanding of basic necessities which 
includes a relational understanding of the goods and burdens of common life 
and an articulation of injustices of distribution as the deprivation of basic 
necessities required by human and nonhuman ecological entities for their 
existence and flourishing. The previous section already indicated some of the 
ways in which this articulation is politically effective for taking all affected into 
account in the politics of nuclear energy. It thus began to challenge the short-
circuiting in the dominant discourses of the process of taking all affected into 
account. Deprivation of basic necessities provides a common language so that 
diverse understandings of both the goods and burdens necessary for various 
existences may be taken into account as relevant to our understandings of 
common life. Thus it may be possible to negotiate common ground and 
alliances between those deprived, to highlight the political stakes of nuclear 
energy and to more effectively challenge assumptions about basic necessities 
for endless economic growth in consumption of energy and goods which prevail 
in the dominant discourses.  
Articulating injustices of distribution in this way enables more thorough 
contestation of dominant answers to ecological crises, particularly climate 
change. Having reopened the question of ‘how many (and who) we are,’ 
articulating injustices enables us to reconsider the question of ‘how we might 
live together’ with a better understanding of the basic necessities of all affected. 
In what follows, I consider both the transformative potential and the limits of 
contesting distributive injustices across space and time, with reference to the 
deprivation of basic necessities of those in other countries, and future 
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generations. There are limits to the efficacy of articulating deprivation of basic 
necessities if the basic causes of unjust distributions remain unaddressed and 
those who are deprived are pitted against each other, or do not succeed in 
comprehensively challenging the dominant interpretations of basic necessities, 
or the concentrations of power and resources in the hands of a few. These 
limits reinforce the importance of considering distributive injustices in 
conjunction with those of recognition and representation, addressed in the next 
two chapters. However, these limits should not detract from the continued 
importance of contesting distributive injustices. Articulating the deprivation of 
basic necessities enables us to understand and imagine a broad range of 
structural inequalities across both time and space and can help draw attention 
to and contest unsustainable inequalities and contradictions which expose 
serious problems in the prevailing social and economic organisations; the ways 
in which we live together.  
In considering the political efficacy of articulating deprivation of basic 
necessities it is useful to consider the main vehicles of distribution, particularly 
the capitalist economic market and state systems. Considered in the abstract as 
distributors of basic necessities for all affected these may seem limited, 
particularly regarding the question of injustices to future generations and those 
in other countries, yet they remain important centres of power which must be 
taken into consideration if we are to contest distributive injustices. Within the 
modern context, distribution has been mediated by technocratic state politics 
(apparent in different forms of state including the welfare state, corporatist 
capitalism and state socialism) (Drake, 2010: 97, 159). Distributive politics has 
tended to involve an appeal to centralised state power to provide management 
of just distributions, to regulate and facilitate economic growth and technological 
progress, upon which distributions to an ever widening moral community 
apparently depend (Gibson-Graham, 2006). Both Rawlsian and Marxist 
understandings of just distributions implicitly rely upon an apparently ‘neutral’ 
arbiter, the state, to facilitate or manage economic growth and technological 
progress, to enable and defend just distributions.  
However, other conceptualisations of the politics of distribution are not 
necessarily tied to the state, nor are they tied to assumptions about capitalist 
economic growth or a particular, homogenous rights bearer. Concerns about 
the distribution of power in anarchist politics, for example, highlight the utility of 
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distributive thinking for understanding and addressing injustices resulting from 
inequalities in ‘political resources’ or sources of power (Gordon, 2008: 55-61). It 
is perfectly plausible to consider the case of just distribution within any 
community or association aside from the state, such as in a food coop, for 
example (Warren, 2000). Other examples of the politics of distribution also exist 
which draw upon the authority of alternative legitimising sources which are not 
necessarily confined to state capitalist imperatives. 
Often such cases focus on resource and property distribution rather than 
the distribution of income. In an example of the rights of stakeholders in older 
industrial regions of the US, stakeholders have been understood not only as 
workers and managers but also as suppliers, customers, service providers, 
taxpayers and other community members, with appeals to basic rights which 
have been upheld and have ‘contributed to innovative dispositions of industrial 
property that can be understood as distributions of social wealth from the 
owners of that property to the labor force and local community’ (Gibson-
Graham, 2006: 178). For example, in Massachusetts, a judge awarded an 
industrial plant to a lower bidder who promised to keep the plant open, thereby 
violating owner’s rights to the highest price and giving legal support to 
stakeholders rights (ibid.) Aboriginal land rights movements have opened up the 
potential for distributions of wealth to traditional landowners in the form of 
compensation, rent and royalty payments on the basis of ‘indigenous rights’ to 
the land, in a sense which again goes at least partly beyond conceptions of 
state sovereignty (Gibson-Graham, 2006: 178).  
The ecological challenge to the dominant discourses, and in particular 
awareness of ‘”future rights” of succeeding generations to existing resources 
and environments’, has underlined the importance of thinking about  ‘the need 
for a distribution of wealth obtained through non-renewable or unsustainable 
economic activities toward renewable/sustainable ones’ (Gibson-Graham, 2006: 
178). Some of the political efficacy of articulating distributive injustices of 
nuclear energy to future generations lies in the commensurability of such 
articulations with dominant discourses and short-hand ways of understanding 
the world. Such articulation provides a means for conceptualising relative 
benefits and burdens across time and thereby brings excluded costs into more 
economistic, instrumental modes of thinking such as cost-benefit analysis. The 
phrase, ‘our children’s children’s children...’ is often used at protests and 
141 
 
reflects the personal connections that do exist. But the long-term and most 
troubling aspects of the nuclear waste issue bring up such a long timescale that 
many of those affected are complete unknowns to us.  
For Dobson (1998: 110), because ‘most theories of justice – and most 
practices too -  make reference to future generations only as an afterthought, it 
practically goes without saying that bringing them closer to the centre of 
attention will be transformative for both theory and – particularly – practice’. This 
emphasis upon potential distributive injustice relates to Robert Goodin’s (1985: 
33, in Dobson, 1998: 123) insistence that the vulnerability of those in the future 
to our actions in the present should be motivation enough (a duty due to special 
need, such as that owed to infants), and would also help to confront ‘the 
“sleeper” type of environmental problem’ such as high-level radioactive waste. 
The ascription of rights, and an understanding of certain equal basic 
necessities, to people of the distant future might help to provide an imperfect yet 
‘hard core of a standard on which to base demands for transformation’, and 
against which present practices can be tested (Dobson, 1998: 110). The 
comparative aspect which a consideration of inequality brings, may make the 
effects upon people of the future as ‘real’ as any other effort of comparison and 
conceptualisation of relations between selves and others has at least the 
potential to do. Abstract numerical thinking in terms of ranking (of which equality 
is a part) (Plumwood, 2002: 172) is dominant not only because it corresponds 
with the dominant forms of social organisation and valuation systems, but 
because it is so useful for simplifying and making comprehensible complex and 
vast pieces of information. 
Thinking about deprivation of basic needs for future generations provides 
a conceptual bridge along lines of have/have not, which provide a useful and 
easy to conceptualise mental shorthand (at least for many). Although vague, 
simplified and imprecise in actuality, this formulation provides a clear signal of 
extent of potential harm and suffering as a result of present action. It thus 
provides a way of including previously and presently excluded, or to use the 
language of economics – externalised, costs of nuclear energy. Also, because, 
arguably for some, it is easier to make this leap within the human world across 
time than between the human and nonhuman world within the same generation, 
it has also tended to be used as an indirect way of bringing nonhuman nature 
into dominant calculations of anthropocentric self-interest (Hayward, 1998). The 
142 
 
possibility of assigning quantifiable costs and benefits is strategically crucial for 
raising awareness of problems in most economic, political and legal contexts 
(Warren, 2000: 178). 
In a similar way to the articulation of distributive injustices to future 
generations, articulating international distributive injustices of nuclear energy is 
politically effective in so far as it enables a clear and often stark depiction of 
comparative deprivation and inequality which chimes with dominant 
understandings of cost-benefit-analyses and in particular, economic disparities 
and inequalities. Thinking about international distributive injustices also brings 
out, less ambiguously than thinking about future generations, the existence of 
certain roughly equal basic necessities for a healthy environment. This is the 
case, at least with regards to basics such as clean air, drinking water and 
environment which does not contain significantly more causes of disease than it 
would have without interferences of uranium mining and milling, for example. 
Thus, I argue that despite, or in fact because of important cultural 
differences at global level, it is perfectly possible, and in fact vital to articulate 
distributive injustices at the international level and across time, not only 
between peoples of nation states, but between people and big corporations and 
their shareholders, or between the poor and the wealthy in the same country. 
Although in the context of globalization the state and the corporation have 
arguably seen a decline in their power to effect redistributions of wealth and 
other important rights (Gibson-Graham, 2006: 177), the continued articulation of 
global distributive injustices, for example the deprivations of basic necessities 
highlighted by those in the global justice movements, highlights their continued 
power to expropriate and redistribute resources in the name of economic 
growth. Articulating deprivation of basic necessities at the global level highlights 
rising inequalities and the increasing concentration of resources in the hands of 
a few rather than any progress towards ameliorating distributive injustices. 
Importantly, articulations of distributive injustices against and despite 
reported GDP growth and other development statistics, helps to highlight the 
limits of economic growth as a mechanism for meeting basic needs. On the 
contrary, articulations of international distributive injustices, ecologically 
understood, highlight the ways in which conventional understandings of 
economic development and growth are contributing to the deprivation of basic 
necessities and increasing inequalities. It is in appeals or articulations about the 
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injustices of the deprivation of basic necessities, ecologically understood, that 
the political efficacy of articulations of international distributive injustices lies. 
Articulation of unequal deprivation and exposure to ecological bads is 
particularly important from a political point of view. 
Warren (2000: 176) points out that appealing to distributive justice plays 
an important role in highlighting deficiencies in current forms of economic 
organisation. Articulating distributive injustices can highlight the detrimental 
effects of markets ‘where outcomes recommended by economic analyses 
conflict with considerations of justice’ in so-called ‘justice-efficiency quandaries’ 
(Warren, 2000: 179). Attention to such quandaries raises the question of how 
one can ‘reconcile economic market efficiency in the allocation of resources 
necessary to produced desired goods and services, with justice in the 
distribution of the wealth necessary to purchase those goods and services’ 
(Warren, 2000: 177). Efficient outcomes tend to be distributively unjust 
outcomes, for example, when market forces locate hazardous waste 
consistently and disproportionately in poorer areas, and in the US in more black 
communities than white (Warren, 2000: 180).  
Articulating deprivation of basic necessities brings out the tendencies for 
correlations, and therefore also potential solidarities, between injustices – that 
those suffering other social, economic and political distributive injustices are 
more likely to suffer unequal distribution of ecological burdens, while those who 
tend to be in receipt of more benefits than burdens tend to ‘have the strongest 
economic stake in the sort of accumulation which generates environmental 
harms’ (Plumwood, 2002: 85). Focusing upon articulations of distributive 
injustices helps us to see that those who benefit from uneven distributions of all 
kinds of goods can afford to avoid the worst forms of environmental 
degradation. This is a matter of turning attention just as much to the most 
advantaged, rather than simply focusing upon the situation of the most 
disadvantaged (see Plumwood, 2002). This takes seriously the implication that 
deprivation of basic necessities tends to be intrinsically linked to inequality. 
This aspect of distributive injustice is very politically effective in 
highlighting how the problem of nuclear energy as a solution to energy scarcity 
and the need to reduce carbon emissions actually enables the continued 
degradation and exploitation of both people and ‘natural resources’, enables 
‘sustainable degradation’ (Luke, 2008b: 143) in order to further facilitate capital 
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accumulation, thereby further exacerbating deprivation of basic necessities and 
severe inequalities. 
However, it is important to note that without considering the correlations 
between inequalities and distributive injustices, we encounter strong 
contradictions between environmental concerns and social justice concerns. 
Stephen Tindale and Chris Hewitt (1999) have highlighted how discussion of 
environmental taxation on energy can tend to mask social inequalities and 
important issues such as fuel poverty perpetuated by the existing capitalist state 
and market systems, which can pose as neutral and unproblematic arbiters of 
distributions. A shift in focus from taxes to energy efficiency and property 
insulation would better consider the distributive impact of sustainability policies 
upon the poor (1999: 239). By considering the ways in which different 
distributive injustices link up with environmental concerns it might be possible to 
counter the strong single-issue focus which leads to such conflicts, and to 
emphasise complementary rather than exacerbating, conflict augmenting 
solutions to these complexly interlinked problems. 
In the past redistributional politics succeeded best where unions have 
been able to control the labour market for certain jobs (often by using sexist, 
racist, and nationalist strategies of exclusion)’ (Gibson-Graham, 2006: 176). 
The politics of distribution was focused on the state and based upon implied 
and assumed characteristics of the citizen or subject of distributive rights, the 
model for which was the male citizen (Drake, 2010; MacGregor, 2004). This 
assumed a ‘culturally homogeneous, male breadwinner of a nuclear family’ 
(Drake 2010: 98; Lister, 2007). This highlights some of the limits of distributive 
articulations as long as those who suffer distributive injustices are widely 
dispersed across space and time, remain substitutable for at least the 
immediate foreseeable future and the existing value and meaning systems as 
well as modes of political and economic organisation continue to pit the basic 
necessities of some against the basic necessities of others. 
There are problems with thinking about distribution across time and 
space, even if we expand our consideration to the contestation of basic 
necessities including both goods and burdens. The problem which thinking 
about both distributive injustices to future generations and injustices to those in 
other countries brings to our attention is that we may be confronted with 
conflicting conceptions of basic necessities. Dobson identifies a major problem 
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with assigning rights to future generations, and that is the question of the extent 
of present sacrifice.  Because the future contains so many unknowns, the idea 
of ascribing equal rights to people of the future has the tendency to push cost-
benefit analyses into absurdity (Dobson, 1998 105). Peter Laslett and James 
Fishkin, for example, have argued that ‘the resources of the human world, 
social, political, and material, cannot themselves possibly be infinite, even if it is 
uncertain how large they are in fact and how far technical ingenuity can spread 
them out’, whereas to comprehend potential past, present and future 
generations we must think of these as infinite (Laslett & Fishkin 1992: 6, in 
Dobson, 1998: 105-106). So if ‘every member of every generation must have 
equal access to the  resources of the world, quite irrespective of the generation 
into which he or she was, is, or will be born’ a just distribution makes no sense 
because ‘a finite quantity divided by an infinite number must have a zero result’ 
(Laslett & Fishkin, 1992: 6).  
One suggested way around this problem is to use the economists’ 
method of discounting the future, often used because ‘future costs are less 
burdensome than current costs’ (Pearce et al., 1989: 7, in Dobson 1998: 111). 
By pushing the costs of present activities into the future it is possible to arrive at 
a calculation whereby, for example ‘[a]t a 5% discount rate [..] one life today is 
equivalent in value to [..] sixteen lives in 57.6 years’ and in 489.6 years one life 
is ‘worth more than sixteen billion lives then’ (Wenz, 1988: 230, in Dobson 
1998: 111-2).  
One of the limits of the articulation lie in the fact that there is no tangibly 
measurable or affective reciprocity between those of the present and those of 
the future which would provide a nudge to those acting out of apparently purely 
instrumental rationalist self-interest. Robert Heilbroner (1981: 191, in Dobson, 
1998: 103), poses and then closes down any response to his query: ‘Why 
should I lift a finger to affect events that will have no more meaning for me 
seventy-five years after my death than those that happened seventy-five years 
before I was born? There is no rational answer to that terrible question’. 
Rationality is an ambiguous term, and part of the problem here is that 
assumptions about what is rational affect the ways in which we understand and 
frame distributional problems in terms of who counts as rational (recognition) as 
well as who may claim to speak rationally (representation). 
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The problem is exacerbated by the unknowability of the future. There are 
many unknowns. For example, the objection to giving people of the future rights 
often involves the argument that they do not exist and they do not have identity 
(Dobson, 1998: 108). However, this point may be countered by the argument 
that they will nonetheless have interests, for example, to have ‘living space, 
fertile soil, fresh air’ etc. (Feinberg, 1981: 143, Dobson, 1998: 109), i.e. certain 
equal basic necessities. 
Yet this raises the reason that at least some kind of discount rate is so 
appealing, because prioritising future needs over present wants faces us with 
the problem of imposing large and potentially unpalatable sacrifices upon 
present generations (Dobson, 1998: 112). There is a tension here between ‘the 
felt need to do something like discount the future’ because the future is 
unknown, and the green emphasis upon the precautionary principle, also 
because the future is unknown   (Dobson 1998: 113). This tension exposes an 
underlying difference in valuing the future, and thus highlights a problem with 
articulating injustices to future generations in terms of distribution alone. 
Dominant beliefs in the substitutability of resources and the potentials for 
technological and economic capitalist development to mitigate present problems 
permeate much academic thinking on distributive injustice to future generations, 
with, for example, the Rawlsian assumption that economic wealth created by 
present generations might compensate loss of other resources, or exposure to 
ecological bads (Cowen and Parfit, 1992, in Dobson, 1998). 
Distributive articulations, especially in the abstract, push us towards 
numerical articulations in terms of cost-benefit-analyses which encourage trade-
offs which in reality may not be palatable or even realistic. Thus we have hit the 
problem that in order to shift dominant assumptions about who may suffer 
distributive injustice and what is of value to be distributed, there is a need for 
articulations and understandings of both recognition-and representation-based 
injustices, which for example, raise the issue of the intrinsic value of nonhuman 
nature, of its non-substitutability and the inherent uncertainties in predicting the 
future. Without articulations of representation we are unable to raise the issue of 
the prevailing lack of recognition of the limits to human knowledge and power 
apparent in more ecological understandings of the human self, and the question 
of who has legitimate knowledge and who speaks for whom about the risks and 
benefits that we leave to future generations. The problem of what the future 
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counts for, and who and what counts in the future is a question we need to 
articulate in terms of potential recognition-based injustices, while the problem of 
who speaks on behalf of whom concerning the risks and benefits we leave for 
future generations needs to be considered with potential representation-based 
injustices in mind. 
Many in the local communities around Hinkley C remain supportive of the 
project. This is in great part due to the strong presence of EDF, and associated 
support companies for the power station’s construction and infrastructure, as 
local employer and investor in the region’s infrastructure. The contradiction here 
between concerns over economic development and growth, particularly 
apparent in the investment in local colleges and schools, and the concerns 
about the impact of the power plant in terms of increased risk and hazard for 
local people and wildlife both far into the future and in the present , is a stark 
and seemingly irreconcilable one. Both may be considered in terms of 
distributive injustices yet with different conceptions of the good life and the basic 
necessities which are necessary for this. 
Arguing for alternative forms of energy and energy-use-reduction 
involves different conceptions of what counts while calling for more 
decentralised and accountable forms of energy production, brings in issues of 
who may speak on behalf of whom. Without challenges over what is to be 
distributed and who has a say in the distribution processes, articulations of 
distributive injustices may gain less traction for change. To return to the 
example of the struggle at Hinkley C, Bob Brown, Corporate Director of 
Sedgemoor District Council pointed out in 2012 that in the communities around 
Hinkley C  
[f]uel poverty rates are among the highest in the UK; wages and 
educational attainment levels are low. We risk the grotesque spectacle of 
communities suffering in fuel poverty in the shadow of one of the UK's 
largest power stations’ (Western Daily Press, 2012).  
 
This draws attention to the correlation and compounding of the deprivation 
brought about by the environmental burdening of the UK’s largest nuclear 
power station with other forms of social and economic deprivation. In pointing 
this out, the aim, which achieved limited success (see Macalister, 2013), was to 
call for more compensation and a share of the power station’s profits, despite 
already existing investment in local schools and colleges and the promise of 
jobs. It demonstrates the extent of the distributive injustice felt, but it still only 
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goes so far as to ask for more compensation, rather than challenge the 
existence of the power station itself. Often, the promise of jobs and local 
investment suffices.  
Impacts of uranium mining have also been ‘compensated’ by promises of 
development and economic and infrastructure incentives (Lichacz & Myers, 
1977: 57; Perera & Pugliese, 1998: 74-5; Katona, 1998) However, there can be 
no compensation for losses of culture which such compensation actually often 
accelerates. It is also the case that when workers and locals have struggled for 
compensation against mining companies they have been severely 
disadvantaged in their chances of addressing the starkly uneven distributions of 
goods and burdens (Martinez-Alier, 2001: 165; Pearson, 1980). The 
correlations of distributive injustices have also been known to enable mining 
companies to dismiss their own adverse distributive effects. Historically, the 
industry has been known to belittle consequences of mining, for example, 
blaming ‘lung cancers occurring to miners on excessive smoking, drinking, and 
low living’, or even describing uranium mining populations of the early 1950s as 
‘drunks and tramps’ (Pearson, 1980: 144). Martinez-Alier (1993: 115) has 
pointed out that often those who are already deprived tend to ‘sell cheap.’ 
Those who do not recognise the value of what is at stake may sell cheaper. And 
for those not recognised or given the status they deserve, or who are not given 
a say in the matter, the sale may be even cheaper still, if not outright theft. 
To return to the contradictions which articulating distributive injustices 
helps to bring out, if we confine our understanding of basic necessities to 
financial and economic considerations, then the presence of a ‘new power plant’ 
which is ‘already generating jobs’ (EDF advertisement at Taunton Train Station 
in 2011), appears to mitigate certain injustices of economic and social 
deprivation, bringing new life to the region. If we narrow our concerns about 
ecological degradation to combating climate change with carbon emissions 
reductions, then nuclear energy appears to redistribute certain bads of energy 
production (carbon emissions) away from this particular problem (climate 
change). Yet if we extend our considerations, ecologically, to consider basic 
needs of local people and wildlife for a safe and healthy environment, in an 
already volatile and changing climate, then the picture becomes more 
complicated and the nuclear power plant begins to look like more like a potential 
distributive injustice.  
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If we extend our consideration to compare the distribution of power 
plants with the distribution of wealth and other social benefits within the UK, 
then the superficial benefits of jobs and development from such a dubious and 
risk-laden source are unmasked as problematic to say the least. We need to 
add to this the consideration that nuclear energy involves a capital-intensive 
concentration of resources and control in the hands of a few, redistributing 
investment away from viable renewable energy sources as well as encouraging 
us along the well-trodden path of increasingly high energy and resource 
consumption linked to an engine of economic growth driving the depletion of 
limited resources and bringing with it increasing inequality.  
If we add to this consideration both the global picture, taking the impacts 
of uranium mining into account, and the future, taking the impacts of an as yet 
unsolved waste problem into account, the distributive injustice effects of nuclear 
energy become even more apparent. Quantifying the numbers of deaths from 
the nuclear industry in comparison to the coal industry becomes an irrelevant 
numerical game in comparing two evils, neither of which can help us face the 
problems we currently face. In fact, these problems and their distributive effects 
are likely to exacerbate each other. Those pushing the development of uranium 
mines and plants emphasise development opportunities in terms of the building 
of local infrastructures, jobs, schools etc. Those opposing argue that this 
development is not of their choosing, disrupts and extinguishes traditional ways 
of life and the healthy ecology necessary for this.  
In the case of uranium mining in Namibia, European environmental 
activists worked together with trade unionists at the Rossing uranium mine and 
processing plant there in the period running up to and after the end of apartheid 
and independence from white South Africa (Hecht 2010b). In the early stages 
the Europeans and the local trade unionists coincided in their aim to call for 
boycotts of the mine. However there were tensions. For while the trade union 
members were against their own exploitation and pushed for more stringent 
safety standards and exposure of the managements’ faults they were ultimately 
dependent upon Rossing for their livelihoods. After apartheid, with the Rossing 
mine owners supporting the new government, and the new government strongly 
dependent upon the industry, the contradictions between the position of the 
European activists and that of the workers became stark (Hecht 2010b). Here 
again, if we consider basic necessities as restricted to economic considerations, 
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the closure of the mine causes distributive injustice. If the closure of the mine 
coincided with and contributed to the withdrawal of other foreign investment 
from Namibia, the contribution to a failing economy and weakened social and 
political infrastructure would likely ensue. The legacy of the mine would also 
need to be considered, for while stopping its operations would halt some of the 
infringements upon basic necessities concerning a healthy environment, and at 
least halt the production of more waste, tailings piles would still exist and might 
pose an increased threat if not dealt with adequately.  
All such considerations require attention, and they involve consideration 
of recognition- and representation-based injustices too. Should the Europeans 
who in great part benefit from their countries’ historical and contemporary 
exploitation of African countries, and the continuing unjust distribution of 
benefits and burdens in the current economic and political systems, have a right 
to say what Namibians should do? Can they make common cause against the 
complex inadequacies of current modes of economic, social and political 
organisation? What might be the potential recognition-, representation- and 
distribution-based injustices in such collaboration and how might they be 
mitigated? When it comes to considering transnational distributive injustices we 
are confronted with conflicting notions of the basic necessities for flourishing 
lives. And in the cases, such as that of indigenous peoples resisting uranium 
mining, distributive claims are often difficult to separate out from claims about 
lack of recognition of ways of life and alternative conceptions of the human 
relationship with nonhumans and the land, and representation in terms of 
persistent silencing or marginalisation (see also Schlosberg 2007).  
Thus we see the limits of articulating international distributive injustices, 
for, on the one hand, what counts and is counted in comparative cost-benefit-
analyses must be considered with an awareness and possibility for articulation 
of injustices of recognition, and on the other, the question of who contributes to 
processes of putting forward the multiple perspectives which exist must also be 
considered, so that possible representation-based injustices are also taken into 
account. A more integrated ecological focus, rather than simply prioritising 
ecological concerns over human concerns, seeks to bring out and help us 
understand points of contradiction so as to better address underlying structural 
problems which need addressing.  
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Articulating as broad a range of distributive injustices in relation to 
nuclear energy as possible, despite the limitations can nonetheless help to give 
a clearer picture of what is at stake. Current considerations by the UK 
government over the strike price for nuclear energy (protracted, difficult and 
ongoing at the point of writing) ought to take into account potential distributive 
injustice at both local and global levels, in both the present and future, in terms 
of who may reap the benefits and who will suffer the burdens of the nuclear 
energy production which a high strike price would encourage. Those 
campaigning against new nuclear energy are usually fully aware of the 
distributional injustices which centralised power over distribution of energy 
supply can exacerbate and call for alternative more decentralised forms of 
energy production, as well as energy efficiency, as better placed policies for 
avoiding all kinds of distributive injustices. However, given the power of 
dominant discourses, and of dominant conceptions of what the basic 
necessities are, and the limited extent to which nonhuman nature is taken into 
account in all this, we also need to consider the problem in terms of both the 
politics of recognition and in terms of the politics of representation.  
The question of distributive injustices to nonhuman nature has been 
addressed by some (e.g. Baxter, 2005). However, the concern has been that 
our inevitable ‘use’ of parts of nature, makes moral considerability on similar 
terms to humans (in the present, internationally or across time) impossible, for it 
raises yet another point of conflict over distributions in a limited world. In 
particular the risk of conflict with social justice to less advantaged humans is 
often emphasised (Plumwood, 2002). Thus expressions of injustice to humans 
and expressions of injustice to nonhumans are often pitted against each other. 
If those who are deprived of basic necessities continue to be pitted against each 
other and the articulation of basic necessities does not succeed in challenging 
dominant understandings of what these are so as to take into account the 
ecological interdependence of human and nonhuman nature, then 
compensation and precaution will tend to remain affirmative, reinforcing rather 
than transforming the social structures which exacerbate deprivations. The 
importance of integrating social justice and environmental concerns is vital from 
an ecological point of view. As discussed in this chapter, some suggest that this 
be done by prioritising human interests and attaching the interests of nonhuman 
nature or future generations as a side-effect of these interests. Many argue 
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however, that prioritising human interests cannot suffice to redress the 
injustices to both humans and nonhuman nature, for it fails to acknowledge the 
blind spots of dominant anthropocentric forms of social organisation, the extent 
of our lack of knowledge about nonhuman nature, and the extent of our 
dependence upon it (Plumwood 2002).  
 
 
 
This chapter has sought to reformulate an image of politics as distribution 
so as to find a language to express how future generations, those beyond state 
boundaries, and nonhuman nature are affected in the politics of nuclear energy. 
Through this reformulation I have proposed an articulation of distributive 
injustice which can incorporate an understanding of the connections between 
goods and burdens and thereby more strongly draw attention to the correlations 
between unequal distributions. As discussed, such contestation draws attention 
to starkly uneven and unsustainable distributions of basic necessities across 
both space and time and the human/nonhuman divide, thereby highlighting 
serious problems with existing forms of social organisation. Articulating 
distributive injustices and the correlations between these can help to highlight 
points of solidarity and common ground between those deprived, including 
indigenous peoples, workers, environmental groups, nonhuman nature and 
future generations, helping to unmask the particular dominant interests of 
industry, of mining companies such as Rio Tinto, and governments’ collusion 
with these in the interests of a few rather than the many. As witnessed at world 
social and environmental forums, and in protests and participation at UN 
conferences, there is also much common ground with others deprived of basic 
necessities through other problematic developments justified by climate change, 
energy shortage, and/or development. For example, the development of 
massive hydro-electric dams, biofuel plantations, solar, or wind farms which 
further deprive those - human and nonhuman - already seriously deprived in 
national and global contexts. The expression of deprivation of basic necessities 
for well-being will never be a ‘neutral,’ apolitical cost-benefit-analysis, as those 
subscribing to the hierarchical separations of science/politics and nature/culture 
might wish. Yet, it is precisely because understandings of basic necessities and 
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well-being are always relational and therefore always political and never neutral, 
that we require ongoing contestation of distributive injustices. 
However, while articulation and contestation of distributive injustices is 
crucial to understanding certain significant harms of nuclear energy from the 
points of view of all affected, understanding politics through an image of 
distribution alone cannot help us to understand all affected with regards to who 
is able to act and speak in the politics of nuclear energy, who can make 
decisions regarding changes to the dominant forms of social organisation to 
redress distributive injustices. These are questions of representation to be 
addressed in Chapter Five. Correspondingly, just as distributive injustices 
cannot be understood independently of representation-based injustices, they 
also exacerbate and cannot be understood separately from recognition-based 
injustices. In order to facilitate contestation of distributive injustices and to 
contest the dominant understandings of basic necessities for well-being which 
can fragment potential alliances and pit these against each other, we must also 
be able to recognise all affected – future generations, those in other countries, 
and nonhuman nature – as members of political community. This involves 
questions of who counts as what in the value and meaning systems structuring 
self/other relations in common life beyond the separation of nature/culture. The 
injustices arising from these value and meaning systems which structure 
self/other relations may be better articulated in terms of the politics of 
recognition, to which I now turn. 
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Chapter Four 
Articulating Injustices of Recognition:  
Who counts as what in the politics of nuclear energy? 
 
Nuclear energy is being put forward as a necessary mediating technology, our 
only chance of controlling and overcoming the problem of climate change for 
the good of all. Government, industry, scientists and environmental 
spokespeople argue that we must recognise the value of ‘21st century 
technology’ (Caldeira et al., 2013) and the extent of the threat which it can help 
us to master. We have entered the age of the ‘anthropocene’ and because we 
dominate the earth any threat to the earth is a threat to us; we have to face up 
to our responsibilities and wield the power we have. While more primitive 
technologies and organisational forms of the past may have succumbed to 
disaster, such risks have now been stabilised and can be controlled and 
managed through superior forms of technology and organisation. 
This framing of the problem takes nonhuman nature into consideration as 
a matter of politics but it does so in terms of the entrenched and contradictory 
hierarchical separations of science/politics and nature/culture which structure 
our understandings of common life. This framing assumes human domination 
and continues to portray aspects of human and nonhuman nature as something 
that can be controlled, managed or overcome, thereby failing to challenge the 
value and meaning systems which have caused ecological crises in the first 
place. As a result, significant socially produced harms to both human and 
nonhuman nature remain difficult to articulate. In Chapter Three, the dominant 
discourses were challenged for failing to consider the burdens as well as the 
benefits of common life affecting future generations, those in other countries 
and nonhuman nature. Articulating injustices in terms of the politics of 
distribution can help to contest deprivation of basic necessities of all affected. 
However, there were limits to this articulation if considered alone, particularly for 
reconsidering how nonhuman nature counts as a subject as well as an object of 
politics. As some feminists have long argued, extending the scope of political 
community is not enough if the value and meaning systems which structure 
political community do not change. If taking all affected into account does not 
also provoke reconsideration of who we are in relation to each other, then 
important injustices go uncontested. Simply weighing up who gets what within 
an expanded sense of political community, without considering who counts as 
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what, perpetuates the dominant structures of common life based around the 
hierarchical separation of nature/culture. The implications of this are that 
significant socially produced harms of nuclear energy remain only partially 
articulated as injustices and our understanding of what is at stake in the politics 
of nuclear energy remains limited. 
In this chapter I continue the development of my heuristic framework for 
articulating injustices. Guided by the ecological approach of taking all affected 
into account, I reconsider what is at stake in terms of an image of politics as 
recognition so as to give another perspective on the thesis problem. The image 
of politics as recognition helps us to see how the expansion of political 
community to take into account those previously subordinated or excluded can 
transform value and meaning systems which structure self/other relations. I 
argue that we can articulate recognition-based injustices of nuclear energy as 
disrespect for integrity, with integrity signifying awareness of both the 
continuities and differences in self/other relations and the accompanying 
unpredictability of both human and nonhuman interactions. 
In the first section I develop insights from justice and green theory so as 
to reconsider the image of politics as recognition in terms of the ecological 
process of taking all affected into account beyond the separation of 
nature/culture. Thinking about recognition in ecological terms entails a 
challenge to hierarchical inside/outside conceptions of recognition and political 
community which displace rather than challenge the problems of self-centred 
power that underlie the structuring of social relations. This suggests a shift from 
centrist inside/outside relations of recognition, based upon dominant 
understandings of human intersubjectivity, towards a more complex multi-valent 
understanding of the processes of interaction which involve both continuities 
and differences between humans and nonhumans as both subjects and objects 
of politics. The implications of this are that taking all affected into account 
challenges not only the status of the others (future generations, non-nationals, 
nonhumans) involved, but also the status of the dominant human self. We 
therefore require a new way of conceptualising and contesting the quality of 
self/other relations which accounts for both continuities and differences between 
selves and others and enables contestation of hierarchical relations within 
which the dominant human self is able to maintain an illusion of independence 
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from the unpredictable processes of interaction and deny vulnerability and 
dependency upon others. 
In the second section I draw upon this ecological reconsideration of 
politics as recognition to disclose injustices which may broadly be articulated as 
disrespect for integrity. I argue for an understanding of integrity as a notion 
which describes an unavoidable paradoxical quality in self-other relations which 
accounts for both continuities and differences between entities and the complex 
ways in which these interact with each other. This helps to provide a language 
with which to redescribe the problem of nuclear energy discussed in Chapter 
One in terms of the politics of recognition. The suggestion of nuclear energy as 
a solution to climate change presupposes human independence from and 
control of both human and nonhuman nature. The claims to sovereignty of the 
dominant human self through both state and financial power as well as the 
power and promise of science and technology disrespects the integrity of 
self/other relations and perpetuates an illusion of independence and 
invulnerability. This insulates those in power from a sense of their own limits 
and fallibility. Assumptions about human control disrespect the integrity of 
nonhuman nature, failing to account for its difference, and the essentially 
unpredictable character of open and complex ecological systems, as well as 
failing to account for our continuities with nonhuman nature as an influencing 
factor within these systems. The articulation of nuclear energy as a way of 
managing climate change also capitulates to the dominant modes of social and 
economic organisation, assuming that there is no alternative and posing nuclear 
energy as the only alternative. This entails disrespect for the integrity of a 
diversity of other value and meaning systems which may be more respectful of 
integrity in self/other relations. These include some indigenous cultures, but 
also alternative cultures and technologies which are more sensitive to both the 
continuities and differences between humans and between humans and 
nonhuman nature. 
In the final section of this chapter I consider the political efficacy of 
articulating disrespect for integrity. I consider the transformative potential of 
finding a common language for reconsidering value and meaning in self/other 
relations in a way which accounts for both continuities and differences between 
selves and others. The articulation of disrespect for integrity has the potential to 
challenge the dominant anthropocentric illusion of independence and control of 
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‘nature’, highlighting the ways in which the dominant human self uses other 
humans and nonhuman nature to distance itself from both, and retain an illusion 
of its own superiority, invulnerability and mastery. Challenging this opens up 
space to imagine and learn from different existing and potential self/other 
relations which do not implicitly rely upon hierarchical dualist forms of 
domination but enable more respect for integrity of selves and others in 
complex interactive processes. Such potentials include the idea of the 
commons and alternative technologies which challenge and reconfigure our 
relationships both with other humans and with nonhuman nature. Such ideas 
and practices are potentially empowering and prefigurative as they show 
possibilities for withdrawing support for those hierarchical relations which limit 
the possibilities of self-development of all involved, including those of the 
dominant self.  
 
 
Ecologically reformulating recognition: understanding all affected in  
complex interaction beyond hierarchical intersubjectivity 
 
The image of politics as recognition has been of great use in understanding the 
formation of identities and social value and meaning systems which structure 
social relations. Traditionally this has been restricted to an understanding of the 
effects of human intersubjectivity. However, taking all affected into account, 
extending the scope of political community to include those previously excluded, 
alters the character of that political community, changing our understanding of 
the quality of self-other relations within it. Ecologically reformulating the image 
of politics as recognition requires two related shifts. First it involves a more 
complex understanding of value and meaning systems which structure 
self/other relations constructed through complex interactive processes involving 
both continuities and differences between humans and between humans and 
nonhumans. Secondly, this more complex understanding of the quality of 
self/other relations entails a challenge to the dominant anthropocentric self as 
independent and invulnerable within these processes of interaction. As a result, 
in considering ‘who counts as what’ we must pay as much attention to the value 
and meaning ascribed to the position of the dominant anthropocentric self in 
ecological processes of interaction as upon revaluing previously devalued 
others. Paying attention to the position of the dominant self entails a challenge 
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to the ways in which the anthropocentric self does not recognise dependency 
upon others, both human and nonhuman. The illusion of sovereignty is 
facilitated by relations of domination which stabilise complex and often 
unpredictable interactive processes between human and nonhuman nature, 
thereby insulating the dominant self from understanding its own vulnerability 
and dependency upon both. 
 Attention to actual struggles against injustices has led feminists and 
others to emphasise the importance of thinking about recognition as an aspect 
of justice in its own right, which cannot be subsumed or assumed to be 
adequately dealt with in thinking about distributive or representative justice 
alone (Honneth, 1992; Fraser, 2001; Taylor 1992; Schlosberg, 2004, 2007; 
Markell, 2008). Political theorists who work with a concept of justice as involving 
recognition have been involved with and inspired by social movement politics. 
They consider the importance of recognition for the formation of identities and 
social meaning and the damage and injustices which are inflicted upon groups 
and individuals when this is lacking. Charles Taylor (1992) has argued that we 
need theories of recognition in order to be able to understand and justify many 
of the demands of social movements which have had an impact in 
contemporary political life since the 1960s and up to the present day. 
 Building upon an underlying Hegelian dialogical understanding of 
intersubjectivity, Taylor (1994: 25) posits identity as crucial to ‘a person’s 
understanding of who they are, of their fundamental characteristic as a human 
being’ and this is shaped in great part by recognition or a lack of it. Our sense of 
identity is shaped through interaction with others and constitutes ‘a vital human 
need’ (Taylor, 1994: 26). Lack of recognition ‘can inflict a grievous wound, 
saddling its victims with crippling self-hatred’ (Taylor, 1994: 26). 
Historically, Hegel’s intersubjective understanding of the self, emerged in 
contrast to the atomistic conception found in Descartes, still present in Kant, 
and also apparent in Hobbes and Locke (Plumwood, 2002; McQueen, 2013). 
Hegel was influenced by Fichte, who argued that mutual recognition was a 
necessary condition for the existence of free individuals, capable of selfhood 
and self-understanding (Williams 1992, in McQueen, 2013). For Hegel, freedom 
is intrinsically related to self-consciousness which can only come about through 
recognition of another (and vice versa) (Hegel, 1821, in McQueen, 2013).  Axel 
Honneth (1995: 169) builds on Hegel on this point, arguing that  
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it is only due to the cumulative acquisition of basic self-confidence, of 
self-respect, and of self-esteem … that a person can come to see himself 
or herself, unconditionally, as both an autonomous and an individuated 
being and to identify with his or her goals and desires.  
 
Autonomy for Hegel is the result of an intersubjective, contingent, social 
practice (Hegel 1807, in McQueen, 2013). Recognition ‘is absolutely the double 
process of both self-consciousnesses… Action from one side only would be 
useless, because what is to happen can only be brought about by means of 
both’ (Hegel, 1807: 232, in McQueen, 2013). This interaction, rather than 
constraining autonomy, serves instead the ‘enhancement and concrete 
actualization of freedom’ (Williams, 1997: 59, in McQueen, 2013). Markell 
(2003: 7) also emphasises the importance of interaction, drawing upon Arendt 
in claiming that identity is constantly formed through interaction with others in 
public life. Denial of recognition or the failure to achieve truly mutual recognition 
in relations of domination, as is the outcome in Hegel’s life-and-death, master-
slave, struggle (McQueen, 2013), results in a loss of potential for freedom on 
both sides of the self-other relationship.  
Some of the cultural aspects of the ‘new social movements’ enabled the 
(at least partial) co-optation of identity politics (a key aspect of the politics of 
recognition) by capitalist consumerism, which very much emphasised 
individualism. Generally speaking, the emphasis in the politics of recognition 
has been upon inclusion of the previously excluded or devalued other and the 
debilitating effects when there is either no recognition or the recognition given 
has been demeaning in some way (Taylor, 1994; Honneth, 1995). This is 
important. However, the tensions between group and individual within more 
progressive politics of recognition are more complex than this reading of 
recognition politics would suggest. By its very interactive and social nature, the 
politics of recognition involves not only the identity of one group or individual, 
but the interactions between identities. It is useful to consider Markell’s (2003: 
24) objections to thinking about injustice only in inside/outside terms. He 
emphasises the implications of Hegel’s master-slave struggle, that inclusion can 
also entail injustice, for example through social stratification, hierarchy and the 
division of labour. Recognition is about more than just identity and 
intersubjective relations, for as Nancy Fraser emphasises it involves matters of 
status and social standing determined by ‘institutionalised patterns of cultural 
value’ (Fraser & Honneth, 2003: 29).  
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An understanding of recognition in purely intersubjective terms is limited 
for the purposes of also taking into account harms to nonhuman nature. 
However, this takes me to my second point about the impact of an ecological 
approach for thinking about the politics of recognition. It is possible to rethink 
the politics of recognition more broadly in terms of more complex processes of 
interaction and the construction of meaning and value systems which structure 
such interaction between both human and nonhuman nature. David Schlosberg 
(2007) draws upon Nancy Fraser’s (2003) more structural understanding of 
recognition to think about how we might include nonhuman nature in thinking 
about recognition-based justice.  For Fraser (2003: 29) ‘[s]ome individuals and 
groups are denied the status of full partners in social interaction simply as a 
consequence of institutionalised patterns of cultural value’, which determine our 
understanding of their place within political community and often ‘disparage 
their distinctive characteristics or the distinctive characteristics assigned to 
them.’ Schlosberg uses this more structural and institutional understanding of 
status to emphasise that nonhuman nature ‘either sentient and capable of 
feeling excluded or not’ can still have a place in our thinking about justice 
(Schlosberg, 2007: 140). However, building upon this, we also need to think 
about the manner of inclusion of nonhuman nature within value and meaning 
systems which structure processes of interaction between human and 
nonhuman nature, and how the type of inclusion within such meaning systems 
constitutes injustice. 
 Focusing upon complex processes of ecological interaction in the politics 
of recognition means that our attention is not only drawn to the status of the 
devalued ‘other’ but to how that status is intrinsically related to the elevated 
status of the dominant human (anthropocentric) self. Interaction is not simply a 
matter of two-way relations between self and other, but a more complex 
process of meaning construction through interrelation and interaction between 
multiple selves and others, both human and nonhuman.  It also involves 
intersectional interactive processes within selves if we consider the body as the 
devalued other within the anthropocentric dominant human self.  
Markell (2003: 13) is helpful here for he emphasises that we need to 
reconceptualise recognition beyond inside/outside terms and think about its 
relation to action and time. He critiques the way in which the ideal of mutual 
recognition in the work of theorists like Honneth and Taylor rests upon an 
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understanding of identity as relatively static, or at least complete in ways which 
fail to recognise the temporality of identity and the impossibility of fully capturing 
or ever truly recognising it. He argues that ‘the question of justice on the terrain 
of identity and difference cannot be addressed in this way because it concerns 
the quality of recognitive relations through which identity itself is brought into 
being and reproduced’ (Markell, 2003: 179). 
Thus, while failures of recognition and its consequences upon devalued 
others are often considered simply as unfortunate relics, resulting from 
‘persistence of outdated hierarchical belief systems’, ignorance about the other 
or ‘baseline unreasonableness in the pursuit of self-interest’, it is important to 
consider the origins of these failures, namely, the ‘motives, investments, and 
experiences that sustain misrecognition’ (Markell, 2003: 21). By paying more 
attention to the processes of interaction which make up relations of recognition, 
and following through Fraser’s call for deconstruction of structures and relations 
of domination, we must engage ‘with the deeper question of the sources of 
misrecognition for those who commit or benefit from it’ (Markell, 2003: 21). 
Markell goes on to analyse the tensions and contradictions involved in how the 
dominant self’s desire for sovereignty and independence pushes for freedom 
through subordination and domination. Thus Markell (2003: 22) deepens 
Fraser’s approach to recognition as status relations, examining the motivations 
which perpetuate misrecognition: 
Social subordination can be understood as a means of avoiding or 
disavowing the open-ended temporality of human action by converting 
the existential problem of time into the technical problem of organization 
of social space.  
 
So, in reconsidering recognition we must fundamentally address the problem of 
the self’s desire for sovereign agency, its unwillingness to confront its own 
limits, to face uncertainty and lack of knowledge and control in the face of the 
future. 
This resonates with Val Plumwood’s (1993, 2002) analysis of the 
‘mastery’ and domination entailed in anthropocentrism. Plumwood (2002: 147) 
argues that constantly expanding the circle of moral or political considerability 
fails to problematise the centrist modes of thought predicated upon hierarchical 
inside/outside dualisms, thereby displacing the problem which lies in the 
underlying structuring of social relations and assumptions about the nature of 
power and self-interest. Inclusion of others into the circle of moral 
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considerability is always predicated on an outside and can boomerang back 
upon other devalued others in unexpected ways.  Her analysis of 
anthropocentrism, emphasises the important methodological approach of 
‘studying up’ rather than ‘studying down’, by which she means that we must 
shift the onus of proof from inclusion to exclusion, and focus not on the question 
of the ‘qualifications’ of others for ethical inclusion and attention, but instead 
consider the ‘different and largely neglected question of the ethical stance of the 
human evaluator and their own moral status’ (Plumwood 2002: 11, 261). She 
emphasises that in the context of anthropocentric culture, it is self rather than 
other, which requires critical philosophical engagement (Plumwood 2002: 11). 
Reconsidering recognition ecologically so as to take all affected into account 
therefore throws a spotlight upon how domination of human and nonhuman 
nature has been used to isolate the dominant anthropocentric self from the 
inevitable dependencies and vulnerabilities of interactions between selves and 
others, both human and nonhuman. 
 Markell (2003: 11) traces in Hegel the way in which the relations of 
domination described in the master-slave struggle serve to insulate the master 
from the ‘hard work of acquiring and preparing parts of the material world’ 
necessary for survival, thereby making the other (the slave) ‘bear the 
disproportionate weight of the fact of human dependence on the material world.’ 
Thus the master achieves an ‘image’ of himself as free and independent from 
the unpredictability of interaction with non-human nature and is insulated ‘from 
the experience of his own dependence’ (Markell, 2003: 11). The master is thus 
able to use the other human to ‘finesse the problem of his own contradictory 
relation to the material world by establishing social distance between production 
and consumption’ (Markell, 2003: 112).  
However, there remains the problem of the unpredictability of interaction 
within the human world – of human intersubjectivity. As Markell (2003; 12) 
interprets Hegel, the master is able to use the material world, the ‘existence of 
an object to be worked on – what Hegel calls the “thing”’ in order to ‘relate to the 
slave “mediately”: that is in terms of their own differentially defined roles in 
relation to the objects of nature.’ This gives substance to the social identities of 
master and slave ‘lending relative stability to the intersubjective world’ because 
it enables ‘the master to experience his own status – like the slave’s – as a 
reflection of who he already is, rather than as the political (and therefore fragile) 
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effect of an ongoing [and unstable] practice of subordination’ (Markell, 2003: 
112). 
Markell (2008: 462) describes this as  
an account of a subject’s contradictory effort to secure certainty of its 
own independence through the establishment of a hierarchical social 
form – an effort that ironically testifies to the subject’s continued 
dependence on others whilst materially insulating him, however 
imperfectly, from the force of the contradiction. 
  
Subordination enables the insulation of some from the inescapable 
contradiction between desire for freedom and power and the limits to this, ‘the 
ineliminable fact of finitude’, and this allows the dominant ‘to live within that 
contradiction at the others’ expense’ (Markell 2003: 22). He therefore finds ‘the 
source of relations of subordination [..] not in the failure to recognize the identity 
of the other but in the failure to acknowledge one’s own basic situation and 
circumstances’ which are ultimately those of dependency and vulnerability in 
the face of ongoing self-other interaction (Markell, 2003: 7). 
Markell (2003:22) draws upon W. E. B. Du Bois’ analysis of the 
‘psychological wage’ paid by whiteness. He characterises structures of 
subordination as paying  
an ontological wage: they organize the human world in ways that make it 
possible for certain people to enjoy an imperfect simulation of the 
invulnerability they desire, leaving others to bear a disproportionate 
share of the costs and burdens of social life.   
 
As the green challenge makes clear, it is not only relations between humans 
with which we must be concerned here, but the impact of such structures for 
human-nonhuman relations too. 
Markell’s discussion highlights how interactions between humans and 
nonhuman nature have been used to give value and meaning to the quality of 
(dominating and hierarchical) relations between humans. Plumwood’s analysis 
shows how the domination of both humans and nonhumans intersect in the 
value systems of the dominant anthropocentric self, relying upon similar 
mechanisms of subordination. Within such value systems, hierarchy and 
domination are ‘naturalised’ or normalised by simultaneous interactive 
processes of both radical separation and relational incorporation which deny 
both continuities and differences between selves and others. 
Radical separation concretises hierarchical self/other relations so that the 
other is understood as completely separate and ‘part of a lower, different order 
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of being’, often through classifying characteristics of different orders of value 
(Plumwood, 1993: 49). So for example, ‘reason’, ‘intellect’ and ‘higher pursuits’ 
which are understood to be more active and dominant are associated with the 
master (self), while the slave (other), associated with ‘merely manual 
occupations,’ is seen as ‘passive’, ‘nurturant’, ‘submissive and lacking in 
initiative’ (Plumwood, 1993: 50). Rather than creating differences such radical 
separation capitalises on differences which are reproduced through social roles 
which then ground hierarchy (Plumwood, 1993: 55).  
By naturalising homogenizing and stereotyping capacities and ‘natures’ 
the difference relationship between self and other is also one of relational 
incorporation. It is presented as benefiting both the dominated other and the 
dominant self. However it cages the dominated other into a subordinate role 
where they ‘are obliged to put aside their own interests for those of the master 
or centre’, and are ‘conceived of as his instruments, a means to his ends’ 
(Plumwood, 1993: 53). The subordinated other is then often ‘judged by a 
separate instrumental standard (as in the sexual double standard) or seen as 
outside of morality altogether’ (Plumwood, 1993: 53). This of course has a 
detrimental impact upon the subordinated human other.  Iris Young (1990) 
draws upon Du Bois’ conception of ‘double consciousness’ in her discussion of 
cultural imperialism, one of her ‘five faces of oppression’: ‘this sense of always 
looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the 
tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity’ (Du Bois, 1969 
[1903]: 45, in Young 1990: 60). 
 The logics of radical separation and relational incorporation are also 
central to the perpetuation of anthropocentrism. Nonhuman nature is 
characterised as a completely separate ‘lower order lacking in continuity with 
the human’ (Plumwood, 2002: 107). Features which make humans different 
from nonhuman nature are emphasised over those that are shared, and the 
features that make humans different are idealised as ‘constitutive of a truly 
human identity’, (such as psychology and intersubjectivity) contrasted with ‘a 
plastic, passive, ‘dead’ nature which is conceived in mechanical terms as 
completely lacking in qualities such as mind and agency that are seen as 
exclusive to the human’ (Plumwood, 2002: 107). This is accompanied by a 
‘strong ethical discontinuity’ at the ‘human species boundary’ (Plumwood, 2002, 
107).  Yet again, nonhuman nature is also relationally incorporated into 
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anthropocentric value systems by means of its homogenised difference, and is 
‘conceived in terms of interchangeable and replaceable units (as ‘resources’, or 
standing reserve) rather than as infinitely diverse and always in excess of 
knowledge and classification’ (Plumwood, 2002: 107). The nonhuman other is 
conceived in terms of a ‘lack’ and ‘devalued as an absence of qualities said to 
be essential for the human, such as rationality’ (Plumwood, 2002: 109).  
 Radical separation and relational incorporation, for example through 
backgrounding and taking for granted services to the dominant self are 
‘hazardous for those in this category of ‘nature’’ (Plumwood 2002: 110). Within 
the private property system the other which is not incorporated into the self, 
made useful for the self, ‘is conceived as externality, that place remote from the 
self or home for which no responsibility is accepted and from which resources 
can be taken or waste deposited’ (Plumwood, 2002: 111). Plumwood (2002: 
110-111) highlights the ways in which these forms of domination impact upon 
humans and nonhumans whilst insulting the dominant self: 
abstract decision-makers may never be brought to face the failure of their 
rational edicts on the ground, because that has become externality, 
‘someone else’s department’. In private enterprise and private property 
culture, the ‘forgetting’ of nature’s agency and contribution is often 
paralleled by the forgetting of the importance of social infrastructure, 
which under economic rationalism and centrism is similarly either 
privatised (often with disastrous consequences) or starved of resources 
to the point of breakdown. 
 
Thus Plumwood brings together the concerns of many feminists and green 
thinkers with the importance of difference and the need to allow for the diversity 
of experiences and needs. Crucially important to the development of the politics 
of recognition was the way in which social movements problematized and 
unmasked the universality underpinning egalitarianist distributive politics as 
exclusive (in distinguishing between citizens and non-citizens) and implicitly 
normative. Feminist and anti-racist critiques unveiled assumptions about the 
subject of politics as male breadwinner (Drake, 2010: 98; Lister, 2007), which 
assumed the subject of politics to have the same needs, opportunities and 
ambitions, thereby ‘implicitly excluding or pathologizing difference, not only of 
gender but of other social identities also (Drake, 2010: 98). The movements 
engaged in identity politics ‘arose in the first place precisely to protest the 
disguised particularisms – the masculinism, the white-Anglo ethnocentrism, the 
heterosexism – lurking behind what parades as universal’ (Fraser, 1997: 5). 
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Groups different to the norm, ‘communities of value’, struggle ‘to defend their 
“identities” against “cultural domination”’ (Fraser, 1997: 2). However, both 
greens and feminists also emphasise the importance of recognising 
fundamental relations and continuities between humans and others, the 
complex dependencies and interrelationships which constitute the social and 
ecological realms. By simultaneously denying both continuities and differences, 
radical separation and relational incorporation of human and nonhuman nature 
bolster domination within the human world.  
Conceptions of what makes a good human in anthropocentric culture 
tend to  
reinforce [..] discontinuity by devaluing the qualities of human selves and 
human cultures it associates with nature and animality in the human self, 
and thus also to associate with nature inferiorised social groups and their 
characteristic activities, real or supposed’ (Plumwood, 2002: 107).  
 
As Markell’s (2003) rearticulation of Hegel’s master/slave relation indicates, this 
is reinforced by the division of labour. This enables those who are dominant to 
‘associate themselves with the overcoming or mastery of nature, both internal 
and external, and the management of colonised groups’ (Plumwood, 2002: 
107). The dominant self is distanced from both human and nonhuman other, 
this distance and the hierarchical relation of domination and subordination is 
naturalised, and the dependency of the dominant self upon both is denied and 
backgrounded at the same time as the independent worth and difference of 
both human and nonhuman other is distorted and homogenised . 
 In crystallising and emphasising both continuity and difference in 
complex interactions between selves and others, Plumwood (1993, 2002) 
highlights these apparently contradictory, yet vitally important tendencies.  She 
argues that the problematic value and meaning systems which underlie the 
dominant interactive processes between selves and others have certain 
features which enable a simultaneous disrespect of relation and of continuity 
(between humans as well as between humans and nonhumans), at the same 
time as they disrespect the other’s independence of self (the other’s difference). 
This contradictory, simplifying logic of mastery between dominant self and 
subordinate other obscures the dependency and vulnerability of the dominant 
self within the complex and often unpredictable interactions between human 
and nonhuman selves and others.  
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Yet this logic is not completely totalizing. Du Bois’ ‘double 
consciousness’ of the oppressed has emancipatory potential when ‘the 
oppressed subject refuses to coincide with devalued, objectified, stereotyped 
visions of herself or himself’  which means that a sense of ‘positive subjectivity, 
recognition and affirmation’ can often be maintained from within the oppressed 
group (Du Bois’ 1969, in Young 1990: 60). As I will argue in the next section, 
while unpredictability in interactions between selves and others is unavoidable, 
and attempts to stabilise and escape this through domination remains an ever 
present possibility, this does not have to result in relations of domination and 
subordination between selves and others and requires ongoing contestation. 
 
Articulating recognition-based injustices: disrespect for integrity in the 
politics of nuclear energy 
 
Within the hierarchical value and meaning systems of the dominant 
anthropocentric self  the contradictory use of ‘nature’ to assert radical 
separation as well as relational incorporation between human and nonhuman 
selves and others has subordinated important realms of both human and 
nonhuman nature and insulated the dominant self from its own vulnerability and 
dependencies upon both human and nonhuman others. Markell (2003: 23) 
points out that  
the very invocation of identity carries with it the prospect of violence or 
domination; and this, in turn, often inclines us to think of the constant 
destabilization of identity as a necessary component of any just politics – 
even if, as we also often acknowledge, identity remains something we 
cannot do without.  
 
Combining the analyses of both Plumwood and Markell shows how ‘nature’ has 
been used in anthropocentric value and meaning systems to stabilise relations 
of recognition in order to provide a measure of predictability in interaction. The 
image of politics as recognition has itself fallen foul of such hierarchical value 
systems. The socialist and feminist recognition of difference and ecofeminist 
politics of care and ethics which has accompanied this, have been seen as 
symbolising a softer, more romantic and naïve notion of politics which seeks to 
overcome alienation in human and human-nonhuman relations. Yet the analysis 
in section one shows domination as one response to the inevitable 
unpredictability in relations between selves and others as a result of ever-
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present continuities and differences between these. This highlights the 
persistence of possibilities for recognition-based injustices in self/other relations 
with the implication that rather than being a secondary concern, the ongoing 
contestation of injustices in terms of the politics of recognition is of vital 
importance. 
 The injustices which arise in the politics of recognition may therefore be 
articulated as disrespect for integrity. For Honneth (1992: 189) disrespect for 
integrity involves both symbolic and material harms such as bodily injury, torture 
and rape. Within an anthropocentric understanding of recognition the emphasis 
has been upon intersubjectivity and the psychological experience of disrespect 
as a ‘particular human vulnerability,’ and of integrity as enabling a subject to 
‘regard society as supporting him over the entire range of his practical 
relationships to self’ (Honneth 1992: 196). However, as Schlosberg (2007: 160) 
also points out, unwanted exposure to ecological harms is a matter of the loss 
of control over one’s body due to actions of more powerful others and is ‘a type 
of physical abuse, especially given the direct health effects shown to be 
produced by, for example, exposure to lead in urban housing or uranium mine 
tailings on Native American reservations.’  
Honneth’s (1995: 132) understanding of physical integrity and the 
injustice of ‘practical maltreatment in which a person is forcibly deprived of any 
opportunity to freely dispose over his or her own body’ can also be expanded to 
thinking about damage to ecological systems and communities (Schlosberg, 
2007: 132). The notion of ‘integrity’ has been used in ways which cross ‘natural’ 
and ‘social’ scientific, as well as popular thought and it was a key principle of 
the Earth Charter, referring to ‘the integrity of Earth’s ecological systems, with 
special concern for biological diversity and the natural processes that sustain 
life’ (Miller & Westra, 2002: xvii, 11). I use the word integrity as short-hand for 
the continuities and differences between entities (including humans and 
nonhumans), and the complex ways in which these interact with each other 
within a relational whole consisting of our understanding of ‘what is.’ Disrespect 
entails disregard, ignorance and insult to these and is just as relevant to 
describe our treatment of nonhuman nature.  An awareness of ecological 
integrity moves beyond, for example ‘older monological socialist forms that 
define value exclusively in terms of human labour and production, as the key 
characteristics of the human’, and instead conceptualises ‘the production of 
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value in more mutualistic terms that recognise the crucial contribution of the 
non-human to the production and reproduction of value’, thus highlighting the 
sphere of reproduction previously denied (Plumwood, 2006: 56; Shiva, 1997, 
Salleh, 1997). An ecological understanding of disrespect for integrity includes 
both material and symbolic injuries to the status of ecological entities which 
covers the harms of both radical separation and relational incorporation 
described in the previous section. This includes disrespect for the integrity of 
the self, for it fails to recognise other potentially more liberating self/other 
relations, potentials which are closed off if we refuse to each ‘bear our share of 
the burden and risk involved in the uncertain, open-ended, sometimes 
maddeningly and sometimes joyously surprising activity of living and interacting 
with other[s]’ (Markell, 2003: 7). Thus crucially, disrespect for integrity also 
describes the dominant human disrespect for our own finitude and vulnerability 
within the broader integrity of common life. 
How then, does the articulation of disrespect for integrity help us to gain 
a different perspective upon the thesis problem whereby significant harms to 
human and nonhuman nature produced by nuclear energy remain difficult to 
express within the dominant discourses? As discussed in Chapter One, despite 
ostensible recognition of environmental issues in dominant understandings of 
political community, the manner of this inclusion and the status given to aspects 
of nonhuman nature vis-à-vis humans is still highly problematic. In the 2008 
White Paper on Nuclear Power, Gordon Brown emphasised that ‘[m]ore than 
ever before, nuclear power has a key role to play as part of the UK’s energy 
mix. I am confident that nuclear power can and will make a real contribution to 
meeting our commitments to limit damaging climate change’ (BERR, 2008: 4). 
The problem is confined to a limited understanding of the environment as a 
matter of climate change which entails carbon emissions reductions, but does 
not consider any other action on the part of the dominant human self.  
To simply incorporate the nonhuman other as ‘damaging climate change’ 
not only fails to interrogate the position, value and meaning systems of the 
dominant human self but also portrays the nonhuman other as a threat, as 
something to be controlled and limited (see also MacGregor, 2013). Counting 
carbon emissions may be seen as an aspect of the domination of abstract 
‘rational management’ over nonhuman nature reduced to numbers. In this way 
the dominant self can afford to forget integrity in self/other relations. This 
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constitutes disrespect for integrity, not only of the nonhuman other, but also of 
the dominant human self, for it fails to acknowledge the disrespect for integrity 
which climate change is itself a response to. Without conceding this injustice 
there is no guarantee that ‘the same approach will not immediately be repeated 
somewhere else where it might be equally damaging’ (Plumwood, 2002: 116). 
The suggestion of nuclear energy as a solution to climate change 
assumes human control and excludes concerns about human ability to 
eliminate potentially catastrophic risk (regardless how small) of nuclear 
accidents, or to manage immensely dangerous high-level radioactive waste into 
the unknown future. It also neglects the risk of disrespecting the integrity of 
different human and nonhuman populations through the as yet unknown 
cumulative effects of increasing levels of background radiation. 
Markell (2003: 26) problematizes the implicit role of the state in 
consolidating an illusory or parasitic sovereignty through the processes of 
hierarchical differentiation described above. He points out that many theories of 
recognition either let the state fade into the background, concentrating instead 
on exchanges between individuals, or the state is seen in Hegelian terms, as a 
mediator between self and other, enabling the harmonization of social life and 
solution to struggles for recognition. It is for this reason that recognition is 
usually conceived as something that may be granted simply by extending the 
realm of the political or moral considerability. This also enables a shift in focus 
away from the sources of inequality and those who benefit from unequal 
institutionalised power relations to a kind of depoliticised focus upon improving 
the position of the other through the apparently neutral power of the state.   As a 
result, the extension of the arm of state regulation into economic and private life 
and with regards to legislating for protection or management of the environment 
is seen in relatively unproblematic terms. 
The relation and contradiction between our own desire for sovereignty 
and the idea of state sovereignty is fleshed out by Markell so as to highlight the 
trade-off made by citizens in their desire for sovereignty and their attribution of 
sovereignty to the state. It is not just that the state’s ‘desire for sovereignty 
feeds relations of subordination that are external to it’ but that the ‘state is itself 
a relation of subordination, fed by our own desire to find a kind of agency we 
cannot possess on our own in the experience of belonging to a larger whole’ 
(Markell, 2003: 32).  On the one hand it overestimates the power of the state for 
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controlling and resolving conflicts which are inherent and naturalised in its very 
make-up, while on the other hand it underestimates the entrenched power and 
interest of the state in perpetuating an extending social subordination as a 
means of perpetually eluding the unavoidable contradictions inherent in it. ‘[A]s 
a bearer of the displaced aspiration to sovereign agency, the state participates 
in and reconfigures but by no means transcends, the conflictual and potentially 
unjust dynamics of recognition’ (Markell, 2003: 126). 
Markell (2003: 29) develops this line of argument, that looking ‘to law and 
the state to redress social injuries may depoliticize rather than transform 
relations of domination.’ He does this, however, by giving more attention to the 
idea of sovereignty, arguing that it is precisely the idea that is important, for 
while 
The juridical doctrine of sovereignty, taken as a description of the nature 
of power, may well be a false or incomplete representation, it is 
nevertheless a potent representation within the modern political 
imaginary – one which, whatever its truth-value, affects the formation of 
political subjects through exactly those productive mechanisms of power 
to which Foucault draws our attention (Markell, 2003: 29). 
 
Markell (2003: 30) argues that ‘characterizations of the state as sovereign are 
implicated in the same underlying misrecognition – in the sense of a failure of 
acknowledgement [which he ascribes] to the politics of recognition more 
generally.’ So, although states are in many ways ‘disproportionately powerful 
actors’, for them, sovereignty is just as much an unattainable goal as for 
individuals. 
Thus, attempts to extend recognition to others often at best deal with the 
symptoms and effects of subordination, while simultaneously reproducing the 
‘problematic aspiration to sovereignty in which those effects are rooted’ 
(Markell, 2003: 31). Reform to ostensibly improve recognition, in this sense 
then, although often improving things for some within a polity, may also produce 
or reproduce other ‘ways of stratifying the social world, which still distribute 
vulnerability and dependence unequally’ (Markell, 2003: 31-32). 
Inclusion in the realm of politics without challenging the dominant 
understandings perpetuates rather than challenges the inside/outside 
understanding of politics which means that other forms of domination continue. 
Because these forms of domination are considered outside the realm of politics 
they are more difficult to articulate as injustices and address politically (Markell, 
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2003: 128). Markell (2003: 128-9) argues that rather than being accidental, this 
is a side-effect of the way in which the modern state legitimises its own power in 
inside/outside terms. This means that by looking only to the state to manage 
environmental concerns, assumptions about our power over nonhuman nature 
are disguised and made even more difficult to address. The mechanisms of 
state power tend towards centralised solutions to energy and minimum 
disruption to the perpetuation of economic growth. Thus technocratic solutions 
become more appealing, and the sovereignty of the state in controlling and 
securitising the risks which accompany such large-scale projects is taken for 
granted. 
The urge to manage and control the problem of climate change with 
technological solutions such as nuclear energy which require higher levels of 
human control and security is symptomatic of the problematic centrist 
assumptions of the dominant human self and fails to challenge the value and 
meaning systems which have led to anthropogenic climate change in the first 
place. The domination of much of nonhuman nature by the human world is 
becoming total, to the extent that it is now suggested that we have entered the 
‘anthropocene’ (Zalasiewicz et al., 2010). The continued denial by much of the 
human world of our own dependencies upon the nonhuman other and the limits 
to our knowledge and power, coupled with the idea that we can successfully 
control, manage or mitigate the adverse effects of this by means of heightened 
technologies of domination and control raise the prospect that, as in Hegel’s 
unsustainable and unstable master-slave relation, we have come to need the 
nonhuman other more than much of nonhuman nature needs us. And yet the 
rate of ecological destruction remains testament to the ways in which many 
aspects of nonhuman nature really are deadly dependent upon the decisions of 
humans who simply do not care or recognise the implications of this. 
Recognition of the extent of domination and of our dependence on and 
continuities with nonhuman nature is vital. This is of course what many deep 
ecology thinkers have been arguing – for different conceptions of the self. Such 
alternative understandings intend to strengthen the identification of the self with 
nonhuman nature and thus attempt to overcome the hyperseparation of 
human/nature dualism.  In a sense this is vital, for the recognition of humans as 
nature, particularly of ‘internal’ nature, and the problematic dualist constructions 
of mind/body and reason/emotion which accompany the denial of this is part 
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and parcel of the process of human recognition of continuity with biological 
processes. Indeed, as many have pointed out, scientific thinking and discovery 
increasingly underlines this understanding of continuity (Hawkins, 1998; Latour, 
2004; Cudworth, 2005). However as Hawkins (1998) points out, the knowledge 
at the scientific level is still not translated into behaviour at the level of the 
social, for the human/nature dualism is very deeply ingrained. Attention to the 
intersections between humans, and ‘nature’ within humans is therefore also 
important.  
However, while recognition of continuities between humans and 
nonhuman nature are important it is important that there is concomitant 
attention to difference too. Otherwise recognition of continuities risks slipping 
into disrespect for integrity through either incorporating nonhuman nature into 
the human sense of self, or through merging the human self with nature, as 
feminist critiques of deep ecology have emphasised. Ecofeminists have been 
sceptical of some of the alternative conceptions of the self which are suggested 
by deep ecology thinkers such as Arne Naess and Warwick Fox (Plumwood, 
1991; Salleh, 1995). Plumwood points out the problems of indistinguishability, 
where the self tends to be merged holistically with the greater ‘natural’ whole. 
This is intended to enable the identification of the other’s needs as one’s own 
needs, for example, that the needs of the rainforest are commensurate with 
human needs, but as Plumwood (1991: 13) points out, on this account ‘there is 
nothing to guarantee this – one could equally well take one’s own needs for 
[those of the rainforest]’. The lack of differentiation and the failure to 
acknowledge power differentials can have the effect that ‘the situation of 
exploitation of nature exemplifies such unity equally as well as a conserver 
situation and the human self is just as indistinguishable from the bulldozer and 
Coca-Cola bottle as the rocks or the rainforest’ (Plumwood, 1991: 13). The 
merged ecological self, whilst addressing the problem of radical separation 
between humans and nonhumans and seeking to recognise continuity, fails to 
account for the equally important second point where recognition between self 
and other has failed – that of difference: ‘we need to recognize not only our 
human continuity with the natural world but also its distinctness and 
independence from us and the distinctness of the needs of things in nature from 
ours’ (Plumwood, 1991: 13). This danger lies in the emphasis upon nuclear 
energy as a solution to climate change. The emphasis in some deep ecology 
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upon ‘personal psychological identification and unity as the basis for suitable 
relationships with the non-human’ fails to problematise underlying political and 
structural failings, including the human-centredness of institutions which play 
into this, and thus does not provide an adequate tool for dealing with situations 
of interspecies conflict when they inevitably arise (Plumwood, 2006: 65). If we 
fail to recognise difference as well as continuity, then we will be ‘poorly 
equipped to correct the foundational delusion of self-enclosure and make visible 
our dependency on the denied and backgrounded presence of nature’ 
(Plumwood, 2006: 65-66). 
It is important in this analysis that we do not lose sight of some key 
analytical distinctions. The simplified model of dominant self (and associated 
traits, characteristics, behaviours, modes of communication, concerns) and 
subordinated other can be applied to both human/human and human/nonhuman 
relations and differences, but eliding the two potentially falls into some of the 
same problems which the human/nature dualism itself causes. It is the 
importance of keeping in mind both continuity and difference which supports 
Cudworth’s (2005: 53) point, that it still makes sense, despite the need to 
highlight the continuities between humans and nonhuman nature (for example 
when considering the effects of radiation upon the human body), to speak of 
humans and nonhuman nature as distinct entities. Despite Bruno Latour’s 
(2004: 22, 255) interesting and at times useful discussion of tangled objects and 
the importance of letting go of ‘nature,’ it is important also to be aware of the 
important role that difference still plays in this. Here, Plumwood’s (2002: 34) 
distinction between separation and hyperseparation is useful. The discussion in 
this chapter concerns recognition of both differences and continuities between 
dominant selves and subordinated or devalued human others, and subordinated 
and devalued nonhuman others along with associated traits, characteristics, 
behaviours, modes of communication, concerns on both sides. 
The diversity of nature in such contexts tends to be ignored and its 
difference from humans is ‘a ground of inferiority’, it is ‘conceived in terms of 
interchangeable and replaceable units (as “resources”, or standing reserve) 
rather than as infinitely diverse and always in excess of knowledge and 
classification’ (Plumwood, 2002: 107). This can lead to ‘a serious 
underestimation of the complexity and irreplaceability of nature’, with, for 
example, ‘scientists assum[ing] their own genetically engineered replacements 
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for natural species and varieties are always superior, although they have not 
been tested for survival over a range of conditions nearly as rigorously as 
naturally evolved varieties’ (2002: 108) (as with many GM crops). 
The disregard inherent in the rationalist, economistic, centrist system 
dominant in contemporary global order enables both devalued human and 
nonhuman nature to undergo recognition-based injustice whereby it is seen as 
an endless and exchangeable resource for utilisation or as a universal dustbin 
to be forgotten about. Thus we have seen low-level nuclear waste disposed of 
in the oceans (until it was prohibited in 1994), intermediate-level waste from 
French nuclear power plants ending up in open-air waste pits, bought cheaply 
for ‘recycling’ in Siberia and agreements for nuclear waste from Japan to be 
finally disposed of in Mongolia (Hamblin, 2008; Reuters, 2011; Spiegel, 2009). 
In Taiwan there are disputes over nuclear waste repositories on indigenous 
lands (Fan, 2006), similar to those in US Nevada on Navajo land (Endres, 
2009). Nonhuman nature and less recognised, often poorer and otherwise 
disadvantaged other humans in remote parts of the world bear the brunt of the 
excesses of the rich world’s consumer society. These injustices result from 
backgrounding and devaluation as well as splitting and hyperseparation through 
the division of labour and the global divisions between production, consumption 
and waste, which form the predominant structure of relations between selves 
and others in the contemporary world. 
Nonhuman nature is backgrounded and human dependency upon it 
denied, ‘systematically, so that nature’s order, resistance and survival 
requirements are not perceived as imposing a limit on human goals or 
enterprises’ (Plumwood, 2002: 108). As Plumwood (2002: 108-109) points out  
crucial biospheric and other services provided by nature and the limits 
they might impose on human projects are not considered in accounting 
or decision-making. We only pay attention to them after disaster occurs, 
and then only to restore the status quo, to fix things up. Where we cannot 
quite forget how dependent on nature we really are, dependency 
appears as a source of anxiety and threat, or as a further technological 
problem to be overcome. 
 
This is clearly evident in the dominant discourses about climate change and 
nuclear energy. 
This is exemplified in the relations of both states and markets to nuclear 
power. Many states grasp at or cling on to nuclear energy as a sign of 
sovereign progress and prestige (over both human and nonhuman nature) 
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which may be traced back to its origins in (and continuing potentials for) the 
production of atomic weapons. Where nuclear energy is sufficiently backed up 
by the state, markets are willing to take the risks of investment, but they are 
consistently reluctant where this is lacking (Sovacool & Valentine, 2012). The 
dangers associated with the high-level radioactive materials produced, demand 
high levels of government responsibility and control in decommissioning and 
handling waste even in countries such as the UK and Japan where the industry 
has been liberalised. The ongoing nuclear disaster in Japan highlights the dire 
consequences when that apparently miniscule risk of disaster escapes the 
confines of carefully controlled and measured expert human risk assessments 
and becomes real. As Brian Wynne (2011) has argued, expert risk assessments 
do not satisfy large proportions of the public because what they are intended to 
predict is in fact by its very nature, the unpredictable. Human fallibility and a 
conception of the self which matches this is often lacking in dominant scientific 
and technocratic approaches (see also Haraway, 1988). Reports have shown 
the reduced tolerance to risk displayed by experts when asked to imagine 
themselves as fathers in situations where they are not in positions of ‘expert’ 
control over risk (Fischer, 2005: 59). 
Lack of recognition of nonhuman nature on its own terms constitutes a 
failure to comprehend it, or rather to acknowledge the impossibility of full 
comprehension. This is highly problematic, for to consider the issue in empirical 
terms, in the ‘natural’ or more practically oriented sciences there is an 
increasing acknowledgement of the complexity and difference of the nonhuman 
(and human) world (e.g. see Haraway, 1988; Forsyth, 2003). Assumptions 
about understanding the other can lead, not only to injustice towards the other, 
but also to a failure to fully comprehend risks and the dependency of humans 
upon nonhuman nature.  
When activists raise concerns about their health, the health of children 
and future generations, as well as the effects of radiation upon wildlife in 
protected and unprotected areas they are touching upon the parts of human 
and nonhuman nature which to some extent intersect. Yet although there have 
been studies concerning the effects of radiation upon nonhumans these are 
highly limited. The International Commission on Radiological Protection was 
slow to consider the effects of radiation on nonhumans except where these 
impacted on humans. Prior to the 1990s, the effects on humans were 
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considered the standard for the effects on nonhuman others. Even now the 
consideration is still only very basic, with the use of reference animals, and very 
incomplete knowledge about effects even on those (Pentreath, 1998). It is also 
very homogenising, failing to account for differences between different animals 
(Wrixon, 2008; IAEA, 1992;). Similar points are made about differences in 
susceptibility between humans, in terms of health, biological make-up and over 
their life-cycle (Shrader-Frechette, 1991b: 191). 
It is therefore important to consider differences between ecological 
contexts and difference and change within nature, both human and nonhuman.  
This implies the need for reflexive sensitivity to different ecological contexts, 
again relating back to the importance highlighted in the introduction to this 
thesis, of a more open than closed means for considering injustices.  
Importantly, humans do not fully understand the effects of their experiments 
upon nonhuman nature. Oreskes et al. (1994) highlight the slippage between 
heuristic numerical modelling devices intended to aid understanding of effects 
and an assumption of verification of actual effects when this is actually 
impossible due to the open, complex and essentially unpredictable character of 
natural systems. Openness to complex relationships is of great importance, and 
is at odds with the ‘dualistic stance of ethical closure that insists on sharp moral 
boundaries and denies the continuity of planetary life’ (Plumwood, 2002: 145). 
The emphasis upon human hubris and fallibility is a common theme at 
anti-nuclear protests, and is often seen as irrational or cynical fear mongering. 
However, it highlights the disrespect for ecological integrity entailed in the 
arrogant assumption of human control over nonhuman nature. Such disrespect 
also includes the failure to recognise that risk assessment cannot account for 
the unpredictable - that which is not fully understood (Wynne, 2011). 
Reconsidering the human self in terms of dependency and relationality, as well 
as difference, involves a consideration of the fallibility of humans regarding the 
risks of nuclear energy. Human presumption with regards to the short and long-
term controllability of nuclear power is tied up with conceptions of the self as 
separate and superior to nonhuman nature. 
A different quality of relations of recognition is possible. At Hinkley Point, 
the site for the first of the UK’s proposed new nuclear power stations, those 
resisting are concerned for the integrity of nonhuman nature, for badgers, bats, 
nesting birds and trees which will be destroyed. Take for example the emotion 
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of a Bridgwater activist who finally succeeded in gaining a tree preservation 
order for some of the trees on the Hinkley C site: ‘I'm actually elated, it is so 
important that EDF don't get to completely decimate this site without planning 
permission, there are at least a dozen notable/veteran Oaks in this copse’ 
(Clarke, 2011). Recognition of nonhuman nature, which goes beyond 
understandings of it for the good of humans alone and the assumptions about 
nonhuman nature along property and means-to-end lines, is conducive to 
understanding and articulating those types of injustice which address such 
issues of connectedness and attachment. 
Such concern extended to the occupation of trees which were at risk 
from felling during the preliminary works, and occupation of farmland next to a 
barn where bats were roosting, and the willingness of some to resist a court 
order to leave and thus undergo arrest and court appearances. The individuals 
concerned profess emotional ties to the countryside and animals inhabiting it. At 
blockades many have worn badger face masks to highlight the forced relocation 
of badger colonies from the site and signify solidarity with the nonhuman. This 
willingness to put self at risk for the sake of the other, contradicts the dominant 
purely anthropocentric conceptualisation of individuals.  
Understanding the politics of recognition in this way enables a critique 
and articulation of injustices of nuclear energy on the basis of its disrespect for 
the integrity of both human and nonhuman nature. On the part of the dominant 
human self, to disrespect one’s own dependency upon nonhuman nature, one’s 
finitude and the limits to one’s capacity for control of the other is to succumb to 
an illusion of power which must ultimately fail, thereby causing a constantly 
insecure and unstable basis to relations with the nonhuman world. This is an 
instability and insecurity which exacerbates the quality of relations within the 
human world and vice versa. While to a certain extent such instability may be 
stabilised in inter-human relations of subordination within the state, the limits of 
existing state forms in the face of complexly interconnected global ecological 
limits is increasingly apparent. The persistence of disrespect for integrity in 
self/other relations in response to increasing ecological crises may have 
problematic repercussions upon both human and nonhuman alike and requires 
contestation. 
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Political efficacy of articulating recognition-based injustices: 
transformative possibilities for valuing integrity in common life 
 
In this chapter I have suggested an understanding of integrity that accounts for 
both continuities and differences between ecological entities, and an articulation 
of injustices of recognition as disrespect for integrity in complex self/other 
interactions. In the previous section I detailed some of the ways in which this 
articulation enables us to gain an ecological understanding of all affected in the 
politics of nuclear energy, and the ways in which this challenges the constitution 
of political community assumed in dominant discourses and opens up the 
question of how we might live together. Disrespect for integrity provides a 
language with which to articulate both continuities and differences between 
entities and may therefore provide common ground for solidarity in struggles 
against hegemonic self/other relations. Articulating injustices in this way opens 
up possibilities for ongoing contestation of the question of how we might live 
together, with potential, not only for better understanding of the differences and 
continuities between the basic necessities required by all affected (Chapter 
Three) but also for reconfiguring the quality of self/other relations which affect 
such basic necessities. In what follows, I consider some of the transformative 
potential as well as the limits of articulating and contesting recognition-based 
injustices, particularly with regards to human/nonhuman relations.  
Respecting integrity involves careful attention to both continuities and 
differences and ongoing contestation of these. I argue that there is great 
potential for challenging dominant discourses and practices with ongoing 
contestation of disrespect for integrity, displacing rather than replacing 
hierarchical forms of domination in self/other relations and embracing the 
ongoing unpredictability and therefore also possibility, inherent in common life. 
However, there are limits to the efficacy of articulating disrespect for integrity if 
the desire to overcome the separation and atomism which pervade dominant 
anthropocentric and liberal capitalist discourses slips into a desire to overcome 
alienation in self-other relations. In this section I make this argument, firstly, by 
considering the political efficacy of articulating ecological injustices of 
recognition and the potentials which exist within the dominant discourses for 
transforming conceptions of political community. Secondly, I show how 
articulation of recognition-based injustices can combine with articulation of 
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distributive injustices to challenge the dominant discourses, and how articulating 
recognition-based injustices alone is not always sufficient for political efficacy. 
Thirdly, I suggest that we also need an understanding of representation-based 
injustices, particularly to challenge the tendency to deny difference and the 
agency of the other through the ever-present quest for security and sovereignty 
apparent in the politics of recognition.  
I begin by considering how articulating ecological injustices of recognition 
is politically effective. By moving beyond inside/outside conceptions of political 
community an understanding of integrity helps to build common ground 
between those suffering injustices and to articulate these in solidarity with each 
other in order to counter the dominant conceptions of political community. An 
understanding of integrity in self/other relations can help to expose how within 
the dominant discourses and practices of modern state sovereignty and 
individual sovereignty in market relations, there are also potentials for 
transformation. There are potentials in the interactions in everyday life and in 
green conceptions of the ‘commons’ which challenge the dominant conceptions 
of sovereignty and invulnerability in self/other relations. These involve the 
possibility of transforming and moving away from reductive understandings of 
the other. 
Reassessing and critiquing the anthropocentric understandings of the 
dominant human self can transform our understanding of the relations between 
selves and others and the conditions and possibilities of interaction as they 
unfold in social/ecological spheres. But this also involves a critique of the 
underlying institutions, norms and values which structure such interaction. This 
latter point emphasises why such analysis of self and other, whilst often 
seeming individualist and appearing to locate change only at the personal  level, 
or the level of culture, has implicit within it (and this really needs to be 
emphasised and made ever more explicit) a structural socio-political-economic 
critique.  
There are potentials within the dominant discursive structures. Modern 
complex industrial and post-industrial societies rely upon self-regulation and 
therefore ‘institutional organisations put resources of knowledge and 
communication at our disposal’ enabling ‘the development of capacities for 
training and education and the ability to transform oneself as an individual’ 
(Drake, 2010: 148-149). This has the ‘dual effect of both increasing 
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(Foucauldian) control over every aspect of life, but also, because it relies upon 
this as a means of control, increasing potential individual autonomy’ (Drake, 
2010: 148-9). Through ongoing interaction and relations within society which go 
beyond, or are not only about social control and top-down organisation, 
‘networks of social actors are able to use such resources in ways not intended 
by agents of control’, so ‘[i]ndividuals in complex societies “work on themselves” 
in interactive negotiation with others in everyday life through the language they 
use, their sexual practices, emotional management, dress, patterns of 
consumption, and so forth, and in the process make cultural innovations’ (Drake 
2010: 149). 
Interaction establishes ‘[t]he meaningfulness of these innovations’, and 
‘constitutes a form of collective action which modifies the social order. Everyday 
life thus becomes a political theatre, in which given identities and practices 
become contested’ (Drake, 2010: 149). Thus collective action can include the 
undertaking of ‘experiments in everyday life, creating new experiences and 
forging new social identities’ (Drake, 2010: 149). Such action may be 
‘institutionally invisible’ but yet still ‘effectively transform society without formal 
political or cultural representation’ through ‘interpersonal networks, consumption 
networks and the use of public space, effectively changing social reality from 
within, simultaneously bypassing “politics” and politicizing the everyday’ (Drake, 
2010: 149). The politics of recognition is therefore also about transformation in 
everyday life, ‘opening the possibilities of life itself’ (Vaneigen, 1979, in Drake, 
2010: 149). And it has proved ‘extraordinarily successful in shifting social 
attitudes and opening up new ways to live’ (Drake, 2010: 154). This is a politics 
based ‘on cultural production and consumption, on everyday life’ (Drake, 2010: 
154). It is the politics of ever shifting value and meaning in social interaction.   
The idea and experience of the ‘commons’ has been used as an actually 
existing and potentially prefigurative counterpoint to the logic of capitalist 
economic development, the enclosures and expanding commodification of life 
forms this encourages, the resultant concentrations of power and wealth which 
also exacerbate the marginalization of other ways of being and relating and the 
resulting excesses of anthropocentric technocratic expert-reliant culture 
(Paterson, 2005). Such spaces which may exist at decentralised, local levels 
are seen as remnants of, or starting points for, potentially more sustainable 
ways of life ‘typically organized for the production of use values rather than 
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exchange values’, requiring rough equality of income and power and certain 
cultural norms such as ‘the  priority of common safety over accumulation’ 
(Paterson, 2005: 245).  
This idea of the commons relates directly to an understanding of 
integrity, for it entails recognition of mutual dependence. The openness of the 
idea, its potential adaptability to different local contexts globally, also 
emphasises recognition of the other side of the integrity tightrope, that of 
difference. This is similar to the idea of permaculture, with its ethic of ‘care for 
the land and the people’, and its emphasis on allowing ecological individuals 
and communities ‘to follow their own, intrinsically determined course of 
development’ according to context (Gordon, 2008: 137; see also Trapese 
Collective, 2007). The commons encapsulates a powerful ‘counter-hegemonic’ 
ontology (or set of ontologies) which arguably might have more potential for 
avoiding the traps of the more monological hegemonic ways of being which it 
challenges. Thus, alternative conceptions of the self and relations between 
human and nonhuman selves and others are apparent in the emphasis by many 
protestors on more ecological forms of living, reduced material and energy 
consumption, lower-impact living, and decentralised microgeneration of energy 
which radically reconfigure the extent of human control over nonhuman nature, 
as well as the extent of some humans’ control over resources needed by other 
humans and nonhumans 
My second main point in this section is that the articulation of recognition-
based injustices is helpfully considered in combination with the articulation of 
distributive injustices (discussed in Chapter Three). While articulating 
distributive injustices exposes patterns of deprivation of basic necessities 
across time and space, as well as to nonhuman nature, by itself it may not 
easily challenge the dominant understandings of basic necessities (of the goods 
and burdens) of common life. The articulation of recognition-based injustices as 
disrespect for integrity (continuities and differences between ecological entities) 
opens up the possibility of challenging the inside/outside understanding of 
politics and the accompanying linear, instrumental model of production.  Such 
conceptions of politics and production emphasise goods and fail to adequately 
consider burdens, and involve a unidirectional understanding of power in 
self/other relations as power-over which necessitates an inside/outside 
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conception of politics, emphasising state and individual (human) sovereignty as 
independent from ecological relations.  
It is important to consider the critique of the state as a key political 
mechanism for emancipation and arbiter of social conflicts and problems in 
conjunction with an understanding of capitalist markets, also seen by some as a 
potential source of emancipation. The ‘sovereignty’ of the market is also 
dependent upon the idea of state and individual sovereignty for stabilisation and 
regulation of internal conflicts and contradictions. Markets too act as mediators 
between our struggles for sovereignty, and enable atomism and a certain denial 
of dependency through monetary relations. The idea of the free market also 
masks power relations and legitimates and perpetuates cultural as well as 
economic inequalities. It is therefore important to understand markets as 
potential transmitters of injustices in ecological terms.   
Articulating disrespect for integrity challenges the dominant conceptions 
of basic necessities entailed in consumerist culture. In particular, this 
articulation challenges person/property dualism which corresponds to the 
hierarchical separation of nature/culture. For Plumwood (2002: 147) it is the 
Lockean model of property ownership and person/property dualism which 
accompanies it, that reinforces the commodification of the nonhuman world and 
hence injustice to it. There is a ‘broad and deep gulf’ between those who can 
own and those who can be owned and exchanged for property’ and this gulf 
corresponds to such binaries as human/nonhuman, subject/object, 
consciousness/mechanism, respect/use and those worthy of protection from 
injustice and those not worthy (Plumwood, 2002: 146). According to dominant 
capitalist discourses rationality is identified with egoism and competition over 
property with the result that recognition of injustices to the nonhuman world is 
minimised and comes second to capitalist production and economic growth 
(Plumwood, 2002). Minimising the class of beings entitled to defence from 
injustice ‘maximises the class of other beings that are available to be treated 
with maximum ruthlessness as resources or commodities’ (Plumwood, 2002: 
146).  
Privileged groups ‘often aim to set themselves apart from otherised 
groups’ through overconsumption, and ‘develop a culture celebrating 
consumption’ (Plumwood, 2002: 87). The dominant understanding of well-being 
relies upon understandings of individual sovereignty according to the dominant 
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discourses of consumerism which exacerbate disrespect for both human and 
nonhuman others, backgrounding and exploiting aspects of these. If these 
consumerist tendencies come to dominate in the public sphere, the cultural 
hegemony of social privilege exacerbates ecological damage (Plumwood, 2002: 
87).   
This clearly relates to energy politics which is very much tied to 
consumer culture. Tracing such mechanisms back to the unrealistic desire for 
sovereignty helps us to clarify some of the problems with a simplistic, one-sided 
drive for recognition and means by which misrecognition is perpetuated.  Greta 
Gaard (2001) provides a comprehensive and critical ecofeminist account of how 
this has occurred with regards to the treatment of water in the US and Canada. 
Gaard (2001: 167) argues that  
our conception of power and energy, as well as our relationship to water, 
is based on a linear model [..] based on the assumption that energy can 
be continuously extracted from nature – from water, from poor people, 
from people of color, from women – [..] and in the process, wastes are 
produced: noise, electromagnetic radiation, flooding, pollution.   
 
This linear model coincides with conceptions of power as ‘power-over’ which 
support the centrist relations of hierarchical domination Plumwood (1993, 2002) 
describes and which Markell (2003) discusses in his examination of the elusive 
drive to sovereignty engaged in by the dominant self. 
An understanding of integrity, of inevitable continuities and differences 
between selves and others enables the displacement of the dichotomy of 
use/respect to a more reciprocal and multi-valent understanding of power 
relations where ‘use’ does not necessarily preclude ‘respect’ and vice-versa 
(Plumwood, 2002: 145-146). This helps to address the problem whereby those 
deprived of basic necessities are pitted against each other, particularly if it is 
combined with a challenge to how the dominant discourses perpetuate growing 
inequalities and increasing deprivation of basic necessities of the many to the 
advantage of a few under conditions of capitalist accumulation.  The trade-off 
argument between the interests of humans and the interests of nonhuman 
nature represents a continuation of person/property dualisms, whereby the 
‘moral extension of the class defined as ‘resource’ is represented as nothing 
less than a matter of justice to less fortunate members of the ‘person’ class’, 
many of whom were also historically understood as resource (Plumwood, 2002: 
145). Moving away from such moral dualism is then seen as ‘depriving persons 
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of property or resources that are rightfully theirs’. So, Plumwood (2002: 145) 
goes on: 
[j]ust as poor whites were seen to be further deprived by the liberation of 
slaves, and working-class men by the liberation of women, so our duty to 
underprivileged humanity is seen to require the continued treatment of 
animals as mere resources, and of trees as mere fodder for timber mills. 
 
However, Plumwood (2002: 145) believes that moving away from a moral 
dualist conceptualisation is possible and the conflict scenario can be 
reconceptualised in more complementary ways. She argues that such conflicts 
between the good of one and the good of the other should be circumvented and 
eliminated where possible. This applies to both intraspecies and interspecies 
conflicts. Opting for solving such conflicts avoids multiplying and reinforcing 
them. Thus Plumwood argues that we have a ‘methodological obligation to seek 
out and favour complementary over competitive constructions of justice 
spheres, other things being equal’ (2002: 145). Markell’s analysis would 
suggest, similarly to Plumwood that the competitive drive to an impossible goal 
of sovereignty is part of the problem here.  The follow through for Plumwood 
(2006: 72) is that  
a dialogical form of rationality aimed at mutual benefit clearly cannot be 
one that aims at maximising outcomes, including economic outcomes, for 
just one party, the human party. A dialogical economics would replace 
monological economic maximisations by concepts of sufficiency or 
enough.  
 
This follow through crucially doesn’t only affect the relations between humans 
and nonhuman nature but also between humans. 
Thus we see how recognition-based injustices can fruitfully be articulated 
in relation to distributive injustices in challenging the dominant discourses. It is 
helpful to consider recognition-based injustices in conjunction with distributive 
injustices, rather than simply on their own, because awareness of distributive 
injustices, in this case particularly to nonhuman nature, helps to reinforce the 
potential for an articulation of recognition-based injustices which challenges 
traditional inside/outside conceptions of recognition. Both Fraser (1997) and 
Plumwood’s (1993: 66) analyses imply that it is possible to make normative 
judgements about the relative value of different norms, practices and 
interpretations which can enable ‘movement beyond the old, polarised 
understandings, redefining the ground and renegotiating hyperseparated 
identity.’ Fraser (1997: 202-203) calls for a ‘differentiated politics of difference’, 
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a ‘critical theory of recognition’ which defends only those versions of the politics 
of difference which are ‘genuinely emancipatory’. As discussed above, this is 
more likely when articulations of recognition-based injustices are considered in 
conjunction with articulations of distributive injustices. 
This takes me to my third main point. There are pitfalls in the politics of 
recognition which may be difficult to escape without concomitant articulations of 
both distributive and representation-based injustices. The ever present desire 
for stabilisation of social relations, for certainty in relations of interaction is the 
reason why state and market exist in the first place and this desire for 
sovereignty will not disappear simply because of emancipatory intent of and for 
others (in fact it is likely to continue for this very reason). Relations of interaction 
which are apparent in the politics of recognition can also be fruitfully understood 
in terms of the politics of representation. The politics of representation enables 
articulation of injustices which fail to attend to authority and agency, also 
aspects of the difference of the other, in self-other relations.  
Markell (2003) points out the importance of acknowledging the basic 
ontological situation of all selves as dependent and vulnerable. This 
dependence and vulnerability is what leads to the pursuit of sovereignty. While 
it may appear that a community of mutual recognition would achieve this in a 
better, less alienated way than within a community structured by hierarchical 
relations of domination, to succumb to this illusion involves once more 
succumbing to the illusion of sovereignty understood in inside/outside terms. It 
is by means of the illusion of sovereignty that ‘we insulate ourselves from the 
weight of our finitude, displacing our aspiration to sovereign agency onto a 
larger whole with which we identify’ (Markell, 2003: 95). This desire for 
sovereignty and belonging is an ever present one and therefore an ever present 
cause of injustice. As a result, adhering to idealised notions of community as 
overcoming alienation and recognition-based injustices ‘misses the point, and 
worse’ because in providing security and a sense of sovereignty it dulls our 
sensitivity to injustices and may well affirm and intensify, rather than alleviate 
them (Markell, 2003: 95). 
Recognition alone cannot articulate the injustices of power and resources 
which bolster and maintain dominant conceptions of the self. It is this which has 
led to the concern amongst some theorists that the politics of recognition and 
difference can also fail to achieve the critical distance from the liberal pluralist 
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status quo (Salleh 1997). All this brings us back to the importance highlighted 
also by Young (1990), of addressing underlying institutional and cultural causes 
of injustice. Markell’s (2003) critique of recognition as pursuit of an illusory 
sovereignty illustrates the fundamental failure to recognise the finitude, 
vulnerability and dependency of the human self which is evaded, albeit 
temporarily, by means of institutionalised forms of subordination and divisions of 
labour in the dominant forms of social organisation, the institutions of the state 
and capitalist relations. We therefore see how injustices of recognition are also 
closely linked with injustices of representation. Injustices of recognition arise out 
of complex processes of interaction, our understanding of which can also be 
assisted by thinking in terms of the politics of representation.  
When we begin to think about recognising nonhuman nature we come up 
against the limits of recognition-based injustice for articulating socially produced 
harms. For Taylor (1992: 72), the lack of knowledge about the other on the part 
of the dominant self is what, for him, makes some arguments calling for 
automatic equal recognition problematic, as he wonders how recognition can 
occur when there is this gap of knowledge, and is there not  
something midway between the inauthentic and homogenizing demand 
for recognition of equal worth, on the one hand, and the self-immurement 
within ethnocentric standards, on the other?  
 
However, inherent within recognition of integrity is the acknowledgement that 
difference cannot be fully comprehended by the self.  Indeed Taylor (1992: 72) 
himself begins to overcome the problem by calling for the ‘presumption of equal 
worth’  and this is something which especially applies from the position of the 
powerful self in relation to  others, and can especially be considered in relation 
to the problems of extending thinking about recognition-based injustices to 
nonhuman nature. Plumwood (2002: 172) argues that we can conceive equality 
‘both along the axis of sameness and along that of difference’.  The former 
presents us with ‘scalar equality,’ the latter gives us an understanding of 
incommensurability and ‘non-ranking’ (Plumwood, 2002: 172). It is the latter 
which Plumwood argues is needed if we are to think about the intrinsic worth of 
the nonhuman and its inclusion within conceptions of mutual recognition. This is 
because, between categories of different beings, ‘many of whose capacities the 
ranker may not be in a position to know, insistence on ranking (on a scale of 
superior/inferior which includes the case of equality) is both poor methodology 
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and symptomatic of an arrogant stance of closure which is impoverishing and 
limiting for both human self and nonhuman other’ (2002: 173). As Taylor’s 
(1992: 73) discussion highlights, ‘it would take a supreme arrogance to discount 
this possibility [of equal worth] a priori’ and ‘we only need a sense of our own 
limited part in the whole human [or to move beyond anthropocentrism - life] 
story to accept the presumption.’  Taking this approach suggests that we be 
willing to engage in learning processes in interactions between selves and 
others which ‘displace our horizons in the resulting fusions’ (Taylor, 1992: 73). 
However, the difference of nonhuman nature means that it is liable to be 
subsumed within our meaning systems without necessarily being able to 
challenge this in terms we may readily recognise, especially not if we adhere to 
the dominant anthropocentric discourses. The difference of nonhuman nature 
(and of many human others) means recognition-based injustices are best 
contested in conjunction with contestation of representation-based injustices. 
For while nonhuman nature has been subordinated in the politics of recognition, 
it has been used as a higher power in the politics of representation, underlining 
the authority of science, to by-pass political contestation of both the integrity as 
well as the basic necessities of selves and others in common life.  
Plumwood (2002: 177) has argued for an ‘intentional recognition stance’ 
towards nonhuman nature which ‘allows us to re-animate nature both as agent 
in our joint undertakings and as potentially communicative other’, she says we 
can ‘join scientists like Humboldt in hearing basalt cones and pumice speak 
their past to the well-versed observer who stops to listen.’ Similarly to the 
Frankfurt School theorists and many others, Plumwood (2002: 172) laments 
how the reductive stance of modern enlightenment thinking has denied ’to the 
world [..] the ground of enchantment [..] the butterfly wing-dust of wonder that 
modernity stole from us and replaced with the drive for power.’  Adorno critiques 
the drive for reenchantment of nature, pointing out that modernity already 
reenchants by positing nature as the ground for the naturalisation of the 
dominant hierarchical relationships within the human world as well as between 
humans and nature. He also points out that the reenchantment desired by many 
green thinkers is dangerously deceptive, for the experiences of reenchantment 
‘depend on, and can occur only against the background of, hierarchical social 
relations which are predicated on the domination of nature’ and which ‘conceal 
the dominating character of modern society’ (Stone, 2006: 239).  
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While it is important to bear in mind the human lens and the dangers in 
according nonhuman nature agency, for fear that it might rebound back into that 
fear and insecurity which might again cause the reassertion of human 
domination and control (over both humans and nonhumans), I think to conceive 
of relations between self and other only in such terms as this is to 
misunderstand and disregard the possibilities for the relations between. To 
argue, as Adorno does, that humans only begin to appreciate the beauty of 
nonhuman nature when they have achieved a position of dominance which 
enables their security from the fear, uncertainty and the precarity of life (Stone, 
2006) is to posit a very narrow understanding of what it means to attain security, 
and in fact feeds into the dominant understandings of the purpose of the 
struggle for recognition itself which, as Markell (2003) argues, result again and 
again in unstable relations of subordination and denial of dependency and 
vulnerability. 
Plumwood (2002: 177) argues that the enchantment is retained or 
refound ‘in many indigenous cultures’ and within forms of prefigurative 
ecological politics. The argument that humans only appreciate the beauty of 
nonhuman nature through dominance and freedom from fear, points back to a 
recurring theme which runs throughout this chapter about the intersections 
between injustice as disrespect for the integrity of otherised human nature and 
injustice as disrespect for the integrity of nonhuman nature. It is through 
dominance of both that a semblance of sovereignty and security is achieved by 
the dominant self, but this is not the only possible way of organising self/other 
relations. Historically, dominant cultures have denied and neglected this through 
distancing themselves from other more ‘primitive’ cultures outside the remit of 
the category of ‘civilisation.’  
Plumwood (1993) has also addressed the question, to be considered 
especially within the human world, but also with implications for 
human/nonhuman relations, of what should be done to address the very 
complex lack of recognition of continuity, relationality and dependency on the 
one hand, and valid difference and independence of experience and 
perspective on the other. It is a thorny issue which feminists have had to 
grapple with and touches on the question of the agency, and hence also upon 
the representation of the oppressed. Using the example of feminism, Plumwood 
(1993: 65) discusses the importance of distinguishing between  
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the content and value feminists might now assign to those activities and 
life-concerns which are allocated women and the low status or 
powerlessness which the master culture has assigned to them (usually 
by treating them as ‘nature’ rather than as ‘culture’). The failure to make 
such a distinction perpetuates rather than escapes the master 
perspective by denying the life-concerns, values and knowledges 
traditionally associated with women and other subordinated groups. 
 
This potential slippage arises because of the ingrained nature of the logic, and 
the fact that, as discussed, the difference that is highlighted is homogenised 
and conceived in terms of a lack to the complementary difference on the 
master’s side. However, although this process of relational definition has to an 
extent formed subject identities on both sides, it still does not wholly account for 
the otherness which escapes the stereotyping of the master discourse. 
However, Plumwood (1993: 65) argues that while we should not ‘see all 
difference and all qualities characteristic of women as inseparably imbued with 
powerlessness, powerlessness is inherent in some kinds of femininity and is not 
detachable from some characteristics’. Here she gives the example of 
‘nurturance’ and ‘empathy’, which can mean both ‘supporting others, being 
receptive to their needs and being concerned for and skilful in promoting their 
growth and welfare; or they can mean making powerful others feel good, 
bolstering masculinity and ego-massaging, the sensitivity of the slave to the 
needs of the master’ (Plumwood, 1993: 66). In the second sense it is the 
‘product of the master’ and could not be empowered in an equal society. Fraser 
(1997: 204) touches upon the issue too. She describes three types of 
difference: i) differences as artifacts of oppression which should be abolished; ii) 
differences as marks of cultural superiority over the oppressors, which merit 
revaluation and extension, and; iii) differences as cultural variations which are 
neither superiorities nor inferiorities, should not be eliminated nor universalised 
but affirmed as valuable expressions of human diversity. The cultivation of 
otherised characteristics in the first, positive sense is something which needs to 
be revalued for the dominant self. So, for example, the common complaint that 
not enough female children aspire to go into the more technical and scientific 
professions (such as nuclear science and engineering) needs to be balanced by 
the cultivation of aspirations by male children to work in the caring professions – 
the characteristic or skill needs to be detached from its superficial and limiting 
markers of difference.  
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Although the present day context gives us much cause for pessimism 
and despair, histories of liberation politics (and attention to the hybrid nature of 
such politics) not only teach us to be wary of false hope, but also highlight the 
possibilities, slim though they might be, for agency and change on the part of 
the oppressed. So, for example, as Young (1990: 60) points out, W. E. B Du 
Bois’s understanding of ‘double consciousness’, not only highlights the suffering 
of the oppressed, but also points to continued agency, the refusal to submit to 
the dominant discourse. Crucial to this is an ecological conception of agency 
which involves action for both self and other. The interaction between selves 
and others is a multi-valent process whereby witnessing disrespect for others 
also motivates action.  
Schlosberg gives the example of ‘Vernon Masayeva, a Hopi and 
executive director of the Black Mesa Trust, an organization dedicated to 
preserving reservation water from mining use’ speaking of his inspiration for 
activism having come from seeing how ‘the elders were being treated, ignored, 
and ridiculed’ in the process of stopping a coal slurry pipeline when he was 
younger (Masayeva, in Schlosberg, 2007: 61-62). Injustices of recognition can 
therefore be understood to motivate action in the processes of representation. 
Understanding the process of motivation arising from witnessing of disrespect of 
others is important as it emphasises a shift from thinking about human and 
nonhuman relations in atomist terms, and has implications for the possibilities of 
human-nonhuman relations of recognition.   
However, political efficacy is limited and counter-productive - tending to 
affirm the dominant structures through reversal rather than transform through 
displacement – if the articulation of recognition-based injustice succumbs to the 
dream of overcoming alienation and difference in self/other relations. For, while 
the desire to achieve this is understandable and perhaps inevitable, it responds 
to, yet fails to accept the differences as well as the continuities which constitute 
integrity in self/other relations. Attention to integrity involves ongoing, 
ineradicable risks ‘of conflict, hostility, misunderstanding, opacity, and 
alienation’ that characterise life among others (Markell 2003: 38). While 
articulating disrespect for integrity is helpful in highlighting continuities and 
differences, inherent tendencies within the politics of recognition, the desire for 
sovereignty and security, mean that an emphasis upon community can occur at 
the expense of the difference and independent agency of those with less power, 
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such as nonhuman nature. This can be seen in conceptions of the 
‘anthropocene’ and certain constructions of a global human community which 
must act in the face of climate change. The danger here is that of slippage 
between the agency and interests of dominant humans and the diverse 
interests of all others, both humans and nonhuman nature, thus obscuring key 
power disparities, and perpetuating and deepening injustices.  
 
 
 
This chapter has sought to reformulate the image of politics as 
recognition in order to find words to express how future generations, those in 
other countries, and nonhuman nature are affected in the politics of nuclear 
energy not only, as discussed in Chapter Three, by unjust distributions of the 
goods and burdens of common life, but also by the dominant value and 
meaning systems which structure understandings of who counts as what in the 
relations of common life. By way of this reconsideration of the politics of 
recognition I have adapted an expression of recognition-based injustice as the 
disrespect for integrity in self-other relations. I proposed an ecological 
understanding of integrity as signifying both continuities and differences 
between human and nonhuman selves and others. Contesting recognition-
based injustices in this way draws attention to the inherent unpredictability in 
human and nonhuman interactions and exposes how relations of domination, 
which are perpetuated by nuclear energy and the prevailing forms of social 
organisation, mask the dependencies and vulnerabilities of the dominant human 
self. Integrity in self/other relations does not signify an undifferentiated holism, 
as is apparent in some conceptions of the ‘anthropocene’, but instead it 
highlights a more complex, unpredictable and ever incomplete understanding of 
self/other relations in common life. Articulating recognition-based injustices can 
help to contest assumptions about the controllability and acceptability of risk, 
unmasking dominant assumptions which background and take for granted 
certain continuities and differences of both human and nonhuman nature and 
thereby underestimate the vulnerability of the dominant human self in the 
unpredictable interactions of common life. Contesting recognition-based 
injustices in the dominant discourses can build common ground in struggles for 
alternative conceptions of self/other relations, and has potential for innovation 
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and the opening up of possibilities for alternative futures. Such potential was 
apparent in the alternative technology movements of the 1970s and 1980s. 
However, the politically transcendent hopes attached to alternative 
technologies, apparent in how the knowledge of these technologies has been 
taken up within dominant discourses, points to the desire to escape the inherent 
unpredictability of human and nonhuman interaction. Despite an ongoing desire 
on the part of the dominant human self for harmony and stability, alienation and 
unpredictability in self/other relations cannot be overcome. For this reason, 
contestation of recognition-based injustices is an important and ongoing task. 
 Articulation and contestation of recognition-based injustices can help us 
to apprehend certain important socially produced harms of nuclear energy 
regarding who counts as what within the dominant forms of social organisation 
that nuclear energy reinforces. However, as discussed, it is also important to 
consider such articulations of injustices in combination with distributive 
injustices, as interpretations of the status and standing of members of political 
community tends to be influenced by their relative access to basic necessities. 
Deprivation of basic necessities limits well-being of both human and nonhuman 
nature which can then impact upon how interactions between these occur. 
Those already deprived are either less likely to be able to contest domination in 
self/other relations, or may contest domination in ways which reinforce 
interpretations of both human and nonhuman others as threat to order and 
stability, an interpretation which can then reinforce the position and reduce 
reflexivity of the dominant human self at the expense of these others. 
Deprivation of basic necessities for well-being can reinforce and perpetuate 
limiting and often damaging stereotypical characteristics of the other that 
disrespect both continuities and differences between selves and others.  
As this discussion implies, it is therefore also important that we consider 
who speaks and acts as what in the politics of nuclear energy. The desire for 
sovereignty on the part of the dominant self and the inevitable recognition-
based injustices resulting from this can be more effectively contested through 
sensitivity to the agency of others in common life. The agency of others impacts 
upon the value and meaning systems which structure self/other relations. 
Greater awareness of this agency can assist in contesting disrespect for 
integrity by the dominant self.  Considering the agency of selves and others in 
interaction prompts us to consider how the value and meaning systems 
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structuring self/other relations discussed in this chapter are constructed, 
perpetuated or transformed through the politics of representation. Articulating 
representation-based injustices provides yet another heuristic tool with which to 
apprehend and contest the socially produced harms of nuclear energy that are 
justified and normalised by the separation of nature/culture, and science/politics 
in the dominant discourses. This is the topic of the next chapter.  
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Chapter Five 
Articulating Injustices of Representation:  
Who acts for what in the politics of nuclear energy? 
 
Within the dominant framings of debates, nuclear energy and the question of 
our energy future in the context of climate change are a matter for the scientific 
or technological and economic experts to decide. Influential climate scientists 
say that there is no place for ‘emotions and biases’ in addressing this problem; 
‘[w]e ask only that energy systems decisions be based on facts’ (Caldeira et al., 
2013). As discussed in Chapter One, there is a tendency for government, 
industry and scientific experts as well as some environmental advocates to view 
democratic public consultation as counterproductive, an obstacle to the 
necessary clarity which blocks progress in addressing the complex technical 
problems upon which ‘our’ common future relies. The public is assumed to be 
largely ignorant of the interests of nonhuman nature and of the ‘true’ risks we 
face, and unable to objectively assess these. For the sake of all our futures we 
need ‘objective’ expert knowledge to cut through the troublesome 
misconceptions and political biases which block possibilities for urgent effective 
action.  
 When the debates are framed in the way just described, ‘nature’ is 
understood to be a domain of truth and authority which only a minority can 
represent, thereby reinforcing the hierarchical separation of nature/culture.  
The continued separation of nature/culture serves to mask and perpetuate 
significant harms of nuclear energy. As discussed in Chapters Three and Four, 
these harms can in part be contested by articulating distributive injustices, 
drawing attention to basic necessities for well-being and the connections 
between the distribution of goods and burdens of common life, and they can 
also be partially contested by articulating recognition-based injustices that draw 
attention to integrity in self/other relations and the inherent unpredictability in 
human and nonhuman interactions. In this chapter I complete the development 
of my heuristic framework for articulating injustices and argue that we can 
strengthen contestation of the separation of nature/culture and science/politics 
in the dominant framings of the debates about nuclear energy and our common 
futures by also articulating representation-based injustices of nuclear energy. 
 Using the ecological approach to taking all affected into account 
developed in Chapters One and Two, in this chapter I reformulate the image of 
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politics as representation in order to achieve yet another view of what is at stake 
in the thesis problem. Taking all affected into account entails reconsideration of 
the inescapability of negotiated processes of representation and the role which 
action, as well as speech, plays within these processes. I argue that we can 
articulate representative injustices of nuclear energy as denial of authorities of 
some by others, caused by the monopolisation of authority by disengaged forms 
of knowledge production. 
 In the first section, I draw upon justice and green theory to reformulate 
the image of politics as representation in terms of the ecological approach. 
Taking all affected into account entails rethinking representation and 
participation in representative processes beyond traditional state boundaries 
and the human/nature divide. This requires an expanded understanding of 
speech and communication to include protest and resistance of many kinds. 
This expanded understanding of representative processes also involves being 
aware of the role which action beyond speech and conscious communication 
may play in these processes. This can include signs of change within ecological 
systems in response to both our own actions and those of others. Taking all 
affected into account therefore requires an understanding of representation 
which accounts for the gaps between speech and action and acknowledges the 
important role played by both creative and destructive action in representative 
processes. 
 In the second section, drawing upon this reconsideration of the role of 
both speech and action in representative processes, I offer an articulation of 
representative injustices as denial of multiple authorities. I emphasise a more 
decentred, situated and multiple understanding of authority which involves a 
sense of ‘authoring’, of determining one’s own narrative and life. This 
encompasses both speaking and acting and has both creative and destructive 
potentials. In redescribing the thesis problem, articulating representative 
injustices as the denial of authorities in the politics of nuclear energy helps to 
show how certain spokespeople claim a monopoly of authority, wielding 
scientific and economic facts and figures in authoritarian fashion, short-circuiting 
debate over the construction of such facts and figures. This fails to interrogate 
the ways in which claimed authority is always inevitably situated within political 
relations. Such denial of the important situated character of authority of both the 
dominant self and the denied other limits reflexivity and has serious implications 
197 
 
for creative or destructive possibilities of collaboration in common life, 
particularly in the context of such a politically controversial and high-risk 
business as nuclear energy.  
 In the final section of this chapter I evaluate the political efficacy of 
articulating representative injustices as denial of multiple authorities. This 
articulation provides a common frame of reference for contesting the 
monopolisation of authority by some over others. There is transformative 
potential in reclaiming authority to counter totalising forms of knowledge and the 
monopolisation of both decision-making and action by certain social actors. This 
includes potentials for grassroots politics as well as for a reclaiming of the 
production of scientific knowledge for a more democratic understanding of the 
common good which involves an ecological understanding of all affected. 
Crucially it allows for more responsive collaboration and reflexivity in relation to 
nonhuman nature in representative processes. Articulating and contesting 
denial of authorities also has political currency as it coincides with discussions 
of democracy and democratisation in mainstream discourses.  
 
 
Ecologically reformulating representation:  
understanding all affected in both speech and action 
 
Representation has traditionally been understood to be about ‘speaking for 
others in a largely settled institutional context’ (Saward, 2010: 18). However, 
taking all affected into account in an ecological manner means that we need to 
rethink the image of politics as representation beyond the traditional ‘political’ 
sphere of electoral state politics, to include the economic, cultural, and 
international spheres, as well as think about implications of representations of 
future generations and nonhuman nature. In this section I argue that taking all 
affected into account requires us to rethink representation and participation in 
representative processes in two ways, i) as speech, and ii) as action, with 
attention to both the creative and destructive potentials of speaking and acting 
with others. While this more open understanding of representative processes 
may often though not always involve, in Hannah Pitkin’s words, ‘a substantive 
acting for others’ or ‘acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner 
responsive to them’ (Pitkin 1967: 209; Saward 2010: 10), it will certainly involve 
attention to working together, or acting with, even in cases where one party to 
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this collaboration perhaps does not yet exist, or is not conscious in any way that 
humans can understand. 
The problem of representing nonhuman nature, and future generations 
has posed a challenge which has been much discussed, particularly in green 
theory. Much of this has been concerned with the ways in which nonhuman 
nature can be represented in political decision-making processes. Robert 
Goodin (1996: 840) points out that the political mechanisms for considering 
nature’s interests are not at all clear within dominant conceptions and 
institutions. Enfranchising nonhuman nature in the contemporary electoral 
sense appears absurd, while communication of nonhuman nature’s intrinsic 
interests by nature itself is often deemed to be impossible, too (Goodin, 1996: 
840-841). Similar problems arise with consideration of the interests of future 
generations, for as with nonhuman nature, those represented cannot speak. 
Dating back to Aristotle, the long-standing connection between speaking and 
politics makes it much more difficult to take those that cannot speak into 
account (Dobson, 2010). 
This problem has been tackled in a variety of ways. Goodin (1996: 842) 
proposes the idea of ‘encapsulated interests’, which, despite having historically 
distasteful associations with the master/slave (or wife) relationship, is still 
considered legitimate in certain cases, for example with children, where humans 
are still deemed unable to speak for themselves. With nonhuman nature, rather 
than understanding the representation of interests and preferences as singular 
we can move towards a better understanding of how ‘we come to internalize the 
interests of each other and indeed the larger world around us’ (Goodin, 1996: 
844). While ‘slippage’ between interests is inevitable, ‘politically it is also 
unavoidable’, meaning that a ‘second-best’ solution is necessary, and so also 
legitimate (Goodin, 1996: 844). In a similar fashion, John Dryzek (2000: 150) 
emphasises the importance of ‘ecological selves’ (which relates to discussion in 
the previous chapter), humans who ontologically ‘recall their own situation as 
ecological rather than merely social beings.’ While Robin Eckersley (2004: 132) 
argues for ‘enlarged thinking’ as a means of representing nonhuman nature and 
others who are not able to participate in representative processes.  
To redress the anthropocentric imbalances in contemporary society 
these green thinkers often advocate the participation of specific humans or 
institutions that are considered more likely to have access to or understand the 
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interests of nonhuman nature. For example, Eckersley (2004: 134) proposes 
‘specialised environmental advocacy’, drawing upon Andrew Dobson’s 
suggestion of ‘proxy representation for both non-human animals and future 
generations in representative assemblies by deputies elected from the 
environmental sustainability lobby’ (see also Dobson, 1996). In a similar 
fashion, Bruno Latour (2004: 64, 67) gives particular consideration to the role of 
scientists, arguing that ‘the notion of spokesperson lends itself admirably to the 
definition of the work done by scientists in lab coats’, for these have ‘invented 
speech prostheses that allow nonhumans to participate in the discussions of 
humans’ (emphasis in original). 
All of this is important for thinking about representation of those who 
cannot speak by those who can. However, while science and other particular 
social actors can play a vital role in ecologically rethinking representation and 
there is a need for better understanding of the roles which science can play in 
political representative processes, it is important to be aware of the potential 
dangers in ascribing knowledge of nature’s interests only to particular social 
actors. As Latour (2004: 759) acknowledges, uncertainty and doubt about 
possibilities of representation accompany all spokespersons, and as the 
discussion of the dominant discourses in Chapter Two highlighted, particularly 
with regards to science there has been a tendency for ‘scientific fact’ to be used 
to short-circuit political process.  
Michael Saward (2010: 2) too, points out that, while ‘representation is an 
institutional fact in the contemporary world’, we must not neglect that 
representation ‘is a multisided process of claim-making and the reception and 
judgement of claims’ (emphasis added). Saward (2006: 189) critiques Goodin 
(1996) for his use of the term ‘objective values’ to be found in ‘nature’ and the 
idea that these can be ‘read off nature, not read into it,’ ‘discerned rather than 
creatively construed’ (emphasis in original). Saward’s point is that this is a 
problematic, one-directional understanding of the representative process, for 
while Goodin (1996) acknowledges slippage of interests, we must question the 
straight-forward knowability of interests. 
Saward (2006) highlights the constructive processes involved in 
representation. All representation involves creativity, imagination and 
interpretation in claim making rather than simple fact finding. To illustrate:  
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the green party (M [the claim maker]) offers itself (S [the subject]) as the 
protector of the interests of endangered species (O [the object]) with 
respect to the animals in question (R [the referent]) to governments and 
the broader media and public (A [the audience]) (Saward, 2006: 185).  
 
Representation is constitutively bi- or multi-directional due to the ‘interpretive 
and selectively creative role of makers and subjects in representation’ (Saward, 
2006: 188). 
Saward is therefore critical of the idea of a more direct, participatory 
democracy put forward by many green thinkers. He interprets John Dryzek’s 
(2000) work as also having this tendency, ‘seeking to break the boundaries of 
representation, to find directness, engagement, contact, authenticity’ (Saward, 
2006: 195). Arguably there has been much attention to the epistemic dimension 
of representation in green thinking and not enough attention to the interpretive 
aspects. This emphasis exists because of ‘the power of material consequences’ 
of representations and the desire to overcome ‘the undesirable consequences 
of the play of representation in political life’ (Saward, 2006: 195).  
Particularly in green theory, given the sense of urgency surrounding 
ecological crises, the urge to break through entrenched institutions and ways of 
doing things in order to effect change is understandably great. Science has 
been vitally influential in raising awareness of climate change, and remains an 
important asset in the ongoing contestation of the issue with climate change 
deniers and others who resist change having the weight of the dominant 
political, economic and cultural status quo behind them. To surrender epistemic 
certainty to interpretation and the play of representations would appear to 
concede vital political ground and damage rather than further the green cause. 
This is of particular concern when, in the name of neutrality, media 
organisations present the issue of climate change as a debate over the 
empirical evidence for climate change, rather than as a debate over the 
foreseeable consequences and ways of addressing these (Harvey, 2013).   
However, as discussed in Chapter Two, the translation of processes of scientific 
knowledge production and understanding into undisputable non-debateable 
facts, can have a tendency to ‘abort politics’ (Latour, 2004), by producing non-
negotiable imperatives, such as population control, or carbon-emissions 
reduction, with ‘a no-real-choice quality’ (Saward, 1993: 64). It perhaps goes 
without saying that this applies to eco-authoritarians, yet ‘even in more 
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mainstream versions the science-based objectivity that greens claim for their 
policies can acquire a “no-option” quality’ (Dobson, 2010: 757). 
Yet Saward (2006: 196) reminds us that ‘we live in and by 
representations, and representation is a necessary human activity, not one that 
diminishes in importance just through physical proximity to or familiarity with 
‘nature’ or anything else.’ His warning against privileging certain 
representatives, and factifying the interests of nonhuman nature (and others), 
and instead giving attention to the constructive, productive, interpretive 
processes of representation is important. Ambiguity of representation is 
inescapable 
the desire to move beyond a politics of representation to a direct 
engagement with nature is understandable enough, but it is 
misconceived. Our need to ‘make up nature’ does not go away just 
because we are close to it (or even because we are it) (Saward, 2006: 
196, emphasis in original).  
 
This has broader implications for mainstream political theory. While the green 
temptation is to ‘find better, alternative metaphors’, there is no single 
‘unambiguous, good or bad, helpful or dangerous metaphor from a political 
ecological point of view’ (Saward, 2006: 195). Ecological crisis (and the 
objectivity crises it brings with it – see Chapter Two) poses a challenge, as well 
as an opportunity ‘to imagine in detail a democracy that revels in representative 
politics in the broader and deeper sense, since the metaphors and 
representations we invoke are critical in shaping political outcomes for ‘nature’ 
and for us as a part of it’ (Saward, 2006: 198). As Steve Hinchcliffe et al. (2005: 
652) also argue, it may be more helpful to think in terms of ‘more circulating 
references’ rather than ‘better representation.’ 
  This underlines the importance of political contestation, and the input 
and acknowledgement of as many representations from all affected as possible. 
In advocating variations of discursive democracy, the green theorists discussed 
here certainly take on board the importance of this at least with reference to 
‘human’ issues, even if this understanding is not fully followed through with 
regards to representations of the nonhuman world or ‘nature’. Goodin (1996: 
846) describes the co-creative politicisation process characteristic of discursive 
or deliberative democratic theory whereby ‘having to defend our positions 
publicly makes us suppress narrowly self-interested reasons for action and 
highlight public-spirited reasons in their place.’ 
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Eckersley (2004: 132) emphasises that because representation is 
unavoidable, the primary aim must be to ensure that ‘political representation is 
as diverse as possible’ and ‘representative in a double, reflexive sense.’ By this 
she means that it needs to encourage ‘enlarged thinking’ as well as provide for 
enlarged, as in diverse, representation on the understanding that it is 
‘dangerous always to “trust” in the political imagination of the chosen or 
privileged few’ (Eckersley, 2004: 132). According to Eckersley (2004: 132) there 
are many reasons why ‘political representatives may find it difficult or impossible 
to understand or imagine the perspectives of all differently situated others in 
order to formulate norms that may be acceptable to those others’, these include 
‘lack of personal experiences of the other, lack of information, or misinformation, 
or scientific uncertainty’, as well as ‘lack of the necessary motivation to treat the 
lifeworld and interests of differently situated others on an equal par with their 
own.’ Despite at times relying upon a less mediated understanding of 
representation, particularly with regards to nonhuman nature, Eckersley (2004: 
132) agrees with feminist difference theorists that ‘all political arguments, 
however well intended, cannot be entirely detached from the experience, 
cultural and class background, and material interests of their proponents’ (see 
also Young, 1990). 
Due to the situated character of political arguments devices are needed 
which help to ‘widen and deepen the horizons of those who are actually 
engaged in the making of risk-generating [or ‘risk-displacing’] decisions’, 
because such decisions are  
less likely to survive policy-making communities and legislative chambers 
that are inclusive in terms of class, gender, race and region, and so on, 
and especially so when deliberators are obliged to consider the effects of 
their decisions on social and ecological communities both within and 
beyond the formal demos (Eckersley, 2004: 133).  
 
Such procedures would ‘accommodate the relevant affected community in 
every potentially risk-generating decision’ (Eckersley 2004: 133). Eckersley 
(2004: 133) specifically highlights the importance of diversity if not equality of 
representation, to enable the representation of disadvantaged groups and to 
prevent ‘unfair displacement of ecological and social costs onto their 
communities.’ Given existing empirical realities, social learning is an important 
and integral component here which in many ways facilitates the others. 
Eckersley (2004: 131) argues that understanding deliberative democracy as a 
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‘school of social learning’ requires active schooling ‘in deliberative democracy’ 
to enable it to flourish more widely. Such interactive learning processes also 
necessitate an encouragement to listen across differences (Dobson, 2010; 
Dryzek, 2000; Young, 2000).  
Goodin (1996: 848-9) uses this to argue for decentralised participatory 
forms of representation, for in ‘tolerably small groups, people listen to what one 
another says, internalize those new views and revise their own opinions 
appropriately.’ However, given the sale of ecological problems, Dryzek (2002: 
160) also envisions the possibilities for this across space and time through the 
reflexive linked spontaneous orders arising from the networked organizations of 
civil society and the discursive orders produced or challenged by them. He 
argues that ‘especially when the institutional [representative] hardware is weak 
or absent, discourses as social phenomena can and do co-ordinate the 
understandings and actions of disparate actors’ (Dryzek, 2000: 160). The 
advantage here is that discourses transcend geographical boundaries, and 
although ‘it matters a great deal how and by whom their terms are set’ there is a 
‘dispersed capacity to determine these terms of discourse’ which ‘finds 
expression in the network form of organization, itself at home in civil society and 
in the public sphere’ (Dryzek, 2002: 160-161).  
With his emphasis upon ‘egalitarian listening’ as part of a two-way 
communicative process, Dryzek (2000: 154) helps to counter assumptions that 
nature cannot communicate. In his earlier words, ‘[i]f the topsoil on which my 
crops depend is shrinking, then clearly nature is “telling” me something’ 
(Dryzek, 1987: 207). Christopher Stone (1973: 450-501) has also argued, ‘it is a 
lot easier for my lawn to communicate to me that it would be in its interests to 
be watered than it is for ‘the United States to communicate to the Attorney 
General that it is in its interests for Al Capone to be prosecuted.’ Dryzek (2000: 
150) argues that continuity between the human and the nonhuman is apparent 
in ‘nonverbal communication – body language, facial displays, pheromones, 
and so forth’, for much goes on in human conversation which is beyond words. 
Dryzek (150-151) notes that  
some categories of human beings are not very good at challenging 
interpretations placed upon their needs: but we should try to listen to 
them, and be open to challenges to our interpretations from third parties 
concerned with these needs 
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While ‘there can be no reciprocity of the sort commended by deliberative 
democrats’, it is for this reason that listening is so central to an ecological 
understanding of representation (Dryzek, 2000: 149, see also Dobson, 2010).  
It is important to be aware that relations of interpretation, justification and 
understanding exist not only between the representative and the 
constituent/represented, but also between the varying constituents (Young, 
2000). Iris Young explicitly draws upon Haraway’s (1988) theorisation of 
situated knowledges and partial objectivity, but proposes a relationally produced 
sense of objective representation as a ‘product of inclusive democratic 
communication’ (Young, 2000: 115). She argues that 
‘[a]n objective account of social relations and social problems, and an 
objective judgement of what politics and actions would address those 
problems [..] are accounts and judgements people construct for 
themselves from a critical, reflective, and persuasive interaction among 
diverse experiences’ (Young, 2000: 115). 
 
Thus she points to both the constructive, creative as well as multi-sided 
processes of representation and pushes for an alternative understanding of 
‘objective’ representation to account for this. 
 However, Young’s work also addresses the problems with privileging a 
certain type of argumentation in deliberative democratic theories of 
representation. Indeed, although Eckersley (2004: 129) does not fully follow 
through the implications for her ideal of ‘unconstrained dialogue’ within the 
‘green state’, this is something that she is also aware of, for she notes Edward 
Said’s (2000: 298) point that ‘the scrubbed, disinfected interlocutor is a 
laboratory creation with suppressed, and therefore falsified, connections to the 
urgent situation of crisis and conflict that brought him or her to attention in the 
first place’. Young’s (2000, 2001) attention to situations of crisis and conflict, 
and to activist experiences of exclusion, as well as what she terms ‘internal 
exclusion,’ means that her work is particularly helpful in considering the 
limitations of ideal forms of deliberative representative process. 
Young (2001: 685-686) notes the power of hegemonic discourses 
whereby ‘the conceptual and normative framework of the members of a society 
is so deeply influenced by premises and terms of discourse that make it difficult 
to think critically about aspects of social relations or alternative possibilities of 
institutionalization and action’. She draws upon the early Habermasian notion of 
‘systematically distorted communication’, which describes situations where 
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those deliberating ‘may agree on premises, they may accept a theory of their 
situation and give reasons for proposals that the others accept, but yet the 
premises and terms of the account mask the reproduction of power and 
injustice’ (Young, 2001: 685). In much deliberative democratic theory, the 
restriction of understandings of democratic discussion ‘narrowly to critical 
argument’ reinforces a ‘culturally biased conception of discussion that tends to 
silence or devalue some people or groups’ (Young, 2001: 120). Young (2000: 
54) points to less noticed or more difficult to articulate forms of ‘internal 
exclusion’ where, although representatives are included, their participation is 
limited because ‘the terms of discourse make assumptions some do not share, 
the interaction privileges specific styles of expression’ or ‘the participation of 
some people is dismissed as out of order.’ Disruptive or emotional forms of 
expression are often a sign of long-standing, unremedied power disparities and 
injustices. 
To push for passionate politics is controversial partly because politics, 
and particularly politics understood in traditional representative terms, has been 
associated with speaking and this has been used to police the inside/outside of 
politics as an exclusively rational sphere considered separate from emotions. 
However, as the discussion so far has shown, this definition poses serious 
problems for those who cannot speak or for those who do not speak in a 
manner acceptable in the dominant discourses. This discussion highlights some 
of the basic problems with considering representation only in terms of ‘rational’ 
speech. 
Indeed, representation and ‘speaking for others’ has in any case been 
much criticised, particularly in more radical politics, including the green 
movement, with calls for more decentralised and participatory forms of 
democracy. It must not be forgotten that, historically, arguments for 
representation have been used to temper demands for social and political 
change and to retain ‘aristocratic and elitist features of government’ (Castiglione 
& Warren, 2006: 10). There is good reason for some of the contemporary 
disillusionment with existing forms of democratic representation. As Linda Alcoff 
(1991) explains, the ‘crisis of representation’ entails acknowledgement that 
because social location impacts upon representation, the act of ‘speaking for 
others is arrogant, vain, unethical, and politically illegitimate’ and can involve ‘a 
kind of discursive coercion and even violence’ (Alcoff, 1991: 7). Yet as 
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discussion in this chapter also shows, there is no escaping representation; the 
‘politics of presence’ and the ‘politics of ideas’ are not mutually exclusive, 
participation is part of the representative process rather than an opposing ideal 
(Alcoff, 1991; Plotke, 1997; Young, 2000; Saward 2010). This is at least in part 
because even where participation is possible, speaking for oneself entails 
representation: ‘in speaking for myself, I am also representing myself in a 
certain way, as occupying a specific subject-position, having certain 
characteristics and not others, and so on’ (Alcoff 1991: 10). 
As Alcoff (1991) points out, it is not only the unavoidability of 
representation which reinforces the continued significance of representation. It 
is important to bear in mind, particularly, if representation is being avoided for 
political and ethical reasons, that ‘[e]ven a complete retreat from speech is of 
course not neutral since it allows the continued dominance of current 
discourses and acts by omission to reinforce their dominance’ (Alcoff, 1991: 
20). In addition, the emphasis upon ‘speaking for oneself’ implicitly assumes a 
conception of the self as autonomous, assuming a lack of connection with 
others. To the contrary, Alcoff (1991: 21) argues that 
we cannot neatly separate off our mediating praxis that interprets and 
constructs our experiences from the praxis of others. We are collectively 
caught in an intricate delicate web in which each action I take, discursive 
or otherwise, pulls on, breaks off, or maintains the tension in many 
strands of a web in which others find themselves moving also. 
 
This reinforces and deepens the point made by both Saward (2006, 2010) and 
Young (2000), about the entangled, multi-sided processes of representation. It 
also emphasises the collaborative character of representation beyond 
discursive action. Alcoff takes seriously Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s (1988) 
warning that simply promoting ‘listening to’ as an alternative to ‘speaking’, 
‘essentializes the oppressed as nonideological subjects’ (Alcoff, 1991: 22). This 
assumes the direct readability of interests in a similar fashion to that critiqued by 
Saward in his analysis of much green theory. Spivak’s (1988) preference is 
‘speaking to’ in a manner which neither abnegates [the intellectual’s] discursive 
role nor presumes an authenticity of the oppressed but still allows for the 
possibility that the oppressed will produce a “countersentence” that can then 
suggest a new historical narrative’ (Alcoff 1991: 23). Alcoff (1991: 23) agrees 
and emphasises that ‘[w]e should strive to create wherever possible the 
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conditions for dialogue and the practice of speaking with and to rather than 
speaking for others.’  
 Yet as Young’s work underlines, this ‘speaking with’ must allow for 
difference, and involve attempts to understand the position of the other. I argue 
that this must involve attention to action, as well as speech. Implicit in Alcoff’s 
(1991) discussion of the web of representative processes (above) is an 
understanding of both speech and other forms of action as playing a part in 
representation. It is important to consider Young’s (2001: 687) defence of the 
activist acting outside of deliberative processes because ‘he suspects some 
agreements of masking unjust power relations’ and ‘believes it is important to 
continue to challenge these discourses and the deliberative processes that rely 
on them’ in ways which do not fit into the rational speech category, for example 
with ‘pictures, song, poetic imagery and expressions of mockery or longing 
performed in rowdy and even playful ways aimed not at commanding assent but 
disturbing complacency.’ The intention with this type of action or communication 
is to provoke questioning, to wake up people’s minds, crack open their 
assumptions, ‘make us wonder about what we are doing, to rupture a stream of 
thought, rather than to weave an argument’ (2001: 687). Thus Young (2001: 
688) points towards a conception of representative processes ‘as far more 
rowdy, disorderly and decentred’ and therefore potentially more open to 
contestation than conventional understandings of representation assume.  
This discussion of activist practice in Young’s (2001) work extends to a 
consideration of violence. While ‘violence directed at others is not acceptable in 
most circumstances,’ and while much debated in many activist circles, it 
becomes acceptable in defence of self and others, and some forms of damage 
to property ‘need not be condemned’ (2001: 674). Often this is interpreted in the 
dominant discourses as unreasonable or extremist, demonstrating 
unwillingness to engage in rational discussion, yet as Young (2001: 675-676) 
points out, ‘[o]ne can interpret such blanket labelling itself as a power ploy 
whose function is to rule out of bounds all claims that question something basic 
about existing institutions and the terms in which they put political alternatives.’ 
Young (2001: 689) emphasises the legitimacy of both engaging in discussion 
with others ‘to persuade them that there are injustices that ought to be 
remedied’, and of protest and direct action.  
208 
 
Disruptive direct action and more orderly deliberation are often in 
tension; ‘[t]he two kinds of activities cannot usually occur together’ and ‘one of 
them is liable to eclipse the other’ (Young, 2001: 689). Yet it is useful to think 
about this tension between speaking and acting and to consider that while this 
ever present representative tension - the gap between the represented and the 
representation - might seem a problem it is precisely this gap which we need to 
be paying attention to, because this is the space which makes contestation 
possible, and it is contestation which facilitates the multi-sided processes of 
representation. The fear for the ‘absent referent’ often discussed in critiques of 
the play of representations is valid, particularly when it comes to thinking about 
the role which nonhuman nature may play in representative processes, beyond 
simply being a passive object, spoken for in a speech dominated understanding 
of representation. However, that referent is never too far away if we pay heed to 
action and to the constant challenges to existing representations emerging from 
the spaces between. 
I therefore argue that paying more attention to action as well as speech, 
may help us to gain a broader, more comprehensive understanding of 
representative processes, as well as helping us to better take all affected into 
account. Attention to action also enables us to bring nonhuman nature, much of 
which is understood as ‘objects’ within the dominant discourses, into 
understandings of representative processes as ‘subjects’ of representative 
action. This is evident in Latour’s (2004: 66) argument for taking entities into 
account beyond the nature/human divide. In his alternative conception of the 
polity ‘nonhumans are not in themselves objects, and still less are they matters 
of fact. They first appear as matters of concern’, they are ‘entities that provoke 
perplexity’ and are not ‘defined by necessity any more than they are defined by 
mute objectivity.’ He (2004: 83) suggests that ‘propositions’ rather than 
speaking citizens are the named subject of politics: ‘I am going to say that a 
river, a troop of elephants, a climate, El Nino, a mayor, a town, a park, have to 
be taken as propositions to the collective’ (see also Dobson, 2010). Part of 
Latour’s (2004: 237) recommendation for bringing the sciences into a 
democratic politics of representation, is to understand representative processes 
as scientific experiments, in which actors or ‘actants’ modify other entities and 
action ‘is always recorded in the course of a trial and by an experimental 
protocol.’  
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As Dryzek (2000: 149) points out too, we need to be able to account for 
‘the ecological processes which transcend the boundaries of species (and the 
living and non-living), such as creation, modification, or destruction of niches; or 
cycles involving oxygen, nitrogen, carbon, and water.’ Attention to such 
processes made up of multiple nonhuman and human activities is vitally 
important, and we need to be attentive to changes and disruptions in these 
which challenge existing representations in order to notice them, for example 
‘climate change, desertification, deforestation, and species extinction’ (Dryzek, 
2000: 149).  
This emphasis upon the non-verbal action which plays a role in the 
contestation of representations is not intended to replace speaking and 
deliberative contestation. If we are to take Saward and others’ multi-dimensional 
creative understanding of representative processes seriously we, as humans, 
cannot escape the mediation of speaking, and neither can the nonhuman world 
which has become woven up in our representative language and discourses. 
However, we can try to ensure that our understanding of the discursive or 
communicative sphere remains as diverse an arena as possible in order to 
enable ongoing contestation of representations. Action is an inherent 
component of representative processes; speech is just one aspect of the multi-
dimensional processes of ‘acting with’ others. The implications of this are that 
we can try to understand representation as a multi-way collaboration between 
humans and between human and nonhuman nature (with this distinction 
between the two in many cases being difficult to determine). As Young’s (2001) 
discussion of disruptive and sometimes even violent action and Dryzek’s (2000) 
concern for disruption of ecological systems suggest, such collaboration can be 
both constructive and destructive.  
The reciprocity involved in this is of a different kind to that of more 
conventional understandings of representation. Yet it is in any case not clear 
how much we can separate out ‘speaking’ from the rest of the world of action. If 
we understand discourse to be more than simply speaking, to involve the 
processes of co-creation involving other significations and practices, then the 
line between speech and other forms of action is less clear cut (Ferree, 2009: 
87-88; Spivak, 1988). Alcoff points out that just ‘[a]s my practices are made 
possible by events spatially far from my body so too my own practices make 
possible or impossible practices of others’ (1991: 20). Opening up an 
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understanding of representation to include action brings the contestatory gap of 
representation into focus and makes space for better contestation of both 
creative and destructive representative processes between humans, and 
between humans and nonhumans. The significance of paying attention to this 
gap and enabling contestation reinforces the importance of articulating 
injustices resulting from both the creative and destructive forces of 
representation. This is the focus of the next section. 
 
Articulating representation-based injustices:  
denial of multiple authorities in the politics of nuclear energy 
 
If we widen our understanding of representation to include both speech and 
action more broadly, we can consider that, to use Dryzek’s terms, there are 
‘numerous loci of political authority’ (Dryzek, 2000: 157), ranging across, within 
and between human and nonhuman entities. These authorities are both creative 
and destructive, depending on perspective or location, and participate through 
both speech and other forms of action in representative processes which inform 
our constructions of common life. Taking these multiple authorities into account 
is important if we are to encourage contestation and make space for the play of 
representations, which as Saward says, ‘are critical in shaping political 
outcomes for “nature” and for us as a part of it’ (Saward, 2006: 197-198), and 
help to mitigate the unavoidable problem of speaking and acting for and with 
others, with its attendant violence and misrepresentations. Articulating injustices 
can play an important part in the freeing up of representative contestation. 
 I suggest therefore, that the injustices which arise in the politics of 
representation can be articulated as denial of multiple authorities. The intention 
is to draw upon a more decentred and situated understanding of the word 
authority which encompasses both speaking and acting. While authority has 
traditionally been used to designate either a more centralised codified form of 
state legal power and leadership, or an institutionalised form of expertise, it also 
describes individual or specific knowledge of some thing or situation and can 
therefore chime with understandings of ‘situated knowledge’ (Haraway, 1988). 
In his discussion of authorisation and authenticity in representative processes 
beyond the traditional electoral sphere of government Saward (2009: 21) points 
out that both ‘share a common root in the idea of “authoring”, being one’s own 
author, telling one’s own story (and being self-determining).’ With a more 
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decentred and situated understanding of authority I seek to capture a sense of 
authorship which includes creative (or destructive) power and consequence of 
action, and a sense of freedom of participation in the multi-constitutive 
processes of representation.  Part of the risk ‘of speaking for others’ involves 
‘expanding one's own authority and privilege, and a generally imperialist 
speaking ritual’ (Alcoff, 1991: 23), which brings about or reinforces 
‘authoritarianism derived from the dominance of partial perspective’ (Young, 
2000: 84). Denial of authority then entails a form of silencing and 
disempowerment, refusal of another authority, or the refusal of accountability 
and responsibility for one’s own authority.  
 To return to the problem of the thesis then, how does articulating 
injustices of representation as denial of multiple authorities help to redescribe 
the problem whereby important harms of nuclear energy are naturalised and 
justified within dominant discourses and in debates within green politics and 
politics more generally? The dominance of abstract economic and scientific 
facts and figures in the arguments both for and against nuclear energy suggests 
the seduction of the illusion of a directness of representation pointed out by 
Saward and Latour. The authority of economics and science are wielded ‘as 
fact’ in authoritarian fashion over other arguments deemed to have less 
authority due to their association with political or ideological bias, opinion or 
emotion.  Both sides of the nuclear debate engage in this, although as 
discussed, the green anti-nuclear side is often at a disadvantage for it is more 
obviously against the dominant status quo. Economic and scientific facts and 
figures are used to reinforce and naturalise the authority of the state and 
dominant (political) conceptions of energy security and other aspects of the 
‘public good’. 
This temptation to use the idea of a higher authority to cut a way through 
contestation is particularly strong for those in green politics because the 
authority of ecological claims - drawing attention as it does to the need to take 
into account nonhuman nature and others traditionally deemed outside of the 
political realm - has been denied and disadvantaged in the conventional sphere 
of government and governance. Yet the continued reliance upon the authority of 
economics and science and certain exclusionary notions of the public good 
within debates over nuclear energy only serves to reinforce the dominant 
discourses which deny the authority of others.  
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In the politics of nuclear energy this plays out in three interrelated ways 
with distinctly unecological consequences. Firstly, it reinforces the 
monopolisation of authority by those in powerful discursive positions, in 
particular, the authority of state governments, the authority of the nuclear 
industry, and the authority of those scientists who deny the implications of their 
own authority by claiming disengagement and neutrality. The second 
consequence is that this denies authority to other humans who would propose 
alternative interpretations of the problem of nuclear energy, drawing upon 
different experiences and concerns for the future. Thirdly, it denies authority to 
nonhuman nature in discursive processes, dulling human attention to the 
actions and reactions of nonhuman nature in the continued constructive and 
destructive processes of life on earth, thereby denying possibilities for 
responsible collaboration. 
 First, the monopolisation of authority by the state is hardly a new 
problem, indeed a substantial degree of centralisation of authority at this level of 
political organisation is often deemed a necessity and an inescapable reality 
(e.g. see Eckersley 2004). However as many greens have long argued, the 
centralisation of authority in the state poses many problems from an ecological 
point of view. For example, as Dryzek (2000: 156) points out; ‘a bureaucracy 
with a well-developed internal culture may prove highly inattentive to its 
environment.’ Dryzek (2000: 155) argues that ‘a bureaucratic hierarchy pretty 
much ensures distortion and loss of information across the levels of hierarchy.’ 
However, taking on board Saward’s critique of any ‘direct’ and straightforward 
understanding of information means that this is not only about a loss or 
distortion of information, but about the ways in which the creation or 
interpretation of information and understandings about the world can become a 
bureaucratic monoculture; the dominance of one way of understanding, 
speaking and acting in the world at the expense of others. Although there is 
often, understandably, slippage between interpretation and ‘reality’, it is this 
denial of the authority of others which underlies the green scepticism about 
centralised authority, and we do not have to believe in the possibility of 
undistorted communication to see that this reinforces injustices and is therefore 
unecological. This has been apparent in the Japanese government’s handling of 
the Fukushima disaster, for example, but it has also been the finding of many 
studies and exposés of the entwined government and nuclear industry’s 
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handling of numerous nuclear plants both military and civilian, all over the world, 
not only in times of obvious crisis (Wynne, 2011; Sovacool & Valentine, 2012; 
Breach, 1978; Walker, 1999).  
 While liberal democratic states are arguably designed to enable the play 
of representations and the contestation of multiple authorities, carrying a kind of 
authority which represents the ‘public good’, they retain bureaucratic structures 
and cultures entailing power asymmetries passed on from (even) less liberal 
times and suffer from the dominance of cultures which are insensitive to all 
sorts of injustices. The dependence of the authority of states upon the 
instrumental capitalist economic growth imperative in particular, and with the 
need to power the economy at all costs used as a justification for the 
securitisation and centralisation of energy production in the hands of a few, little 
obvious room  is left for genuine contestation. In some ways this explains 
reliance upon the authority of science, as a means of competing with economic 
authority and/or contesting other dominant authorities to effect change. 
Yet science in many of its institutionalised forms contains its own 
authoritarian strands which involve a history of representative processes which 
deny the authority of both human and nonhuman others and increase the 
authority of economic power at the expense of others. The underlying 
‘instrumental, human-centred goals and methodologies aimed narrowly at 
prediction and control’ cannot simply be written off as ‘bad science’ for they 
have been ‘an established part of modern science since its inception’ 
(Plumwood, 2002: 40). Plumwood (2002: 40) illustrates the problem, describing 
how a combination of scientific, political, administrative and economic 
authorities reinforced each other in the case of overfishing in the Canadian 
Atlantic. Technology design and research orientations of science in this case 
were dominated by productivist goals, exemplifying a ‘production model view of 
nature’, a reductive view which treated ‘appropriate knowledge in the 
instrumental terms of development and production.’ The danger in this 
approach is that it ascribes authority only to a few dominant sources which 
reinforce anthropocentric instrumentalisation of nonhuman nature. This 
monopolisation of authority is dangerously monological, particularly in contexts 
where we press limits ‘we have not gauged’ (Plumwood, 2002: 40). The 
monopolisation of authority produces knowledge and power which is ‘very 
narrow, focusing on just those aspects of the other that can be exploited’ and 
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capitalised upon (2002: 40). In a similar way, the emphasis upon particular 
technologies as a solution to climate change also emerges from the same 
logics. Economic growth cannot be questioned and it is easier to try to find low-
carbon ways of accommodating the existing system and therefore narrowly 
focus on counting carbon emissions than to attend to the bigger picture which 
involves other ecological crises resulting from the overconsumption and 
production inherent in the dominant socio-economic structures. Increasing the 
levels of radiation in the biosphere and the effects of long-term storage of 
nuclear waste, particularly under increasingly unpredictable conditions of 
climate change, are just some of the other limits we have not gauged. While 
radiation exposures are obsessively counted and the numbers of deaths from 
coal and from nuclear are weighed up against each other we miss the chance to 
attend to other loci and forms of authority which might bear upon our current 
situation. 
The authoritarian strands in science which make it more likely to either 
be held up as higher authority or succumb to instrumental and exploitative 
authorities can be traced back to Platonic rationalism and the idea that 
knowledge and authority can be won in spite of bodily hindrances and Cartesian 
rationalism wherein knowledge is understood as freedom from doubt, the body 
and its deceptions and weaknesses, including personal and emotional ties 
(Plumwood, 2002: 46-50). Such rationalism is strongly gendered and adheres to 
mind/body and reason/emotion dichotomies whereby authority can only be 
assured through exclusion of ‘the emotional, the bodily, the particular, the 
personal, and of course especially the political’ (Plumwood, 2002: 42). This 
history of ‘empiricist-rationalism’ is authoritarian for it stems from ‘the idea that 
the knower is superior to the object of study, that the other can be known 
completely, and in the absence of consent – knowledge can be wrung from it, 
as a form of power over it’ (Evelyn Fox Keller, in Plumwood, 2002: 42). 
Disengagement and emotional detachment from the object of research, the 
denial of connections of care and respect between knower and known, enables 
and reinforces instrumentalist approaches to knowledge which deny authority to 
others.  
The intention of overcoming individual self-interest in this type of 
disengagement has the opposite effect, for ruling out ‘care and respect for what 
is studied and of responsibility for those who will be affected by it’ means that 
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‘the knowledge relation is constructed as one in which the known is merely a 
means to the knower’s ends’, or to the ends of the power which, without 
engagement, the scientist will come to serve, as ‘appearance of neutrality 
conceals capitulation to power’ (Plumwood, 2002: 43). Therefore, to be 
positioned as an authority in science, or to make an authoritative scientific 
claim, is to be positioned within this methodological history of disengagement, 
separation from objects of study, and impartiality towards potential social effects 
and outcomes. The disengaged knower uses the denial of attachment and 
location in order to ‘present themselves and their knowledge as absolute and 
transcending location’ and ‘the limits of social shaping of knowledge imposed by 
the knower’s identity and their cultural or personal “slant” or “set” are 
disappeared in the presentation of such knowledge as emerging from a 
universal perspective’ (Plumwood, 2002: 42). This mechanism justifies 
monopolisation of authority, particularly in the scientific disciplines of privileged 
expert knowledge. 
The monopolisation of authority is inherently related to the second way in 
which denial of multiple authorities plays out in the politics of nuclear energy. 
The authority of science denies the authority of others in the representative 
knowledge construction processes and the active processes of common life. 
Such denial of the authority of others is problematic because it denies that  
the knower is active not only in seeking and selecting observational input 
but in constructing knowledge, that knowledge is a social activity, not the 
passive “neutral” reception of raw, ‘pure’ observational data by presocial 
individuals (Plumwood, 2002: 43). 
An outcome of this authoritarianism in scientific knowledge claims is that those 
claims which reinforce the (already authoritarian tendencies of the) status quo, 
or are not obviously critical, are seen as universal, impartial forms of authority, 
while the more marginalised perspectives of ‘the oppressed must act to disrupt 
the status quo from a passion for change’ (Plumwood, 2002: 44) and are 
interpreted and represented in the dominant discourses as ‘emotional’, ‘biased’, 
and ‘political’ and their authority therefore remains denied.  
Such denial of other authorities is a problem because it constitutes 
injustice, but importantly it also ‘hinders self-critical forms of engagement which 
can acknowledge the limitations of particular knowledge locations and place the 
subject of knowledge on the same critical causal plane as the objects of 
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knowledge’ (Plumwood, 2002: 44) it thus has a tendency to encourage hubris. 
The trouble is that the dominant forms of authority – state, economic-industrial 
and scientific – become mutually reinforcing. As Brian Wynne (2011: xxii) has 
argued, ‘if a technology requires for its existence such socially remote 
development and control institutions that those arrangements themselves 
become (as they have for nuclear power) a point of public concern, that very 
remoteness precludes the achievement of social credibility’. Such loss of 
credibility produces ruptures in public or common life, which are unsustainable. 
Wynne (2011: 22) discusses the idea of ‘public good science’ in his 
updated discussion of the implications of the 1977 Windscale Inquiry.  The idea 
of the deterrent of the nuclear bomb as necessary for the public good  
was invested implicitly but fervently in nuclear science and technology. 
Of course this definition of public good science enjoyed no kind of 
informed democratic debate, accountability nor sceptical reflection about 
what might be the proper human ends of knowledge and technical 
power. No human hand was recognized to be at work in shaping them; 
just the force of history and necessity – benign or not (Wynne, 2011: 22).  
 
Similar tendencies can be seen again in the conversion of greens to the 
necessity of nuclear energy in the context of climate change (e.g. see 
Pandora’s Promise, 2013). The idea of a  ‘public good science’ claims a higher 
authority; ‘the attempted construction of public authority through particular 
constructs of science and rationality’ (Wynne, 2011: xiii), yet it relies upon 
privileging certain authorities over others and while this constructed public 
authority might claim legitimacy and universality for the greater good, it is more 
often the case that ‘high-science big technologies’ are being pursued ‘with 
fundamentalist quasi-religious fervour yet denying any emotive charge’, so that 
there are ‘inevitable tensions between ideals of rationality, and the “noble lie” 
which has to declare that politically charged commitments have been 
determined by expert revelation alone’ (Wynne, 2011: 21).   
 Attending to the grassroots and to other forms of authority, such as the 
points of view and actions of the subjugated, is of course not a guarantee of a 
‘better’ or clearer perspective or form of authority. Rather it is here that it is 
more likely that there are perspectives that have been denied and that see 
through attempts to claim authority over others in totalizing and universalising 
ways which are insensitive to other authorities at local levels. Plumwood 
emphasises the importance of the capacity to hear ‘the bad news from below’ 
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(2002: 91), and Dryzek (2000: 154) draws upon this to emphasise that it is 
relatively straightforward ‘to criticize institutions that try to subordinate nature on 
a large scale, and those that are remote and so incapable of hearing any news 
from below, be it good or bad.’ The point is that to claim transcendence, 
universality and neutrality is what is really unobjective and unrealistic and not in 
the interests of the common good: ‘knowledge from the point of view of the 
unmarked is truly fantastic, distorted, and irrational’ (Haraway, 1988: 587). It is 
this, along with force, which enables authoritarianism, the monopolisation of 
authority, rather than the creative meeting of different authorities from different 
positions. 
 The ‘distortion’ of the potentially creative processes of communication 
through the monopolisation of authority often occurs in very subtle ways which 
tend to go unnoticed by participants. It affects  
the conceptual and imagistic frame for discussion, which often contains 
falsifications, biases, misunderstandings, and even contradictions that go 
unnoticed and uncriticized largely because they coincide with hegemonic 
interests or reflect existing social realities as though they are unalterable. 
(Young, 2001: 686). 
 
As a result of such monopolisation of authority in hegemonic discourses, the 
authority of others is weakened or rendered ineffective. 
 Young (2000: 57) points out that ‘[a]rguments require shared premises 
[…] which are not always present in a situation of conflict.’ She also points out 
that ‘a norm of “articulateness” devalues the speech of those who make claims 
and give reasons, but not in a linear fashion that makes logical connections 
explicit’ (2000: 57). Like Plumwood (2002), she critiques the ‘norm of 
dispassionateness’ which ‘dismisses and devalues embodied forms of 
expression, emotion, and figurative expressions’, which mean that as a result, 
‘contributions to discussion tend to be excluded from serious consideration not 
because of what is said, but how it is said’ (2000: 57). Young (2000: 124) points 
out that ‘norms of assertiveness, combativeness, and speaking by the contest 
rules are powerful silencers or evaluators of speech’ which are apparent ‘in 
many actual speaking situations where culturally differentiated and socially 
unequal groups live together.’ The problem is not only the silencing, but that the 
dominant groups ‘often fail entirely to notice this devaluation and silencing’ with 
the result that those whose authority is denied ‘often feel put down or frustrated, 
either losing confidence in themselves or becoming angry (Young, 2000: 124).  
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Anger, and the disruptive behaviour which often accompanies it, tends to 
disqualify those engaging in it from taking part. For example, in October 2011 
security was called to escort ‘female hecklers’ out of the hall where the 
University of Exeter’s Debating Society were debating the motion ‘This House 
believes that nuclear power is unsafe’ (Wynick, 2011). Green Party MEP, Keith 
Taylor, guest speaker for the motion walked out of the debate in protest, saying 
he was ‘shocked at this heavy handed and draconian approach’ (Wynick, 2011). 
He left behind only Audaye Elesedy, chair of Exeter Green Party, to defend the 
motion against Nigel Knee, Head of Nuclear Power at EDF energy, guest 
speaker for the opposition. The latter commented that he’d recognised the 
women from previous protests and: ‘was impressed by the way the chairman 
retained order throughout’. The other guest speaker for the opposition, Roger 
Helmer, MEP for UKIP, later commented on his blog that he was ‘certain that 
the antics of these green zealots inclined the audience against the motion’ 
(Wynick, 2011). Although away from the university at the time I knew the 
women who were handled in this manner and had in fact asked if they could 
attend the debate in my absence. Speaking to them afterwards I felt their anger 
and frustration at the imbalance in the speakers and the failure to address 
important aspects of the debate.  
 In another example, from the preliminary meeting of the Infrastructure 
Planning Commission’s examination of EDF's application to build Hinkley C in 
March 2012 ‘local resident and single mother Nikki Clarke asked who would 
look at the dangers of nuclear power to the health of local children if the IPC 
were not prepared to do so’ (Stop Hinkley, 2012). The IPC lead commissioner 
told her that ‘her point was irrelevant,’ and ‘when she tried to continue he had 
her microphone switched off and adjourned the meeting, asking her to leave’ 
(Stop Hinkley, 2012). Many other participants at the meeting ‘were left shaken 
and angry at the way they had been treated’, as the lead commissioner 
impatiently interrupted those brave enough to speak in front of a crowd of 
hundreds, ‘saying he couldn’t hear them and what they were saying was not 
relevant’ (Stop Hinkley, 2012). 
Given the recurring dismissal of concerns (problems also of recognition) 
it is hardly surprising that people should become angry and frustrated and turn 
to other forms of action to try to get their message across. The accident at 
219 
 
Fukushima once again demonstrated that the authority of expert assurances of 
risk management and government and industry authority over nonhuman nature 
is limited. The assumption of knowledge and power neglected the authority of 
nonhuman nature through its capacity to disrupt and destroy the best made 
plans. This has impacted in turn upon the authority of the local people over their 
own lives and livelihoods. The World Nuclear Association (WNA, 2014) asserts 
that ‘[o]fficial figures show that there have been well over 1000 deaths from 
maintaining the evacuation, in contrast to little risk from radiation if early return 
had been allowed’. Rather than acknowledge the impact of the disaster and of 
the continued risks that nuclear energy poses to the authority of others, this 
instead shores up their own sense of authority whilst at the same time denying 
responsibility for the low, yet still existing raised risks of radiation exposure 
which have been shown to have serious effects upon peoples well-being, 
whether they ultimately manifest or not (Fairlie, 2010). 
It is also important to bear in mind again the multi-sided character of 
representative processes, for the point is that activist political engagements are 
not simply directed at the powers that be, but also ‘aim to communicate specific 
ideas to a wide  public’ (Young, 2001: 676). This means that representative 
‘processes of engaged and responsible democratic communication’ can be 
expanded to ‘include street demonstrations and sit-ins, musical works, and 
cartoons’, for example (Young, 2001: 688). And if responsibility entails 
disrupting complacency, then ‘public noise outside when deliberation is 
supposedly taking place inside’, or invading places of deliberation and 
disrupting ‘by unfurling banners, throwing stink bombs, or running and shouting 
through the aisles’ may also be deemed important aspects of the representative 
process, as are attempts to disrupt business as usual, for example with 
blockades (Young, 2001: 673). This shifts an understanding of communicative 
representation processes ‘from simply a willingness to give reasons for one’s 
claims and listen to others to a broader understanding of the generation and 
influence of public opinion’ (Young, 2001: 688). Attempts to assert authority in 
such ways against monopolisation of authority is often dismissed, within the 
terms of the dominant discourse, as ‘extremist’, ‘irrational’ or biased. As Young 
(2001: 675-676) points out however, an alternative response to this is to argue 
that ‘the charge of being an irrational extremist’ invokes ‘far too narrow an 
understanding of what is reasonable’, indeed it entails the injustice of denying 
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another’s authority and failing to reflect upon the limitations of one’s own 
authority. 
 The third way in which denial of authorities plays out in the politics of 
nuclear energy is that it denies authority to nonhuman nature and ecological 
processes and events of which humans are a part, but over which they have 
little control or knowledge. The monopolisation of authority by industry, 
government and scientific spokespeople who claim ‘sovereignty or scientific 
knowledge over public concerns, by defining the public issue as a “risk issue,” 
and thus a scientific issue’ (Wynne, 2011: xv) denies the authority of both 
human and nonhuman others in the issue. Risk assessments cannot fully 
account for myriad potential - and in many ways unpredictable - actions of both 
human and nonhuman nature. They fail to account for human error, or as 
activists also continue to point out, the possibilities of breaches of security and 
safety procedures by either humans or nonhuman nature. The failure to 
adequately take into account the implications of the ongoing Fukushima 
disaster is an example of this. While activists are criticised for scare-mongering 
or extremist and often illegal action, they are demanding a say in the risk 
assessment process which has been shut off from them and deemed above 
their level of authority. For example, in July 2013 Greenpeace activists in 
France broke into Tricastin, an EDF nuclear power plant to expose security 
flaws and also highlight the potential of a disaster at one of France’s oldest 
plants (Chrisafis, 2013). 
 Pointing to the possibilities for disaster is a way of highlighting the 
authority of the nonhuman, and the limits to human authority and control. The 
assumption of authority in issues of nuclear safety on the part of industry, 
government and regulators rules out any such doubts. The counting and 
measuring of radioactivity is an important means for understanding risks, yet it 
dominates understandings of safety and gives a semblance of authority and 
certainty about an area that still contains much scientific uncertainty. Exposures 
to radiation are confidently compared to ‘natural’ background levels and thus 
normalised and rendered harmless. The long-term effects of raising overall 
background levels of radiation through large increases in the numbers of 
nuclear plants worldwide (if nuclear energy really is to provide an alternative to 
fossil fuels) are not known.  
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Plumwood’s discussion of the Atlantic cod fisheries is again instructive. 
Here, the science which was funded ‘focused almost exclusively on ways to 
find, count and catch more fish’ and other research was neglected (2002: 40). 
Marine researcher, Richard Beamish, noted ‘we… sacrificed the opportunity to 
understand the mechanisms of the ecosystem better’ (in Plumwood, 2002: 40). 
The neglect of ‘non-production goals’ that aim ‘to know the object in its fullness’ 
reinforced ‘mechanist illusions that nature is passive and open for the taking’, 
embedding these in research which then analyses the process of taking and 
exploitation ‘down to some subset of self-contained technological problems that 
can always be solved’ (Plumwood, 2002: 40). Where this type of tendency 
prevails, science’s claimed authority over understandings of nonhuman nature 
is extremely problematic and is compromised by a ‘kind of crudely instrumental 
research direction’ (Plumwood, 2002: 40).  
As Hinchcliffe et al. (2005: 652) point out, ‘Science declares the truth of 
the matter and Politics sorts out the interests and passions and adds up the 
numbers for and against’. In the nuclear energy issue the claimed public 
authority remains sceptical of public passions and tends to focus instead upon 
weighing up the numbers - be they millisieverts (or rem) of ionizing radiation, or 
grams per kilowatt-hour of carbon dioxide - and certain interests and passions 
are disguised as fact and necessity, whilst others are marked as unacceptable 
and irrelevant to discussion of the issue. ‘Ideal forms (often but not only 
species) are turned into manageable and manipulable data’ (Hinchcliffe et al., 
2005: 652) and (in the case of nuclear energy) are modelled into risk 
assessments claiming uncontestable authority and leaving little room for 
alternative understandings of the authority of nonhuman nature. 
It should now be clearer how the denial of multiple authorities in the 
politics of nuclear energy is a double-edged problem, whereby the assertion of 
authority of the dominant forces and knowledge production processes denies 
responsibility for this authority and its effects in denying the authority of others, 
both of human and nonhuman nature. As discussed in the first section of this 
chapter, this is a problem of representation regarding the possibility of being 
represented through both speech and action. The denial of multiple authorities 
perpetuated by nuclear energy constitutes a denial of the inherently ecologically 
situated and potentially powerful character of all action. This articulation 
contributes to the first part of the ecological knowledge construction process in 
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answering the question of ‘how many (and who) we are’ by pointing to multiple 
authorities among humans and nonhuman nature and cautioning us not to 
ignore these. The next section will more fully evaluate the political efficacy of 
this articulation, in particular considering it in terms of the next step in the 
ecological knowledge construction processes which asks ‘how we might live 
together.’ I consider how well the articulation works in generating transformative 
political potential to counter the dominant discourses and in opening up 
possibilities for effective political action to resist injustices. 
 
Political efficacy of articulating representation-based injustices: 
transformative possibilities for multiple authorities in common life 
 
This chapter has suggested an understanding of multiple loci of authority 
comprising participation of both speech and other forms of action in processes 
of representation, and an articulation of injustices of representation as the 
denial of multiple authorities, which can apply to both human and nonhuman 
nature and the spaces in between. In considering the political efficacy of this 
articulation I am interested in the ways in which it may be considered to be 
effective, not only for the process of taking all affected into account, but also for 
the process of putting in order and opening up answers to the question of how 
we might live together. The previous section already indicated some potential of 
this articulation for taking all affected into account as I highlighted possibilities 
for articulating denial of authority to human and nonhuman nature, as well as 
the intersections between. Articulating injustices entails translating them into a 
common language so that diverse experiences and observations might be taken 
into account as relevant to our understandings of common life. In this sense the 
aim is to facilitate possibilities for alliances between the marginalised and less 
powerful in order to produce more effective challenges to the dominant 
discourses (Hall, 1996). Highlighting intersections and points of solidarity can 
help us attend to new possibilities for answering the question of how we might 
live together. Opening up answers to this question also involves the practical 
action problem of how we might best collaborate in common life. It is this 
potential for both translating experiences of representative injustices and 
effectively challenging and facilitating the development of practical alternatives 
to dominant discourses that I seek to evaluate in this section. Firstly I consider 
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the potential and power of the multiple authorities of ‘civil’ and ‘uncivil’ society  
to contest the authoritarian tendencies of dominant capitalist state and market 
structures, as well as the potential for transforming our understanding of 
scientific production to better enable the contestation of multiple authorities. 
Secondly, I begin to point out the limits to contesting representation-based 
injustices alone, pointing to the ways in which disrespect for integrity, for the 
continuities and differences between selves and others, is intertwined with the 
denial of authorities of others. Thirdly, I emphasise that the contestation of both 
recognition-based and representation-based injustices may be undermined 
without contestation of distributive injustices in the context of a highly uneven 
playing field in the distribution of basic necessities.  
First of all I consider the potential of articulating representation-based 
injustices. While the dominant authorities of the capitalist state, markets and 
industries will continue to deny the multiple authorities of others, asserting their 
own disengaged authority and denying their own responsibility for the effects of 
this authority, articulating the denial of authorities can help to reinforce the 
existing potential and power of civil society networks and social movement 
actors and the power these have for contesting authoritarianism and the denial 
of multiple authorities, as well as enabling effective political action in response 
to the problems faced. In combining the articulations of multiple representative 
injustices there are possibilities for challenging the status quo. It is clear that 
‘[t]he state and its environmental problem-solving capacities are likely to be with 
us for the foreseeable future’ as are the often mutually reinforcing authorities of 
the market, transnational corporations and international institutions (Dryzek, 
2000: 117, 158). Yet, taking the authority of all affected into account, ‘an 
ecological perspective [also] points to the [efficacy of] kinds of co-ordination that 
are not organized centrally (as in the state), but arise as emergent properties as 
the scale of ecological and social organization arises’ (Dryzek, 2000: 158).  
Dryzek (2000: 157) and many others have pointed to the limits of the 
dominant authorities, particularly with regards to the needs for coordination 
‘given that one cannot (for example) resolve air pollution problems while 
completely ignoring the issue of water pollution, or deal with local sulphur 
dioxide pollution while ignoring the long-distance diffusion of sulphur dioxide in 
acid rain’. And while the free market is championed by many as a spontaneous 
order for coordinating multiple authorities in the interests of the common good, 
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depending on ‘partisan mutual adjustment’ and ‘a complex mix of talk, strategy, 
commitment and individual action’ (Dryzek, 2000: 158), this free market does 
not exist under conditions of capitalism where monopolies become inevitable, 
and from an ecological perspective markets are highly problematic within the 
dominant anthropocentric capitalist culture. 
Despite these obstacles to the transformative potential of multiple 
authorities contesting the dominant discourses, Dryzek insists that there is still a 
great deal of promise in the challenges to dominant authorities posed by 
networks of organizations of civil society and social movements in public 
spheres, and their participation in the discursive order (2000: 159). This is not to 
idealize the creative authority of networks and discourses. Dryzek points out 
that ‘in practice they feature information asymmetries, conflicts, and 
misunderstandings’ and that they are not guaranteed to prevail when confronted 
with other centres of political power (2000: 160). However, this is the case for 
imposed authority too, with the state, legal systems, bureaucracies and liberal 
constitutions. The advantage of considering the power of authorities of civil 
society and discourse is that they tend to be ‘problem-driven’ and ‘unlike, for 
example, state bureaucracies’ do not tend to encroach beyond the relevant 
problem or ‘outlive their usefulness’ (Dryzek, 2000: 160). Such forms of 
authority are also more open to contestation. 
The articulation of ‘denial of multiple authorities’ then has political 
currency, particularly with notions of democracy and democratisation at the 
global level. Lack of representation, and demands to ‘speak for ourselves’, have 
become prevalent worldwide, and authoritarianism in government at least, but 
also increasingly in global institutions and corporations, is a widely 
acknowledged form of injustice. We can understand, as Saward too (2006) 
points out, the authority of green theorists as playing a part in this broader 
contestation of authority in the processes of representation. ‘[T]he ecological 
communicative ideal’ has the potential to expose the huge ecological problems 
with existing ‘political (and economic) mechanisms’ (Dryzek, 2000: 155) While 
‘[t]he idealizing force of the deliberative model must confront the limitations and 
practical exigencies of real world political decision-making where time, 
information, and knowledge constraints abound’ we can understand the idea of 
ecological democracy as an ‘ambit claim’ which may help us to ‘”unrig” the anti-
ecological biases of liberal democracy’ (Eckersley, 2004: 129, 131).  
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Social movement and activist groups have a long history in the 
development of ideas of representative contestation and are well-versed in this 
potential for disrupting existing forms of authority and asserting their own 
authorities, as well as the creative process of bringing multiple authorities 
together. Articulating the denial of multiple authorities in terms of speech and 
action has the potential to reinvigorate participation in representative processes, 
traditional and otherwise. This potential lies in raising awareness of the more 
varied locations of authority. As individuals, groups and communities both local, 
national and trans-national become more aware of their own capacity for 
authoritative judgements in context, and the confirmation and affirmation of their 
own authority, there is an increased possibility for empowerment and 
contestation. This has the potential to counter the dominant ‘top-down’, passive 
understanding of authority, the centralisation and monopolisation of authority 
and the accompanying lack of responsibility which reliance upon 
institutionalised technocratic management reproduces.  
There is also transformative potential of a more empowering and 
ecologically responsible understanding of scientific production processes 
attentive to multiple authorities and how this might challenge, in particular, the 
lack of reflexivity in the science of nuclear energy. Attending to multiple 
authorities and the possibilities for contesting injustices through articulations of 
the denial of authority to both human and nonhuman nature might also be good 
for both existing scientific practice and it’s attitudes to other humans and to 
nonhuman nature, as well as public understandings and interactions with 
science. As Latour (2004: 64) has emphasised, epistemologically, awareness of 
‘intermediary states’ of ‘translation, betrayal, falsification, invention, synthesis, 
or transposition’ are the norm in much scientific practice, and Saward (2006: 
193) too reminds us that ‘the claims of scientific knowledge rest upon 
assumptions about the social dimension of creating scientific knowledge and on 
the Popperian fallibilist view that science proves nothing but offers “conjectures 
and refutations.”’ This highlights awareness of the limits to scientific authority 
which tends to be lost as it combines with - or succumbs by default to - the 
instrumental, capitalist productivist purposes of state or economic authorities. 
Donna Haraway (1988: 580) similarly argues that we need to reclaim 
understandings of science, which has always been about ‘a search for 
translation, convertibility, mobility of meanings’, but has been warped by the 
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desire for universal truth (higher authority) and reductionism (denial of the 
authority of others), where ‘one language (guess whose?) must be enforced as 
the standard for all the translations and conversions.’  
This is of particular importance in the context of nuclear science and 
technology. Can it become more power-sensitive, less authoritarian, more 
engaged, locatable, situated and reflexive? Brian Wynne (2011: 21) has asked, 
in response to his analysis of the 1977 Windscale Inquiry, ‘whether highly 
sophisticated technologies that demand even more collective human self-belief, 
commitment, discipline and responsibility’ than he had imagined even at that 
time, are even capable of sustaining the ‘essential “reflexive” sui generis 
counter-discipline of appropriate scepticism towards their own defining faiths.’ 
He argues that if institutional reflexivity of this kind is not sustainable, ‘then such 
technoscientific social programmes turn relentlessly into hegemonic, dangerous 
and provocative fundamentalisms’ (Wynne, 2011: 21). 
And yet, at the other extreme to fundamentalism, in the context of 
dominant understandings of scientific authority, a more interpretive and less 
direct and literal understanding of representation also carries with it the fear that 
the play of representations becomes detached from the referents, and as Ariel 
Salleh (1997: 176) has warned, this pluralism can then become ‘neoliberalism 
by default.’ Saward (2006: 193) does not argue ‘that there is no referent, or 
extra-discursive reality. Certain forms of knowledge of [nonhuman and human 
nature], in this respect can have a particular, if contingent validity,’ and it is 
important to acknowledge that ‘broad and deep consensus among specialists 
with expertise is a powerful thing.’ Yet it is the authoritative power of this, and 
the ways in which this may exclude and deny other important forms of authority 
of which we need to be vigilant, particularly where consensus and expertise are 
generated within structures which encourage emotional detachment and 
neutrality, denying the impact of scientists’ own authority upon others and the 
responsibility which comes with this.  
Contrary to assumptions about the efficacy of uncertainty and doubt, 
there is much transformative potential in greater awareness of the limits of 
authority; the ever present potential for denying the authority of others and the 
dangers in ignoring the potential fallibility of one’s own authority are of vital 
importance. Haraway (1988: 586) reminds us that ‘the split and contradictory 
self is the one who can interrogate positionings and be accountable, the one 
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who can construct and join rational conversations and fantastic imaginings that 
change history.’ She emphasises that  
we need the power of modern critical theories of how meanings and 
bodies get made, not in order to deny meanings and bodies, but in order 
to build meanings and bodies that have a chance for life’ (Haraway, 
1988: 780, emphasis added).  
 
In this respect, articulating the injustices of denied authorities provides a crucial 
means for contesting nuclear energy and the scientific promise of technological 
development when posed as an imperative solution to the current problems of 
common life in the context of climate change. It helps to resist, in Haraway’s 
(1988: 589-590) words, ‘dreams of the perfectly known in high-technology, 
permanently militarized scientific productions and positionings, the god trick of a 
Star Wars paradigm of rational knowledge.’ Yet the challenge remains as to 
whether or not we can move beyond the temptations of looking to a specific 
definition of rational knowledge as higher authority. It is for this reason that 
contestation of authority is so important. 
In part such contestation relies upon the potential for moving beyond 
understandings of particular rationalities as higher authority, and hence upon 
the continued contestation of authority denied - injustices of representation. 
However, this takes me to the second point I wish to emphasise here as we hit 
upon the limits to the efficacy of articulating injustices of nuclear energy in terms 
of representation alone. Limits to the articulation of representation-based 
injustices demonstrate the importance of also contesting recognition-based 
injustices. Articulating such injustices is important because we cannot 
understand the causes of the lack of reflexivity in dominant authoritarian forms 
of science without understanding how this is influenced by a desire for 
sovereignty and control of the inevitable unpredictability inherent in common 
life. Given the power of the dominant discourses it is also important to be aware 
that it is likely that the authority of nonhuman nature and of future generations 
will be adequately taken into account and considered in re-examining the 
question of how we might live together because both do not speak in human 
terms, and the latter is also unable to act. While there is much scope for 
contestation of denial of the authority of nonhuman nature and future 
generations by human others in the present this is likely to be undermined if 
recognition-based injustices continue and humans fail to respect integrity, 
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involving both continuities and differences between the past, the present and 
the future, for both humans and nonhuman nature.  
The wish to be right, to claim true authority and to avoid consideration of 
the inevitable implications of one’s authority upon others may arise from the 
desire to avoid criticism, or to avoid errors (Alcoff, 1991). This ‘[d]esire to find an 
absolute means to avoid making errors comes perhaps not from a desire to 
advance collective goals but a desire for personal mastery’ (Alcoff, 1991: 22). 
Such desire for mastery results from the desire ‘to establish a privileged 
discursive position wherein one cannot be undermined or challenged’ and to 
avoid engaging in the ‘emotionally troublesome’ practice of ongoing 
‘interrogation and critical reflection’ (Alcoff, 1991: 22).  
Thus, resisting denial of authorities also requires an articulation of 
recognition-based injustice as disrespect for integrity of self and other in 
relation. As the previous chapter has shown, this disrespect, tending towards 
the desire for mastery emerges from insecurity and the desire to control 
unavoidable unpredictability in interaction as well as to insulate oneself from the 
implications of dependency upon others. Wynne (2011: 22) has pointed out that 
hubris was a key cause of public mistrust of nuclear energy programmes, yet 
this hubris ‘embodies profound insecurities on the part of its hubristic subject-
agents’. The ‘necessity’ for nuclear energy remained bound up with the 
necessity of the nuclear weapons deterrent which involved the ‘threat of mind-
numbing physical violence and technological terror over others who were 
assumed to be intrinsically lethally threatening, thus requiring control by 
unambiguously genocidal counter-threat’ (2011: 22). Wynne argues that ‘a 
similar if far more deeply buried sense of insecurity prevails with respect to the 
publics that those institutional powers cultivate, and supposedly represent’ 
(2011: 22). In order to get at the values and presuppositions which motivate 
monopolisations of authority an ecological understanding of recognition, and 
contestation of injustices of disrespect for integrity, is also important.  
There is, for example, some transformative potential for reclaiming 
multiple authorities in ideas of bioregionalism which rejects the generally 
‘ecologically arbitrary political units’ which exist at multiple levels in favour of 
‘watershed, topography, or species composition of ecosystems’ (Dryzek, 2000: 
156-7). Similarly to Murray Bookchin’s (1993) eco-anarchism, this enables more 
dispersed representation of humans and nonhumans by those who are less 
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remote from contestation of the consequences of such representations. Yet 
bioregionalism and eco-anarchism are also explicitly linked to the concept of 
ecological selves through the ecological awareness of ‘living in place’ (Dryzek 
2002: 157). As Dryzek (2000: 141) points out ‘decentralization of political 
authority would have decidedly anti-ecological substantive consequences in a 
lot of places with natural-resource-based local economies’. For example,  
many counties in the Western United States have tried to assert their 
authority against federal environmental legislation (so far with little 
success in the courts) in order that mining, grazing on federal lands, and 
forest clearcutting can proceed unchecked (Dryzek, 2000: 141).  
 
Thus it is clear that not only must centralised and remote or universalising forms 
of authority be contested, but also disrespect for integrity, for ‘[d]ecentralization 
will only work to the extent local recipients of authority subscribe to ecological 
values’ (Dryzek, 2000: 141). Without possibilities for contesting recognition-
based injustices it is likely that much that is local might still be disrespected. 
Sole reliance on the local is no guarantee against disrespect for integrity, 
particularly when it comes to considering transnational and future continuities 
and differences and the effects of creative and destructive authorities upon 
integrity across time and space.  
 The importance of also contesting recognition-based injustices is 
particularly clear when we consider the problem that future generations, while 
they can be spoken for, cannot act, and therefore challenging representations of 
them, whilst still an important activity, may be harder to do amongst all the other 
authorities vying for representation. For this reason too, challenges to authority 
require recognition of status and integrity. As Dobson (2010: 754) points out, 
even on rare occasions of consideration, for example, when the committee on 
Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM) appointed by the UK government 
‘explicitly counted future generations among the stakeholders whose interests 
should be taken into consideration in the process of deciding how and where 
waste should be disposed of’, this has remained nominal without significant 
counter-weight authority. The accounting of those who cannot speak remains 
‘some way down the list due to the equivocal status they hold as ‘speechifiers’ 
and therefore as bonafide political beings’ (Dobson, 2010: 754). Even if we take 
on board the possibilities of moving beyond speech as a determiner of political 
relevance, future generations also hold equivocal ecological political status as 
actors or actants. Children may play a role here, of course, but for the more 
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distant future we need to contest more than just authority, but also integrity, the 
continuities and differences between the past, the present and the future, for 
both humans and nonhumans, and also consider the potential injustices of 
disrespect for integrity should we fail to take these into account.  
This vigilance towards potential disrespect for integrity of course doesn’t 
only affect future generations, but also all who participate in representative 
processes – in order to be taken seriously, in order for action and 
communication to be given authority it requires recognition.  For nonhuman 
nature, and others who do not speak, attention must not be of the disengaged, 
remote sort, but requires respect and awareness of both continuities and 
differences between selves and others, both human and nonhuman. If we do 
not hold respect and care for those with whom we interact we are unlikely to 
ascribe authority to them and are more likely to succumb to using them in purely 
instrumental ways to enhance our own authority vis-à-vis other authorities. 
Without the ecological awareness of injustices of recognition, injustices of 
representation will not be adequately contested.  
However, finally, I argue that in contesting representation-based and 
recognition-based injustices of authority it is also important to do so in relation 
to the contestation of distributive injustices over basic necessities. This is so 
because injustices of both representation and recognition are also influenced by 
the fear of deprivation of basic necessities (as well as disregard for such 
deprivation of others) and are perpetuated by uneven distributions of these. 
Representative processes of creative and destructive authority are always 
incomplete, and there is an ever present possibility for monopolisation and 
totalisation of authority, denying the authorities of others. This stems in part 
from the ever-present possibility for alienation and the desire for domination 
which we see through the politics of recognition, but it also stems from both 
greed, and fear of deprivation of basic necessities which also require 
contestation in terms of the politics of distribution. After all, as Aldo Leopold 
(1968 [1949]: 203), noted in ‘The Land Ethic’: ‘The land-relation is still strictly 
economic entailing privileges but not obligations’. This entails contestation of 
purely instrumental attitudes partly of course as a matter of recognition, but also 
a matter of contesting greed and asserting need; a matter of the distribution of 
basic necessities. In judging claims of representative injustices and challenges 
to the authoritarian character of dominant interpretations of scientific authority it 
231 
 
is important to also bear in mind the highly uneven playing field in the 
resourcing of scientific knowledge construction.  
The dominant discourses which structure both the values which influence 
the quality of interaction (recognition), and understandings of communication 
and awareness of constructive and destructive authorities (representation), are 
themselves ‘complex product[s] of structural inequality’ (Young, 2001: 685). It is 
all very well to suggest that we all speak and/or act for ourselves (and each 
other), but to really understand, judge between authorities and aim at more 
responsible forms of collaboration in context we also need to be able to 
evaluate what is at stake in the politics of distribution of any given issue. As 
Wynne (2011: 21) argues, we must be concerned with  
the continuing intensification and enlargement of the instrumental 
expectations of science, its commercial-instrumental imaginaries and 
cultures that dominate it, and its purely knowledge-economy competitive 
meaning in modern funding and policy.  
 
Purely instrumental attitudes which deprive others - both human and nonhuman 
- of basic necessities also require contestation.  
So, in judging between authorities and moving towards responsible 
collaboration between them, the politics of distribution also needs to be taken 
into account. We ‘have to make credibility judgements about alleged authorities 
and experts’ (Dryzek, 2000: 166). The dominant discourses structuring both 
processes of representation and recognition are intertwined with and reinforced 
by structural inequalities in the distribution of basic necessities which limit, 
constrain and sometimes undermine the authority of those contesting the 
dominant authorities. Taking such structural inequalities into account involves 
considering whether or not claims reinforce an unjust distributive status quo, 
and how claims are positioned within this.  
Many of the authoritative voices denying climate change, or asserting 
environmental skepticism, claim to be ‘speaking truth to power’, yet they 
reinforce dominant financial, and other elite political interests (Jacques, 2006: 
78). This can also be said of the distributive agenda which pro-nuclear greens 
and prominent climate scientists end up reinforcing. The instrumental approach 
to solving the climate crisis reinforces the existing power and resource 
inequalities which exist. As Luke (2008a: 1819) argues, sustainable 
development ‘ranging from green venture capital, cradle-to-cradle design, safe 
nuclear energy, and green engineering’ in the projections of such authorities is 
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usually actually the same old ‘sustainable degradation.’ The dominant discourse 
of sustainable development  
embraces decarbonisation as a mode of development, since it celebrates 
capitalists for embracing an ecology of commerce that wrings waste from 
existing conditions of production by stemming needless / profitless / 
senseless losses of material, energy, money, and labor (Luke, 2008a: 
1819).  
 
In this way the ecological crises are addressed in ways which become ‘fresh 
opportunities to produce power and profit’ for a limited, already elite few (Luke, 
2008a: 1818).  
Yet we must also beware of simplistically reducing our understanding of 
the claims and actions of various authorities to their positions, within social or 
ecological relations, distributive or otherwise. Our understanding of multiple 
authorities and the assertion and acceptance – including political efficacy - of 
these, does depend in large part on respect for integrity and the supply of basic 
necessities. But, it is also important that we bear in mind Spivak’s (1988) 
warning, that seeking to simply reverse our current understandings of authority 
and assert those neglected carries the danger of assuming that the subaltern 
can straightforwardly represent their own ‘true’ interests, that the authority of the 
subaltern can somehow cut through the dominant discourses. While this is 
tempting in the context of the dominant anthropocentric separations of 
science/politics, and nature/culture which block change and awareness of 
multiple authorities, it is too simplistic and risks affirming rather than 
transforming liberal anthropocentric understandings of representative 
democracy. Frustration with the latter leads to the temptation to by-pass politics 
and deny the authorities of others, which then perpetuates rather than remedies 
the denial of multiple authorities amongst humans and nonhuman nature and 
limits possibilities for action in response to the problems we face. It is therefore 
important to resist simply asserting the authority of those neglected and denied.  
 
 
 
 This chapter has focused upon finding a language to express injustices 
to all affected in terms of an ecologically reformulated image of politics as 
representation. Emphasising the significance of both speech and action within 
representative processes understood beyond the separation of nature/culture, I 
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have offered an articulation of representative injustice as the denial of multiple 
authorities. I proposed a decentred conception of authorities as involving both 
speech and other forms of action in the multi-valent ‘authoring’ of the realities 
that comprise common life. Contesting the denial of authorities assists in 
unmasking the monopolisation of authority by certain social actors within 
dominant discourses at the expense of other forms of authority in common life, 
particularly apparent in the politics of nuclear energy where government, 
industry and scientists monopolise authority with a disengaged form of 
knowledge which denies the situated and political character of their own 
authority as well as denying the potential of multiple authorities of both human 
and nonhuman others in the constructive and destructive representative 
processes of common life. The concerns about risk, health, nonhuman others, 
and the future, raised by, for example, indigenous peoples, women, and others 
who carry authority arising from their own positionings within the power 
structures of common life, are denied authority in the face of expert scientists’ 
and risk management experts’ authoritarian monopolisation of the facts and 
probability figures. Contesting the denial of multiple authorities insists upon the 
potential effectiveness i.e. the constructive and destructive potential of all 
speech and action within representative processes.  
However, current dominant representative processes are limited for 
taking all affected in representative processes into account because they 
continue to adhere to the separation of science/politics and nature/culture. 
There is a risk that revelling in the play of representations without also taking 
injustices of both distribution and recognition into account, will simply affirm, 
rather than transform liberal anthropocentric understandings of representative 
democracy. It is from frustration with the difficulties in negotiating multiple and 
diverse representations that the temptation to by-pass politics and to deny the 
authority of others through use of some kind of privileged authority that appears 
beyond contestation emerges, as in the use of reductive constructions of 
science and economics in the nuclear debates. While this frustration is 
understandable in situations of crisis, it perpetuates rather than remedies the 
denial of authority to aspects of both human and nonhuman nature and thereby 
limits possibilities for ecologically sensitive action in response to the problems 
we face. It is for this reason that I have sought to encourage the contestation of 
injustices emerging from all three images of politics examined in this thesis; 
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distribution, recognition and representation. Paying attention to injustices 
emerging from each of these, and considering them in relation to each other 
can provide us with much needed political efficacy, a way of navigating and 
responding to the problems we face, whilst also opening up rather than shutting 
down the continued contestation of ecological injustices in this process. 
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Conclusion 
 
“To those who care about people and planet  
but who advocate nuclear power…”
21 
 
This thesis began with the problem of communicating harms of nuclear energy 
within mainstream debates about climate change and our energy options. Part I 
described how reductive conceptions of science and economics, understood to 
be separate from politics, pervade such debates, reinforcing dominant forms of 
political organisation, and fragmenting and blocking understandings of other 
realities and possibilities. It sought to retrieve and develop the radical 
intersectional potential of the early green movement in an ecological 
redescription which explicitly challenges the separation of nature/culture 
inherent in dominant understandings of legitimate and effective knowledge, 
which are structured around the separation of science (traditionally understood 
to be about ‘what is’) and politics (traditionally understood to be about ‘what 
could be’ and the power relations which make up political community). These 
separations have naturalised and reinforced socially produced harms of 
contemporary life, making them more difficult to contest and articulate as 
significant. I suggested that these harms, including those produced by nuclear 
energy, might be better contested if articulated as injustices emerging from the 
inherent politics of ecological interaction. My concern with articulation arose 
from the difficulty of i) making the harms of nuclear energy heard and 
understood as significant within the dominant discourses, and of ii) resisting 
fragmentation, and finding points of solidarity and political efficacy in the 
articulation of these harms as injustices alongside other injustices produced by 
contemporary life.  
In Part II of the thesis I developed a heuristic framework for articulating 
injustices in accordance with my ecological normative and ontological 
commitments. Taking three images of politics connected to the political 
imagination – politics as distribution, recognition, and representation – I 
reformulated each image of politics so as to take all affected, understood 
ecologically beyond the separation of nature/culture, into account. This first step 
helped to pave the way for the second step where I drew upon the ecological 
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 In response to the open letter from climate scientists Caldeira et al. (2013): ‘To those influencing 
environmental policy but opposed to nuclear power..’ 
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reformulation of each image of politics to articulate political intuitions of 
injustices in the politics of nuclear energy.   
In Chapter Three, ecologically reformulating an answer to the question 
‘who gets what?’ drew attention to the connections between uneven 
distributions of the burdens as well as the goods of common life, and the limits 
of human and nonhuman capacity to sustain these. The political intuition of 
distributive injustices of nuclear energy could then be articulated as the 
exacerbation of the deprivation of basic necessities of both human and 
nonhuman nature across time and space. In Chapter Four, answering the 
question ‘who counts as what?’ in ecological terms drew attention to the 
unpredictability of complex interactions involving both continuities and 
differences in self/other relations (integrity) beyond the separation of 
nature/culture, highlighting limits to the independence and control of the 
dominant human self. The political intuition of recognition-based injustices of 
nuclear energy could then be articulated as the disrespect for integrity in 
relations between the dominant human self and both human and nonhuman 
others, through the dominant illusion of independence and control of 
unpredictable human and nonhuman interactions. In Chapter Five, ecologically 
considering the question ‘who acts for what?’ highlighted the multi-valent 
constructive and destructive power of both speech and action in processes of 
representation involving both human and nonhuman entities across time and 
space. The political intuition of representative injustices of nuclear energy could 
then be articulated as the denial of multiple authorities of other humans and 
nonhuman nature, by government, industry and scientists’ monopolisation of 
particularly remote and disengaged forms of authority. 
In the last sections of Chapters Three, Four, and Five I reflected upon 
some possibilities and limits of each articulation for a transformative ecological 
politics. In this conclusion to the thesis I seek to further underline the political 
efficacy of articulating ecological injustices beyond the separation of 
nature/culture, by drawing them together in response to three powerful, 
interlinked and mutually reinforcing arguments for nuclear energy. These 
arguments are all implicit in the case of pro-nuclear greens, in the UK 
government’s justification of the harms and risks of nuclear energy in 
accordance to the guidelines of the International Committee for Radiological 
Protection (ICRP), and in the governments’ nuclear energy policy more broadly. 
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The first of these arguments I broadly summarise as the ‘no alternative, 
lesser evil’ argument, which posits nuclear energy as the only realistic 
alternative to carbon-intensive fossil fuels, with all the greater risks and 
consequences, including climate change, which these entail. This argument for 
the further development of nuclear energy is a forceful one. At time of writing 
the need to reduce carbon emissions to prevent 2 degrees warming which could 
trigger runaway climate change is more urgently apparent than ever (IPCC, 
2013). Human caused climate change is already exacerbating disruption and 
harm to those who are worst positioned to respond (IPCC, 2014).  The 
argument for nuclear energy is that without it, governments will depend more 
heavily upon fossil fuels, thereby increasing the risks and damage of climate 
change. Not only this, fossil fuels are doubly evil; the industry has a notorious 
safety record worldwide, with coal-mining accidents causing thousands of 
deaths annually, not to mention the harmful emissions for those living close to 
coal-fired power stations. As extraction of oil and gas becomes more 
technologically complex in response to less readily accessible supplies, harms 
from these are also increasing. 
None of this will be news to most environmental and global justice 
activists. The trouble with this framing of the problem and the difficulty in 
countering it lies in how the dominant discourses pit harms from energy sources 
against each other. The appeal to numbers and ‘facts’ in the face of the 
overwhelming problems we face is an attempt to find a way of comparing 
options so that we can then act in response to them. But this way of 
understanding the issue continues to separate scientific facts from political 
values, relying upon and reinforcing the separation of nature/culture, and using 
the former to avoid serious reconsideration of the latter. To navigate the 
problem in reductive comparative terms blocks understanding of its inherent 
politics. 
From the point of view of an image of politics as distribution, we can see 
that nuclear energy causes deprivation of basic necessities to those in other 
countries, to those who suffer the after effects of accidents, and to future 
generations, both human and nonhuman. Not only this however. Those 
impacted by such distributive injustices are also more likely to be subjected to 
deprivation of basic necessities caused by other factors, including fossil fuels. If 
we choose the nuclear energy option, future generations are likely to be 
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impacted upon by both the long-term effects of climate change and of nuclear 
energy. In the context of a disaster such as Fukushima it is the poorest and 
those otherwise disadvantaged who will suffer effects the most. Both nuclear 
and fossil-fuel energy produce distributive injustices as a result of the 
production of burdens as well as goods, and the deprivation of basic necessities 
this entails is likely to be exacerbated in the context of climate change and 
various other linked ecological crises (water shortages, soil depletion, 
deforestation, flooding etc.). 
It might be contested that if nuclear energy helps us to combat the 
effects of climate change through reducing reliance upon fossil fuels then this is 
still justified. However, reconsidering this in terms of an image of politics as 
recognition, shows how this assumption that nuclear energy can help us to 
control the forces which production of carbon emissions has put in motion 
disrespects the integrity of both humans and nonhuman nature. As discussed in 
Chapter Four, integrity involves both the continuities and the differences 
between ecological selves and others and entails inevitable vulnerabilities and 
dependencies in, often impossible to predict, interactive processes of ecological 
life. In the politics of nuclear energy, some humans (industry, government and 
scientific experts) assume the controllability of nuclear energy and the 
possibilities of minimising risk through control and coercive protective 
measures. In assuming independence and control of nonhuman nature they 
deny human fallibility, and vulnerability to factors in nonhuman nature beyond 
human control, thereby disrespecting the ecological integrity of both themselves 
and others. Nuclear energy causes additional recognition-based injustices, 
which compound and add to, rather than alleviate, injustices produced by the 
overuse of fossil fuels. In addition, as they are both base-load forms of energy 
supply nuclear and fossil-fuel energy as they currently stand do not challenge 
the existing electricity grid structure nor encourage more careful and context-
sensitive uses of energy. This means that they reinforce (except in times of 
crisis disruption) the illusion of independence from and control of the human 
and nonhuman world, and the idea that we can continue to live as we do, 
disrespecting the integrity of this world and the effects of our actions upon both 
ourselves and others within it. 
The ‘no alternative, lesser evil argument’ also perpetuates 
representation-based injustices. Those adopting this argument monopolise 
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authority, both in terms of language and action. While potentially engrossing 
and all-consuming, responding to utilitarian moral calculations of relative deaths 
by reemphasising the disputed figures of actual and potential deaths from 
nuclear energy, or to the facts about radiation with another set of facts about 
radiation from another set of experts, again neglects the inherent politics. 
Disputing numbers in this way denies authority to those who do not have 
access to the production and evaluation of numbers, but it also denies the 
authority of those who have experienced losses and damage from nuclear 
energy, regardless of quantity. The authoritarian use of numbers also 
encourages disengagement and a lack of self-critical reflexivity in the authority 
of those wielding them, as they abdicate political responsibility for the lives 
which these numbers do or do not represent. In countering the ‘no alternative, 
lesser evil’ argument it is important to bear in mind that both fossil fuels and 
nuclear energy perpetuate representation-based injustices because they allow 
the authority of a minority of large energy corporations to continue, denying the 
potential of multiple decentralised authorities to negotiate energy production in a 
manner potentially more responsive and sensitive to the authorities in 
nonhuman nature. 
This takes us to the second, linked argument for nuclear energy in the 
context of climate change. This argument can be formulated as the ‘poverty, 
security and development’ argument. This posits nuclear energy as necessary 
to secure energy security and therefore addresses problems of poverty and 
economic development. The ‘poverty, security and development’ argument is 
made in both industrialised and industrialising countries, but is often considered 
especially relevant for the latter. This argument builds on the idea that nuclear 
energy is the lesser evil and the only currently viable alternative to fossil fuels 
as a motor for economic growth, national security and human well-being. As 
with the Atoms for Peace program in the 1950s, nuclear energy is promoted as 
a means to help countries develop and to alleviate global poverty. Building on 
the logic of the previous ‘lesser evil’ argument, nuclear energy is seen as a 
solution to the impasse between industrialised and industrialising countries over 
the right to industrialise and the problem of reducing carbon emissions in the 
context of climate change. Nuclear energy is put forward in both parts of the 
world as producing jobs and enabling economic development in 
underdeveloped regions, providing energy security and thereby preventing 
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certain forms of deprivation such as fuel poverty and poverty in general. Yet 
here again, countering the facts and figures and projections for economic 
growth, growth in demand and the ability of certain technologies to meet these 
demands  or not, fails to address the inherent politics of the issue. 
Responding to this argument about poverty and economic development 
from the perspective of politics as distribution, understood in ecological terms, 
involves thinking about the deprivation of basic necessities across time and 
space, as well as how these relate to each other through rising inequalities in 
distributions of many kinds. Bearing in mind the burdens as well as the goods of 
energy production means taking into account not only nuclear waste, but also 
the effects of a continued rise in energy production, consumption of goods and 
production of other hazardous wastes. Taking into account how this deprives 
humans and nonhuman nature across time and space exposes the limits to 
human and nonhuman capacities to sustain endless material economic growth, 
as hazardous waste will impact most upon those already deprived, both human 
and nonhuman. According to the existing forms of social organisation nuclear 
energy will profit those already benefiting disproportionately from unequal 
distributions, and it will exacerbate rather than alleviate the deprivation of others 
as the risks will be distributed unevenly. Proposing nuclear energy on the 
grounds of security, alleviating poverty and encouraging economic development 
is therefore flawed when considered in relational distributive terms. We can see 
that it encourages rather than solves continued deprivation of basic necessities 
of both human and nonhuman nature.  
This might be contested with the liberal argument that this deprivation of 
basic necessities can be compensated for by the trickle-down effect resulting 
from the production of wealth by the few. It might be argued that economic 
development can reduce the production of burdens which deprive basic 
necessities of human and nonhuman, as through the production of wealth and 
development, environmental regulation standards increase. However, this is 
also a matter of the quality of relations between selves and others in (an 
expanded understanding of) political community, and therefore also a matter of 
recognition. 
If we think about the ‘poverty, security, and development’ argument from 
the point of view of an image of politics as recognition we can challenge the 
dominant conceptions of development and state security as something to aspire 
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to, as something which solves the problems of the relations of political 
community. This conception of well-being and security is predicated on an 
inside/outside understanding of political community which seeks security and 
sovereignty through relations of domination which mask and deny both 
continuities and differences between human and nonhuman selves and others. 
The emphasis upon nuclear energy to promote energy security and state 
development perpetuates disrespect for the integrity of relations between 
ecological entities across time and space as the capitalist economic growth 
model backgrounds and instrumentalises much of human and nonhuman 
nature. This argument reproduces the dominant understandings of basic 
necessities and perpetuates the illusion of human independence from 
nonhuman nature. Because of its high risk character nuclear energy is also 
highly securitised, promoting state security over individual security of both 
humans and nonhuman nature, as well as potentially endangering international 
security. To advocate nuclear energy to address security and economic 
development problems of specific national areas or countries also disrespects 
the integrity of other cultures which do not subscribe to the dominant 
understandings of human well-being that problematically insulate humans from 
both each other and nonhuman nature. 
It is therefore helpful to respond to the ‘poverty, security and 
development’ argument by looking at it in terms of an image of politics as 
representation, too. To advocate nuclear energy for state security and 
development denies the authority of those who do not subscribe to this 
understanding of well-being and detracts from the representation and 
development of alternative possibilities for self/other relations. The ‘poverty, 
security and development’ argument for nuclear energy reinforces the non-
reflexive authority of a dominant culture and of the dominant state and scientific 
and economic powers. In this framing, expert authorities represent well-being of 
other humans and nonhuman nature in reductive terms of GDP growth and 
unemployment and job statistics which fail to account for the multiple authorities 
and potentials of both human and nonhuman nature. In addition, because 
nuclear energy is such a highly centralised technology, the forms of state and 
industrial authority it encourages are highly centralised, denying the potential of 
a more multiple and reflexive understanding of both human and nonhuman 
authorities in the construction and interactions of common life. It is questionable 
242 
 
how resilient such centralised forms of authority may be in the context of the 
long-term effects of climate change. Promoting nuclear energy encourages 
reliance upon a dominant source of energy which denies the potential for 
multiple authorities to negotiate multiple sources of energy which may be more 
adaptive and respond more quickly and flexibly in times of change and crisis. To 
advocate nuclear energy as alleviating poverty, promoting economic 
development and security is to encourage a path which would limit the capacity 
of multiple authorities to be flexible and adapt in an ecologically sensitive 
manner to the difficult-to-predict changes which the future will bring. 
Finally, I broadly summarise the third argument for nuclear energy as the 
‘path-dependency and trust in techno-scientific solutions’ argument. This 
combines the inescapable legacy of the problems we already face in tackling 
nuclear waste storage with the idea that science and industry will develop the 
solutions to both these and climate change. Furthermore, through continued 
investment in nuclear technology we may still fulfil our dreams for limitless low-
carbon energy. This argument ties into the first two, as it combines a sense of 
no alternative with the hope that existing dominant systems and lines of thinking 
about the world might still help to get ‘us’ out of the mess that ‘we’ are in. Given 
that we already have nuclear waste, so the argument goes, we need to trust the 
nuclear industry to solve this problem. We need to place our faith in fast-
breeder and fourth generation nuclear reactors which will help us to ‘recycle’ the 
high-level radioactive waste which we already have as a result of irresponsible 
industry and governance of the past. The industry needs to continue in order to 
help to solve the problems it created. Not only this, but we should put our faith 
in the idea of nuclear fusion which could provide us with limitless energy, or in 
thorium which is also abundant. 
To address this argument with the help of an image of politics as 
distribution, we can highlight again how this perpetuates and exacerbates the 
unequal distribution of basic necessities of common life. Large corporations 
which are the only ones capable of this scale of project are guaranteed 
government loans, insurances and price-assurances, thereby limiting 
investment in other potential forms of energy and efficiency technologies as well 
as a more widespread distribution of the benefits of energy production and 
efficiency measures. Centralised nuclear energy is also less sensitive to the 
basic necessities of both human and nonhuman others than other technologies 
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might be. In the context of the dominant political and economic structures the 
dream of a limitless supply of energy would reinforce rather than alleviate 
deprivation of basic necessities as it would lead to increased material 
production and consumption, generating more goods, but also more burdens 
which would exacerbate deprivation of basic necessities for many humans and 
much of nonhuman nature.  
Seen from the perspective of an image of politics as recognition, this 
trust in science to address the problems already produced by nuclear energy, 
and modern society as a whole, perpetuates an understanding of science as 
something separate from the rest of our complex political relations and fails to 
adequately comprehend our own embeddedness in the world and the effects of 
our actions within it. It perpetuates the mastery of a disengaged form of science 
which disrespects the integrity of ecological self/other relations. While limitless 
energy by itself might not be an issue, it is the failure to challenge the dominant 
conceptions of political community which make it potentially dangerous, for this 
would enable us to continue to isolate ourselves from each other and 
nonhuman nature. Placing faith in techno-scientific solutions and the idea of 
limitless energy feeds understandings of human security as entailing 
independence from, and control of, the nonhuman world. The problem of 
existing nuclear waste does indeed need to be addressed, and it challenges us 
as humans in both our power and our powerlessness. Similarly to the problem 
of climate change it is tempting to respond by turning to the mechanisms we 
have developed for dealing with the uncertainties which pervade common life – 
through relations of disengagement, domination and control. However, 
conceptions of science, industry, and governments as being capable of such 
control disrespects integrity, that is, the continuities and differences between 
both humans and nonhuman nature which make common life inherently 
unpredictable. Such unpredictability implies inevitable fallibility and 
vulnerabilities. The trust that nuclear and other forms of science as they 
currently stand can help us to solve the problems of nuclear waste and climate 
change assumes a degree of control and power that is an illusion of the 
dominant human self, perpetuated through hierarchical relations of domination. 
This can also be understood in terms of an image of politics as 
representation. The ‘path dependency and trust in techno-scientific solutions’ 
argument places faith in forms of authority which claim to be able to describe 
244 
 
reality from above, to present the ‘one’ truth and account of reality, thereby 
denying the authorities, the power of others. It reinforces the dominant 
conceptions of authority in an industry, and a science, which has been shown to 
lack reflexivity and responsibility in understanding its own authority and the 
impact of this upon others both historically and up to the present day. Trust in 
the safety of nuclear energy relies upon an understanding of total authority that 
is neither a desirable, nor a likely possibility. 
These three arguments for nuclear energy combined assert a sense of 
the power of humans over other humans and nonhuman nature. However, the 
understanding that we must choose this path and that we cannot devise 
alternative responses to the problems we face, also plays on our insecurities, 
on the sense of powerlessness that we have. We are thus potentially doomed 
by a double-edged sense of both the power of a dominant culture and its 
wretchedness. That this age, the Holocene, might be renamed the 
Anthropocene is symptomatic of this simultaneous double-edged awareness. In 
this thesis I have argued that if we as humans can learn anything in our 
development of knowledge about common life, it might be something about the 
problem of how those contradictions might be negotiated, through ongoing 
attention to and contestation of multiple injustices.  
The heuristic framework I adopted and adapted in this thesis drew upon 
and brought together some of the knowledge from the history of justice and 
liberation struggles so as to challenge the separation of nature/culture which 
perpetuates ecological injustices and limits awareness of these. I applied a 
particularly ecofeminist sensibility to this undertaking, seeking to demonstrate 
the value of an ecofeminist inspired toolkit for negotiating the ecological 
challenges with which we are confronted. In this way I have sought to translate 
the importance of ecofeminist thinking into the language of politics, and to help 
remedy the relative neglect of vital insights from ecofeminism within green 
political theory (cf. MacGregor, 2003, 2004, and 2009). If understood in abstract 
terms according to the dominant logics, this framework may seem too radical, 
too demanding, too critical, too impossible or idealistic. And yet given the extent 
of the ecological crises we face, it is important that we find stronger ways of 
contesting the dominant discourses, because ‘[r]ealistically the only longterm 
option available is radical’ (Barry & Doran, 2006: 251). The point of this thesis 
has not been to describe an impossible ideal, but to enable the contestation of 
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injustices, and to attend to and negotiate these in the everyday decisions we 
make. I contend that the heuristic framework developed in this thesis is 
particularly useful from an ecological perspective which takes on board the 
reflexive insights of ecofeminist attention to all affected in an ecological 
understanding of common life, beyond the contradictory yet powerful 
hierarchical separations of science/politics and nature/culture. This framework 
can help us to consider, as we carefully pick our ways forward, how and where 
deprivation of basic necessities, disrespect for integrity, and denial of multiple 
authorities occur, to attend to the various ways in which they are articulated, 
and then negotiate how best to respond to and reduce their occurrence for both 
humans and nonhuman nature.  
 By articulating deprivation of basic necessities, disrespect for integrity, 
and denial of multiple authorities in the politics of nuclear energy the intention 
has been to open up political contestation so as to take (as far as possible) all 
affected into account. I have also shown how ecological injustices tend to 
intersect and reinforce each other. Just as science and economics cannot be 
understood to be separate from politics, nuclear energy cannot be considered 
separate from the dominant forms of social organisation. This has implications 
beyond the issue of nuclear energy, for green politics more generally. Efficiency 
and renewable energy technologies cannot in and of themselves be seen as 
solutions to the ecological problems which a rejection of nuclear energy leaves 
in its wake. Depending upon how these technologies are used, they too will 
generate and perpetuate ecological injustices. Taking away the ‘technofixes’ 
leaves us with an apparently stark political picture which may seem stripped of 
much hope, particularly according to the dominant discourses.  It is this 
condition of hopelessness that may be seen as a key reason for green 
capitulation to dominant discourses and to the idea of nuclear energy as a 
solution to climate change.  
Yet the double-edged tension between urgency and hopelessness, which 
has encouraged many along the nuclear energy path, remains trapped within 
the dominant discourses which paint such a limited picture of the possibilities 
the world still holds. This attitude both over- and underestimates human and 
nonhuman potentials. There are other ways of confronting the contradictory 
politics of common life. In the words of Theo Simon (Monbiot & Simon, 2012), in 
times of despair ‘re-assess your thinking, and then figure out who your allies are 
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and start to make a plan.’ There is potential in this shocking awareness of our 
predicaments. The loss of the idea of the ‘technofixes’ removes a mediating and 
insulating factor in common life, confronting us with both ourselves and with 
each other. This is not to dismiss the role which technologies do and will play in 
ecological relations, but it is to caution us to be explicit about the inherent 
politics of these. As such, this thesis has sought to reiterate the old radical 
green critique in a renewed form. I have suggested that we pay more attention 
to the connections between those injustices resulting from common life which 
have been separated out and pitted against each other according to the 
dominant logics. Such articulations are in vital need of strengthening and 
encouraging. Historically, the odds have always been stacked against 
movements for social change, but that has never been considered a valid 
reason to give up the struggle against injustices. 
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